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Abstract

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA:
A CASE STUDY O F THE ANDEAN GROUP. 1969-1995

by

Julio J. Chan-Sanchez

Adviser: Professor Kenneth Paul Erickson

This dissertation examines and confirms the hypothesis, through the study of the
evolution of the Andean Group (a subregional economic integration unit in South
America), that economic integration is a quasi-cyclical process involving phases of
progress, stagnation, and decline. It is not a smooth linear progression. This quasicyclical evolution is fundamentally determined by the governments of the member
countries. As such, the individual governments are the most important actors in setting
the evolution of the economic integration process.
The integration process will progress when all the governments of the member
countries find the Andean Group useful for attaining some of their objectives. The
integration process will stagnate if a minority of the governments consider that
integration does not further some of their aims. The process will regress if most of the
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member countries find that it does not help them to accomplish some of their national
interests.
Research guided by this perspective will result in better understanding of the
process of economic integration, which so far has defled successful explanation. Such
understanding is especially important to help predict future developments of economic
integration efforts. A better knowledge of these processes will allow us to entertain more
realistic expectations about the possibilities and the limits of the integration processes.
This study will also be of timely and practical use, considering the revival of integration
processes all over the world. This research project is the first to cover the entire history
of the Andean Group (1969-1995) and at the same time to present a comparative political
economy analysis of the Andean countries.
The study focuses on the interactions among the Andean countries to understand
the evolution of the integration process. It also examines the evolution through changes
in the strategy of development, economic policies, and external factors influencing the
governments of the member countries. Although it is important to analyze the domestic
factors which affect national objectives, this type of analysis is left to other
investigations.
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CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
A ... GREAT LEAP FORWARD OR A ... LONG MARCH?

1.- THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF INTEGRATION
PROCESSES

In the late 1980s we witnessed profound changes in the international system.
Chief among them was the end of the Cold War, the new impetus given to regional and
subregional1 economic integration processes throughout the world, and the formation of
continental trading blocs.
After World War n, European economic integration was seen as a means to
create a more peaceful international system. This process was originally assumed to
contain the seeds leading eventually to supranationalism. Rival member states would

'Subregional economic integration processes denote schemes that encompass part of the generally
accepted geographically and/or politically and/or culturally defined regions characterized, among others,
by a sense of historical relations, political, and economic interactions, social similarity, cultural affinity,
and land continuity. For a discussion of the concept of region see Bossier, 1993; Cantori and Spiegel,
1970; Kaiser, 1968; Neumann, 1994; Padelford, 1954; Russett, 1967; Thompson, 1973; Vayrynen, 1984.
Wendt 1994.
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eventually be replaced by larger units after a short period of mutually beneficial and
increasing cooperation. Time showed that this was not the case. We need to know more
about what to expect from these processes in the evolving post-Cold War international
economic environment. One way to do it is to study the evolution of economic
integration processes. Understanding this will help us, on the one hand, to better assess
the potential contribution of economic integration in reducing conflict, increasing
cooperation, improving security, and, possibly, bringing about a more peaceful
international system. On the other hand, the study of the evolution of the integration
processes will help us to know better what forces and circumstances shape, define, and
change the direction taken by the processes themselves.
This dissertation attempts to show, by using the Andean Group as a case study,
that economic integration is a non-sequential process involving phases of progress,
stagnation, and regression. Such quasi-cyclical evolution is fundamentally determined by
the governments of the member countries. As such, the individual governments are the
most important actors in setting the evolution of the economic integration process, a
factor which theories of economic integration do not sufficiently consider (see section
1.1). The phases of progress, stagnation, and regression, can largely be explained by the
extent to which member governments’ objectives can be achieved through the
instrumental use of the integration process. Integration processes function more like
international organizations than supranational units.
In brief, this dissertation attempts not only to reassess the role of the governments
but to demonstrate their paramountcy in guiding integration processes, and as such to
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provide a more adequate means to understand these processes.
For the purpose of this dissertation, economic integration is defined2 as a
political-economic process pursued by the governments of the member countries whereby
they aim to achieve common economic objectives through closer economic relations. The
most commonly used mechanisms are the reduction and/or elimination of discriminatory
economic barriers among the member countries; the modification and harmonization of
economic instruments and institutions, or the creation of new ones; and the intensification
of their economic interdependence.3
The Andean Group (Grupo Andino* - GRAN) is a subregional economic
integration process5 whose aim is to contribute to fostering economic development of its
members by means of trade expansion and economic policy harmonization. It was created
in May 1969, with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement by the governments of
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela joined in 1973, and Chile
withdrew in 1976. This subregional integration process was conceived as the boldest,

■This definition is based on Balassa, (1961: 1); Cohen, (1984: 58); Kaplan, (1957: 98) Keohane and
Nye, (1975: 366); and; Robson, (1987: 1). For discussions on the definition of integration see Cohen,
(1984: 50-57); Nye, (1968: 856-860) and; Pentland, (1973: 19-22).
3Integration and cooperation are used sometimes interchangeably. Balassa (1966: 24), however,
differentiates between the two. He considers that integration tends to eliminate economic discrimination
(e.g., tariff removals) while cooperation tends to diminish discrimination (e.g., tariffs reductions) or to
harmonize policies.
4It is also know as Pacto Andino—Andean Pact—and in English it has also been known as the Andean
Common Market—ANCOM.
T h e Andean Group considers itself a "subregional" integration process because it consists of part of
South America. See footnote 1 for a definition of subregion.
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most innovative, and most ambitious. 6

I.1.- Theories of regional integration
Most of the earlier theories of integration by both economists and political
scientists have explicitly or implicitly assumed that once economic integration agreements
were signed, they would progress uninterruptedly towards the final stage of total
economic or political union. This was based on the assumption that benefits would be
greater than costs, thereby creating the necessary incentives for a supranationalization
process (Balassa, 1961; 1966; ECLA, 1965; 1970; Haas, 1958; Mitrany, 1966; Nye,
1968; 1971).7
In political science there are four discernible schools of thought which have dealt
with international integration (Pentland, 1973: Part One; Taylor, 1984: chapter 3). These
are the pluralist (transactionalist), federalist, functionalist, and neo-functionalist schools.
The common thread of these schools is that they saw economic integration as a means
to end war. Since rivalry among nation-states was seen as the main cause of World War
II, lasting peace can be achieved by replacing nation-states with larger units
encompassing former enemies. This was the case of the European Coal and Steel

6Other existing integration processes in Latin America are: the Latin American Integration Association,
LAIA, created by the Treaty of Montevideo o f 1980, which replaced the Latin American Free Trade
Association, LAFTA, established in 1968; the Central American Common Market created by the General
Treaty of Economic Integration signed in 1960, in Managua, Nicaragua; the Caribbean Free Trade
Association (CARIFTA) created by a treaty signed in Antigua in 1965, it was replaced by the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) created, in 1972, by the signing of the Treaty of Georgetown; the MERCOSUR
(Southern Cone Common Market - Mercado Comun del Cono Sur) created in 1985; and the Association
of Caribbean States established in 1994. There is also a plethora of bilateral and trilateral free trade
agreements.
7As it will be shown in this section, theories were later modified, to adapt them to the realities.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5

Community, which included France and Germany as its main members. Scholars
espousing this position have teleological and normative reasons to do so. They were
committed to the construction of a more peaceful international system. The four schools,
however, emphasized different aspects of it.8
The pluralist-transactionalist view focuses its attention on factors that lead to the
establishment of a process of integration (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch et al., 1957). It is
assumed that there is a basic interest in developing a community of nation-states, and that
there is some kind of communication (transaction) among interacting nations. As
communication increases, there is a need to formalize interactions through the creation
of common institutions with limited, specific, and delegated authority. Over time, this
authority increases and will eventually lead to political integration, that is, the creation
of a security community, where its members rule out aggression as a means to solve
disputes.
The focus of interest of the federalist approach lies in the achievement of the end
product: political union through the creation of a federal state. It assumes the existence
of some commonalities, e.g., language, culture, geographic continuity. These features
are the basis for the adoption of a common constitution and institutions. Consent and
support of the citizens to the common institutions increase the legitimacy of the latter,
which gradually evolve into a supranational state (Etzioni, 1965; Friedrich, 1968; Liska,

8The contending school is that of the realist who sees the existing nation-states as the most important
units of the system and assumes that they are here to stay. For realists, this is the reality to accept and deal
with. Peace among sovereign states can be achieved through balance of power and international law. As
with the theories of integration, the realist theory has also been modified. Recently some realists (or
neorealists) based on the experiences of Western Europe are accepting the possibility that Europe would
became a new unit, in the sense advocated by the theories of integration (e.g. Waltz, 1993).
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1967).
Functionalism centers its attention on the dynamics and maintenance of the
process of economic integration. It argues that in present-day society there are many
technical and non-controversial (functional) needs that cannot be fulfilled by single
nations. These needs and functions are better met through collective efforts, via the
transfer of specific and limited powers from the individual governments to a
supranational executive authority. Success in the accomplishment of the task in one area
will lead to "ramification" (integration) in other areas. This in turn will automatically
result in the creation of a loose political community (Mitrany, 1966), political
integration, then, will be the result of economic integration.
Neo-functionalists also focus on integration as a process. They consider, however,
that there should be cooperation not only in technical (functional and non-controversial)
issues but also in politically (e.g., controversial) important areas though with technically
oriented problem-solution approaches. As in the case of the Functionalist school, this
school agrees that common institutions must be created to achieve shared objectives.
According to Neo-functionalism, there is a "spillover" effect9 by which successful
cooperation in one area will deepen cooperation in that particular area, and expand it to
other areas (Haas, 1964; Haas and Schmitter, 1964). The key political actors fostering
integration are the domestic organized groups (e.g., entrepreneurs and political parties)
that perceive this process as a tool to advance their interests. These groups will pressure
their governments to relinquish more functions and power to common institutions. This

’This is quite similar to the Functionalist concept of "ramification."
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process will result in the creation of a supranational authority.
Over time Neo-functionalists acknowledged that the creation of a supranational
authority is not automatic, gradual, continuous, or incremental. The process of economic
integration is guided by the concept of "fragmented issue linkage" (Haas, 1975: 25, 26;
1976: 180-189). This means the integration process is fragmented going from one crisis
to another, dependent on the interests of the actors, and on the possibility to link the
solution of one problem to another.
Among the other innovations, those proposed by Schmitter (1970, 1971) are
relevant for this study. He introduced concepts that allow analysts to take into account
different forms of progress, stagnation, and regression in the integration process. One
form of progress is "buildup," in which the integration process would only continue to
deepen in one area. A second form is "spill-around, ” in which the process would only
expand to some other areas. One form of stagnation is "retrenchment," defined as
deepening in some areas and withdrawal from others. Another is "muddle-about," in
which there is a spread into new areas while at the same time the commitment is reduced
in others. The third form of stagnation is "encapsulation," in which the integration
process goes into marginal and insignificant changes. Finally, regression for Schmitter
is a "spill-back" situation in which the integration process reduces the areas it covers,
and also decreases the depth of the commitments in the areas it still affects.
The main criticism of all these theories is that they consider economic integration
teleologically, as a process which will eventually reach its final objective, namely
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political integration.10 Perhaps influenced by Modernization theories, international
integration theories also saw economic integration as a unilinear process. Specific
interests of the integrating partners and international factors which could jeopardize or
foster commitments to the integration process are almost completely ignored, as is the
role of their governments.
Economic integration is a process that, according to economists, can consist of
different forms, which may or may not be consecutive. These forms are: preferential
trade areas where the members grant each other some trade advantages on some or all
commodities; free trade zones in which member countries eliminate all barriers to trade
among themselves; customs unions where, besides free trade, member countries establish
a common external tariff; common markets, covering the above, as well as the
establishment of the free movement of capital and labor; economic unions, in which the
harmonization of economic policies is pursued; and total economic unions, where
member countries establish identical economic policies.
These various forms of integration are known as types of market integration. They
have been classified into "pure market integration," in which trade is the most important
mechanism (preferential trade areas, free trade zones, customs unions); and in "economic
policy integration," where policy harmonization constitutes the most important aim
(Common Markets, economic unions, and total economic unions).11 Another form of

"There are of course other criticisms, much more specific to each one of them. See for instance,
Pentland, 1973; and Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), 1994.
“The concept of pure market integration is similar to Tinbergen’s concept of negative integration in
which barriers to trade are dismantled; while economic policy integration is similar to positive integration
in which new institutions and their instruments are established (1965: 77-79).
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integration not considered by neoclassical economists is production integration.12 In this
process industrial production is planned and coordinated. Therefore, the most important
mechanisms are industrial planning and the specialization of production.
The economics literature has focussed mainly on customs unions and considers
integration as a field of international trade theory. As such it deals only with market
integration. Within market integration, this literature concentrates on some effects
generated by "pure market integration," while the effects created by "economic policy
integration" have not been considered (Pelkmans, 1980: 333-335). Among the aspects
economists have been most interested on are the conditions under which the world’s
welfare would increase or decrease due to the reduction of trade barriers;13 the process
of policy harmonization; the economies of scale; the increased rate of growth; and the
changes in the structure of production and efficiency. Important areas of inquiry, such
as, financial, monetary, labor, and fiscal integration have not been adequately addressed.
Furthermore, economics completely ignores production integration. Even within the
narrow effects of pure market integration, it is assumed the benefits originating from the
reduction of trade barriers could provide the impetus to pursue it until total economic
union is achieved.
With the pursuit of economic integration in the Third World, analysts employed

,2This was the aim of the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). See for
example, Brabant, 1988.
l3To focus on changes in the world’s welfare due to economic integration is unrealistic. For one thing,
governments that join an integration process are not concerned at all with the effects this process would
have on world’s welfare. At most they would be concerned with the effects of integration on the
integrating countries as a whole. More often than not, governments will be concerned solely with the
effects of integration on their own country, as shown by US Congress debates, in 1993, surrounding the
approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
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political science and economics theories developed for the European integration processes
to understand and explain the phenomenon in developing regions. Federalists concluded
that attempts to create federal states in developing countries have not been a success
(e.g., the West Indies Federation, the Malaysian Federation, Mali Union, the United
Arab Republic) due to lack of a political environment conducive to it, and of people’s
support (Rothchild, 1968: 7).
Functionalists, and more importantly, Neo-functionalists found that the elements
favoring integration simply did not exist in developing areas. Factors such as a pluralist
social structure, industrialization, economic diversification, low level of ideological
politics, high degree of urbanization, and administrative skills were missing (Haas, 1966:
104-105, 117; 1967: 316). Neo-functionalists expanded their theory to include more
variables, to make the approach more relevant to Third World countries, and to explain
changes in the integration processes (Schmitter, 1971; Nye, 1971: Lindberg, 1971).
Among these variables were: national actors, political leadership, nationalism, external
factors, foreign capital and technology, political will, economic nationalism, and
ideological pluralism (Haas, 1975: 3, 72; Hazlewood, 1982: 157; Mytelka, 1979; Nye,
1971: 207-208; Puyana, 1982: 157-162, 176-178). In the end it seems that, for analysts,
everything was influenced by integration while integration, in turn, was also influenced
by many factors. The relation of causality was lost, integration was termed "a
multidimensional phenomenon" (Lindberg, 1971), and Neo-functionalism cease to have
analytical relevance for the Third World integration attempts.
Economists also devoted their attention to the conditions, and the special
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circumstances of economic integration in developing regions (Balassa, 1965; ECLA,
1965; El-Agraa, 1982a, 1989; Hojman, 1981; Morawetz, 1974; Robson, 1987). Most
economists thought that economic integration was not possible among developing
countries, because of the similarity of the structure of production in the integrating
countries, limited, and inefficient industrialization, inadequacy of their infrastructure, and
underdevelopment of their market economies. Critics argue, however, that integration
can help: to improve the terms of trade; to favor capital and labor movements; to
modernize the productive structure; to foster equitable distribution of costs and benefits;
to favor foreign investment; to promote economic development; to allow policy
harmonization; to lower transportation costs; to improve infrastructure; and to reduce
dependency (Andie, Andie and Dosser, 1971; Axline, 1984; Balassa and Stoujesdijk,
1984; Cohen 1984; Cooper and Massell, 1965; Dell, 1963 and; 1966; Furtado, 1976;
INTAL, 1988; Kitamura, 1966; Linder, 1966; Martirena Mantel, 1969; Myrdal, 1957).

1.2.- The practice of regional economic integration
The early economic integration processes in Latin America put into practice the
orthodox theory of international trade as applied to free trade zones and customs
unions.14 According to this theory (Viner, 1950; Meade, 1955; Tinbergen, 1965;
Johnson, 1962), an endeavor for economic integration will be more beneficial to the
world as a whole if it has many participants; if its members have a similar industrial

l4LAFTA’s objective was the creation of a free trade zone, the Central American Common Market
aimed to establish a common market, but its previous stage was the establishment of a customs union, and
CARIFTA, tried to create a free trade zone as a step towards a common market.
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production structures; if there is wide margin among the members in their production
costs of similar or like products; if transportation costs are low; and if the pre-integration
tariff schedules of the member countries were higher than those after integration. In
practice, however, "when plans for economic integration moves from the blueprint stage
to that of implementation, individual and group interests are immediately affected, and
‘economics’ very quickly becomes ‘politics’ ... " (Hansen, 1967: 97). That is, politics
cannot be excluded from the process.
From the political and "pragmatic" point of view, economic integration processes
in the Third World were modeled after the European predecessors. As such, the neofimctionalist theory served as a guide. For neo-functionalists, successful economic
integration depends on the existence of three major preconditions: low levels of
nationalism; economic, social, and political homogeneity and; a well functioning,
effective, and efficient bureaucracy (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 1-3). Given that these
preconditions did not exist in the developing areas, "functional equivalents" were found
as catalysts in the role of the "technocrats" and in the influence of external factors
favoring or constraining integration (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 59; Schmitter, 1970;
Nye, 1968a; Cochrane, 1964; Denham, 1969; Schmitter, 1972). These "functional
equivalents," however, together or separately do not explain the process of economic
integration.
Political science and economics discuss mainly the conditions for successful
integration processes among developed countries. Since economists and political scientists
mainly stress, among developing countries, the lack of elements conducive to successful
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economic integration processes, it is necessary to question why these nations pursued
such an endeavor; and more importantly, "why economic integration has not failed
altogether in the underdeveloped world" (Lieber, 1972: 45). One answer to this is that
there is a greater need for economic integration among poor countries than among more
developed countries because most poor countries have markets too small to industrialize
adequately (Hansen, 1969: 262-269). This is a compelling reason for pursuing
integration, even though conditions are not those that theories prescribe for success.
Insofar as resources are scarcer in developing countries compared to developed nations,
and the issue at stake is how to better distribute them among the members, the problem
becomes "one of premature overpolitization" (Nye, 1968a: 335-336). As such, since the
process depends more on politics than on economics, its evolution is likely to be anything
but gradual and steady.
Experience shows us that integration processes have not in fact progressed steadily
or unidirectionally. The most successful have had serious reverses (as when, in 1966,
France unilaterally imposed a de facto veto in the European Economic Community; and
the Central American Common Market after the "Soccer War" of 1969), and some of
them collapsed (e.g., the East African Community, in 1977; and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, in 1990). The Andean economic integration process is no
exception.
The Andean Group’s evolution can be characterized, based on the evidence
presented in this dissertation, and loosely in the terminology proposed by Schmitter, as
a process that has gone from a phase of optimism and progress (1969-1973), to one of
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doubts and stagnation (1974-1978), to another of pessimism and regression (1979-1986).
Between 1987 and 1989 the process stagnated again, and from that year to 1992 a phase
of progress, and reinvigoration was experienced. Finally from 1992, and up to now
(1995), progress continued but at slower pace. This evolution could not have been
foreseen or predicted on the basis of the existing theoretical and empirical studies.
What explains this quasi-cyclical evolution? Why has the process of integration
not proceeded linearly as predicted by the theorists? Studies on integration suggest one
or more of the following factors as explanations: lack of political will, economic
nationalism, fear of losing sovereignty, ideological and political differences, lack of
political support by the would-be beneficiaries, different levels of development, changes
in the international environment, influences of foreign capital and multinational
corporations, uneven distribution of benefits and costs, and negligible economic and
physical interdependence (Bemales, 1974: 88-90; Bywater, 1990: 2, 7-16; ECLA, 1987:
99; INTAL, 1988: 31, 35; Mace, 1988: 420; Mytelka, 1979; Puyana, 1982: 156-164,
170-178, 272-274). The evidence from the Andean Pact suggests that all or most of these
factors can be related or encompassed in an obvious, yet ignored, variable, namely the
interests, policies, and behavior of the member governments.

1.3.- An alternative explanation for the evolution of economic integration processes
There is scant literature, however, devoted to the important role of the
governments of the member countries in determining the pace, direction, scope, and
dynamism of the economic integration processes. The writers who have considered
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governments to be the central or most important actors include Puchala, Bemales, Duffy
and Feld, Tomassini, Tironi, and Moravcsik.15 Their writings will serve to develop a
hypothesis making the government the central factor.
Puchala (1972) proposes to study international integration schemes as a set of
routinized processes that states engage in to achieve benefits. He identifies nation-states
as the major units of the integration process and governments as the central actors, but
not the only significant ones. Other actors from the subnational, national, transnational,
and supranational arenas also participate. This constitutes a system very similar to the
existing international nation-state system, but in successful integration processes it is one
in which there are common or compatible aims among states rather than conflicting ones.
When incompatibility of basic aims arises, the system will deteriorate. The existence of
the integration system can be assured because in an era of globalization of the economy
and technology, nation-states have recognized that sovereignty can best be preserved by
pooling resources.
Puchala provides us with the valuable concept of integration process as a system
similar to the international system. Thus, member countries’ interactions define the
integration system, and as such shape its characteristics, and its evolution. Puchala also
contributes to our understanding of progress (existence of common aims), and of
stagnation or regression (incompatibility of basic aims), but he is not explicit as to when

I3More recently Axline (1994a: 27, 29; 1994b: 217; 1996: 214) argues in a similar vein, however he
does not elaborate his argument. According to him integration among developing countries is the product
of negotiations in which national interests of the partners are accommodated. Success, failure and patterns
of an integration process will depend on the ability of the integration organization to satisfy the national
interests of the member countries as shaped and influenced by external factors and the international system.
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these incompatibilities will led to stagnation alone, or further, to regression of the
integration process. A related aspect is, what happens after the system deteriorates? How
does it transform this deterioration into progress? Puchala takes into consideration the
international system only marginally when he deals with globalization as the incentive to
integration. In the case of the Third World countries, however, international influence
is very important. Lastly, he does not take into account the constituent national systems
as a factor influencing the evolution of the integration process.
Bemales (1974), in proposing a framework to study the political actors in the
Andean integration process, considers governments to be the most important ones. They
are influenced by domestic actors (e.g., industrialists and unions), and constrained by
their dependence on the international system. Governments’ support of integration will
depend on how the common political model and its redefinitions reflect the political and
economic interests of the governments as well of the domestic actors. Bemales argues
that, should governments adopt national political models that are quite different or
opposite to the one pursued at the Andean level, the process would be in crisis.
The author correctly suggests the existence of three levels of analysis: the
international, the regional, and the national. Bemales also provides the basic and most
acceptable reason for progress and for regression in an integration process. It progresses
when it reflects governments’ aims and it regresses when it does not reflect the objectives
of the governments. Bemales also informs us that aims and mechanisms of the integration
process can be changed in response to changes in the countries. This fact reaffirms the
pre-eminence of the governments in the integration process, and their use of it as tool.
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The fact that the integration process can be modified provides an explanation of why only
few integration processes have disappeared. He also suggests rationales for integration
at the international and domestic levels. To reduce dependency is the reason in the first
case, and to get political and economic benefits in the second. If this is so, then the
government is the most important actor in the process but its acts are constrained by both
international and domestic actors. Bemales points to crucial aspects with regard to the
levels of analysis, the possibilities of progress and regression, the rationale for
governments to integrate. Having said this, like Puchala, he does not take into account
the most common possibility in the evolution of an integration process, namely
stagnation—or in Schmitter’s jargon "encapsulation."
Duffy and Feld (1980) propose a pre-theory based upon the idea that nation-states
pursuing their national interests are the central actors in the integration process, and as
such, nation-states are able to set the pace of both the scope and level of regional
integration. These central actors are influenced by three intervening variables: internal
(the decision-making process), systemic (the intraregional system), and global (the
international system). For Duffy and Feld nation-states are paramount in defining the
evolution of the process. They, however, do not provide an explanation of how
governments determine the evolution of the process or what the factors are which make
an integration process advance, stop, or go backwards. Nor do they develop any
reasoning for the interrelations between the three intervening variables.
Tomassini (1985) and Tironi (1976, 1978) consider that economic integration is
one of the tools available to the governments to achieve goals emanating from their
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strategies of economic development. Tironi also argues that an integration process begins
when a group of countries identifies the existence of common economic objectives, and
agrees on the mechanisms to achieve them.
Tomassini and Tironi correctly assert that economic integration is a tool for the
member countries, and not an end in itself. Tironi develops this pragmatic view of
integration by asserting that it is a process in which there are aims to be achieved
through agreed mechanisms. Tomassini, for his part, in agreement with Bemales, asserts
that changes in circumstances will change the goals of the process. He also says the
process will be affected when common economic objectives, and agreement on the
mechanisms disappear. Both, however, fail to say how these factors will influence the
integration process. Will the process slow down, will it stagnate or decay? Do changes
in the aims and mechanisms mean a reorientation of the integration process, or could
they also mean its demise?
Finally, Moravcsik (1991; 1993), analyzing the adoption of the Single European
Act (SEA) by the European Community, evaluates, and rejects a crucial theoretical
claim: that supranational institutions and transnational business interests are the most
important variables. He shows that the role of the negotiating governments and the
convergence of national interests of the three major countries, Germany, France and
Great Britain are the most important factors in explaining the adoption of the SEA. This
phenomenon is called intergovemmentalism by the author. Moravcsik, however, finds
no convincing explanation as to why the national interests of these three countries
coincided. Besides, Moravcsik only cursorily analyzes the influence of external

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

(international) economic factors. A more closely related issue to the present research is
that for Moravcsik the European Community has proceeded in fits and starts, or in a start
and stop process. That is, a sudden great leap forward followed by long or short periods
of standing still.
Aside from giving primary role to the governments (and not to the supranational
institutions), Moravcsik sees the process as the functionalists and neo-functionalists in the
sense that there is progress and at worst stagnation, but he provides no place for
regression. This may be true, up to a point, in the case of integration in Europe, but not
in other parts of the world. Furthermore, he considers (in the same vein of Bemales)
progress or stagnation solely as a function of convergence or not of national interests.
The author fails in this crucial aspect to point out a more general possibility. Progress,
stagnation, or regression can be explained by governments’ interests (not necessarily
coincidental) being reflected or not by aims and mechanisms of the economic integration
process.
Linking the basic ideas and concepts stated by the aforementioned writers, and
the criticisms of them, it is possible to propose a framework which can be more useful
in helping to explain the evolution of economic integration processes and the role of
governments in it. This approach emphasizes that the governments are the most important
actors influencing the process, and hypothesizes that their actions are guided by changing
definitions of national interests. Applied in this study, this approach differs from these
studies because it enables us to explain the changes in the evolution of the integration
process.
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This framework can be expressed as follows. With actors from the subnational,
national, transnational, and supranational arenas, nation-states participating in a process
of economic integration constitute a regional system similar to the existing international
system (Puchala), where nation-states, represented by their governments, are the most
important players. In this system, however, it is expected that common or compatible
ends are the rule and not conflicting interests, which is the rule in the international
system. Governments, being the most important actors, are able through their interactions
to shape both the scope and level of regional integration (Duffy and Feld, Moravcsik),
but are influenced or constrained by domestic, intraregional, and international systems
and actors (Bemales, and Duffy and Feld).
Economic integration is considered to be a set of routinized processes of
bargaining and negotiation in which states engage to pursue benefits (Puchala) or national
interests (Duffy and Feld). Integration is thus a tool of governments to achieve the goals
defined in their strategies of economic development. The process of integration begins
when countries identify common economic objectives, and agree on the mechanisms to
achieve them (Tomassini, Tironi). Cooperation among governments and their support for
economic integration depends on how their individual national interests are served by the
process (Bemales), especially those of the most powerful governments (Moravcsik).
The integration process will deteriorate and changes will occur in it when conflicts
and incompatibility of aims arise due to changes in the national strategies of
development, in the economic policies, in domestic politics and/or in the international
arena (Puchala, Bemales, Tomassini, Tironi). Deterioration can take the form of
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stagnation or regression of the integration process. Stagnation (or lack of progress)
occurs when a minority of the members (or a group of the least powerful countries) find
that their interests are not being achieved through integration. Regression (reduction of
the scope of the integration process), happens when the majority of the countries
(including the powerful countries) finds that integration does not serve their national
interests. To progress, the integration process needs the member countries to find
integration a useful tool to achieve their goals, that is, that the integration aims and
mechanisms reflect their national strategies of development, and economic policies.
This framework for analyzing the role of governments in the evolution of
economic integration processes is more comprehensive and encompassing than the ones
developed by Puchala, Bemales, Duffy and Feld, Tomassini, Tironi, and Moravcsik, on
which it is based. Although all of these authors consider the government (or the state)
as the most important actor in determining the process, none of them develops a
comprehensive framework to understand how the governments influence the dynamics
of economic integration. This dissertation improves the explanation of the evolution of
integration processes, which is not towards supranationalism, an idea still being proposed
as late as 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, but towards whatever member
countries want it to be. Through the study of the Andean Group, this dissertation
reinforces the neo-realist proposition that nation-states are, and will continue to be, for
the foreseeable future, the main actors in international economic processes. This study
is the first to attempt to understand the evolution of the Andean integration process since
its inception, and could serve as a model to understand other integration processes.
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There is no doubt that international and domestic factors influence government
actions (as pointed out by Bemales, Duffy and Feld, and Moravcsik). It is also important
to analyze the factors which explain changes in the domestic sphere which in turn affect
national objectives, but this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation and
must be left to other investigators. This study focuses on the evolution of the integration
process. To explain this evolution, following Axiline (1994b: 216, 217, 218), it examines
the external factors and their influence on the changes in the member governments’
strategy of development, and in economic policies, but does not deal with domestic
factors that shape these changes. This study thus attempts to analyze the area where the
domestic and the international fields intersect.

1.4.- The alternative explanation and the Andean Group
This dissertation attempts to explain the evolution of the Andean Pact by testing
the following hypothesis. That, in any stage, the Andean Group’s experience of progress,
stagnation, or regression is determined to a significant extent by the degree to which the
member governments find integration aims and mechanisms useful to achieve national
objectives. These objectives stem from the nations’ development models, strategies, and
policies they pursue. The extent to which the Andean governments find that subregional
integration enables them to achieve their goals determines the usefulness to them of the
Andean Pact, and in turn shapes the evolution of the process. The means to achieve their
objectives is determined by negotiation. In this process, governments of the member
countries behave as if they were in the international system. The outcomes of bargaining
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and negotiations, as in the international system, are highly influenced by the most
powerful countries.
This research project hypothesizes that the Andean process progresses when
interests pursued by the governments of the member countries are served by the process.
The process stagnates when a minority of the member countries find their interests are
not furthered by the integration process. It regresses when the majority of the
governments consider that the integration process does not reflect their national interests.
The Andean Group thus can be perceived less as an end in its own right than as another
instrument for the attainment of national interests which change over time. This may
explain why the Andean Group did not become an end in itself or a supranational
organization with a life of its own, as foreseen by the integration theories. It is in this
sense that the role, and the synchronous behavior of the governments—which are
influenced by domestic and external factors16—constitutes a fundamental variable in
explaining the evolution of the Andean Group.
The hypothesis of this research project and the influences on it can be restated in
terms of the Andean Group as follows. By concentrating mainly on the interactions
among the Andean institutions, and the governments of the member countries,17 it will

,6Changes in the international environment (global, and regional), in the national environment, in the
relations among member countries, and between each one of them with other nations, and other
international actors will modify governments’ behavior. These changes will be reflected in modifications
in the domestic situation, and in variations in the way national interests are pursued by each country. These
changes will in turn increase or decrease the usefulness of GRAN.
17"The evolution of the Latin American integration as a political and as an economic process cannot
be conceived only as a function of intraregional variables; it also significantly depends on the conditions
of the extraregional international environment. During the period in which the international framework was
favorable for integration, it effectively progressed, although, as is well known, with great limitations and
insufficiencies” (Wilhelmy, 1982c: 199).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

be possible to consider the relations among the Andean countries as a subregional system
of states similar to the international one (Puchala). In this system, nation-states
represented by their governments are the most important actors (Bemales, Moravcsik),
and their pursue national political, and economic interests (Duffy and Feld, Tomassini,
and Tironi) are presumed to be common to all (Puchala). Changes in the evolution of the
Andean process (progress, stagnation, or regression) will be traced back to the changes
in governments’ policies, which in turn reflect redefinitions of their national objectives
(Tomassini and Tironi) and hence the ways they seek to affect the aims and mechanisms
of the integration process (Bemales).
In other words, governments act not in the common interest of the group but in
their own individual interests. Thus political factors have to be taken into account in
order to be able to explain the Andean integration process. This means that, although
economic integration is a scheme with economic aims and it uses economic mechanisms,
it has political goals and means. Moreover, it is a political endeavor which uses
economic means and goals, in which government behavior has the crucial role in its
evolution.
Research guided by this perspective will result in better understanding of this
process, which so far has defied successful explanation. Such understanding is especially
important to help predict future developments of the Andean process in particular and of
economic integration efforts in general. A better knowledge of these processes will allow
us to entertain more realistic expectations about the possibilities and limits of the
integration processes. This research project is also of timely and practical use,
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considering the revival o f integration processes all over the world and the formation of
continental economic blocs.18

1.5.- Overview of the political economy of the Andean countries as a context of the
evolution of the Andean process: 1969-1995
During the 1960s and part of the 1970s, as was the case of other Latin American
countries, the common development model asynchronically pursued by the Andean Pact’s
governments, was one of inward oriented industrialization model. The strategy used was
import substitution. Although widely varied among countries, the model and strategy, as
proposed by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
aimed basically to produce progressively more sophisticated goods, given the limitations
of the human, material and financial resources, and the size of the market.19 The main
policy used to achieve the aims was market protectionism. This convergence of the
models and strategies of development (which Hirschman (1971: 270-311), called
"ideology of economic development"), of the member countries coincided with the first
phase of progress of the Andean Group. Between 1969 (when the Cartagena Agreement
creating the Andean Pact was signed) and 1973, there was a rapid advance in the

18We should not overlook, however, the process of political disintegration going on in Eastern Europe,
in the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world. For an analysis of disintegration see Holsti, 1988;
Chatterjee, 1993; and Gurr, 1994.
’’"The industrialization process has not taken place in all the Latin American countries [including the
Andean nations] simultaneously or at the same pace
Despite these differences, all the countries have
pursued a very similar policy as regards the conduct of the import-substitution process, and all have
continued to export primary products" (ECLA, 1970: 137).
"In the Agreement’s discussion period and during the first years that it was in force, a certain
congruency existed in the economic policies of the member countries ... To a greater or lesser extent, they
were all "Cepalian", progressing towards import-substitution ...” (Puyana, 1984: 296).
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implementation of important aspects of GRAN.
From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, changing domestic and international conditions
gradually led governments to divergent ideologies of economic development. As a
response to these challenges, the Andean countries, at different paces and in different
forms, gradually and with forward and backward leaps began to shift to a model of
development based on an outward oriented industrialization.20 The strategy changed to
one of increasing exports by improving efficiency and competitiveness and augmenting
the capability of the domestic economic structure to respond to international and domestic
changes. The new policies aimed at seeking free trade, market competition and at
maximizing comparative advantages.21
This protracted process of redefining and changing ways to pursue national
objectives led GRAN first to stagnation (1974-1978) and then regression (1979-1986).
By the second half of the 1970s, infringements of the Agreement and commitments
derived from it by the member countries became widespread, as they pursued what they
perceived as their own national interests. The violations, during this period of stagnation
of the process, were basically the reaction of governments to the economic problems they
were confronting. These problems originated by the United States unilateral declaration
of August 1971 of the inconvertibility of the dollar into gold, and thus changing the basis
of the international monetary system, and by the increase in the price of oil in the last

“ According to Gereffi (1990: 18), inward and outward oriented industrialization models are not
mutually exclusive but complementary. This argument was voiced earlier by Robock (1972). However, it
was not widely perceived as such in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
21Weintraub, 1991 and Cohen, 1993, among others, discuss this shift of the ideology of economic
development.
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quarter of 1973.
The Andean integration process also stagnated (1974-1978) due to two inherent
problems that diverted the attention of the governments from furthering the process. One
of them was the entrance of Venezuela into the Andean Group in December 1973. It
increased the number of actors, and augmented the difficulties in reaching agreements.
This oil rich country, moreover, was able to exert an important influence in the Andean
process while the reverse was not true. The second inherent problem that led to the
stagnation of the Andean process was a consequence of the overthrown of the Chilean
Socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. In 1974, the Chilean military
government adopted an outward oriented model of economic development, and a strategy
based on free trade, private initiative, and government withdrawal from the economy.
This ideology of economic development was, at that time, considered by the other
governments incompatible with the one they pursued and incongruous with the aims of
the Andean Pact. The discrepancy was eventually solved, in 1976, with the withdrawal
of Chile.
The member countries modified some basic mechanisms and deadlines in the
Protocol of Lima of 1976; and in the Protocol of Arequipa, 1978. These Protocols
reflected changes the governments were interested in introducing in the Cartagena
Agreement in response to the new circumstances effecting their national environment.
They were also the legal answer to the need to update deadlines that were already
missed, clearing the way for the process to resume its progress. The new deadlines,
however, were not met.
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The phase of regression (1979-1986) began, paradoxically, with an attempt to
revitalize the process. The Presidents of the Andean Group met in May 1979 to
commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Cartagena Agreement. As a result of this
meeting the Andean Court of Justice and the Andean Parliament were created in October
1979 and November 1979 respectively. These attempts did not revitalize GRAN. The
treaties came into force only in 1983 (the Court) and in 1984 (the Parliament). By the
time the Court began to function, the governments had reached a "gentlemen agreement"
not to bring cases to the Court because governments were not ready to fulfill their
obligations. As for the Parliament (constituted by five representatives of each o f the
national congresses) it has only the power of recommendation. A Court without cases and
a toothless Parliament were incapable of inducing the governments to amend their
behavior. On the contrary violations became widespread not only in magnitude but also
in importance. For example, trade restrictions were applied to Andean trade. This caused
trade flow to diminish by almost half between 1982 and 1986 (see table VI.2).
In addition to the violations, the representatives of the governments were not able
to reach agreements on matters that were fundamental for the process to progress, such
as the common external tariff. When some important decisions were adopted, most of
the time they were not implemented by the governments.
The behavior of the governments reflected the increasing economic strains
imposed by the second oil price rise (1979), and by the increasing external debt. The
Andean process as a tool for the governments became irrelevant to and was neglected by
them, since governments perceived that economic integration could not be of much help
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to them in coping with the pressing socio-political situation. The governments, instead,
began to apply policies which over time led to a different strategy of development. As
a result governments find no important objectives to be fulfilled by the Andean Pact.
Regression, thus, was characteristic of this period.
The new ideology of economic development that emerged among the member
countries from the mid 1980s defined an outward oriented industrialization model and an
export-led strategy based on exporting goods for which each country had comparative
advantages, and in reliance on the market economy. In 1987, while this ideology of
economic development was still being hesitantly implemented, Andean countries adopted
the Quito Protocol. The protocol signaled an attempt to revitalize the Andean process
based, again, on the governments finding new compatible aims to be fulfilled through the
Andean process. The aims were to help restructure the economies of the countries to
increase their economic efficiency and competitiveness, to make them more flexible and
adaptable to changing international conditions, and to improve the negotiation capability
of the Andean countries in the international political and economic arenas (JUNAC
1990a: 13-21). It was not until 1989, however, that GRAN began a phase of rapid
progress again due to changes in the most important members. First in Venezuela and
then, in the same year, in Colombia and, in 1990, in Peru drastic changes in economic
policies signaled a clear and decisive adoption of the export oriented model.22 It was at
that time that the objectives stated in the Quito Protocol began to reflect governments
aims. Violations were quickly eliminated, trade increased, and the creation of an effective

^Bolivia had, since 1985, already moved decisively to it. Ecuador did it in 1992.
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free trade area advanced rapidly.
Progress lasted until August 1992 when the Andean Group slowed down its
advancement. It reflected the differences among the governments, especially between
Peru and the rest of the members,

about the pace and depth of the domestic

implementation of the new ideology of economic development. As a result, Peru
"temporarily withdrew" from the process.23 Another reason for this slow down of the
process was the perception of Venezuela and Colombia that an immediate integration of
their markets, the largest and most dynamic of the Group, provided greater benefits for
both, and could be done without the participation of the other Andean members.
Presently, the developmental model common to all Andean countries is outwardoriented industrialization. The strategy is to promote exports by pursuing a policy of free
trade with the rest of the world based on comparative advantage. Table 1.1 presents a
summarized comparison between the two "ideologies of economic development" applied
from the 1960s to the 1990s in the Andean nations.
This succinct review of the evolution of GRAN shows that economic integration
is a political endeavor which is shaped by government interests. The Andean Presidents
officially acknowledged for the first time, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the
Andean process, in May 1979, the political nature of economic integration (JUNAC,
1979b: 57). At the twentieth anniversary, in 1989, the presidents also officially

^Peru’s self-exclusion of from the process was agreed among the representatives of the five member
countries ignoring the fact that the Cartagena Agreement does not consider this possibility. This is one of
the most obvious example supporting this dissertation hypothesis, namely that the individual governments
of member countries are the most important actors in die Andean integration process. As such they act,
when necessary, above and beyond the rules they have sovereignly agreed upon.
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TABLE L I
ANDEAN COUNTRIES’ IDEOLOGIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1960s-1970s

1980s-1990s

Model

Inward-oriented
industrialization

Outward-oriented
industrialization

Strategy

Import substitution

Export promotion

Policies

Market protectionism

Market competition and
comparative advantage

Government role

Direct intervention

Arbiter

Andean Pact major emphasis

Market and production
integration

Pure market integration

recognized that GRAN served as a complementary tool in the pursuit of shared national
interests (JUNAC, 1990a: 16, 69).

2.- METHODOLOGY

To explore the hypothesis that the evolution of the Andean Group has been
overwhelmingly determined by the governments of the member countries, this
dissertation has divided the Andean process into five phases. They correspond to turning
points in the history of the Andean process: 1969-1973 termed as one of progress, 19741978 a phase of stagnation, 1979-1986 a phase of regression, 1987-1989 again a phase
of stagnation, and finally from 1990 to 1995 another of progress.
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2.1.- Indicators
Several indicators have been developed in order to ascertain the main
characteristics attributed to each of these phases. One indicator is how the main
mechanisms have evolved. During a phase of progress the main mechanisms would be
implemented with only minor problems and delays. In a phase of stagnation
implementation would become more difficult and delays would begin to spread. A phase
of regression would show great difficulties in implementing the main mechanisms and
the abandonment or replacement of some of them.
Another indicator is the amount (value) of trade among member countries.
Progress of the process would be evident if the value of trade among member countries
increases every year. The process stagnates if the value of intra-subregional trade
decreases in one or a few years. The process would be in a phase of regression if trade
among Andean countries decreases in several or most years.24
A third indicator is the fulfillment of obligations by member countries. There
would be progress if the violations are minimum; stagnation if they become larger, but
they do not constitute an obstacle to the process. There would be regression should
violations became widespread, and create major obstacles to the main mechanisms of this
process. It is clear that this is not an obvious quantitative indicator. What it intends to
show is that there would be more violations of the Cartagena Agreement when the
process is in a regression phase than when it is in a phase of stagnation.
The fourth indicator is the number of decisions approved by the Commission, the

21Trade among the member countries "is one of the most accurate indicators of success of economic
integration" (UNCTAD, 1989: 2).
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political body of the Andean Group. A greater number of decisions dealing with new
issues would be approved by the Commission during a phase of progress; fewer would
be passed during a stage of stagnation, while during regression even fewer decisions on
new issues would be approved. Parallel to this, during the phase of progress there would
be more decisions modifying previous decisions which would strengthen the process than
during the phase of stagnation. In turn during the phase of regression there would be
fewer decisions of this type than in a phase of stagnation. On the other hand, modifying
decisions that weaken accords would be more common during a phase of stagnation than
in a phase of progress, and even more frequent in a phase of regression. Unimportant
decisions would be more common in a phase of regression, than in a phase of stagnation
or in a stage of progress. Table 1.2 summarizes these indicators.

2.2.- Three levels of analysis
If findings from an examination of the implementation of the mechanisms, of
trade, violations, and decisions confirm the existence of the phases the Andean Pact has
gone through, the next endeavor is to find out the factors that can explain the different
phases. This can be accomplished by analyzing, for each of the phases, how the
strategies of development, the and the policies to be pursued by the governments were
reflected by the aims and mechanisms of the Andean process. This is to be done
concurrently with the analysis of the interactions of the governments of the member
countries to achieve their objectives and the examination of the activities of Andean
institutions. This proposition yields three levels of analysis, or three different
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TABLE 1.2
INDICATORS OF INTEGRATION

Phase
Indicator
Progress

Stagnation

Regression

Implementation of
main mechanisms

Little
difficulties
and delays

Difficulties
and delays

Great
difficulties
and retreat

Trade among
Andean countries

Increases
every year

Decreases in
some years

Decreases in
several years

Violations

Minimum

Increasing

Widespread

New issues

Many

Few

Almost none

Modifying Decisions
- Improving
- Weakening

Many
Few

Few
More

Almost none
Even more

Unimportant
Decisions

Few

More

Even more

Decisions:

perspectives to explain the evolution of the Andean process.
The first level examines the interactions of the Junta with the governments of the
member countries, and of the governments among themselves pertaining to their positions
on the general situation of the Andean process, and on specific issues being negotiated.
The second level is the analysis of short-term domestic policies being implemented
or modified by the member countries, and how these policies are reflected by the Andean
integration. This analysis will allow us to identify the similarities and differences of the
domestic policies in relation to the main mechanisms of the Andean Group, and the
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possible changes in the importance of the Andean Pact for each member government, as
well as the changing short-term goals to be achieved through this process.
The third level analyzes the asynchronous shifting of the countries’ strategy of
development. This will be done through the analysis of the strategies of development
being implemented by the economic plans and the long-term policies adopted by the
member governments as well as the analysis of the economic, political, and overall
situation of the countries. They will be compared with the aims of the Cartagena
Agreement to see how the domestic interests are reflected by the Andean purposes. These
three levels of analysis are summarized in table 1.3.

TABLE 1.3
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

LEVEL

TYPE OF ANALYSIS

1

Interactions among governments and Andean institutions

2

Analysis of national short-term policies

3

Analysis of national strategies of development

At each one of these levels it will be possible to determine the extent to which
the Andean Group reflects the interests of the member governments. If progress in the
Andean economic integration process coincides with the existence of harmonious relations
between government and Andean aims, if stagnation can be related to the lack of
harmonious relations between Andean objectives and the interests of a minority of the
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member countries, and if regression is linked to the majority of the member countries
not being able to relate their interests to the aims of the Andean Group, then the
proposed hypothesis to explain the evolution of the Andean Group will have established
its validity.
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CHAPTER n
FROM SANTIAGO TO CARTAGENA (1945-1966):
EN ROUTE TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION

I.- INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS FROM INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THE END OF
WORLD WAR H

From the time the former Spanish colonies in America began their efforts to
become independent, they simultaneously but unsuccessfully attempted to integrate in one
way or another. Until the end of World War II, these undertakings were primarily aimed
to achieve political integration following confederal or federal models. Since World War
II, these endeavors have focused on some form of economic integration.
Several Latin American leaders and writers of the past century dreamed that it
was possible to create a larger political unit encompassing sizable parts of the continent.
The most common aim was to have a strong and prosperous nation capable of protecting
itself from external threats. The main bases for this dream were the commonalities of
language, religion, culture, history, civilization, and the longing for reestablishing a
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hypothetical and unrealized unity in colonial Spanish America. Chief among the
proponents of this integration was Simon Bolivar. Under his leadership the independence
of what are today Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia was
attained. Bolivar first proposed the idea of political integration in 1815 in his "Jamaica
Letter" ("Carta de Jamaica"). In that letter he proposed the creation of a confederation
modeled after the ancient Greek confederacy called the amphictyony (Belaunde, 1983:
124-125). The objective was to protect the nascent republics from European powers. The
forces toward disintegration, however, were stronger, and by the late eighteen thirties,
the four former Spanish viceroyalties (New Spain, New Granada, Peru and Rio de la
Plata) had splintered into eighteen countries.
From 1826 to 1865 four inconsequential international conferences were held
aiming to create political alliances against European attempts to reconquer the area. From
1865 to the end of World War II, the Latin American countries placed more reliance on
this time from the United States.1
Inter-American conferences were also held from the end of the XIX century on.2
They were not successful in attempting to pursue some form of economic cooperation

‘The Latin American met several times, among them in, Lima, 1877-1880; Caracas, 1883; and
Montevideo, 1888-1889 but nothing important came out of them.
3At the first Inter-American conference, 1889-1890, Secretary of State James G. Blaine proposed the
creation of a continental customs union. It was rejected by the Latin Americans due to the existing antiAmerican sentiments, and because it was perceived as running counter to Latin American interests (Martz,
1993: 30-34).
During the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 1933, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull proposed bilateral tariff cuts. The aim was to increase trade and to ease the problems
created by the Great Depression and the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (This Act increased the average
ad valorem tariff level from 38.2 to 55.3 percent, the highest of this century [Milner, 1990: 141; Lake,
1991: 133]). The Latin American governments rejected the suggestion because they were highly dependent
on tariff revenues.
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between the United States and Latin America.3
Between the two World Wars, attempts by Latin American countries to create
customs unions among themselves were opposed by the United States and by Great
Britain because they violated the most favored-nation principle.4 As far as the United
States was concerned, any customs union formed in this hemisphere ought to fulfill the
conditions set forth in the Conference of the Commissions of Inter-American
Development, New York, 1944 (Grunwald, Wionczek, and Camoy, 1972: 69-70). These
criteria were: a) the customs union should be open to any country, b) tariffs and other
trade restrictions among the members should be eliminated in the shortest time possible,
c) the common external tariff should be equal to or lower than the ones that were applied
before the existence of the union, and d) the members should participate in international
conferences aimed at reducing trade barriers.

3For a study of US foreign economic relations with Latin America in the 25 years period, 1906-1931,
see Seidel, 1973. The author termed this period as Progressive Pan Americanism. It was aimed "at
expanding trade, building investments opportunities, and tapping sources of agricultural and mineral raw
materials in Latin America", ... in order "to aggrandize United States economic interests and enhance
domestic prosperity", while at the same time it tried "to allay Latin American fears of its might and
suspicious of its intentions. Yet ... [it] could not completely replace Latin fears and suspicious with an
ideology of politico-economic progress that would be realized under benevolent and non-coercive United
States Stewardship" (2, 646) At the end of this period, ”[i]n the emerging [of the Depression], as so often
before, the interests of the United States took precedence over general hemispheric remedies" (ibid., 9).
4For example, in 1939, a free trade agreement was signed by Argentina and Brazil. Argentina tried
to expand and deepen it with a 1941 treaty creating a customs union between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. The treaty was not ratified due to US opposition. A similar fate was encountered
by a customs union treaty, signed in 1943, between Argentina and Chile.
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2.- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960

After World War II, Latin American nations renewed their attempts to integrate
among themselves in order to increase their international standing through economic
rather than political integration. Economic integration processes "were founded on the
joint economic and political goals of accelerating economic development and achieving
economic independence" (Bryant, 1984: 79). Since the very beginning decision-makers
were aware that economic integration would be only one of the many tools available to
them to further economic growth and hopefully socio-economic development. More
concretely, "[t]he primary goal of integration [was] development, with an emphasis on
industrialization" (Mytelka, 1975 38). Industrialization, "[t]he motive for subregional
integration in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1950s and 1960s, [aimed] to
expand the scope for import substitution; ..." (Weintraub, 1993: 10).
Governments were also aware that integration by itself would not avoid the
difficult and painful measures to deal with their socio-politico-economic problems,
although they had hoped that economic growth fostered by integration would help to do
the job.
... regional integration is no panacea for Latin America. It will not diminish the
need for political, economic and social reform. ... and certainly will not obviate
the need for greater access to the markets of the developed countries. ...,
however, ... the concerting [sic] efforts on a region-wide basis could significantly
accelerate the attainment of these goals (Dell, 1966: 14).
Few governments were willing to undertake the kind of fundamental redistribution
of wealth required to create a sizeable domestic market. Instead, they opted for
regional free trade agreements, hoping that by grouping the middle classes ...
they could reach the market size required for industrial take-off (Green, 1995:19).
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As stated by the then head of the powerful Peruvian National Planning Office:
the Latin American integration process emerges as a common necessity, a
meeting place of national development policies and a means to make possible a
self-sustaining development. Within this concept, integration is necessarily a
complementary road to be used. As such, integration would accelerate the
adoption of measures that in turn would reduce internal disequilibria and would
allow a more rational social structure (Marco del Pont, 1969: 76).
In other words, integration could not be an end in itself, but ought to be an additional
policy tool, and only part of an overall strategy for development.

2.1.- The role of ECLA
When World War I interrupted trade, Latin American countries had to produce
as many products as possible that were formerly imported. The import substitution
process was an unexpected by-product of the severance of trade links. It was fostered
when the Great Depression greatly hurt Latin American exports, drastically limiting the
importation of manufactured goods. Between the wars import substitution was abandoned.
World War

n, however,

forced the Latin American countries to produce locally goods

that until then were imported.
After World War n, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA)5 provided the rationale to further import substitution as a explicit strategy for
industrialization and the promotion of economic development. This strategy was
accompanied with a proposal to enlarge the domestic markets through economic

5ECLA was created in 1948, in 1984 was renamed ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean.
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integration.6 A Latin American common market was necessary to overcome "the splitting
of the industrialization process into as many watertight compartments as there are
countries, without the advantages of specialization and economies of scale" (Prebisch,
1959: 268). Greater emphasis was given to the integration mechanism promoting
industrialization, than to the one fostering trade integration.7
Latin American governments found ECLA’S recommendations politically useful
and they began to apply them. ECLA’s willingness to play an economic and a political
role, in part, the result of the personality and the work of Raul Prebisch, ECLA’S second
Executive Secretary (Bawa, 1980: 4-7). As a result, this United Nations institution was
able to play a very important role in promoting import substitution and economic
integration (Gregg, 1968: 313-319, 328-332; Axline, 1994a: 9; 1994b: 184).

2.2.- International factors favoring economic integration
International factors also created an environment conducive to the gradual
acceptance of ECLA’s economic integration proposal by the Latin America. The most
important ones were the post World War H political and economic orders. In the political
realm, the new world order was characterized by a bipolar system dominated by the two
continental superpowers. The new international order established new monetary, financial
and trade systems. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the

6It was argued that the success of the policy to replace imports for domestic production was due
basically to the possibility of having larger regional markets (U.N., 1952: 7).
7"... it was realized in the beginning that the integration of trade should proceed side by side with
industrialisation, ... [but] industrialisation was the cardinal principle of the Prebisch Thesis ... (Bawa,
1980: 150).
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD-The World Bank) were created to maintain these systems.
With bipolarity came the Cold War. Because of it and specifically due to the
Korean War, the prospects of a continuing lack of availability of industrial goods led the
governments to recognize the need for guided import substitution industrialization as a
permanent strategy. This conclusion was reinforced by the problems to establish the new
international economic order. The IMF was unable to deal with the existing monetary
disarray. GATT, which was intended only as a temporary procedural guideline for tariff
negotiations, became the sole treaty dealing with one aspect of international trade,
namely commercial policy.8 Finally, resources of the IBRD were to be dedicated to
reconstruction rather than to development (Wionczek, 1966: 73-74; Kaufman, 1990: 120126; Hirschman, 1971: 85-123; Spero, 1990: 33-35, 154-155,159-160,203-208; Walters
and Blake, 1992: 13-16, 40-45, 70). Given this scenario, currencies continued to be
unconvertible, trade restrictions in the countries devastated by the War were maintained,
and resources for development were not forthcoming.
On the other hand, there were pressures on the Latin American governments to
comply with the newly created international economic order. These pressures came
primarily from the IMF, which compelled these countries—chiefly Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Uruguay which had a relatively large reciprocal trade in raw materials—to

®The agreement creating the International Trade Organization (ITO), was an all encompassing treaty
on trade. Its creation was prevented when the Truman administration decided, in 1950, not to send the
treaty to the Senate. He feared that it would be defeated.
In December 1993, among the accords reached in the latest GATT negotiations, the Uruguay
Round, was the creation of the World Trade Organization, WTO, as the institution dealing with all issues
related to international trade.
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reduce their controls over trade and payments policies. According to the IMF, this should
be done through promoting trade liberalization, extending tariff preferences on a mul
tilateral basis, creating freely convertible currencies, and eliminating their bilateral
payment agreements.9
As a consequence, trade among the Latin American countries steadily declined,
creating payments problems.10 This situation persuaded the countries, principally the
aforementioned four, to look for mechanisms that would allow them to reestablish the
level of trade and solve the payments difficulties. One of these means was the creation
of a free trade area in harmony with United States conditions and with Article XXIV of
GATT (and specifically paragraph 5).11
Another international factor contributing to economic integration as a viable

’Most of the Latin American countries had bilateral trade agreements with the United States since the
early 1900s when protectionism became the main feature of the US trade policy. These agreements were
quite disadvantageous to Latin America. It seems that the IMF was successful in its pressure because the
United States promised to accept the abrogation of these unfavorable treaties.
l0These twin problems imposed from abroad of forced industrialization and free trade led to the Latin
American nations to a developmental model with two parallel strategies. One of them was outward-looking
to the international market, especially through the exports of raw materials, and the other was the inwardlooking import substitution scheme which was very protectionist and thus, very inefficient (Valdes, 1981:
448).
""... the provisions of this agreement shall not prevent, .... the formation of a customs unions or of
a free trade area ..." (Dam, 1970: 432).
"Art. XXIV of the GATT exempts from the basic requirement of nondiscrimination [that is, the
application of the most favored nation clause, stated in Arts. I and II of GATT] to: a completed customs
union or free trade area and an "interim agreement" to achieve such a union or area "within a reasonable
length of time" according to a plan and schedule that is not disapproved by the Contracting Parties" (Evans,
1968: 83).
"[Although they are technically incompatible with the most-favored-nation-principle and are
undeniably discriminatory, such arrangements are, or at least once were thought [by the time of the
negotiation of the General agreement], to constitute a movement toward the GATT goal of freer trade"
(Dam, 1970: 19).
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political option was the deterioration of the terms of trade.12 Positing that problem out
constituted one of ECLA’s major contributions. It made the Latin American governments
aware of the vulnerability caused by the reliance on the vagaries of the international
market to obtain the foreign exchange they needed for development (ECLA: 1970).
The Treaty of Rome, 1957, which created the European Economic Community
(EEC) also influenced politicians and thinkers (Gutierrez and Wilhelmy, 1991:482). The
Community was the model for Latin America. European integration, ever since it began
to be proposed in 1946, was supported and actively promoted by the US government
(Machlup, 1977: 8-12; Hallstein, 1962: chp. 2; Hackett, 1990: 6-7; Simai, 1977: 12).
The United States, however, opposed economic integration in Latin America.
Between the end of World War II and 1960 the United States policy towards Latin
America was focussed mainly on security matters. The Latin American countries, on the
other hand, were concerned with economic issues (Bawa, 1980: 16). At the economic
level, the United States government believed that its interests and of the world would be
better served with global trade liberalization. The government was concerned that "trade
diversion" would be greater than "trade creation in the cases of economic integration
processes among developing countries."13 The United States was also worried that

12Terms of trade is defined a the ratio between the average international price of exports of a country
(or a region) and the average price of its imports. A deterioration of the terms of trade, means that over
time a country (or a region), is getting less for its exports and/or paying more for its imports.
l3Given a intra-regional trade liberalization process by which country members reduce or eliminate
import tariffs reciprocally in a pan or all of the universe of products, trade creation is a situation by which
local production is replaced by imports from a partner country which is more efficient. Trade creation will
lower for consumers the price of the products in the imponing country by the amount of the eliminated
tariff plus the amount of the difference between the price in the imponing country before the abolishment
of the tariff and the price after its elimination.
Trade diversion is a situation by which cheaper imports from non-member countries are replaced
by impons from more expensive productions coming from a partner country. The importing country will
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economic integration would affect adversely its commercial interests, and that this
process could make the region less dependent on the United States. To accept the
creation of a process of integration, the United States demanded that in addition to the
criteria stated in 1944 (see above, section 1), the process must be beneficial to new
private foreign investment, and insure free competition within the integrating area
(Thompson, 1970: 108).
As for security matters, with few exceptions, Latin America was "free" of the
Communist peril and was within the United States’ sphere of influence. For this reason
the region enjoyed a low priority in both political and economic terms. Between 1948 and
1958 "... Latin America received only 2.4 percent of Washington’s foreign aid, ranking
behind every other region in the World" (LaFeber, 1984: 95). In the 20 year period,
1945-1965, Latin American countries (excluding the Caribbean) received US $3.92
billion (Thompson, 1970: 52). The Marshall Plan allocated US $17 billion to reconstruct

be paying more for the products now coming from its partner, but the price paid by the consumers will
be equal or lower than before tariffs abrogation. This phenomenon will occur because the partner country
has the advantage of not being charged with the import tariff—which is applied to imports originating from
non-member countries.
These concepts were first coined by Viner (1950). They were subsequently developed and
expanded by Meade (1969), Gehrels (1956-1957), Lipsey (1957), Johnson (1962), Markower and Morton
(1953), and Krauss (1972). For and overview of the theories see Lipsey (1960), Krauss (1972), and
Pelkans (1980).
Trade creation is deemed as positive, in terms of world’s welfare because efficiency has increased.
Trade diversion, in the contrary is considered negative because efficiency has decreased. This factors do
not hold if only the interests of the integrating countries are taken into account. Several political effects can
be analyzed. Two of them will be dealt with here. In the first case (trade creation), the less efficient
partner, which looses its production, may consider it as unacceptable for its consequences in employment
and income generating activities, while the successful partner might be increasing its exports only slightly.
In the second case (trade diversion), the country which stops buying from third countries to buy from a
less efficient partner is not only losing fiscal revenues because tariffs are being eliminated on imports from
the partner, but also, by definition, the country is paying a higher price than otherwise. This country will
be "losing" twice, forfeiting budget income and buying dearer, while the winning country may only export
marginally. In both examples the "losing" country will be unhappy with the situation, even more so, if the
integration agreement does not consider effective compensatory devices. In the case of the "winning"
country, increase in exports may be only minimal.
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Europe.

2.3.- Domestic factors favoring economic integration
At the domestic level, many Latin American nations were undergoing profound
changes and facing similar problems. Chief among them were demographic explosion
and rural migration to the cities. These problems created a need to industrialize, to
provide urban jobs and to meet the increasing demand for goods. Other common
economic problems were stagnation, chronic inflation, balance of payments deficits, and
deterioration of the terms of trade. These problems led to social and political unrest.
Import substitution industrialization changed the structure of production in Latin
America. Industry increased its share in the gross domestic product at the expense of
agriculture. Over time, industry grew at a slower pace and more inefficiently than
expected, while agriculture stagnated. The import structure changed. The importation of
semi-finished products and capital goods became more important than the importation of
consumer goods.14 The structure of exports remained almost unchanged. Major exports
continued to be raw materials and minerals. Imports rose due to the deepening of the
industrialization process and the increasing demand for manufactured consumer goods.15
The price of exports tended to remain the same or to decrease due to vagaries of the
market, which stagnated agricultural output even more. Deficits in the trade balance

14This meant that dependency on foreign goods increased because it became more difficult for imports
to be reduced in case of a decrease in foreign exchange earnings. This was so, due to the fact that a
decrease in imports of intermediate and capital goods would almost immediately slow down industrial
activity, which in due time would affect economic growth.
l5The latter was originated by the increase of urban population due to internal migration.
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ensued, capital borrowing increased, as well as debt service. Consumption rose at a
faster pace than production, and investment lagged because of low rate of savings.
Unemployment increased because industrial production was capital intensive.
ECLA’s regional economic integration proposal allowed these countries not only
to continue the strategy of import substitution industrialization, but permitted them to
increase exports of traditional goods, and more importantly of semi-manufactured and
manufactured goods within the region. This in turn would free foreign exchange to be
used for imports from outside the region of goods not produced within it. In addition,
economic integration, by creating an expanded market, would generate the incentives to
establish new industries in these countries. Existing industries would increase efficiency
and would become competitive in the international market. By doing so, Latin America
could diversify its exports, and therefore change its export structure. In turn, increased
exports would increase regional production, would make import substitution more
efficient, and would decrease reliance on imports, thereby reducing the vulnerability and
dependency of the region. Economic integration was proposed as the instrument by which
a vicious cycle of underdevelopment could be transformed into a virtuous circle of
development.

2.4.- Progress of economic integration between 1945 and 1960
Between 1945 and 1960, several avenues were pursued towards the creation of
the common market. In 1954, a Group of Experts summoned by ECLA supported the
need for "... greater integration of the national economies in wider spheres ..." (Lleras
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Restrepo, 1972: 64), and to limit the scope of the most favored nation clause. In 1955,
ECLA, in its Sixth Session, created a Trade Committee which proposed the constitution
of a common market. It should be created gradually, should cover all goods, should
provide special treatment to the relatively less developed countries (RLDC), should
further production complementarity, should have a payments system and safeguard
clauses, and should foster competition (U.N., 1962: 38).
The Central American countries were the first to agree to pursue some sort of
economic integration. In 1952 the Central American Committee for Economic Cooper
ation--CCCE—(Comite Centroamericano de Cooperation Economica) was established.
Between 1954 and 1960, the Committee was able to create some regional institutions,
and to negotiate a series of treaties that led to the creation in 1960 of the Central
American Common Market (CACM).

3.- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE 1960s

During the 1960s, the Latin American integration process began to take shape in
the form of the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).

3.1.- The Central American Common Market (CACM)
The CACM was created by the General Treaty of Economic Integration (Tratado
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General de Integracion Economica), signed in 1960 in Managua, Nicaragua. The aim
was to create a customs union with a high degree of economic policy harmonization to
foster the economic development of the region.
At first, progress was highly impressive but problems among member countries,
which had existed from its inception, began to mount. Two of the most acute problems
were the unequal distribution of trade benefits and of industrial production. The most
developed countries—Guatemala and El Salvador—benefitted the most, while the least
developed ones—Nicaragua and Honduras—benefitted the least. Political problems made
the situation even more difficult. In 1969 El Salvador and Honduras fought the "Soccer
War." In the 1970s there was a series of trade retaliatory measures imposed primarily
because of economic stagnation. By the end of this decade, most of the restrictions to
trade among the countries were lifted, but by then civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Guatemala brought the process to a halt until the early 1990s when some attempts
were being made to revitalize it. Currently, emphasis is given to infrastructure and to
create a common market among themselves and with other Latin American countries.16

3.2.- The Caribbean integration: CARIFTA and CAR1COM
The treaty creating CARIFTA was signed in Antigua in 1965. The aim was a
gradual creation of a free trade zone in the Caribbean. In 1972 the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) was created with the signing of the Treaty of Georgetown. It encompass
the Caribbean Common Market and a system of functional cooperation and coordination

16See for instance Caballeros, 1992; Caceres, 1992; and Rojas, 1992.
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in specific areas. Its members expected that integration would bring about accelerated and
balanced development, greater economic independence, and increased leverage in
international negotiations.
Although some progress has been achieved towards the creation of the common
market, problems still abound. As in the case of the CACM, the unequal distribution of
benefits seems to be the major difficulty, accompanied by a weak linkage system among
these insular countries. Since the mid-1980s, renewed attempts to further Caribbean
integration have been made. More recently, a report of the West Indian Commission
(1992) suggesting new actions to deepen and expand integration was presented to the
Heads of State. "Despite frequently declared ambitious plans, intra-regional trade still
faces much higher barriers than most exports to the outside world" (Inotai, 1994: 59).

3.3.- The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
a) The Treaty of Montevideo
The Treaty of Montevideo creating LAFTA was signed in February 1960, and
went into effect in June 1961.17 The original seven members were Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 1961 Colombia and Ecuador joined the
association, Venezuela did it in 1966, and, lastly Bolivia, in 1967. The original aim was
the creation of a free trade zone over a period of 12 years, 1961-1973.

17An unofficial English text, translated by ECLA (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Multilateral Economic Co-operation in Latin America, Vol. I: Text and Documents, New York:
United Nations, 1962), was published in Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 43-66.
Other English translations of Treaty of Montevideo have been published in Inter-American Institute
of Legal Materials, 1975: 3-25; and in Dell, 1966: 228-257.
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The most important instrument was intra-regional trade liberalization. Every year,
new tariff reductions were to be negotiated bilaterally, and product-by-product. The
treaty also provided for limited industrial integration. There were provisions to protect
agriculture from trade intra-regional liberalization, to apply the most favored nation
clause only among the member countries, and to provide a trade treatment favorable to
the RLDC. Finally a weak institutional structure was created.
By 1964 LAFTA was stagnating. New and broader goals were to be planned, and
decisions had to be taken at the highest level, if this institution was to be revitalized
(Haas and Schmitter, 1964). Two different approaches were proposed. One, was to
convert LAFTA into a common market. The second approach was subregional
integration. The latter was the aim of some of the medium-sized countries, particularly
Chile and Colombia which had realized that the Latin American common market would
be quite difficult to achieve. These two countries were the most dissatisfied with the lack
of substantive progress of LAFTA.
In December 1965, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations was created.18
In 1966 a limited payment system began to operate.19 Furthermore, in 1967 the Summit
of American Presidents, which met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, decided to create the
Latin American Common Market in fifteen years beginning in 1970. By 1968, however,
it was clear that the dynamism required to overcome the obstacles to the free trade zone

,8The Protocol was signed in December 1966. For the texts of Resolution 117 creating the Council and
the respective Protocol see Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 87-88 and 67-70 respectively; and also Inter-American
Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 116-119.
I9In 1965 a rudimentary and cautious Multilateral Payments Clearing agreement among the Central
Banks of the LAFTA’s members was created. See the text in Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 350-353.
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was lacking. The need to modify the Treaty was raised by Peru in May of 1968, and by
Mexico in July of the same year. Discussions went on until December 1969 when the
member countries could only agree, through the Caracas Protocol, to extend the deadline
to create the free trade zone from 1973 to 1980.20 This postponement did not help at
all, and by the end of the 1970s, a new treaty was being negotiated. It was signed in
Montevideo in 1980.21 It replaced LAFTA with the Latin American Integration
Association (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integration - ALADI).
ALADI’s official aim is the gradual and progressive creation of a Latin American
common market. The new treaty, however, makes most of the obligations even less
stringent than in the previous treaty. It doesn’t set a timetable to achieve the aim. Some
of the mechanisms of the old scheme were retained but greater negotiation and
operational flexibility were allowed. New mechanisms facilitate the adoption of bilateral
as well as multilateral agreements which do not have to include all of the member
countries. The less developed countries are treated more favorably than in the Treaty of
Montevideo. A new category of countries—those of intermediate development—was
created. These countries receive some advantages over the most developed countries, but
they are not as extensive as those accorded to the less developed members.

b) LAFTA’s major problems and obstacles
From the outset LAFTA was plagued by a series of difficulties. Negotiations for

“ For the text of the Caracas Protocol see Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 26-28.
2lTo differentiate this treaty from the first one signed in the same place, the second treaty was officially
designated as "Tratado de Montevideo 1980" (Art. 64).
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furthering the free trade area quickly became an impossibility since no country wanted
to disrupt powerful domestic protectionist interests. LAFTA became a scheme to sell
excess production, and to buy what was not met by domestic production, but not for
fostering industrialization. The cumbersome tariff reduction system, the broad safeguard
clauses, and the clauses limiting agricultural trade allowed for this.
Intraregional trade, nevertheless, increased over the years (see table n .l) , but it
was marginal, only 14 percent o f total trade. Paradoxically, this percentage was reached
in the last two years of life of LAFTA. The major beneficiaries of the trade were the
three largest countries. Around 60 percent of the total intraregional trade were generated
by the big three: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, while the five medium-size
countries—Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—shared 30 percent of the
total intraregional trade. Only 5 percent of the trade was shared by Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Paraguay (Morales, 1978: 64). Most of the intraregional exports from a given country
went to two or three other member countries. For example around 50 percent of
intraregional exports of Argentina, in 1980, went to Brazil and Chile. For Brazil 58
percent of its intraregional exports went to Argentina, Colombia and Chile. In the case
of Chile, this country concentrated 65 percent of its intraregional trade with Argentina
and Brazil (Guerra-Borges, 1991; 160-161).
A more important indicator, the percentage of intraregional trade enjoying tariff
reductions in relation to total intraregional trade went down from 88.7 percent 1966 to
only 40 percent by the end of the 1970s. This last figure, in turn, was only 6 percent of
LAFTA’s total trade (Blejer, cl985: 19). Exports of products enjoying tariff reduction
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TABLE n.l
LAFTA: TRADE INDICATORS 1960-1980
(In millions of US dollars FOB and percentages)
1960

1965

1970

1975

1978

1979

1980

1

7,345

9,389

13,787

29,664

44,630

60,729

78,134

2

567

842

1,266

4,010

5,838

8,575

10,921

3

7.7%

9.0%

9.2%

13.5%

13.1%

14.1%

14.0%

4

—

5.6%

9.4%

23.0%

16.8%

36.1%

28.7%

5

—

9.7%

10.1%

43.4%

15.2%

46.9%

27.4%

1.2.3.4.5.-

Total exports by LAFTA countries.
Total intraregional exports.
Percentage of intraregional exports over total exports.
Annual average rate of growth of total exports with respect to the previous data.22
Annual average rate of growth of total intraregional exports with respect to the
previous data.23
SOURCE: Fuentes and Villanueva, 1989: 103-104.

were not important for Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela, while 80 percent of Brazilian
intraregional exports were enjoying these reductions.
The second major instrument, industrial complementation agreements, which were
designed to help further import substitution by promoting industrial specialization, was
a failure. Complementation agreements were, in practice, accords among private
entrepreneurs that were sanctioned by their governments. For this reason, these

-This indicator is calculated as the percentage difference between the value of trade of a given year
with respect to the previous data shown in the table and divided by the number of years that are in between
the two data. This percentage result merely indicates the average percentage that trade has increased with
regard to the earliest data.
^See previous footnote.
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understandings were of limited scope and were of little effect. Most of the agreements
involved basically enterprises of the three major countries. The main beneficiaries
appeared to be foreign enterprises and oligopolies (IDB, cl985: 69; Guerra-Borges,
1991: 158).
The main reasons for the failure of industrial complementation agreements were:
a) the unwillingness of the governments to coordinate industrial planning and policies;
b) their lack of interest in relinquishing the possibility of developing production of
specific goods; c) the impossibility of determining a priori a balanced agreement; d) the
unequal distribution of benefits derived from these agreements; e) the lack of sufficient
financial resources, both at national and at international levels, and f) the different levels
of development of the member countries (Bawa, 1980: 59; IDB, cl985: 69-70; Morales,
1974: 66; Guerra-Borges, 1991: 158).
The non-fulfillment of the expectations of the medium-sized and small countries
led to a demand for compensations from the larger members in the form of greater access
to their markets. The largest countries, however, were content with the status quo and
unwilling to make additional concessions. This situation led to an increasing polarization
of LAFTA and to its paralyzation by the middle of the 1960s.
The benefits were concentrated in the three major countries and created a
disillusionment of the medium-sized and small countries. The different abilities to take
advantage of the gradual and limited creation of the Latin American Free Trade Area
were principally related to "the great differences of the economic dimensions and
structures of its member countries" (Salgado, 1984: 81), that is, to their different levels
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of development.
In all, these problems reflect that "national interests dominated regional interests,
and the region remained an afterthought to more pressing concerns" (Rothstein, 1977:
197). This conclusion was more clearly expressed by Vacchino24 (quoted by Marmora,
1990: 54), who stated that "[t]he LAFTA scheme adapted itself, without major
difficulties and complications to the role reserved for economic integration in the national
development strategies, that is, a secondary and subordinate role to national and
international priorities." It is then not difficult to understand why there was no "political
will" among the governments of the member countries to adopt the measures needed to
pursue a common endeavor that from the view point of economic rationale would have
benefitted all.

24Vacchino, Juan Mario; "Teonas, esquemas y experiencias de integracion economica regional," in:
Nuevo Mundo, Aiio 5, Nos 15/16, Jan-Jun 1982, p. 175.
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CHAPTER III
FROM BOGOTA TO CARTAGENA (1966-1969):
EN ROUTE TO SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION

1.- THE DECLARATION OF BOGOTA; AND THE DECLARATION OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA

1.1.- The "Report of the Four11
Trying to revitalize the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the
new president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, asked on January 6, 1965, four outstanding Latin
American economists for advice on how to accelerate the Latin American economic
integration process. They were Felipe Herrera, then President of the Inter-American
Development Bank; Raul Prebisch, then Secretary-General of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development; Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, then President of
the Inter-American Commission for the Alliance for Progress; and Jose Antonio
Mayobre, then Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America.
Their answer, in April of the same year, was the "Proposals for the Creation of
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the Latin American Common Market."1 They said that the lack of a general integration
policy (with clearly and distinctively established objectives, methods and deadlines) is the
major reason why economic integration is progressing so slowly. They recommended the
conversion of LAFTA and the Central American Common Market (CACM) into the
Latin American Common Market. To achieve this, a definition of major objectives, the
adoption of political decisions at the highest level, and the adoption of new mechanisms
were needed.2 These four prominent economists thus reiterated the importance of
political decisions and of institutional structure.3
The recommendations of the "Report of the Four," as this document was known,
were not acted upon. "The first conference of LAFTA foreign ministers, held in
November 1965, considered the report... [but] did not adopt any of its major proposals
... . Another LAFTA conference at the end of 1966 also failed to resolve any major
issues" (Grunwald, Wionczek and Camoy, 1972: 55). This was a reflection of the
divergent national objectives of the participating members toward LAFTA.
In the meantime (1965-1967) the movement towards subregional integration began
to be discussed in earnest. The Chilean President again was its promotor (Frei, 1976:

'For the texts in Spanish of Frei’s letter and the answer the see Garcia Reynoso et al., 1965. For the
English translation of these documents see Dell, 1966: 279-310.
2Among the mechanisms suggested were automatic across-the-board tariff reductions, industrial
programming, foreign investment promotion, a payment system, and a strengthened institutional structure.
3In other words, they gave the neo-functionalist and federalist approaches greater relevance than the
functionalist one. As it has been mentioned in chapter I, neo-functionalism focussed on a political decision
to deepen the process. In this case, the four prominent economists suggested deepening the process by
converting the two Latin American integration processes into a common market. Federalism focussed on
the creation of institutions as the tool to achieve integration. The advice to strengthen the organs of the
Latin American integration process was in line with this approach. Functionalism stressed cooperation only
on technical, non-political issues.
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11). President Raul Leoni of Venezuela and President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo of
Colombia supported the initiative (Elgueta, 1976: 24-25). Moreover, as President-elect,
in July 1966, Lleras Restrepo visited the presidents of Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and
Chile and invited them to meet in Bogota, Colombia in order to adopt the basis of a
future Andean Community (Frei, 1976: 11; de la Puente, 1988: 214; Valdes, 1984: 63).

1.2.- The Bogota Meeting
In August 1966, in Bogota, the Presidents of Chile, Eduardo Frei Montalva;
Colombia, Carlos Lleras Restrepo; and Venezuela, Raul Leoni; and the personal
representatives of the Presidents of Ecuador, Galo Plaza Montano; and Peru, Fernando
Schwalb Lopez Aldana signed the Declaration of Bogota (Declaration de Bogota).* They
decided to foster economic growth of their countries, as a means of achieving a balanced
and harmonious regional development. To accomplish this, they agreed to an automatic
tariff reduction more accelerated, and more encompassing than LAFTA’s; a program to
develop new industrial production; a program to harmonize economic policies, in which
a common foreign investment policy had a priority;5 and more effective actions favoring
the relatively less developed countries (RLDC) than the ones in LAFTA.
The proposed measures were more in line with ECLA’s proposals. According to
Tomic (1980: 188), the Declaration of Bogota was a veiled note to the big three

*The Declaration also includes a "Bases for an Immediate Action Programme" which provides greater
details and more specific steps the governments were willing to pursue. The English version of this text
can be found in Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 149-164.
5A common treatment of foreign investment and technology was a major preoccupation of the
Presidents. They wanted to avoid repeating LAFTA and CACM experiences, where there was significant
evidence that "foreign companies had seized many of the benefits from integration" (Ferris, 1979a: 51).
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(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) that if LAFTA remained in stagnation, the Andean
countries would proceed towards subregional integration. It was also a clear indication
that the presidents of the Andean countries were not only dissatisfied with LAFTA’s
results, but more importantly with the aims, structure and mechanisms of this institution.
The presidents believed in a radical departure from LAFTA as the solution.6

1.3.- The summit of Punta del Este
These were the most important antecedents (with regard to subregional
integration) to the summit meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967. The
Presidents of all the countries of the Americas were present, and the United States, for
the first time, gave official support to integration in Latin America. At this meeting the
Declaration of the American Presidents (Declaration de los Presidentes de America) was
signed. The Declaration, among other things, instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
To promote the conclusion of temporary subregional agreements, with
provisions for reducing tariffs within the subregions and harmonizing treatments
toward third nations more rapidly than in the general agreements, in keeping with
the objectives of regional integration. Subregional tariff reductions will not be
extended to countries that are not parties to the subregional agreement, nor will
they create special obligations for them. ...
The countries of relatively less economic development will have the right
to participate and obtain preferential conditions in the subregional agreements in
which they have an interest (Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 97-98, italics added).

For the Andean countries this was a significant achievement. The Latin American
nations and the United States had accepted the principle that nations would be able to

6"... the move to Andean integration represented a response to the inability of LAFTA to respond to
the national interests of the less well developed partners by failing to agree to packages of measures that
would assure support of all the member countries" (Axline, 1994b: 204).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

create subregional groupings within LAFTA’s framework. Subregional integration would
allow countries to move faster towards the goal of a common market while at the same
time member countries would not have to apply the most favorable nation clause.7
The Declaration of the American Presidents was a non-binding document. Soon,
it was forgotten by most of the governments but not by the Andean countries.

1.4.- "Bases for a Subregional Agreement1'
In June 1967, two months after the Presidents’ summit, in Vina del Mar, Chile,
the Joint Commission (Comision Mixta), envisaged in the Declaration of Bogota (August
1966), to draft the subregion agreement, was installed. It was composed of government
representatives of Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.8 The Commission
adopted the "Bases for a Subregional Agreement" at its third meeting, in August of 1967,
in Caracas, Venezuela and in the following month the LAFTA Council of Ministers
ratified them. The five-member countries agreed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
restrictions for all the products at a faster rate than LAFTA. The Bases stipulated the
adoption of a minimum common tariff, a set of rules of origin, safeguard clauses, and
regulations to prevent unfair competition. The countries also agreed to coordinate their
economic policies. Ecuador and any other RLDC joining the subregional integration
process would enjoy special treatment to benefit effectively from the opportunities created

7The principle of the Most Favored Nation states that any concession given to any member of an
agreement should be automatically extended to all parties.
®The Bolivian government joined the Commission as observer at its third meeting (August 1967), and
as official member in the fourth meeting (November 1967).
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by integration, especially with regard to trade, industry, and investment.
In the second session of its sixth meeting the Joint Commission was able to finish
its work.9 On May 26, 1969, the Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador
and Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement in Bogota, Colombia. Venezuela abstained.

2.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: ORGANS
The original Cartagena Agreement10 established the Commission and the Junta
(Board) as the principal organs of the Andean Pact.11 The original auxiliary units were
the Consultative Committee, and the Social and Economic Committee.

2.1.- The Commission
The Commission is the highest organ of the agreement. It has exclusive legislative
power, as a consequence it is entrusted with making political decisions. It is in charge

’The Joint Commission in this sixth meeting was not able to reach the final accords and had to adjourn.
A second session was then called to finish the work. By this act the technique of adjourning and calling
for a another session of the same meeting was established within the Andean Pact. This device would be
used every time government representatives would not be willing to acknowledge the lack of progress or
the existence of problems in agreeing on certain issues.
10The English translation published in International Legal Materials (Vol. VIII, No 5, September 1969)
is reproduced in Garcia-Amador, 1978: 239-282; and in Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975,
Vol I: 175-218.
"In 1979 the Andean Court of Justice (May) and the Andean Parliament (October) were created. The
Quito Protocol, 1987, incorporated them as principal organs of the agreement. The following Andean units
are not, however, part of the Cartagena Agreement: the Andean Development Corporation (Corporation
Andina de Fomento, CAF), created in February 1968; The Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andino de
Reserva, FAR), created in June 1976, and later transformed into the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reserva, FLAR) in March 1991; the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations
(November 1979); the Andean University "Simon Bolivar, established in September 1986; the three social
agreements (see chapter IV, section 1.1); and the Andean Presidential Council created in May 1990.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

of the general direction of the process and to deal with all the aspects included in the
agreement. It is constituted by one plenipotentiary from each country.12 The
Commission meets ordinarily three times a year, and extraordinarily at the request of one
country or the Junta. The quorum is fixed at two-thirds of its members (four out of five),
each member having one vote. Non-participation in a meeting is considered as abstention
in the voting.
The Commission’s accords are called "Decisions." Decisions, as a general rule,
are adopted by affirmative votes of two-thirds of its members. There are three groups of
issues, detailed in the three annexes of the Cartagena Agreement, for which this general
rule does not apply. For the first group of subjects, included in Annex I,13 there is the
right of veto. For the second group of matters, considered in Annex n , 14 any member
country can veto an item only once. In the third group of issues, related to the special
treatment of Bolivia and Ecuador, a decision is approved if at least one of these two
countries votes affirmatively and the other abstains.

l2The plenipotentiary of each country, have been, in practice the minister or cabinet rank functionary
who was in charge of integration matters.
l3The original items in this Annex were: Delegation of responsibilities to the Junta; approval of changes
of the agreement; amending the Junta’s proposals; approval of the rules for policy harmonization, of
physical and agricultural integration programs; modification of the number of dutiable items exempted from
the tariff reduction program; acceleration of the tariff reduction program; and establishing the terms of
accession to the agreement. The latest version of the Cartagena Agreement, also includes: to modify the
deadlines stipulated in the agreement; to approve and modify the common external tariff (moved from
Annex II) and; to approve Junta's proposals with regard to solving conflicts arising from restrictions in
agricultural trade.
14Items included in this Annex were: Approval of the list of products reserved for sectoral industrial
programming, approval of the sectoral industrial programs, approval of the rationalization programs,
approval of the common minimum external tariff and the common external tariff (moved to Annex I),
approval of the special rules on origin. With the changes in the text of the agreement, the approval of
sectoral industrial programs was taken out of this Annex because it became possible for a country not to
participate in some of them. The rationalization programs were eliminated from the agreement, thus it
disappeared from this Annex. No new items were included in this Annex.
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This complicated voting system relies heavily on consensus, and gives the
Commission the characteristic of an inter-governmental institution,

in which

governments’ priorities dominate and the decisions adopted by the Commission reflect
the interests of the governments. This is reinforced by the fact that most of the decisions
need domestic legislation in order to be implemented.15 In theory, however, the
Commission had to reconcile and amalgamate national interests, giving shape and form
to community interests (JUNAC, 1982a: 2).

2.2.- The Junta
The Junta is the secretariat and the technical organ of the Cartagena Agreement.
Its headquarters are in Lima, Peru. Its main duties are to ensure the observance of the
agreement’s norms, the observance of the Commission’s Decisions and of its own
Resolutions; to prepare studies at its own initiative as well as those requested by the
Commission; to coordinate with government offices in charge of integration, and with
other organizations dealing with regional integration; to cooperate with Bolivia and
Ecuador so these countries can benefit from the process; and to evaluate yearly the
progress made, and based on the results, to propose modifications. In order to fulfill
these tasks, the Junta has the power to make "Proposals" to the Commission dealing with
measures and policies.16 The Commission has to consider all the Junta's proposals.

15With the functioning of the Andean Court, January, 1984, all decisions should have been
automatically part of the national legislation unless it was otherwise indicated in the decision. In practice,
this automaticity has not worked.
16This power was an exclusive prerogative of the Junta. With the Quito Protocol, the governments of
the member countries also share this power but they have not use it.
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The Junta is composed of three members appointed unanimously by the
Commission. They serve for a three year term and can be reelected. In case of vacancy,
the Commission should appoint a replacement for a three year term.17 All actions of the
Junta must be adopted unanimously.
The Junta's main mission is to represent the interests of the subregion as a whole.
With this in mind, the expectation for this principal body was that it would be in charge
of putting into practice a balanced distribution of benefits. The Junta has technical and
administrative personnel under its sole control which is independent of the
governments.18

2.3.- Other bodies
The Consultative Committee was in charge of linking the governments with the
Junta, but it rarely functioned. Its tasks were taken over by the specialized councils
created by the Commission, and later eliminated by the Quito Protocol.
The Economic and Social Committee19 was composed of representatives of
entrepreneurs and workers. Its function was to advise the Commission and the Junta on
matters pertaining to the committee’s interest, as requested by any of the two main

17This was later changed by Article 11 of the Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987. The replacement
should serve only for the remainder of the period.
18In practice Junta’s members tend to reflect the interests of their countries since their candidacy has
to be supported by their governments. The same applies, in general, with regard to the Junta's professional
personnel.
'*The Committee was later replaced, in January 1983, by the Entrepreneurial Consultative Council
(Decision 175) and the Labor Consultative Council (Decision 176). They were incorporated by the Quito
Protocol as auxiliary bodies. Their functions remain similar to the functions of the Economic and Social
Committee.
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organs. This Committee was also seldom asked to convene.
The auxiliary bodies have not functioned as expected, because the Commission
and the Junta colluded to monopolize control of the Andean process, the Commission
from the national and political point of view, the Junta from the community and technical
view point. The few times these auxiliary organs were called on, they were given tasks
for which their reports were not given much attention. They were also summoned just
to be informed about some issues which were in their direct interest.

3.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: AIMS AND MECHANISMS

The official aims of the Cartagena Agreement are to promote the balanced and
harmonious development of its member countries, and to accelerate their growth by
means of economic integration. The benefits derived from integration should be
distributed with equity in order to reduce the existing gap among the member nations.
These aims have the objective of bringing about a sustained improvement in the standard
of living of the subregion’s inhabitants.
The mechanisms to implement the principles were: (a) policy harmonization,
giving priority to a common treatment of foreign investment; (b) industrial programming
to accelerate industrialization; (c) a gradual tariff reduction process; (d) a common
external tariff preceded by a common minimum external tariff; (e) agricultural
development and cooperation programs; (f) physical integration, and (g) special treatment
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for Bolivia and Ecuador, the relatively less developed countries of the group.

3.1.- Policy harmonization
Policy harmonization, which includes coordination of planning, is the first
mechanism the Cartagena Agreement’s text contemplates (Chapter HI). As such, the
drafters signaled that this mechanism was to be the framework for other mechanisms.
Member countries were required to begin a process of coordination of their development
plans, and to coordinate their economic and social policies in order to attain a common
planning system. This process would evolve gradually, parallel to, and in coordination
with, the formation of the subregional market.20

3.2.- Industrial programming
Industrial programming would be implemented through sectoral programs for
industrial development, and rationalization programs. Each sectoral program would be
a negotiated accord specifying the products included, and investment needed. The accords
should also consider plant locations, harmonization of trade and other policies, a common
external tariff, special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador, and other complementary
measures with regard to the enjoyment of the expanded market. Rationalization programs
would be applied to industries which have not been selected as part of sectoral programs.
The aim was to increase their efficiency and productivity.

“ This meant, according to the Junta (JUNAC, 1983a: 8), the adoption from the outset of a set of
common norms on basic aspects of economic policy to avoid distortions in the functioning of the unified
market competition.
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3.3.- Program of tariff reduction
The tariff reduction program was a complex mechanism. It was characterized for
encompassing all the dutiable products; being automatic and irrevocable; being gradually
achieved; having different forms of liberalization according to the level of development
of the country and according to the product; being flexible by allowing the use of the
safeguard clauses; and for the existence of temporary and limited exemptions to the tariff
reduction program according to the level of development of each country.

3.4.- External tariff
The common external tariff (CET) was to be adopted in two stages. The first was
the approval, by December 1970, of the common minimum external tariff (CMET). The
larger countries were to begin the process of gradual, proportional and automatic
approximation of it in December 1971 and finish this process in December 1975. Smaller
countries were, in practical terms,, not required to apply the CMET.
The second stage was the approval of the CET itself. It was to be negotiated
between December 1973 and December 1975 when it would be approved. The larger
countries would have five years (1976-1980) to apply it gradually. The smaller countries
would have ten years (1976-1985) to do it.

3.5.- Special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador
Specific advantages were given to Bolivia and Ecuador in the tariff reduction
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program and the CET. They were in the form of longer periods to implement these
mechanisms, and in the form of the immediate opening of the Andean market for most
of their products.
In other mechanisms only general and ambiguous advantages were conferred upon
these nations. In the case of policy harmonization it was stated that a differential
treatment should be enough as to compensate for the structural deficiencies of Bolivia and
Ecuador. As for the industrial programming, these countries should have priority in the
localization of plants, should have preferential treatment and exclusive advantages to
benefit effectively from the expanded market. The other member countries also pledged
to act jointly in order to obtain technical and financial assistance for the smaller nations.

3.6.- Other mechanisms
The common agricultural regime was basically a vague set of cooperation
programs designed to improve agricultural production and development. More
importantly, it also considered a list of agricultural products (to be defined by December
1970) which would be exempt from the tariff reduction program.
The Cartagena Agreement also included the adoption of rules with regard to
unfair competition, safeguard clauses, and origin of goods. These rules were designed
to minimize trade distortions and to rely on the market as the most important tool to
determine trade.
With regard to physical integration, the agreement attempted to improve
infrastructure, especially in the areas of energy, transports, and communications; and to
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improve border traffic. The aim was to facilitate trade.

4.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS AS A POLITICAL ENDEAVOR

The creation of the Andean Group put into practice the decision to pursue
subregional integration to increase the rate of growth, and to redistribute its benefits in
an orderly manner. In this way, it was expected that increasing social malcontent could
be alleviated. This process was the most creative and the boldest of all the integration
processes attempted in Latin America then or later. Its political creators set to themselves
objectives, ends, and means that responded to both the realities of the end of 1960s and
the future (Davila, 1984: 1).
The governments were also hopeful that subregional agreement would accelerate
the creation of a Latin American common market. As such, the Andean Group was
conceived of as a temporary agreement within LAFTA. This view was echoed by the
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin (1969: 26-27).
He declared that
the Andean Group had been created to overcome the institutional deficiencies, and
the vacuum existing in LAFTA; to promote dynamically the development of a
relatively homogenous group of countries; and to execute temporarily, within the
framework of the Treaty of Montevideo, a program that would help the Andean
countries to develop at the same rate as the rest of the region.
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4.1.-Negotiating the Cartagena Agreement
The member countries supported the creation of the Andean Pact basically as a
tool to achieve or to further their own and not necessarily coincidental national
interests.21 As such, each one of the partners perceived that the subregional integration
process should be an instrument to contribute to their economic and social development.
Although it is complementary to the national measures applied by each country, the
common instrument was designed to greatly modify national structures (JUNAC, 1979b:
7). It is also true that this common instrument has to reflect the national interests of the
governments of the member countries.

a) Commercialists vs Developmentalists
From the beginning the countries’ position clearly defined two groups: the
"commercialist" and the "developmentalist" (Avery, 1983: 158). The first group was
composed of Colombia and Chile, the most developed and industrialized countries of the
subregion and thus perceived as the most important and powerful units (see table III. 1).
They intended to have an integration process in which market forces would be
predominant. Their aim was basically to create a common market as defined by the
prevalent economic theory of the time and by GATT. This common market would be
created gradually but as quickly as possible with the support of a powerful institutional
structure as prescribed by federalist and neo-functionalist theories.

21"It is evident that each country pursue its own objectives to which they give maximum priority, and
conceiving integration as an instrument that contributes to reach these goals.... national economic interests
are, as a matter of fact, above the Andean process ..." (Vega-Centeno and Iguinez, 1978: 171, 172).
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TABLE III.l
ANDEAN GROUP AND ANDEAN COUNTRIES STATISTICAL PROFILE
Relatively more developed
Colombia
YEARS

Chile

Middle

Venezuela

%

Relatively less developed
Ecuac or

Peru

%

%

Bolivia

%

%

GRAN
1/ 2/
3/

A

1992

33

57

B

1970

9.4

21.4

39

10.6

19

13.2

24

6.1

11

4.3

8

55.5

1994

14.0

34.5

35

21.0

21

23.4

24

11.6

12

7.9

8

98.3

1970

70.4

57.4

71.8

58.1

39.5

38.2

1993 4/

85.6

70.3

83.7

70.9

58.0

53.9

1970

2.9

6.5

38

3.0

18

4.2

25

1.8

11

1.4

8

16.9

1994 5/

6.7

13.2

37

7.5

21

8.7

24

3.7

10

2.6

7

35.7

1970

4.1

7.5

7.8

4.7

4.2

13.1

1993 6/

6.2

7.9

10.0

10.0

8.3

6.5

1970

7.6

7.2

25

11.6

41

7.2

25

1.7

6

1.0

3

28.6

1993 11

41.5

50.0

28

80.1

45

27.1

15

14.5

8

5.9

3

177.6

1970

779

337

1,091

544

277

231

515

1993

3,013

1,472

3,774

1,224

1,324

915

1,810

1970 8/

89

501

15

1,970

58

424

12

438

13

70

2

3,403

1993 9/

1,427

4,389

33

4,585

34

1,618

12

1,853

14

1,050

8

13,395

70-75

26.0

34.5

36.1

40.5

41.2

45.4

38.0

90-95

21.8

25.8

28.3

29.0

30.9

34.4

28.0

C
D
E
F
G
H
I

47

93

113

68

6.9
7.9
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70-75

72.0

73.0

48.6

110.0

95.0

151.3

85.0

90-95

14.0

37.0

33.2

75.8

57.4

84.8

52.0

70-75

64.2

61.6

66.2

55.5

58.9

46.7

60.0

90-95

74.4

69.3

70.3

64.6

66.6

61.1

67.0

1970

89.0

78.0

75.0

81.0

72.0

57.0

74.0

1993 10/

95.0

90.0

90.0

87.0

88.0

81.0

88.0

1970

65.0

47.2

54.4

60.4

53.7

60.4

53.0

1990

66.0

57.4

60.9

80.0

72.0

60.1

65.0

1970

15.0

8.0

10.0

20.0

8.0

20.0

n.a.

1992

6.0

9.0

10.0

20.0

5.0

11.0

n.a.

1970 11/

33.0

25.0

15.0

51.0

14.0

63.0

28.0

1994

41.4

39.0

49.0

83.0

88.0

66.0

55.0

1970

19.5

16.0

3.0

16.0

11.0

15.0

1994 12/

23.0

41.0

22.0

21.0

51.0

27.0

Blank = Not applicable
n.a. = Not available
A = Human Development Index
B = Population (Millions)
C = Percentage of urban population
D = Economically active population,
EAP (Millions)
E = Urban unemployment rate as percentage
of EAP
F = Gross Domestic Product (Billions of US
current dollars)
G = Gross Domestic Product per capita (US
current dollars)
H = Foreign direct investment (Cumulative,
US$ millions)

I = Natality rate (Per thousand)
J = Infant mortality rate
K = Life expectancy at birth (Years)
L = Adult literacy rate (Percentage)
M = Ratio of students to total school-age
population
N = Food imports (Percentage of merchandise
imports)
O = Total external debt as percentage of GDP
P = Public debt service as percentage of
exports of goods
1/ Chile is not included while Venezuela is in
GRAN figures
2/ GRAN data may not add-up due to rounding
3/ Data in percentages column refer to shares

9.0>
36.0

within GRAN.
4 / Chile: 1990 5 / Chile: 1995 6 / Chile: 1994
7/ Chile: constant prices, 1980
8/ Chile: 1970 only
9/ Chile: 1993 only
10/ All countries 1992, GRAN 1993
11/ Chile: external public debt only
121 Colombia and GRAN 1993
SOURCES - UNDP, 1995 : 20, 162; ECLA,
1976b; 1984a; 1985a; 1994d; 1995a: 5, 8, 13,
20, 53, 173, 174, 191, 193, 502-503, 764;
JUNAC, 1994; 1994c: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 33,
35; 1994d; 1995c: 27; 1995i: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10
IDB, C1983: 387, 392; 1995: 288, 300, 305;
and author’s calculations.
-j
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The developmentalists, Peru, Venezuela (which were not as developed and
industrialized as Chile and Colombia) and to a lesser extent Bolivia and Ecuador (the
least developed members), wanted an integration process that would emphasize sectoral
industrial programming, economic planning and regional coordination. The position of
these four countries was nearer the ECLA’s stmctmal-dependentista proposals.
It can be said the difference between the two groups was having less policy
harmonization versus having more policy harmonization; and having more or less
government intervention in the economy and, thus, in the Andean integration process.

b) National interests and the negotiation of the Cartagena Agreement
The Chilean governments considered the Andean Group as a place for expanding
exports (Tironi, 1978: 260-263), for improving its relations with Bolivia and Peru with
whom Chile has border problems and, during the administration of Salvador Allende, as
a mechanism to reduce its international isolation. For Colombia the "Andean integration
is visualized as a tool for increasing foreign trade, for stimulating industrial growth, and
for reaching a greater economic efficiency" (Caballero, 1978: 102).
Chile and Colombia were the most interested in finishing the draft as soon as
possible. Their delegations presented most of the proposals, hammered out the
agreements, and worked the hardest to convince the other countries. Therefore, the final
text reflected more the developmentalist interests of the other four countries than the
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commercialist interests of these two.22
The Andean Group, for Peru was also a tool. "We never understood integration
other than to be of profound instrumental value. ... A liberating instrument par
excellence, the Andean Pact should ... strengthen our economic autonomy and the
increasing capability of our peoples to decide their destiny by themselves" (Velasco,
1972: 320).23 The Peruvian government up to 1968, was not enthusiastic about
subregional integration. Its participation in the negotiation process was characterized by
apathy and obstructionism.24 The Peruvian aim was to relinquish as little sovereignty
as possible. Only after the reformist military government took power in October 1968,
did Peru, after some hesitation, decide to participate in earnest.
For Venezuela (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 252, 254), the role of integration was
viewed as a contribution that would help its industrialization and to increase its
international trade. Venezuela at the very end refrained from signing the Cartagena
Agreement. This country felt that, the agreement, as it was, would have meant that its

- " ...th e fact that they [Chile and Colombia] progressively accepted a shift from the commercial to the
developmental axis in the integration strategy only shows how important the extended market was for the
governments of both countries" (Mace, 1994: 37).
“ "The "two fundamental objectives of the Government [are]: political and economic independence at
the international level, social justice at the national level. ... The active participation of Peru in ... LAFTA
and the Andean Group is oriented to attain these goals" (Mercado Jam'n, 1969: 24).
The Andean Group "... contributes to substantially further national development, ..., to acquire
greater influence in the Latin American and international arenas, ..." (Garcfa Bedoya, 1981: 74, 90).
For the Peruvian National Institute of Planning, "Integration ... should be a complement ... for
attaining our goals in a more efficient manner" (Plan National de Desarrollo 1971-74. Vol. I. Plan Global.
Lima, Peru: Instituto Nacional de Planificacion, 1971, 51, quoted in Vega-Centeno and Iguiiiez, 1978:
172).
“ Most of the times its delegates would behave more as observers than as negotiators. Moreover, the
membership of the delegation of Peru was constantly changing, forcing the other delegations to explain all
over to the newly arrived Peruvian representatives, in turn they would not commit themselves to any
opinion adducing lack of knowledge.
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small progress to industrialize would be wiped out by the more advanced countries, Chile
and Colombia.25
According to the Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Bolivia the Andean
Pact was a tool for its industrial development.26 Bolivia reluctantly joined the
negotiation process, in August of 1967, a year after the signing of the Declaration of
Bogota. By then, Bolivia had realized that the other five countries had clearly decided
to go ahead. For Bolivia to forgo integration would have meant to be even more isolated
from the region and the subregion.27 To participate in the subregional integration would
also allow Bolivia easier access to other countries. Last but not least it would provide
another sympathetic forum to continue to press for its quest for access to the ocean.
In the case of Ecuador the Andean market would serve for the expansion of
Ecuadorean exports and the development of certain industries (Moncada, 1978: 152).

^Venezuela had begun its industrialization process later than these two countries. Besides being an oil
rich and oil exporting country, the inflow of foreign exchange obliged Venezuela to maintain an exchange
rate parity based on its oil revenues in order not to pile up excessive foreign reserves. This meant that this
country had to have an overvalued currency in relation to everything else but oil. This in turn meant that
imports were made easier and exports more difficult. To protect its industries, high tariffs had to be
imposed, and when this was not enough, quotas and import prohibitions had to be enacted. This
protectionism lead to local production which was more expensive in Colombia, Chile, and even in some
cases, in Peru. From the political point of view, local industrialists successfully opposed Venezuela’s entry
to the Pact unless special provisions were included (Rodriguez, 1974).
26"... the Andean subregional agreement constitutes one of the vital mechanisms to implement the
national strategy of development ... because it offer access to an expanded market which will allow the
development of the industrial sector" (Estrategia Socio-Economica del Desarrollo Nacional 1971-1991, La
Paz, Bolivia, 1970, Tomo II, 647; quoted in Morales and Machicado, 1978: 44).
More political goals (Dooner and Fernandez, 1982: 25) for Bolivia were: (a) non-participation in
the Andean Pact would be a form of marginalization which its consequences were difficult to foresee, (b)
Since Chile was going to be a member, with whom had a long-standing territorial problem, there was no
other alternative for Bolivia but to be a member also. And (c) the idea that the Andean Group could
improve the situation in Bolivia, while it could hardly made things worse.
^Bolivia had lost all its coastal territory, and Peru its southernmost department, to Chile as a result
of the Pacific War (1879-1883) between Bolivia and Peru against Chile. Since then Bolivia has been
demanding access to the sea either through part of its former land or through Peru. In January 1992, Peru
granted Bolivia a corridor to the Pacific Ocean.
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Ecuador participated with enthusiasm in the negotiation process. The objective of the
Ecuadorean delegation was to obtain as many advantages as possible. Because of this
delegation, the RLDC were able to obtain more extensive special treatment than Chile
and Colombia were disposed to accept.
Whatever were the national interests and the degrees of enthusiasm, the
governments considered the Andean Group as a tool to improve the standard of living
of their population. As a Colombian study stated28:
... the Colombian contribution to the Andean process is positive and contributes
to accelerate it when the national objectives and those of the Andean integration
coincide; and is negative, producing its stagnation, when the interests do not
coincidence ...
Colombia designs and executes its economic policy based solely on its
domestic aims ... it has never adopted policies having as the sole reason its
participation in the Andean Group.
This is also clearly and succinctly stated by Guerra-Borges (1991: 124): "In the last
analysis integration processes are political processes because their creation, development,
stagnation, or reversion are caused by government decisions."

c) The Andean Pact: A political endeavor?
The aforementioned facts show that the negotiating process was political, in which
the governments were directly involved. Eduardo Frei (1974: 33) corroborates it by
stating that "the experience of how the Andean Pact was created shows that it was bom
thanks to a political decision carried out with political will." Frei’s assertion is reinforced

28Junguito, Roberto and Caballero, Carlos.- Situation y perspectivas de la economia colombiana en
relation con elprogreso del integration andina. Bogota, Colombia: FEDESARROLLO, November 1974,
quoted in Caballero, 1978: 103.
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by the following quotations: "The drafting of the Cartagena Agreement is the result of
a long negotiation, held between August, 1966 and May, 1969, which had essentially a
political character" (JUNAC, 1972: 3). "The birth of the Cartagena Agreement was
really the product of a political decision ..." (Grados, 1992: 41). The Andean economic
integration process, from the start as well as in practice, was a political endeavor,
initiated and implemented by politicians using economic mechanisms to achieve shared
national goals, rather than an economic enterprise employing economic tools.

4.2.- The Cartagena Agreement: an economic or a political instrument?
The official aim of the agreement, to foster economic development, was an
economic objective. This objective was to be achieved "mostly" by economic means. The
integration process considered in the agreement aims to attain a sort of economic union
but without considering the creation of a common market29 (because economic policy
harmonization is considered a mechanism, but there was no explicit provision for free
movements of capital and labor).30 Market integration and policy integration, as
explained in chapter I, section 1.1, were part of the aims of the Agreement. By having

■^There is no clear agreement with regard to what was the form of integration the Andean process
wanted to pursue. Some authors say that it was the achievement of a customs union only; others assert that
the aim was to create a common market (Fffench-Davis, 1978: 67; JUNAC, 1991: 5); still others maintain
that the final objective was the formation of an economic union (Salazar, 1973: 13; JUNAC, 1979a: 35;
JUNAC-CEE, 1986: 7). A more cautious view is to say that the purpose was the creation of a larger
economic area (Davila, 1984: 6); or an extended market (Marquez, 1990: 7)
“ Chapter XII of the Cartagena Agreement deals with financial matters. Its aim is the coordination of
national financial and payment policies. Among the aspects to be coordinated is the adoption of measures
facilitating capital circulation within the subregion. Facilitating the circulation of capital is not as having
free movement of capital, that is, a situation in which capital could go from one country to another as if
it was moving within one country. As for movement of labor, the Cartagena Agreement is completely
silent, perhaps because it was perceived as a social issue.
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Industrial Programming as a mechanism to accelerate industrialization (that is, import
substitution), production integration was also an important aim of the Andean integration
process. Thus, from the typological point of view, the agreement’s aim was to create an
economic union (that is, the economic policy integration aspect of market integration)
accompanied integration of production.31
The Cartagena Agreement was also a political instrument, because it considered
topics that have no direct relation to economics. One example of this was the basic
objective of the agreement, to bring about "a sustained improvement in the standard of
living of the subregion’s inhabitants." This aim clearly encompassed more than economic
aspects, and many of them were in the realm of politics. The agreement also included
issues32 that for non-economists seem to be within the realm of economics, but for
economists they are in the realm of other social sciences, like politics.33 This is so
because although economics may intervene to formulate alternatives based on efficiency,
choosing among alternatives is a process in the hands of governments. They may not
choose the most efficient proposal for their countries or for the subregion as a whole in
economic terms, but in political terms dictated by the moment.

31As has been mentioned in chapter I, section 1.1, production integration focus on industrial planning,
coordination and specialization. Market integration refers to the process of creating a larger markets,
through preferential trade areas, free trade zones, and customs unions. Policy integration aims to harmonize
and eventually unify economic and social policies.
32To mention only a few cases, issues like the preparation and the negotiation of sectoral industrial
programs; common regime for the treatment of foreign capital, and transnational corporations; or a
common tariff schedule classification, as well as determining the list of products to be exempted from the
tariff reduction program.
33For example Cooper and Massed (1965) and Johnson (1965) argue that the reason for establishing
an integration process such as a customs union may be to further non-economic objectives, and preference
for industrialization is one of these non-economic aims.
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The process of making economic decisions is not an economic issue but
exclusively a political one, "... policy is politics."34 From the text of the Cartagena
Agreement it is clear that economic decisions that had to be taken had to respond to
political objectives (Aninat, 1992: 17). It is also clear that with the exception of the
automatic tariff reduction program, the functioning of the mechanisms are subject to
negotiations among the representatives of the governments of the member countries.
Furthermore, through the text of the agreement, it is apparent that the implementation
of the treaty is in the hands of the governments of the member countries.

4.3.- The Agreement as a reflection of the interests of the governments
On a more practical level, the ultimate aim of the Cartagena Agreement was to
be an instrument for the improvement of the living standard of the member countries. In
other words, development is the major goal for each one of the member countries. Being
only one means to deal with development, subregional integration was logically linked
to the model and strategy of development" of the members.35 This meant that the aims
of the Cartagena Agreement had to reflect the objectives which at that moment the
member countries wanted to accomplish through the process of subregional economic
integration. The rationale with regard to the role of Andean integration, as had been
already contemplated by ECLA several years ago, was to be a support development by

^"Nobody has attained political maturity who does not understand that policy is politics. Economists
are particularly apt to overlook these truths'* (Joseph A. Schumpeter, quoted by Lortie, 1975: v, italics
added).
35The Andean governments, during the 1960s and part of the 1970s, asynchronically pursued a common
development model of inward-oriented industrialization. The strategy used was import substitution (ECLA,
1970: 137; Puyana, 1984: 296).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

enlarging the market size and, creating the possibility for import substitution to be
furthered more efficiently, and dynamically.
The development model and the integration scheme were responses to the concert
of opinions of the five original member governments. These responses were based upon
the internal situation and perspectives of each one of the countries, as well as on the
international situation at the end of the sixties (JUNAC, 1987: 1; 1976: 19). The
Cartagena Agreement expressly reflects the prevalent ideas about economic development
in Latin America during the sixties (Carmona, 1984: 5). One of these ideas was that
states should not only have a major role in adopting decisions to put the agreement into
practice but also, that the state should have a major role in their implementation.
At the time the final draft was considered to contain a regional strategy flexible
enough to accommodate the diverse national economic policies of the member countries,
while being sufficiently coherent to accomplish the common goals pursued by the parties.
The Andean process was created by a political initiative to deal with political issues
(development) by employing economic instruments.

4.4.- Organs: An assessment
The institutional structure, especially with regard to the Junta, was one of the
innovative characteristics of the Andean Group. The original main bodies of the
Cartagena Agreement were created with enough powers in the expectation that they
would influence the actions of the governments of the member countries. "The Treaty
established a well-developed institutional framework" (Mace, 1983: 183). With the
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exception of the EEC, no other integration process had an organization with such
autonomy and power to implement the political agreement.
Even considering this powerful community organization in which the Junta is
considered autonomous and with a high degree of authority, the Junta recognized that
what is to be done is contained in the Cartagena Agreement; how to do it is within the
scope of the Commission; and the speed of action would depend on what the
governments were willing to provide for it (JUNAC, 1979a: 38-39). In similar terms,
the Cartagena Agreement is a framework treaty outlining the main lines of action for
economic integration. Its efficiency, however, definitively depends to a great extent on
the effective and coordinated action of the agreement’s institutions. It also depends on
the ability of the member countries to apply the common policies, and on the will of the
governments to fulfill their obligations (Aninat, 1992: 15). In other words, the most
important aspects of the agreement: its aims, its policies and its evolution are not in the
hands of the Junta's but in hands of the governments of the member countries.

5.- ANDEAN PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS

The Cartagena Agreement reflected the national objectives the member countries
wanted to accomplish through the Andean integration process. The member countries,
through the negotiation of the agreement, not only reached consensus on the common
aims to be fulfilled but also with regard to the mechanisms to be used. Besides,
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consensus arrived at through negotiations did not mean a convergence of interests, but
a common denominator of the national interests of the member countries. This common
denominator also reflected the relative power of the countries involved, in which the
more important and more interested ones were able to tailor the treaty to their own
interests better than the less powerful and/or less interested countries.
National interests and relative power, however, could change over time, due to
internal and external factors. These changes make countries evolve. Evolution could lead
countries to take different paths at different paces to achieve their changing objectives.
Since the Cartagena Agreement is a collective accord, changes in it which reflect changes
in the member countries are difficult to arrange because all governments have to agree
to them. Thus, over time, there is a major tendency for the Cartagena Agreement, and
in general all integration processes, to fail to reflect the national interests of some or
most of the member countries. If this is so, countries will became more and more
reluctant to fulfill their obligations. If the situation became extreme some countries may
withdraw, or even worse, the process may be cancelled. The other, more likely
alternative is that after negotiations among the member countries, the Cartagena
Agreement would be modified to reflect a new minimum common denominator of the
aims of the various governments. Continuous progress of the Andean process is not only
far from being assured, but stagnation and regression tend to be more likely to happen.

5.1.- Main principles of the Cartagena Agreement
By May 1969 five of the six negotiating members were willing to sign the accord.
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In other words, for them the Cartagena Agreement reflected their national interests which
led to the common denominator of the Andean process. This common denominator was
spelled out by the Junta (JUNAC, 1972b) and has the following characteristics:
(a) Governments play the most important role in the development process of their
countries and in the Andean integration process. The primacy of the governments in the
Cartagena Agreement is shown by the fact that the Commission, the highest organ of the
process, is composed of government representatives, and through its decisions, is in
charge of taking measures to achieve the aims of the agreement. The primacy of the
governments is also demonstrated by the fact that implementation of the mechanisms of
the agreement through the Commission’s decisions rests on the governments.
(b) Since the member countries had equated development with industrialization,
furthering industrialization was a common national interest (Graciarena, 1983;
Fanjzylber, 1983). The member countries agreed that Andean integration would be one
important tool for more efficient import substitution through specialization in production
and pooling their domestic markets.
(c) Improving the standard of living of their peoples was the official ultimate but
vague aim of the Cartagena Agreement. The efforts of the governments to further
development, and to arrogate to themselves the most important role in the Andean
integration process, in order to promote more efficient industrialization, would be useless
if, ultimately, these actions would not benefit their people. One important measure to
avoid this outcome was that foreign capital should play a subsidiary role in their
development, and in the Andean integration process. Foreign capital, furthermore, would
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be restricted to being a complement to domestic capital and the former should be directed
to invest only in areas the governments considered beneficial. Domestic capital would be
in control of the investment activity. Governments agreed to set common rules to treat
foreign capital that would increase their negotiating powers, and would avoid competing
with each other to attract foreign investment.
In summary, three main aims reflecting the common denominator of national
interests became the principles of the Cartagena Agreement (Moncayo, 1985: 31-34).
They were:
1) The primacy of governments in the Andean process
2) More efficient import substitution industrialization process
3) Control, of foreign investment

5.2.- Main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement
The main mechanisms agreed upon to put these principles into practice were the
tariff reduction program, common tariffs, industrial programming, and the common
treatment of foreign capital (Moncayo Garcia, 1985: 73-75). The first three mechanisms
would contribute to the industrialization process. They would provide the enlarged and
protected market (the tariff reduction program and a common tariff) needed for attaining
more efficient production of durable consumer goods, and intermediate and capital goods
in which the member countries would specialize through industrial programming.
The common treatment of foreign investment would assure that the main benefits
derived from the integration process would accrue to the countries rather than outside
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investors. It would also allow the member countries to attract resources to finance the
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development without competing among themselves. This
common treatment of foreign investment was an integral part of the mechanism of policy
harmonization. Its political importance at the time, however, made it the single most
important policy to be harmonized. As such, it is considered independently, instead of
including it within the mechanism of policy harmonization.
A minimum harmonization and coordination of planning and policy was thought
to be necessary to ensure that the other mechanisms would achieve their goals. A long
term common economic plan (through harmonization of planning) would allow member
countries to ratify the common long-term goals to be accomplished by the Andean Group.
Harmonization and/or coordination of policy would ensure, on the one hand, that
domestic rules would not undermine the integration efforts, and on the other hand, that
they would not provide undue advantages to particular countries. These main mechanisms
were:
1) Tariff reduction program
2) Common external tariff
3) Industrial programming
4) Common treatment of foreign investment
5) Planning coordination
6) Policy harmonization
The principles and mechanisms used to achieve common goals describes the basic
elements of the type of inward oriented development pursued by the governments of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

member countries through the Andean integration process. As such they reflect the
common minimum denominator of the national interests of the member countries at the
time of the signing of the Cartagena Agreement. The principles will serve as the
reference to compare the evolving strategy of development of the member countries as
shown by their development plans, and the mechanisms will be compared to their
economic policies.
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CHAPTER IV
FROM CARTAGENA TO CARACAS (1969-1973):
OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS

1.- THE ANDEAN GROUP; 1969-1973

Between 1969 and 1973 the Andean integration process went through a phase of
progress. Progress according to the hypothesis of this research project, as stated in
chapter I, is characterized by the following indicators: (1) intra-Andean trade increases
every year; (2) violations to the Cartagena Agreement are very few; (3) decisions made
by the Commission to implement the mechanisms are approved within the timetable
established by the agreement; and (4) the implementation of the main mechanisms by the
governments proceeds without major delays. Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter show that
the Andean Group enjoyed a phase of progress.
The explanation of this progress, as stated in the hypothesis, lies in the similarities
in the strategy and policies pursued by the governments of the member countries. These
similarities led to an analogous set of national goals to be achieved through the Andean
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process whose aims and mechanisms reflected those of the governments. This argument
is proven in section 4. In other words, the Andean Group had a phase of progress
because all the governments of the member countries found some of their goals reflected
in the aims and mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.

1.1.- Overview of its major achievements
The Cartagena Agreement came into force in October 1969, after Pern ratified
it.1 Between 1969 and 1973 all deadlines but one were met, and the nature of the
Andean integration process and of its institutions were defined (JUNAC, 1979a: 35-36).
Trade increased steadily; and the first Sectoral Program of Industrial Development, was
approved in 1972. The Andean Group went, thus, through a phase of progress.2
The Andean integration process also expanded to social aspects,3 giving it a more
comprehensive character.4 Three social agreements were adopted. The first, the Andres
Bello5 Agreement, dealt with educational, scientific and cultural integration. It was

'In accordance with Article 110 the "Agreement shall become effective upon communication of
approval by three states to the Executive Secretariat of LAFTA." The agreement was approved by Chile
in July 1969, by Colombia in August, by Peru and Ecuador in October, and by Bolivia in November 1969.
2Among the writers who concur with this assessment are Bawa, 1980: 188; Davila, 1984: 17; Ferrari,
1991: 68; Mace, 1983: 184; 1994: 45-50; Marquez, 1989: 5; and Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 7.
3On social integration in the Andean process see: Aparicio, 1972; 1974; Chan, 1990; Duran and Lobos,
1976; Herrera, 1983; JUNAC, 1978e; Miletich, 1977; Ochoa and Gauldfeldt, 1991; Racacoechea, 1981;
Villegas, 1976; and Vittini (ed.), 1980.
4A neo-functionalist writer would have seen these social agreements as a clear case of spill-over.
sAndres Bello was a writer, poet, intellectual, and educator. He was bom in Caracas, Venezuela, in
1781. In 1829 he moved to Santiago, Chile, were he devoted his life to the improvement of education and
to public service. He died in 1865, in Santiago.
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signed in January 1971. The Hipolito Unanue6 Agreement covering cooperation on
health issues was signed in December of the same year. Finally, the Simon Rodriguez7
Agreement on labor integration was signed in October 1973. Unfortunately very little has
been done in these three areas. The Commission ignored the agreements, and "the Junta
... did not cooperate with the ‘Andres Bello,’ ‘Hipolito Unanue,’ and ‘Simon Rodriguez’
agreements" (Guerrero, 1979: 149).8
The most important reason for neglecting the social agreements was the driving
concern of the community organs in approving decisions directly related to the
implementation of the Cartagena Agreement. For this matter, since the social agreements
were not an official part of the Cartagena Agreement, these areas were not perceived by
the Commission or by the Junta as central to the Andean process. Successful actions in
the areas of health, education and labor would have increased public support for the
Andean process, but the "democratization" of the process was never a major concern for
the decision-makers either.

1.2.- The admission of Venezuela
More than three years after the creation of the Andean Pact and after almost one
year of official negotiations between the members of the Andean Group and the

6Hipolito Unanue, 1755-1833, was a noted Peruvian physician and intellectual who was deeply involved
in the independence process of his country. He founded the first school of medicine in Peru.
7Simon Rodriguez, 1771-1854, was a Venezuelan educator, and tutor of Simon Bolivar, the liberator
of the Andean countries and Panama.
8Out of the 380 decisions adopted by the Commission until June 1995, only one percent were devoted
to social issues (JUNAC, 1995h: 8).
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government of Venezuela, the parties signed the "Additional Instrument of the Cartagena
Agreement for the Accession of Venezuela," and other related documents in Lima in
February 1973.9 The additional instrument modified the Cartagena Agreement in two
important aspects. First, the approval of the common external tariff (CET), of
rationalization programs, and of the Junta’s proposals to solve conflicts arising from
restrictions in agricultural trade were included in Annex I of the agreement (issues
subject to veto). Second, the list of products exempted from the tariff reduction program
was increased (see section 2.1 below).
By the end of December of 1973, Venezuela officially became the sixth member
of the Andean Group. This act was the last of this first phase of the life of the Cartagena
Agreement, a phase described as one of progress and optimism.

1.3.- Ideological pluralism
When in November of 1970 the socialist, Salvador Allende, became President of
Chile, a dilemma was posed. Was the Andean Group a place for a country shifting to a
socialist economy, or was the Pact limited to countries with capitalist economic systems?
The military reformist governments of Bolivia, Peru, and to some extent Ecuador, were
supportive of the concept of "ideological pluralism" within GRAN. That is, they accepted
that countries with different economic systems could participate in the Andean integration

’They were the Consensus of Lima, and Decision 70 of the Commission. The Consensus of Lima was
just a formal declaration of the signing of the documents. Decision 70 spelled out the rules to put into
practice the Additional instrument should be and how Venezuela would comply with existing decisions.
Among them the timetable for trade liberalization and for the application of the CMET, and the procedure
for Venezuela to participate in the Metalworking Program.
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process. The civilian government of Colombia was not very enthusiastic.
For the reformist military governments and for the Socialist Chilean government,
support of "ideological pluralism" had its rationale in the need to provide legitimacy to
their experiments (Bemales, 1974a: 231). Colombia’s lack of enthusiasm was based on
the fear that these political experiments might be imitated by other countries, and on the
rhetorical attack of these regimes on representative democracy (ibid.). Nevertheless,the
Andean Foreign Ministers in their third meeting, in June 1972, declared "... we want to
praise the way that respect of the fundamental principle of ideological pluralism is
manifested in the advances of the Andean integration; this offers a significant testimony
to the possibility of common objectives beyond the socio-economic structures each
country adopts "(JUNAC, 1972d: 4).
Aside from these general aspects, the more direct and concrete problem posed to
the Andean Group was the possibility of integrating partners with capitalist and socialist
systems. It was assumed, in the Andean Pact, that all countries had to have capitalist
economies, although they could have democratic or dictatorial regimes as a form of
government (Guerrero 1979: 77). For GRAN, "ideological pluralism" was an untested
area. With the overthrow of Allende in September of 1973, the issue was put to rest, but
between 1970 and 1973, it created great concern.
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2.- PROGRESS IN THE ANDEAN PROCESS

2.1.- The tariff reduction program
The most important instrument related to increasing trade was the Andean
liberalization program. The deadlines for fulfillment of the commitments were met
(JUNAC, 1976: 61). All dutiable products were classified into several lists which made
the tariff reduction program a cumbersome process to implement and to manage.
The process of the tariff reduction program involved specific procedures for each
of the lists. It included three different forms of liberalization: (1) Rules applied among
the three largest countries, Chile, Colombia and Peru. (2) More favorable treatment by
the three largest countries toward the less developed countries, Bolivia and Ecuador. (3)
Special rules for Bolivia and Ecuador to liberalize their trade. "Restrictions of all
kinds"10 were also to be eliminated according to the level of development of the
countries. Table IV. 1 presents a summary of the tariff reduction program process.
The tariff reduction program had the following profile: of all the 4,188 dutiable
products, 34 percent of them11 were reserved for industrial programming (1,416

'“Restrictions of all kinds were defined by Article 42 of the Cartagena Agreement as any administrative,
financial or exchange measure imposed unilaterally by a member country which impedes or hinders
importation.
"Tradeable products, for customs purposes were classified by most of the countries following the
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. This system divided the universe of dutiable products in XXI sections and
99 chapters. Each chapter was further divided into "positions," "subpositions," and "items." An item, is
thus, the unit of this scheme. All countries using this scheme had to have identical descriptions up to the
level of "subpositions."
The Andean Group, by Decision 51 of March 1972, adopted a common nomenclature based on
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. It was called NABAND1NA, that is, Andean Brussels Nomenclature.
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TABLE IV. 1
ANDEAN TARIFF REDUCTION PROGRAM
AMONG CHILE,
COLOMBIA
AND PERU

CHILE, COLOMBIA &
PERU IN FAVOR OF
BOLIVIA & ECUADOR

Reserved for
Industrial
Programming.
Decision 25

As defined in
each program

Same

Same

LAFTA’s first
stage of the
Common List,
Article 49

April 1970

Same

As defined in
LAFTA (It was
never defined)

Non-produced
goods,
Decision 26

Eliminated by
February 1971

Same

Same

Reserved to be
Produced by
Bolivia &
Ecuador,
Decision 28

National tariff

Zero tariff by February
1971

Same (Only in
favor of each
other)

Immediate free
trade in favor
of Bolivia &
Ecuador,
Decision 29

As below

Zero tariff by January
1971

Same (Only in
favor of each
other)

By December
1970 all duties
should equal the
lowest one of the
three countries.
From Dec 1971
to Dec 1980, 10
percent reduction
annually

By December 1970 all
duties should equal the
lowest one of the three
countries. From
December 1971 to Dec
1973, 40, 30 & 30
percent reduction a year

From their
national tariffs,
10 percent
reduction
annually, from
December 1976
to December
1985

Eliminated by
December 1970

Same

When they begin
their tariff
reduction
program process

LIST OF
PRODUCTS

Automatic
Tariff
Reduction,
Decision 27
and
Decision 15

"Restrictions of
All Kinds,"
Article 46

BOLIVIA AND
ECUADOR

SOURCE: Cartagena Agreement Article 34e; Chapter 5; Chapter XHI, Section C.
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dutiable items);12 3 percent were classified as goods not produced in the subregion (144
items); 3 percent were on the LAFTA’s Common List (132 items);13 and 60 percent
were in the list of automatic tariff reduction (2,496 items). According to these data, only
66 percent of all dutiable products were nominally included in one or the other tariff
reduction schedule.
There were two other major drawbacks for the effective functioning of this
mechanism. One was the unilateral list of exemptions.14 The other was the agricultural
program which allowed the governments to protect some goods from trade disruptions.
In their unilateral list of exemptions15 each country included not only those
products in which they had comparative disadvantage, but also products which the
countries did not want to trade. For example, all countries, regardless of their level of
competitiveness included most textiles in their lists (JUNAC, 1976: 62). By the time the
member countries had to present their unilateral lists in December 1970, the five member
countries together had exempted 1,844 items. These constituted 44 percent of the total

I2Almost all the products belonging to the so called "dynamic industries" (automobiles, basic
metal—steel—, glass, paper and cellulose, electronics, electrical products) were included (Tomic,
1980:198). They were generically mentioned in the Declaration of Bogota of August of 1966.
13This list was composed of products for which tariffs reduction were irrevocable (Art. 8 of the Treaty
of Montevideo).
14Articles 55 and 102 of the Cartagena Agreement.
lsChile and Colombia were allowed to have up to 250 dutiable items exempt from the tariff reduction
program; Peru up to 450 items; Bolivia 350 items plus 50 subpositions; and Ecuador 650 items. Peru had
to withdraw from its list one-hundred items by December 1974, and again by December 1979. For Chile,
Colombia and Peru, these products could remain exempt until December 1985. Up to 20 items, however,
could continue to be exempt for four more years. The time limit for Bolivia and Ecuador was December
1990 and they could be prorogated without a deadline.
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items in the automatic tariff reduction list.16
This excessively large number of trade exemptions demonstrates that countries
were more interested in protecting their own industrial production than in expanding
trade. Conversely, member countries did not want to expand intra-Andean trade at the
expense of their domestic production. In other words, the member countries put national
interests above community interests.
Decision 16 of the Commission approved the list of agricultural products to which
member countries could at any time apply import restrictions.17 This was a
comprehensive list, and included most of the agricultural products exported by any of the
partners. With the entrance of Venezuela, the list was increased by around 30 items.18

16This percentage was, in reality, only 33 percent because Bolivia and Ecuador, by Article lOOf of the
original Cartagena Agreement, were allowed to treat most of their imports from other member countries
as if they were coming from non-member countries until December of 1976, some 6 years after the others.
This was, in practice, a de facto generalized exemption from the tariff reduction program for Bolivia and
Ecuador.
With the entrance of Venezuela the scheme became more complex. Venezuela had the same right
to have 250 items exempted from the tariff reduction program—as Colombia and Chile. In addition it could
have 200 additional items exempt with one of the following countries: Colombia, Chile or Peru. The
number of exemptions with any one of these countries could not exceed 110 items. The affected country
could then have an equal number of items exempt from the tariff reduction program with Venezuela.
Bolivia and Ecuador could increase their list of exemptions by 30 items each. These items could only be
exempted with Venezuela.
17Article 72 of the Cartagena Agreement, by invoking Article 28 of the LAFTA’s Treaty of
Montevideo, allowed nou-discriminatory measures to limit imports of agricultural goods to the amount
required to meet domestic deficit and/or to equalize prices of the imported and domestic products.
18Major items included in the consolidated list were: cows, pigs, chickens, beef, lamb, pork, mutton,
bacon, milk, dairy cream, eggs, onions, tomatoes, peas, chicken peas, lentils, beans, manioc, bananas,
pineapples, avocados, oranges, mandarins, grapefruit, grapes, raisins, apples, pears, coffee, dried hot
peppers, wheat, barley, oat, com, rice, sorghum, quinoa, peanuts, nuts, soybean seeds, cottons seeds,
castor oil seeds, sunflower seeds, colza seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, cacao, tobacco, cow skins, cow
hides, wood, wool, cotton, and agave.
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2.2.- Common minimum external tariff
The Common Minimum External Tariff (CMET) was approved by Decision 30
in December 1970, meeting the deadline established by the Agreement. The CMET was
meant to be the first step towards the adoption of a common external tariff on imports.
The agreement and the text of Decision 30 stipulated that between December 1971 and
December 1975 Chile, Colombia and Peru were obligated to gradually and automatically
increase the domestic tariffs of their products whose national levels were below those
approved. The countries could maintain any tariffs that were above the minimum.19
The CMET was not to be applied 1) to the products included in the reserve list
for industrial programming, 2) to those in industrial programs, 3) to those products not
produced in the subregion, 4) or to the products included on the list of exemptions.
The CMET had an average of 40 percent, tariffs ranged from 0 to 120 percent,
but 97 percent of the items had tariffs of 80 percent or less (JUNAC, 1983a: 7). The
average levels of the CMET by type of products are shown in the last row of table IV.2.

2.3.- Industrial programming
The aim of industrial programming was to further the import substitution
industrialization process in the Andean area by assigning the production of a given
product to one country which would be the sole supplier for the subregion. Industrial
programming was to be implemented through the Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development (SPIDs), and the industrial rationalization program. The former was the

‘^Bolivia and Ecuador were only required to apply the CMET to those items in the list of non produced
products once their production in the subregion had begun.
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TABLE IV. 2
AVERAGE NATIONAL TARIFFS (MAY 1969) BY TYPE OF PRODUCT
AND COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF (CMET)
TYPE OF PRODUCT
COUNTRY

CONSUMER
GOODS

INTERMEDIATE
GOODS

CAPITAL
GOODS

AVERAGE

BOLIVIA

71

41

31

48

COLOMBIA

93

38

39

53

CHILE

190

118

95

135

ECUADOR

145

73

49

89

PERU

137

69

48

85

AVERAGE

127

68

52

82

CMET

53.9

36.2

39.1

41.2

CMET = Common Minimum External Tariff
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1972a: 19, 21.

important one, and such became synonymous with industrial programming. The latter
was never put into practice.
For some governments and observers industrial programming was the most
original, innovative and notable mechanism of the Andean Pact, and its cornerstone
(Valdes, 1981, 451; Hutcheson, Bolte, Culagovski, Gonzalez, andMorawetz, 1983: 4).
Industrial programming was the mechanism par excellence to make possible a more
efficient and rational import substitution industrialization process. Besides, this
mechanism was to be one of the tools which would allow Bolivia and Ecuador, the
relatively less developed countries of GRAN, to have access to the benefits of the
agreement (Fffench-Davis, 1978: 37, 45-46).
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The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development (SPIDs) were ad-hoc specific
agreements to be negotiated for each sector. They "are specific in the sense that they are
established anew for a particular industrial sector. ..." (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979: 215).
Each member country was to receive exclusive or shared rights to produce items for a
fixed period and to have free trade in them. A common external tariff had to be agreed
upon, and members were required not to encourage production assigned to others.
Negotiations and accords for each program were difficult and cumbersome. First,
according to Article 33 of the original text of the Cartagena Agreement, all countries had
to participate in each one of the SPIDs. Second, all SPIDs were to meet many technical
and economic requirements. Third, each country could veto a SPID once.20 It is easy
to understand that each of these matters became topics for long debates and negotiations.
They were political issues, or, as Nye (1968a: 335-336) put it, they were
"overpoliticized" topics.
From a political viewpoint, the twin objectives of the SPID, efficiency and equity,
were seen as practically impossible to achieve simultaneously. "In the political sense,
it is clear that the programming decisions alleviate the concerns of the weaker countries
and thus remove a major obstacle to integration among developing countries. But at the
same time ... such decisions disturb the stronger members, which feel limited by [this
mechanism], with the result that such programming is particularly difficult to negotiate"
(Salgado, 1984: 86). In other words, this instrument had to reconcile balanced industrial

order to avoid a negative vote, the practice developed was that when it was clear in the
Commission that a country would veto a proposal, the proposal would be sent back to the Junta without
formal vote but with requests for modifications. This meant that countries could "unofficially" veto a
proposal.
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development among the parties with the creation of more efficient industries.
From a pragmatic angle, the most sensitive political issue and "problem ... is
which country gets what, in terms of production allocation" (Hojman, 1981: 158). This
was the first and the foremost concern of the governments. Once this issue was
satisfactorily solved, then other issues would become negotiable. During this first phase
only was approved the Metalworking Program (Programa Metalmecanico) ,21 in August
1972, by Decision 57.22 "This step forward, although limited in scope, was one of the
most important advances towards consolidating the Andean Group" (Salgado, 1984a:
141).23 This sector was the first to be programmed because of its importance as a source
or as a generator of expertise, as a basis for the production of capital goods, as a source
for the diffusion of technology, and as a creator of employment.

2.4.- Planning coordination and Andean development Strategy
According to chapter

in of the Cartagena Agreement,

the first chapter dealing

with the mechanisms of the process, the Andean countries were to have a common
development strategy. This strategy was to be based on the coordination of the
development plans of specific sectors and the harmonization of social and economic
policies, resulting in a joint planning system for the development of the subregion.

2lFor details in this industrial program see Guerrero, 1973; Avila, 1978; Mytelka, 1979: chapter 5.
~Of the 72 group of products which the program included, 20 were assigned to Bolivia, 23 to
Colombia, 22 to Chile, 11 to Ecuador and 25 to Peru (Avila, 1978: 212).
23The reference to this program being limited in scope refers to the fact that the Junta decided, after
two years of preparing it, to present what was only the "First Metalworking Program." The meaning of
this was, that many products that are part of this sector were not included either because the existence of
production or they were long planned national projects in one or several countries (JUNAC, 1976: 70).
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The subregional development strategy would serve as a blueprint from which the
integration process could evolve. It would also provide the a framework for Andean
activities, especially those related to the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
At the beginning of 1972 the Junta presented its "Bases for a Subregional
Development Strategy" (Bases generates para una estrategia subregional de desarrollo).
This document proposed an overall strategy that involved joint actions on the part of all
the member countries acting together, and actions that had to be undertaken at the
national level. The role of integration was emphasized to be complementary to the
national development policies (JUNAC, 1976: 123). The "Bases" had a poor reception
by the governments of the member countries (JUNAC, 1979a: 43). Accepting the
"Bases" and adopting an Andean development strategy would have meant that the
governments were accepting the Andean process as an end in itself, and not as mere
instrument, placing constraints on their own national plans, and relinquishing
sovereignty.
Other reasons for the lack of interest of the governments were: 1) The admission
of Venezuela to the Andean Pact increased the size of the Andean market (see table V. 1,
chapter V), and changed the overall characteristics of the Andean process, especially in
the financial aspects. This made the Junta revise the "Bases." 2) The existing political
pluralism in 1972. There were not only military and civilian regimes, but also among
them, there were governments with socialist, reformist, populist, and market oriented
economic policies. And 3) within the countries, there was, in most cases, a lack of
continuity in implementing their policies. By 1977, it was clear for the member countries
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and the Junta that a subregional development plan was not important for the member
governments and had to be abandoned. As such, this study will not consider planning
coordination as a mechanism to achieve the aims of the governments.

2.5.- Policy harmonization
The most important tasks in the area of policy harmonization were: the adoption
of a common regime on the treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents, licenses
and royalties; the approval of a uniform treatment of multinational corporations, the
avoidance of double taxation, the adoption of guidelines for the harmonization of
industrial development legislation; and the creation of permanent procedures to achieve
coordination and harmonization of policies. There was also an urgency to harmonize
industrial development legislation and foreign trade policies which directly touched on
the functioning of the tariff reduction program and of the common tariff.
In this regard, Decision 22 on the permanent procedures for achieving
coordination and harmonization of policies, was approved by the Commission in
December 1970, within the deadline imposed by the Cartagena Agreement. This
Decision, however, only created several councils24 and set the rules for their
functioning. The objective of the councils was to facilitate harmonization of policies and
planning coordination. The councils, composed of government officials, had only an
advisory role.

24These councils were: planning, monetary and exchange, finance, fiscal policy, and foreign trade.
Later on, other councils were created: Tourism (Decision 36, March 1971), Health (Decision 68,
November 1972), Physical Integration (Decision 71, June 1973), Agriculture (Decision 76, May 1974),
Industrial Policy (Decision 178, May 1983), and Science and Technology (Decision 179, May 1983).
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The Commission approved, within the deadline required by the Cartagena
Agreement, Decision 46 on the uniform treatment of multinational corporations and the
rules to be applied to subregional capital. The rules were aimed to foster the creation of
Andean multinational corporations with the participation of subregional capital as a
majority partner. No multinational corporation was created during the whole period of
the existence of this decision. In March 1972 the Commission approved Decision 51: the
Andean tariff classification scheme, NABANDINA.
Industrial development legislation were vaguely harmonized in Decision 49
(approved in December 1971). This decision contained rules for the gradual elimination
of tariff exonerations, tariff reductions, and tariff refunds. It also contained a schedule
for the Commission to approve rules with regard to harmonization of fiscal, exchange,
monetary and financial policies; and a timetable to harmonize incentives for exports; as
well as joint actions for industrial development. Decision 49 also included rules for nondiscriminatory tax treatment on subregional products. None of the governments
implemented this decision, because "harmonization of policies demand[ed] changes in
national policies and the renunciation of unilateral practices that go beyond what the
member countries were willing to accept..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 45). Between a community
obligation and a national interest, the latter prevailed.
There was a lack of agreement in adopting rules to govern unfair competition,
rules of origin of the merchandise, and a failure to implement the rules for transport of
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goods by road approved in 1972.25
By the end of 1973, little progress was visible in the area of policy
harmonization. In other words, governments were uninterested in this mechanism. "Even
though there have been notable technical and conceptual progress [regarding policy
harmonization], few decisions [in this area] have been approved which in some cases
have not been implemented..." (JUNAC, 1979d: 52). The main reason was, that "it
would have been impractical to expect any government to renounce control over its own
economy in strategic areas ... in order to further the long-term objective of the GRAN
... [N]o member country was prepared at any stage to cede its sovereignty by allowing
the responsibility for economic decisions to be vested in the Commission" (Puyana, 1982:
161). As in the case of planning coordination, governments considered policy
harmonization would limit their decision-making freedom and their capabilities to pursue
their objectives. Given the situation, this mechanism will not be considered in the
remaining of this chapter nor in chapters V and VI.

2.6.- Common treatment for foreign capital
The adoption of the common regime on the treatment of foreign capital,

^With regard to unfair competition, governments wanted to apply export promotion mechanisms, e.g.,
subsidies, tax rebates, technical assistance, soft credits, for all the products they were interested in
promoting without discriminating the markets of destiny. Harmonization in this area would have meant,
at least, the no application of these measures to exports to the Andean Group. In the case of the origin of
the merchandise, the member countries were afraid that general rules would be too stringent to meet and
thus, their products would not be able to qualify. Linked to this reason, there were very complex technical
problems about how to have a set of acceptable, fair, general, and simple rules applicable to all
merchandise. Lastly, the main problem for the implementation of the decision on transport of goods by
road, was the opposition of the Ecuadorean truckers. They feared that free passage throughout its country
would leave them without business, since the existing national regulations reserved to nationals the
transports of goods within the country.
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trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties, Decision 24, in December 1970, as required
by the Cartagena Agreement, was a major breakthrough (Guerrero, 1971; Mytelka, 1979:
chapters 3 ,4 ). This decision responded to the perceived need to prevent foreign capital
from taking undue advantage of the benefits of the Andean process as had been the case
with the Central American Common Market (Hansen, 1967: 54-55; Schmitter, 1972: 4145), while at the same time welcoming capital contributions to the development of the
subregion.26 Another reason for this common policy regarding foreign capital was to
avoid competition for foreign investment among member countries (JUNAC, 1972c: 2).
The most important aspects of Decision 24 were: (a) gradual nationalization of
foreign investment;27 (b) access to the expanded market limited to companies
undergoing its gradual process of nationalization;28 (c) different treatment for different
sectors;29 (d) prohibition of investment in areas already adequately covered and of
acquiring investment owned by nationals; (e) no access to medium and long-term
domestic credits; (f) transfer of profits limited to 14 percent of the foreign investment;30

“The effects of foreign direct investment in the Andean Group and in Latin America were studied,
among others, by: Tironi, 1975; 1976a; 1976b; Behrman, 1972; Chudnovsky, 1974; Mytelka, 1979;
Vaitsos, 1970; 1973; 1978.
27A company was considered national if 80 percent of the capital was domestic and it was under local
control and management. A company with between 51 and 80 percent of local capital was defined a mixed
if it also was under local management and control. Finally, a company was foreign if less than 51 percent
of the capital was local.
“The period of transformation of a company from being foreign into mixed—in order to gain access
to the subregional market—was 15 years if it was located in Colombia, Chile, Peru or Venezuela, and 20
years if it was located in Bolivia or Ecuador.
“ Companies in mining, oil and forest could be exempted by government from this Decision.
30This limit was justified as a reaction against multinationals overcharging raw materials, under
invoicing exports, for excessive remittances of profits, and charging exorbitant fees for patents and
royalties. For a study dealing with these aspects, see Vaitsos, 1973a.
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(g) reinvestment of profits limited to 5 percent of the company’s capital; (h) foreign
technologies, patents and trade marks were to be approved by the national authorities;
(i) contracts of technology and patents could not have restrictive clauses for the importer;
and 0) creation of a national office in each country to oversee all aspects related to
foreign investment, transfer of technology and industrial property.
Among the issues, limiting the transfer of profits to 14 percent of the investment
caused the greatest controversy, and "drew the wrath of Washington" (Cockcroft, 1996:
13). This was an irony because neither the Junta's proposal nor the Commission had
considered it. It was the Colombian representative who proposed and finally imposed
it.31 This is another illustration of national interest prevailing over that of the
community. This also demonstrates that within an integration process, stronger members
are in a better position to "convince" their partners than weaker members.
Decision 24 was considered "the only multilateral Latin American attempt to
control investment in the region" (Atkins, 1989: 195). It was hailed as "the most
innovative of the schemes’ [the Andean Group] activities" and as "[o]ne of the most
original and pioneering aspects of the Andean Group (Ferris, 1979b: 102; Furtado,
1976: 239). This Decision "... represented a significant shift in policy from the previous
unrestrained welcome of foreign investment ... to a position of controlled foreign
investment as one mechanism to gain greater control over both the domestic economy and
its relationship with the external world" (Bryant, 1984: 87).

■
“ Colombia was the country with the longest experience of managing foreign investment. Its legal code
had a 14 percent limit. This limitation imposed in 1967 was to reduce its circumstantial balance of
payments problems (Guerrero, 1979: 100).
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The implementation of the common treatment of foreign capital and of foreign
technology through national regulations, was, however, not only different in each country
but was also interpreted differently. Furthermore, governments ignored some parts of the
decision, or issued rulings incompatible with the decision.32

2.7.- Intrasubregional trade
Subregional trade had a notable increase. The reasons are easy to discern. First,
there was a quick reduction of tariffs in favor of Bolivia and Ecuador by the larger
countries—Colombia, Chile, and Peru. This, as the figures show, allowed the smaller
countries a rapid increase in their exports to the other member countries (see tables IV. 13
and IV. 14). Second, the tariff reduction program, although gradual and not covering all
products, was an automatic mechanism and member countries, complied with the
reduction of their tariffs. Third, the first products to take advantage of the opening were
those in which the country had excess production capacity and comparative advantage.
Lastly, the tariff reduction program was the first mechanism to go into effect within the
subregion.
Exports among Andean countries increased every year during this first phase, as
was hypothesized in this dissertation (see table IV.3). Exports among member countries
were only $86 million in 1969;33 four years later they totaled $228 million, an increase

“ Colombia, for instance, required the gradual nationalization of new foreign investment only; Peru
required that investment should be registered in local currency rather than in convertible one as ordered
by Article 5, and new and existing companies should be nationalized regardless of their interest in
exporting to the subregion or not; Venezuela did not restrict the access to local medium and long-term
credits (Mytelka, 1979: 66-67)
33 Date does not include Venezuela, since it was not a member yet.
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TABLE IV.3
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE: 1969-1973
1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

86.0

122.8

154.6

166.5

227.9

2,874.0

3,398.0

2,925.0

3,192.0

4,251.0

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

86.1

122.1

154.7

166.7

227.8

2,599.0

2,799.0

3,169.0

3,088.0

3,785.0

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

0.7

(0.1)

(0.2)

0.1

599.0

(244.0)

104.0

466.0

(0.1)
275.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

2.99

3.61

5.29

5.22

5.36

IMPORTS

3.31

4.36

4.88

5.40

6.02

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

42.79

25.90

7.70

36.88

WORLD

18.23

-13.92

9.13

33.18

41.81

26.70

7.76

36.65

7.70

13.22

-2.56

22.57

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47, and author’s calculations.

of 265 percent. Total exports of the Andean countries also increased, but at a lower rate
than intrasubregional trade.
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3.- VIOLATIONS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT AND DERIVED
OBLIGATIONS

3.1.- Violations
In general, in this phase (1969-1973), violations of the Cartagena Agreement and
its derived obligations were minimal, as was expected for this phase according to the
hypothesis of this research project. Violations have been be classified in this research as
(a) non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement, especially the approval
of decisions by the Commission; (b) non-incorporation in the national legislation of the
approved decisions; and (c) failure to comply, or ceasing to comply with decisions
incorporated in the national legislation.
Non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement was rare in this
phase. For the years 1969 to 1971, the Commission was able to approve all the decisions
within the deadlines stipulated in the agreement.
With regard to incorporation into the national legislation of the approved
decisions, there was only one, but a very important, fault. None of the governments of
member countries incorporated Decision 49 (Harmonization of industrial development
legislation) into their national legislation. In fact, it was never incorporated.
As early as June 1971, the Junta compiled the legal instruments with which the
member countries had incorporated some of the decisions into their national legislation
(JUNAC, 1971). The Commission, in response to the Junta's information, ordered "...
the member countries to send to the Junta, within 15 days, ..., the legalized texts of
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national decrees of decisions not yet incorporated [into the national legislation], ... "
(Comision, 1971: 5). As table IV.4 shows, by September 1971, Colombia had not
incorporated into their national legislation five decisions, and Chile and Peru four
decisions, out of the 4034 approved by the Commission (JUNAC, 1971a).35 The
TABLE IV.4
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1969-1973
SOURCE

DATE

BO

CO

CH

EC

PE

TOTAL

(*)

(1)

23 Sep 1971

0

5

4

0

4

13

5

(2)

31 Dec 1972

3

2

3

3

3

14

4

(3)

11 Jul 1973

9

11

10

8

3

41

n.a.

(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation one or
more countries
n.a. = not available
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1971; (2) Guerrero, 1979: 133-134; (3) JUNAC, 1973.

relatively less developed countries—Bolivia and Ecuador—were not delinquent. By
December 1972 all the member countries were in default. By July 1973, all the
countries, except for Peru, had substantially increased the number of decisions not
incorporated into their national legislation.36

“ There was a decision numbered 17a, so by September 1971 there were 40 decisions approved but the
last one was Decision 39.
“ Not all the decisions had to be implemented by the member countries. Several of the decisions dealt
with the management of the agreement, like the decisions pertaining to the rules and regulations of the
Commission, and of the Junta, the creation of advisory Councils, the designation of the members of the
Junta, etc.
“ Since the focus here is only to show the number of decisions which member countries were not in
compliance with, as basis of comparison in the other phases, no attempt is made to rank the decisions. This
is not to say that some decisions were not more important than others, but, it is not always clear how to
rank them. For example, by December 1972, of the four decisions which the countries were not observing.
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This information shows that as time went by the participating countries found it
more and more difficult to comply with the decisions their own government
representatives had agreed upon. Table IV.5 provides the available information
aboutdelays in implementing decisions incorporated into the national legislation of the
member countries. This information pertains only to the tariff reduction program, the
CMET, and decisions on issues directly related to them. The delays were insignificant,
being 12 months the longest period. This corroborates the hypothesis of this study.
Another problem related to the violation of incorporated decisions concerned
trade. In this case, decisions were only "partially" implemented, because countries would
unilaterally stop granting tariff reductions for imports from all or some member
countries, or not apply the CMET to imports from third countries. In the case of some
goods, for which national tariffs were below the CMET and at the same time were
considered important by a country, some governments were reluctant to increase the
domestic tariff, and de facto, violated part of a Decision.37 These violations were a
source of conflict and of further non-compliance with obligations by other countries.
A more widespread violation of the CMET was the "special customs regimes."
They were tariff reductions, tariff drawbacks, and tariff suspensions employed by all the

the most important was Decision 49 on the harmonization of industrial development legislation. The other
decisions not incorporated to the domestic legal order were: Decision 40 on avoiding double taxation
(observed by Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru), Decision 46 on multinational enterprises (observed by Colombia
only), and Decision 56 about highway transportation (observed by Colombia and Chile). Among the three,
it is difficult to discern how to rank them.
37An example, Ecuador began to produce "Sorbitol' —an artificial industrial sweetener used in sugarless
chewing gum and toothpaste. This was one of the products defined as not being produced in the Andean
area and was assigned to be produced in Ecuador. Peru, the major importer of the subregion, did not raise
its tariff to be applied to non-member countries to the CMET level—50 percent—because this would make
this important industrial input too expensive for the user industries. This situation led to a permanent
complaints by the Ecuadorean government, but the government of Peru did not raise its tariff.
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TABLE IV.5
DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING TRADE MECHANISMS
BY DECEMBER 1973
(In months)
MECHANISMS

A /D I /

B
0

C
0

C
H

E
C

P
E

LAFTA’S COMMON LIST

Art. 49

N

"RESTRICTIONS OF ALL KINDS."

Art. 46

N

3

N

2

Adoption of the lowest duty of Colombia,
Chile, or Peru

Dec. 15

N

6

N

4

Liberalization of NON-PRODUCED goods

Dec. 26

4

3

1

1

1

AUTOMATIC TRADE REDUCTION
1st. reduction: 31-12-71

Dec. 27

N

9

4

N

N

9

12

N

2nd. reduction: 31-12-72

N

RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY BO

Dec. 28

N

5

4

2

2

RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY EC

Dec. 28

5

5

4

N

2

IMMEDIATE FREE TRADE FOR BO&EC

Dec. 29

N

5

N

4

COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF
Products in Common List

A65b
/D12

N

X

N

X

1st. approximation 31-12-71

Dec. 30

N

12

N

X

2nd. approximation 31-12-72

Dec. 30

N

X

N

X

MARGINS OF PREF. FOR BO & EC

Dec. 34

N

9

X

N

Adoption of NABANDINA 2/ 3/

Dec. 51

10

7

11

X

Blank space means the country put into practice its obligation, in a timely fashion
N = The country is not required to put into practice the mechanism
X = Not into practice by December 1973
1/ A = Article of the Cartagena Agreement; D = Decision number
2/ Data derived from Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 411, 413
3/ NABANDINA was the common tariff classification for the Andean Countries
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1976a: 1-17
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countries to promote industrialization and other activities. These "special regimes" were
applied in a discriminate^ manner according to who the importer was.38 The application
of these mechanisms constituted a generalized violation of the CMET and a erosion of
the tariff preference39 accorded to subregional productions. Decision 49—not observed
the governments—attempted to regulate and gradually eliminate this practice.

3.2.- The Junta and the violations
In July 1973, the Junta issued its first report on the fulfillment of the obligations
by the member countries. The report (JUNAC, 1973a) concentrates on discussing the
legal aspects40 of the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions of the Commission. The
Junta stated that the Cartagena Agreement is legally enforceable and has to be fully
observed by the countries because it is an international pact freely accepted and duly
ratified by the governments.
In relation to the decisions of the Commission, the Junta argued in a similar
manner. The Junta alerted the Commission to the consequences of failing to comply with

38As an hypothetical example, Peru would apply up to twelve different tariffs to the importation of a
given product. If the importer was the government then the tariff was waived. If the importation was done
by a priority industry then the tariff applied would be, 10 percent of the official rate. If the importation
was done by a lower priority industry, the tariff would be a higher proportion of the official levy. If the
importer was, let say a charity organization, the tariff could be very low and it could also be reimbursed,
according to the specific law which granted this privilege.
39Defined as the difference between the tariff applied to non-member countries and the one—if
any—applied to member countries.
40For greater details of the legal aspects of integration as well as the controversy about international
law and "community law", see the articles in the short-lived periodical (October 1967-November 1978)
'Derecho de la Integration; ’ and articles in "Integration Latinoamericana." More specifically see: GarcfaAmador, 1978; Orrego, 1972; Orrego and Irigoin, 1981; JUNAC, 1972; 1973a; 1980; 1983b; and Zapata,
1989.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

the decisions: damages to the countries and their nationals, and a loss of credibility in
the Andean integration process which could quickly lead to stagnation.
Regarding the problem of the entry into force of the decisions at the national level
the Junta recognized in a previous document the "non-existence of an explicit provision
in the Cartagena Agreement ..." for the incorporation of decisions into the national
legislations (JUNAC, 1972: 9). In order to deal with this increasingly thorny situation,
the Junta reiterated the proposal, for "... the creation of a tribunal41 to solve the
conflicts, control the legality of the acts of the Commission and of the Junta, and to
provide uniform interpretations..." (JUNAC, 1973a 3).
Existing loopholes, and the lack of enforcement power of the Junta42 has allowed
the governments to disregard the requests of the Junta to comply with their obligations.
Compliance or not, has, since the beginning, been decided solely by the countries.

■
“ The Junta had proposed the creation of a Tribunal since the very beginning of the existence of the
agreement. This issue was discussed by the Commission in December 1971. In the following December
the Junta presented a formal proposal (JUNAC, 1972). The Junta (JUNAC, 1973b: 11) expected the
adoption of a decision recommending the member countries to create the tribunal by 1974. It was assumed
the Commission would begin to discuss and negotiate the proposal by the end of 1973.
42Although the Junta has among its functions "To ensure implementation of the Agreement and
compliance with the Commission’s Decisions" (Cartagena Agreement, Article 15, paragraph a); it has no
powers to enforce but to plea to the member countries. It is important to note, however, that this
problem—enforcing the rules—is also one that other inter-governmental organizations have to deal with.
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4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS

4.1.- General Factors
Mace (1983: 184-185) summarized the first phase well.
The years 1970 to 1973 were certainly the most productive in terms of
integration output. ... trade liberalization proceeded according to schedule,
industrial programming was launched with the approval of the Metalworking
Program, the strategic Decision 24 concerning control over foreign investment
and technology transfer was adopted, and other important decisions for the
integration process were introduced ... This period of euphoria was capped by the
incorporation of Venezuela ...
The Junta recognized all these and other achievements43 and concluded that this was "...
a phase of great activity which allowed the consolidation of the Andean Group, fulfilling
the priorities established by the agreement" (JUNAC, 1979a: 36). (JUNAC, ibid.). What
are the factors that can help us to understand why GRAN was successful during its first
five years of existence?
The first factor was the influence of the LAFTA experience. The Andean Group
was created as a consequence of the failure of LAFTA (Mace, 1994; 35); the
governments of GRAN and the Junta wanted to demonstrate that a subregional process
was the path to go, in order to pursue economic integration in Latin America. Thus, the

43Among the other achievements mentioned by the Junta are the definition of the activities of the
principal organs of the agreement, the adoption of the CMET, the opening of the Andean market for
Bolivia and Ecuador, the approval of common regime for multinational corporations, the agreement on a
treaty to avoid double taxation, the harmonization of industrial development legislation, the adoption of the
rules for road transport, the development o f a conceptual framework for negotiating with other members
of LAFTA, and the beginning of common actions in the international arena (JUNAC, 1979a: 36).
The Junta also pointed out some o f the existing problems, " ...it was difficult to fulfill the first
deadlines of the tariff reduction program and to set up an adequate organization to put into effect the
industrial programming mechanism. It is also important to point out that the negotiations for the adherence
of Venezuela distracted the Commission from considering other issues" (ibid.).
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governments were willing to comply with their obligations. Among these obligations, was
the demanding timetable the Cartagena Agreement had set to approve decisions to put the
mechanisms into practice. This accomplishment would give to the governments and to
any observer objective and measurable means to test the degree of success by GRAN.
"On the whole, the rapid pace set by the bureaucrats in Lima [that is the Junta and its
staff] was matched by the member governments, who saw rapid progress as a source of
prestige at home" (Puyana, 1982: 5) and abroad.
All the deadlines set by the Cartagena Agreement for 1970, and 1971 were met
by the Commission, thanks in great part to the Junta’s hard work (Guerrero, 1979: 8081).44 By December 1972, however, the Commission had approved a decision regarding
Article 30 of the Cartagena Agreement,45 nor the ones set in Decision 24 (Common
treatment of foreign capital), or 46 (Common regime for multinational corporations), or
49 (Harmonization of industrial development legislation).46
In 1973, the last year of this phase, the Commission approved just 8 decisions.
The most important was Decision 70 concerning the conditions for the adherence of
Venezuela to the Cartagena Agreement, sanctioned in February of that year.
Table IV. 6 shows a summary of the decisions adopted by the Commission

"As it has been mentioned before, the Cartagena Agreement was signed in May 29, 1969; it only went
into force, according to its Article 110, in October 16 of that year, after the third country, Peru, deposited
the instrument of ratification. In November of 1969 the Commission met for the first time, and the Junta
was installed in the following month. In practical terms, it is only at the beginning of 1970 that the Andean
process began to evolve.
45This article required governments to implement by December 1972, the schedule for the
harmonization of foreign trade instruments which should had been approved by the Commission.
"The Commission spent most of 1972 discussing three issues. First, the approval of the Metalworking
and the Petrochemical programs. Second, the incorporation of Venezuela. Third, the controversy
surrounding Decisions 24, 46, and 49.
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between 1969 and 1973. In general it is possible to note (line 5) that the Commission
over time reduced its output, from 6 decisions per session in 1969 to less than 2
decisions in 1973. On the other hand, as expected in this study, the majority of the
decisions adopted were on new issues (line 2)—there were 58 while there were 23
modifying decisions—and most of the latter were unimportant (line 3.2). The number of
decisions on new issues (line 2), however, tended to decrease over time, from 23 in 1970
to only 5 in 1973. Whereas, the modifying decisions (line 3) went up from 1 in 1970 to
13 in 1972.
A second factor which explains this early success is that most of these obligations
were not difficult to implement by the member countries, because they did not greatly
affect the productive structure and/or specific national interests. The high rate of success
in approving decisions in the first two years of the agreement can also be attributed to
the fact that the first decisions were relatively easy to take. Linked to this, the lack of
previous experience, led both the Commission and the Junta to make bold decisions.
Both were much less concerned with the viability, the efficacy or the efficiency of the
decisions, and the possibility that these decisions could be implemented by the countries,
than to fulfill the Andean compromises within the deadlines. This accomplishment would
lend support to the assumption that the theory and practice of the Andean scheme were
correct, and implying that the objectives would also be attainable.
A third reason for the progress was the need for the Andean process to show
results quickly in order to generate further political support by the governments and
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TABLE IV.6
DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

69-73

1 DECISIONS

6

24

21

22

8

81

2 NEW ISSUES

6

23

15

9

5

58

2.1 Important If

3

15

10

6

1

32

2.2 Unimportant

3

8

5

3

4

26

1

6

13

3

23

3 MODIFYING DECS
3.1 Important 1/

1

1

1

1

- Strengthening
- Weakening
3.2 Unimportant

1

5

13

3

22

4 SESSIONS

1

6

6

7

5

25

4.1 WITH DECS

1

6

5

5

5

22

- Ordinary

1

3

3

3

3

13

3

2

2

2

9

1

2

3

1

2

3

- Extraordinary
4.2 WITHOUT DECS
- Ordinary
- Extraordinary
5. 1/4

6.00

4.00

3.50

3.14

1.60

3.24

6. 1/4.1

6.00

4.00

4.20

4.40

1.60

3.68

SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-7; Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 199-748.
1/ Important is defined as decisions that have a direct impact on the principal
mechanisms of the Andean process.47

■"Examples of important decisions dealing with the Cartagena Agreement in general are: Decision 4
on the percentage contributions of the member countries to the Junta’s budget, and Decisions 6 and 9 on
the bylaws of the Commission and the Junta respectively. Examples of important decisions concerning the
main mechanisms are: Decision 16 (agricultural products exempted from the tariff reduction program),
Decision 24 (common treatment of foreign investment), Decision 25 (products reserved for industrial
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eventually by the domestic groups benefiting from it.48 The choice of issues, decided
by the Commission after first being proposed by the Junta followed a predetermined plan
aimed to obtain quick, positive results that would generate increasing support for
furthering the process as anticipated by neo-functionalist theorists. In so doing, some
mechanisms were overlooked and others overemphasized.
Another factor that accounts for progress, is that in those years the Andean
economies were growing as shown by the growth of their GDPs (table IV.7). This fact
enabled the countries to increase their imports, part of them would be supplied from their
subregional partners. The ".. .relatively satisfactory growth of the economy [furthermore]
provided the necessary political support for the agreement..." (Puyo, 1989: 28), since
any perceived costs derived from the Andean process were easy to overlook because
there were resources to pay for from the growing economies.

4.2.- The role of the Commission and of the Junta
Between 1969 and 1973 the Commission and the Junta were very active in
implementing the objectives of GRAN. Given the great expectations of the members
about the potentials of the Andean process, there was general support for the subregional
pact from most of the government units dealing with economic and foreign affairs, and

programming), and Decision 27 (products subject to the automatic tariff reduction program). It is
acknowledged, however, that there is a degree of arbitrariness in this classification.
^Decisions were adopted "... to present in some cases immediate results and to consolidate some fronts
before opening new ones. This implied, ..., giving priority to industrial programming rather than to the
agricultural sector, ... and even to industrial rationalization programs ... It also implied giving priority to
the common minimum external tariff and to the mechanisms that regulate foreign trade rather than to policy
harmonization, the aim was to make the tariff reduction program work..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 41).
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TABLE IV.7
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1969-1973: RATES OF GROWTH
60-70

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

BOLIVIA

5.6

4.8

5.2

4.9

5.8

6.7

CHILE

4.2

3.1

3.1

7.7

1.4

-4.0

COLOMBIA

5.2

6.4

6.8

6.2

8.5

7.8

ECUADOR

4.7

5.3

9.2

6.3

14.4

25.3

PERU

5.0

1.2

7.5

4.2

2.8

5.4

VENEZUELA

6.0

3.5

4.6

3.1

3.3

6.3

SOURCES:

1960-1970: ECLA, 1986: 145;
1969: IDB, cl972: 4;
1970: ECLA, 1973: 39;
1971-1973: Programa de Armonizacion de Cuentas Nacionales Decision
114). Unidad de Informatica-JUNAC, except for Chile. Chile:
ECLA, 1976: 236.

from some of the domestic industrial sectors of each country. This meant that the
members of the Commission had strong political backing within their own countries, and
had the power to further integration within their respective countries, as well as to reach
agreements their governments would be complying with.
In practice the heads of the national organs in charge of integration issues
constituted the Andean Commission. 49 Their offices had complicated tasks. They had

49This situation, on the one hand, unifies the representation of the interests of the country and gives
a lot of national power to the representative, but on the other hand it forces them to be a specialist in each
of the issues being negotiated. In the case of the European process, the Council of the European Union "is
organized along functional lines" (Archer and Butler, 1992: 29). In other words, "the work of the Council
is divided into policy areas" (Nugent, 1989: 91). It is composed of the ministers in charge of the issue
being negotiated. The Council in which the ministers of foreign relations sit is the one which deals with
the most sensitive and important issues.
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to harmonize the opinions of relevant public and private institutions and to arrive at a
national position on each one of the issues to be negotiated by the Commission. The
opinions were not always in harmony, or even worse sometimes the government
institutions did not have any opinion or policy. After the coordination process, the
national unit had to determine the national position regarding the issues. In theory, these
positions had to be flexible enough to allow the Commission to negotiate decisions. The
decisions adopted had to reflect the interests of all the member countries, and to be
realistic enough so as to be implemented by the governments. Once approved, the
national offices in charge of coordinating the integration process had to push the
necessary legislation to incorporate the approved decision into the legal system of the
country, and then they had to pressure the relevant public institutions to implement the
decision.50
According to a report of the Junta (JUNAC, 1976: 153), "... in some member
countries [Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela] the government representative to the
Commission is, at the same time, head ... of the organism legally in charge of dealing

50There were other aspects that made the job of the national office in charge of Andean integration and
the tasks for the persons in charge of this office even more complicated. First, in all countries, these offices
were also in charge of coordinating and doing the same work with regard to LAFTA, (and later to its
successor the Latin American Integration Association), and the Latin American Economic System (Sistema
Economco Latinoamericano, SELA). Second, in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela—the office in
charge of all these integration and cooperation processes was in turn only part of a larger organization or
ministry. Third, in the other two countries—Bolivia and Peru—the office in charge of integration and
cooperation was reorganized several times, emerging to become a ministry, to be later merged into a larger
ministry. In the specific case of Peru, it was first created, in September 1969, as the National Office of
Integration. It was an autonomous office, solely in charge of all the integration processes Peru belonged
to at that time, e.g., GRAN and LAFTA. The office was "upgraded” and became a ministry, in 1976, as
a result of changing political winds after the take over of the government by General Francisco Morales
Bermudez, in 1975. Later on, in the midst of streamlining the state apparatus, the ministry was
"integrated," in 1978, as part of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and Integration, which in
1992 became the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations. These
changes, although part of the political process in any country, delayed the workings of the Commission and
in turn they retarded the Andean integration process.
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with and implementing all—or most of the—matters related to integration. In [the] other
cases, the representative to the Commission completely lacks the executive faculties ...
In the first case, it is much more frequently the complete and timely fulfillment of the
obligations ... In the other case, delays and lack of fulfillment are easier to occur."
The Junta, during this phase, (1969-1973) was able to exercise its autonomy and
its power of proposal without interference from the governments of the member
countries.51 This was especially true during the tenure of the first Junta, 1969-1972.
"...|T]t appeared in the early stages of the GRAN that the Junta built up such a position
of strength that it functioned as a "sixth government" (Puyana, 1982: 5). This allowed
the process to have a technical organ able to present proposals that had the community
welfare as its aim.
As any other bureaucratic organization, the Junta also has an interest of its own.
As such, as an institution, it is an administrator of policies, yet it has vested interests to
maintain integration as a viable ongoing enterprise (Axline, 1984: 24).

5IThe three members of the first Junta were elected during the first meeting of the Commission in
November 1969 and reelected for a another period ending in December 1975. The Junta began its work
in December 1969. Its members were a Colombian lawyer, a Chilean engineer, and an Ecuadorean
economist. The first Junta was a pragmatic combination of relevant professions and persons who had
worked in the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement.
Politically, this Junta was composed of members of the two countries that had been pushed
integration the most (Colombia and Chile); and by one of the relatively less developed countries (Ecuador).
The president of the Andean Development Corporation, created in 1968 to finance integration project, was
a Bolivian. This situation left Peru without having a "representation" in the highest positions of the Andean
Process. The Peruvian Foreign Ministry insisted on the creation of the position of Director-Secretary
(Director-Secretario) as one immediate below the members of the Junta, and also proposed that a Peruvian
fill it. The diplomatic offensive was successful, and the members of the Junta grudgingly accepted a
Peruvian lawyer and economist for this newly created post. The Peruvian success was due to great extent
to the fact that Article 11 of the Cartagena Agreement stipulates that members of the Junta will be
designated by a unanimous vote of the Commission. Nation^ representatives from each of the countries
in the technical-community bodies was assured.
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4.3.- Relations among the governments of the member countries, the Commission.
and the Junta
The governments of the member countries, and the principal organs of the Andean
Group—the Commission and the Junta-had to meet the challenges of a very broad and
ambitious integration process which included mechanisms never tried before. The process
had to advance at a swift pace in the first years because of the deadlines imposed by the
Cartagena Agreement itself. At the same time the Junta’s proposals and the
Commission’s decisions had to balance economic efficiency with equity, and with
national interests. During this phase, especially until the end of 1972, both the
Commission and the first Junta were able to work together without major clashes. The
Commission was "imbued with an admirable spirit of cooperation," and the three
members of the first Junta had "an inexhaustible creative capacity and willingness to see
the Andean process work" (Guerrero, 1979: 69).
One factor to which the Junta attributed major progress during this phase was the
decision-making system. The Junta developed a proposal having in mind only subregional
interests. The proposal was discussed and negotiated the Commission. In this instance
the political interests of the member countries were harmonized. The decisions adopted
then represented a harmonious balance between subregional interests and the legitimate
national interest of each of the member states (JUNAC, 1972: 15).
Another important factor which helped to insure smooth relations between the
Commission and the Junta was the personal relations among them. The different
members of the Commission were almost all linked to integration efforts in the past. The
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members of the Junta had known each other while working on LAFTA’s issues and
during the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement.
Despite this amicable beginning, tensions began to emerge by 1973 between the
governments and the Junta, as the former became aware of the power of the latter.
"[T]he national governments ... decided upon open opposition to a number of [the
Junta’s] proposals; since that time the power of the Junta has been somewhat checked"
(Puyana, 1982: 5). For instance, in July 1971, the Commission rejected the
Petrochemical Program (Guerreio, 1979: 83). The governments also complained about
"these technocrats, [who] inspired by the example of ECLA, took seriously their role as
disseminators of ‘formal rationality’ ..., with the inevitable consequence that
considerations of national sovereignty were relegated to second place" (ibid.: 8). An
illustration of this was the negotiation of the Metalworking Program. The Junta was
criticized for not taking into account the realities of the member countries. The
governments were unhappy with the products they had been assigned to produce. They
clashed among themselves in trying to get production assignments for all the products
they were producing, as well as those they had planned to produce.52

4.4.- Strategies of development and the Andean integration aims
This section attempts to find out whether the strategies of development pursued
by the member countries between 1969 and 1973 had objectives were reflected in the

“ For example, at the eleventh hour, during the second meeting of the ninth session of the Commission,
the Chilean representative complained that Chile had not been assigned anything related to mining machines
even though Chile is a mining country (Guerrero, 1979: 124).
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basic aims to be attained by the Andean Group (see chapter HI, section 6.1). These
principles were: primacy of government, import substitution industrialization, and
subsidiary role of foreign investment.
The comparison between national objectives and Andean aims will be carried out
by contrasting the relevant aspects of each country’s development plans with the
principles of the Cartagena Agreement mentioned above. Although development plans
in the Andean countries have seldom been implemented,53 they set targets which guided
government action. As such they are good indicators of governments’ interests. For the
comparison, countries are loosely paired based on their similarities in terms of their
levels of development (industrialization), and their economic policies. In this respect,
Chile is analyzed in conjunction with Colombia, Peru together with Venezuela, and
Bolivia along with Ecuador.

a) Chile and Colombia
Among the Andean countries, Chile had the most radical change in the
implementation of its development strategy due to changes in government. In November
1970, power shifted from the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei to the Socialist Salvador
Allende, head of the Unidad Popular coalition. The country went from mixed capitalist
economy to another of increasing state control. In September 1973, after the overthrow
and assassination of Allende, the military regime changed to a neo-liberal one.

53Among the many reasons the most relevant are: changes in government, especially in the case of
unscheduled ones; sudden situations of economic crises, reduction in the prices of most important exports,
inflation, fiscal deficit; and domestic opposition to the implementation of the measures.
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Leaving the analysis of the military government for the next chapter, both the Frei
and Allende administrations claimed a leading role and advocated the supremacy of
government in society including control over foreign capital.54 Frei perceived the
Andean Pact primarily as a market. Allende was interested in increasing the size of the
domestic market, and meeting this increased domestic demand through imports, some of
them coming from the other Andean nations.
Colombia during the presidency of the Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (19661970) had development plans which emphasized the role of the public sector in the
economy. The development plan of his successor, President Misael Pastrana Borrero
(1970-1974) of the Conservative Party, stressed the approach of a leading public sector,
but in neither case was the primacy of the government put into question.
In the case of foreign capital, development plans supported its control, particularly
after 1967 when limits on the transfer of profits were enacted (Caballero, 1978: 98).
With regard to industrialization, Colombia has consistently considered, since the late
1960s, that its industrialization is best achieved through export promotion. Nevertheless
Colombia did agree with selective import substitution as a principle, especially in the
case of capital goods (Caballero, 1978: 97-98).

b) Peru and Venezuela
In October 1968, the Peruvian President, Fernando Belaunde was overthrown by
a coup d ’etat. The new government continued with the strategy of import substitution

**"... it is indispensable to emphasize the central role assumed by the [Chilean] government as
protagonist of integration [during] Alessandr., Frei and Allende ..." (Atria et al., 1974: 141).
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industrialization through greater government intervention of the productive and service
sectors.
"Industrialization is the centerpiece of our country’s economic development"
(Velasco, 1969 [1995]: 267). Industry was regulated by the General Law on Industry
enacted in July 1970. It provided fiscal and tariff incentives to industries according to
their priority. It also established rules for the gradual nationalization of foreign
companies and for government ownership of all the industrial activities defined as "basic"
(mostly capital goods). These rules were similar to those later approved in Decision 24.
The Peruvian military felt that the government should play a fundamental role in
the economy. "[W]ith regard to the integration process state action is fundamental, it is
the state which has to set the objectives and goals to achieve common welfare" (Plan
Nacional de Desarrollo 1971-75, quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 226).
In the case of the Peruvian military government there was a concordance between
some of the national objectives and the three major aims of the Andean Pact. Both had
the government as the primary actor, both wanted import substitution industrialization,
and both were in favor of greater control of foreign investment.
Venezuela55 aimed since the 1960s to reduce its reliance on oil. In the 1970s this
objective was more remote than ever, due to the increased value of oil. Oil, on the other
hand, allowed Venezuela to command resources and to pursue development.
The IV National Plan, promulgated in 1969, aimed to further import substitution
by promoting exports of traditional and non-traditional goods (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978:

“ Member only since 1974, but it is included here for sake of completeness.
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246), and emphasizing efficient production of intermediate and capital goods. The
primacy of the role of government was explicit in Venezuelan development plans. Its role
was heightened by the fact that income from oil allowed the government to have a
decisive say in the economy. The public sector was to be in control of the production of
oil and derivatives, petrochemicals, siderurgy and aluminum. Finally, there was "no
discrimination between foreign and domestic capital until 1974" (Iguinez, 1983: 25), after
Venezuela became the sixth member, when Decision 24 was put into force.

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
In 1961 Bolivia had its first development plan. One of the main objectives was
to further import substitution and to increase exports. In 1970, when the Cartagena
Agreement had already come into force, the second plan was promulgated. It assigned
the public sector a key role in development, and called for import substitution at the
Andean level for industries in which the country had a comparative advantages (Morales
and Machicado, 1978: 42-43). The implementation of the plans was halted by changes
in government, in 1964 and 1972 respectively.56 Bolivian development plans explicitly
coincided with two of the principles of the Cartagena Agreement: the primacy of the
government, and import substitution industrialization.
Given that this country was the least developed of the Andean Group, its need for
foreign capital was the greatest. The Andean market and the common treatment of

“ In 1964 General Rene Barrientos overthrew Victor Paz Estenssoro, and in 1972 Colonel Hugo Banzer
removed from power the reformist government of General Juan Jose Torres. The plans, however, served
as guidelines for the governments which came after.
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external capital, however, provided the country with increased negotiating power which
would enable it to attract capital on more advantageous terms. The principle of
subordination of foreign resources was not openly supported by the governments, but was
not rejected either.
Ecuador, from 1969 on, was governed by Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra. Just before
the end of his term, in February 1972, General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara seized power.
He stayed until 1976. The military government, in its "Philosophy and Plan of Action"
published in March 1972 and in the 1973-1977 development plan, aimed among other
things to continue the import substitution industrialization process which had begun in
the 1950s. What was new about the 1973-1977 plan was that the state reserved for itself
the right to intervene directly in economic activities (Moncada, 1978: 151, 133). With
regard to foreign investment, the Velasco Ibarra regime gave it the same treatment that
was applied to domestic investment until the Andean Group approved Decision 24. The
military government did not have any specific objective with regard to the control of
foreign investment, but applied Decision 24.
In brief, all the countries agreed with the principle that the government should be
the most important actor. This was explicitly stated by the reformist military governments
of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, and also by the non-reformist governments of Bolivia and
Ecuador, by the Christian Democratic and Socialist regimes of Chile, by both the liberal
and conservative regimes of Colombia, and by oil rich Venezuela. With regard to import
substitution industrialization, again, the governments—military or not, reformist or
not—of Bolivia, Peru Ecuador, and Venezuela were highly supportive, the governments
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of Chile and Colombia were less so. Both considered that increasing trade among
member countries was more important. Finally, with regard to the subsidiary role of
foreign investment, the governments of Chile, Colombia and Peru backed this aim, while
the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela had no special policy for the control
of foreign investment.57 The primacy of government is the aim most supported by the
governments, while the subsidiary role of foreign investment was the least supported.
The different positions of the governments are summarized in the following table.

TABLE IV.858
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS
AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES: 1969-1973
B
0

C
H

c
o

E
c

p
E

V
E

TOTAL

Primacy of government

S

S

s

s

S

S

6S

Import substitution industrialization

S

I

s

s

S

S

5S

11

Subordination of foreign investment

I

s

s

I

S

I

3S

31

14S

41

ANDEAN AIMS

S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

Table IV.8 shows that during the phase of progress, 1969-1973, as expected in
this dissertation, there was a great degree of agreement between what the governments

^These results also allows one to conclude that no type of regime—military, civilian, dictatorship, or
democratic—and an economic orientation—neo-liberal or interventionist—are per se more supportive than
other of integration. Regarding the hypothesis that democracies tend to support integration more than other
regimes see Dooner and Fernandez, 1982; and Jaffe and Risquez, 1988.
S8Tironi (1978) is the source of the idea of using a matrix to summarize the findings showing support,
indifference or not support to the aims, and to the mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement.
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had as national objectives and the aims the Andean Group was assigned to achieve.
Colombia and Peru supported all three Andean aims. Bolivia, and Ecuador, the relatively
less developed countries, supported the same two objectives while they were indifferent
to the subsidiary role of foreign investment. Chile also supported two aims, and was
indifferent to import substitution industrialization. Venezuela supported two aims and was
indifferent to the other. "The positive outlook, keenness, and togetherness of the
technocrats coupled with a fairly strong similarity between the political intentions of the
governments of Bolivia [until 1972], Chile [until 1973] and Peru explains the successful
start the Agreement had in its first four years" (Bawa, 1980: 188).

4.5.- National economic policies and the Andean mechanisms
As has been shown above, there was a high degree of correlation between the
goals of the Andean governments and the principles of the Cartagena Agreement. Over
time, however, countries’ needs and interests change, while the aims of an integration
process remain the same until consensus to change them is reached among the members.
It is important then to analyze the correlation between main mechanisms of the agreement
(summarized in chapter HI section 6.2) and the economic policies of the member
countries in order to find out the governments support or lack of support to these
mechanisms.59
These main mechanisms are: planning coordination, policy harmonization, the

59In a recent article Mace (1994), employs a very similar methodology to analyze the support or lack
of it to Andean process. He, however, applies it to only 3 mechanisms (CET, industrial programming, and
Decision 24), and for three periods: 1969-1972 (success), 1974-1977 (first crisis), and 1981-1985 (second
crisis).
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tariff reduction program, common external tariff, industrial programming, and common
treatment of foreign investment. The first two, planning coordination, and policy
harmonization will not be considered in this or in chapters V and VI. The main reason
is the lack of progress in these mechanisms, as stated above in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of
this chapter.

a) Chile and Colombia
a .l) The tariff reduction program .- Chile, during the Christian Democratic
administration headed by Eduardo Frei, considered the Andean pact an opportunity to
expand and diversify its exports. As such, ever since the negotiations of the Cartagena
Agreement, this country was supportive of the tariff reduction program as the most
important mechanism of the agreement.
In the Allende Administration the tariff reduction program lost its importance
since exports were not one of its aims. As table IV.9 shows, Chilean exports only
increased between 1969 and 1971. In 1972 exports decreased by 26 percent because the
country was in a severe economic crisis,60 from which it had not recovered in 1973. In
this latter year, exports increased 17 percent over 1972, but their value was still $3
million lower than the peak achieved in 1971. Its participation in intrasubregional trade
was quite low, ranking, only above Bolivia and Ecuador, between 1969 and 1971, and
in the last two years of this phase (1972 and 1973), even below Ecuador.

“ In that year production went down, GDP was negative, import grew, and foreign reserves diminished
(IDB, c!974: 162-163).
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TABLE IV.9
CHILE: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

EXPORTS (17OB) (Millio n of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

10.8

18.2

24.8

18.7

21.8

1,075.0

1,234.0

962.0

855.0

1,231.0

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

21.5

28.8

32.1

50.8

62.1

907.0

931.0

980.0

941.0

1,098.0

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN

(10.7)

(10.6)

(7.3)

(32.1)

(40.3)

WORLD

168.0

303.0

(18.0)

(86.0)

133.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

1.00

1.47

2.58

2.19

1.77

IMPORTS

2.37

3.09

3.28

5.40

5.66

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

68.52

36.26

-24.60

16.58

WORLD

14.79

-22.04

-11.12

43.98

33.95

11.46

58.26

22.24

2.65

5.26

-3.98

16.68

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

SOURCES: 1969: INTAL, 1975: 53; 1970-1973: ECLA, 1976a: 171, 175
and author’s calculations

In both the negotiations of the Cartagena Agreement and in its development plans,
Colombia was consistently in favor of the "commercialist" approach as the way to go in
GRAN. The Andean Pact was viewed first and foremost as a place to export, and
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TABLE IV. 10
COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

37.5

62.5

69.2

70.1

66.7

608.0

736.0

690.0

866.0

1,177.0

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

16.0

20.5

28.5

28.6

41.8

685.0

813.0

929.0

859.0

1,062.0

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN

.21.5

42.0

40.7

41.5

24.9

WORLD

(77.0)

(77.0)

(239.0)

7.0

115.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

6.17

8.49

10.03

8.09

5.67

IMPORTS

2.34

2.52

3.07

3.33

3.94

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

66.67

10.72

1.30

-4.85

WORLD

21.05

-6.25

25.51

35.91

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

28.13

39.02

0.35

46.15

WORLD

18.69

14.27

-7.53

23.63

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations

secondly as a means to achieve a more efficient and selective import substitution
industrialization (Caballero, 1978: 102). Besides being the most industrialized country
of the subregion, Colombia had been promoting and subsidizing its non-traditional
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exports since 1967.61 Between 1969 and 1973, Colombian exports to the subregion
almost doubled. The value of its intrasubregional exports, however, were never greater
than 11 percent of its total exports (see table IV. 10).

a.2) Common tariff.- In relation to the common minimum external tariff, the Christian
Democrat government agreed to the Junta proposal on this issue. The CMET approved
was much lower than the Chilean average tariffs (see table IV.2), which meant that this
country had very few items on which it had to increase its national tariff. The Allende
government implemented only the first approximation to it, the one due in December
1971 (see table IV.5). Given that non-tariff barriers had become more important for
regulating imports, the CMET had in turn become relatively less important for
accomplishing this aim. Thus, the violation of the CMET shows the lack of importance
of this mechanism for the government.
Colombia supported a common minimum external tariff that would favor an
improvement of industrial efficiency. The CMET was quite close to the Colombian tariff
structure and average levels (see table IV.2).62

6lIn that year, decree 444, known as Statute of Foreign Trade and Exchange (Estatuto de Comercio
Exterior y de Cambios Internationales) was promulgated. This decree exempted tariffs on imports of
intermediate products to be used in the production of goods that would be later exported. It also
consolidated the existing fiscal incentives to exports in one subsidy equal to 15 percent of the value of the
exports. The decree also established a flexible exchange rate system, which favored exports.
“ If we check the tariff structure for the other countries (table IV.2 ), all of them gave the least
protection to capital goods, and the greatest to consumer goods. On the other hand, with the exception of
Bolivia, all the other countries had their average tariffs well above the CMET.
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a.3) Industrial programming.- Industrial programming was not considered an important
mechanism for the Frei administration. The government expected that very few products
would be programmed. Given the complicated negotiation procedures to approve each
of the SPIDs,63 it was anticipated that regardless of how extensive the list of products
reserved for SPIDs was, only a few would be programmed. Under these circumstances,
the Frei administration supported industrial programming. Industrial programming
became even less important during the Socialist government because the areas subject to
SPIDs at that time—metalworking and petrochemicals—did not coincide with national
priorities.
Industrial programming was the mechanism in which the Colombian government
was the least supportive, but supportive anyhow. Since its industrialization process was
ahead of the other countries, the government felt the SPIDs should be very selective.
Without openly voicing its doubts about this mechanism, Colombia participated
intensively in the negotiation of the first SPID, the Metalworking Program, to get
assigned the products it was interested in producing. Its participation in the negotiations
also allowed Colombia to influence major decisions with regard to the levels of tariff
protection,64 the period for which the countries having the assignations would enjoy a
monopoly of the production in the assigned products, and other important issues.

“ It should also be remembered that all countries had to participate in each SPID, and that SPIDs could
be vetoed once by each the member.
“ For example in the case of the negotiations of the metalworking program, "Colombia had
continuously reiterated reducing the levels of the Common External Tariff; ..." (Guerrero, 1979: 127).
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a.4) Decision 24.- Presidents Frei of Chile and Lleras Restrepo of Colombia were for
controlling foreign investment. Both felt that foreign capital was getting the lion’s share
in LAFTA and CACM. There was an increased pressure for an Andean common
treatment of foreign investment since the Andean Pact was a more ambitious integration
process, and therefore providing potentially more benefits to be shared.
The common treatment of foreign capital, was enthusiastically supported and
strictly enforced by the Allende regime. "Decision 24 constitutes the clearest expression
of the new regional economic nationalism and is strongly supported by the government,
because the subregional control of foreign capital and the government’s economic policies
coincide" (Wilhelmy, 1982b: 140).
Support for a common treatment of foreign capital had been voiced by Colombia
ever since the Declaration of Bogota, in August 1966. A year later, by Decree 444,
Colombia imposed controls on foreign investment. Among the restrictions was the
limitation on the repatriation of profits to 14 percent of the total investment, later to
become a cause celebre and the focus of outcry against Decision 24 by American
investors.
In summary, Colombia supported all the mechanisms, although not with the same
enthusiasm for all. Chile, from the economic point of view, supported only Decision 24.
Nevertheless, the Socialist regime supported all the mechanisms, and the Andean Pact
in general, because the Cartagena Agreement was seen as a source of imports in case of
economic boycott by the United States, and as a source of diplomatic support in its
controversies with the same country (Wilhelmy, 1982c: 210).
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b) Peru and Venezuela
b .l) The tariff reduction program.- The Peruvian military regime was supportive of
industrial programming and of the common treatment of foreign capital. It accepted the
tariff reduction program and the restrictions imposed by the common minimum external
tariff as a trade-off. Being less industrialized than Chile and Colombia, Peru had little
incentive or interest in the tariff reduction mechanism. There were no important Peruvian
products that could take advantage of this mechanism, and Peru had to open its market
both to its more industrialized and competitive partners on an equal footing, and to
Bolivia and Ecuador at a quicker pace. In other words, the tariff reduction program was
a mechanism that could only increase Peruvian imports of mostly more expensive or nonessential goods, while contributing almost nothing toward the increase of its exports.
Table IV. 11 shows that the Peruvian trade deficit with its Andean partners rose from
$4.4 million to $46.0 million.
Intrasubregional exports by Venezuela were important within the total intraAndean exports. They, however, were never more than 2 percent of this country’s total
exports during the period from 1969 through 1973 (see table IV. 12). This percentage was
the lowest of the Andean Pact. For this reason, the tariff reduction program was not seen
by Venezuelan authorities as a means to increase intrasubregional trade. Rather, they
considered that the tariff reduction program could be a means to improve efficiency and
reduce costs by creating competition with its domestic production.
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TABLE IV. 11
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

21.6

21.6

21.3

28.4

35.8

866.0

1,048.0

893.0

944.0

1,050.0

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

26.0

46.0

62.1

54.5

81.8

600.0

622.0

750.0

796.0

1,024.0

(24.4)

(40.8)

(26.1)

(46.0)

426.0

143.0

148.0

26.0

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

(4.4)
266.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

2.49

2.06

2.39

3.01

3.41

IMPORTS

4.33

7.40

8.28

6.85

7.99

0.00

-1.39

33.33

26.06

21.02

-14.79

5.71

11.23

76.92

35.00

-12.24

50.09

3.67

20.58

6.13

28.64

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations

b.2) Common tariff.- The common minimum external tariff was a problem for Peru to
implement. It would increase the tariff on intermediate and capital goods which in turn
would increase production costs thereby reducing the competitiveness of Peruvian
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TABLE IV. 12
VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

35,194

39,288

42,266

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

30,111
3,113,000

25,935
3,181,190

3,037,000

2,947,000

4,568,102

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

13,604
2,018,000

15,056
2,201,639

10,569
2,066,000

14,565

24,617

2,441,000

2,815,512

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

16,507

10,879

24,625

24,723

1,095,000

979,551

971,000

506,000

17,649
1,752,590

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

0.97

0.82

1.16

1.33

0.93

IMPORTS

0.67

0.68

0.51

0.60

0.87

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

0.86

1.36

1.12

1.08

WORLD

1.02

0.95

0.97

1.55

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

1.11

0.70

1.38

1.69

WORLD

1.09

0.94

1.18

1.15

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations

exports. Even more important, the CMET, and the future CET, would deprive the
government of the autonomy to change tariffs as it saw fit. Reflecting this latter concern,
by the end of 1973 Peru had not yet begun to comply with the CMET (see table IV.5).
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The Venezuelan government supported the CMET because it could be a means
to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

b.3) Industrial programming.- This mechanism was supported by Peru since it would
help to diversify industrial production and increase efficiency. It fitted very well into the
development plans of the Peruvian policy makers.
Industrial programming aims were coincidental with the industrialization
objectives of Venezuela. Both aimed at developing the efficient production of capital and
intermediate goods. The SPIDs being programmed by the Junta coincided with the
sectors whose development was a priority for Venezuela.

b.4) Decision 24.- Embarked on an ambitious reform program including industrialization,
government ownership of strategic industries, and increasing government intervention in
the economy, the Peruvian military government recognized the need for foreign
investment and skills. At the same time it was aware that foreign participation had to be
controlled in order for it to be beneficial to the country. In the words of president
Velasco "... it will be ... important to agree on a treatment of foreign investment that,
while taking into account their rights, would subordinate them to the interests of the
integrated countries, and thus constitute a supporting factor for our independent
development" (quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 224).
With regard to Decision 24, support by Venezuela was shown by the creation of
the commission to prepare rules to regulate investment which proposed regulations
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similar to those of Decision 24. Since this country did not have problems with financial
resources, thanks to its oil income, regulation of investment was not as important as for
other member countries. Decision 24, however, would allow Venezuelan investment in
the other Andean nations.
Peru’s economic policies were reflected only by the Industrial Programming and
the Decision 24. In practice, however, the Pemvian government was supportive of the
main mechanisms for reasons not dissimilar to Allende’s Chile, that is, to avoid isolation
and to get support from its Andean partners in its problems with the United States.
"UJntegration ... avoids isolation, ... [and] since it is multilateral, integration is less
costly for its supporters than bilateral actions and declarations" (Wilhelmy, 1982a: 195).
The military, furthermore, saw the Andean Pact as a tool for the economic independence
of Latin America. "From the very beginning we saw in it [the Andean Pact] a mean to
strengthen our nations, a form of struggle to reinforce the economic independence of
Latin America" (Velasco, 1972, quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 225).
Venezuela, while it was negotiating its entry into the pact during this phase it
developed a scheme to get support from the entrepreneurial groups, and began to prepare
itself for its future participation. In general, Venezuela was also supportive of the four
main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c.l) The tariff reduction program .- Bolivia and Ecuador, according to the original text
of the Cartagena Agreement, did not have to begin the tariff reduction program until
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1976. On the other hand, they had been enjoying the benefits of the Andean market since
1970. This resulted in an increase in their exports.
In the case of Bolivia, the absolute amounts were very small, between $4.8
million in 1969 and $26.7 million in 1973 (see table IV. 13), but it was a five fold
increase. At its best, in 1973, intrasubregional exports were 11 percent of Bolivia’s total
exports.65 Bolivian exports to the subregion had their biggest jump in 1971, when tariffs
began to be reduced by Chile, Colombia and Peru. Its exports increased by 245 percent,
from $5.0 million to 17.1 million between 1970 and 1971. It is therefore possible to
conclude that between 1969 and 1973 Bolivia supported the tariff reduction program,
because it provided the country with some limited benefits at no economic or political
cost; and helped to increase trade and diversify markets and products.
Ecuador was quite successful in taking advantage of the opportunities created by
the tariff reduction program. Its exports to the subregion increased seven times, from
$11.3 million in 1969 to $76.9 million in 1973 (see table IV. 14), this was the highest
increase of the subregion. Its rate of growth increased as well each year. It was the only
Andean country which was able to accomplish this feat. Exports increased by 28 percent
between 1969 and 1970, by 31 percent between 1970 and 1971, by 58 percent and 154
percent in the following two years.

65Among the most important reasons for its dismal participation in the intra-Andean trade are: its feeble
and late industrialization which did not allowed it to sell manufactured products, the similarities in the
structure of agricultural and mining production with the other Andean countries, its lack of transportation
facilities with the rest of the members, and its lack of access to the ocean, and its geographical location.
Being at one of the geographical end of the Group’s area made Peru the immediate market, a market which
was important before the Andean project began.
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TABLE IV. 13
BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

4.8

6.0

20.3

19.2

26.7

172.0

190.0

181.0

201.0

261.0

3.5

3.8

3.9

5.3

7.4

165.0

159.0

170.0

173.0

204.0

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN

1.3

2.2

16.4

13.9

19.3

WORLD

7.0

31.0

11.0

28.0

57.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

2.79

3.16

11.22

9.55

10.23

IMPORTS

2.12

2.39

2.29

3.06

3.63

GRAN

25.00

238.33

-5.42

39.06

WORLD

10.47

-4.74

11.05

29.85

8.57

2.63

35.90

39.62

33.95

11.46

58.26

22.24

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations

c.2) Common tariff.- As to the common external minimum tariff, Bolivia and Ecuador
had to apply it in the case of goods not previously produced, once their production
started, but, between 1969 and 1973 there was none. Consequently, Bolivia and Ecuador
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TABLE IV. 14
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

11.3

14.5

19.0

30.1

76.9

153.0

190.0

199.0

326.0

532.0

IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

19.1

23.0

28.1

27.5

34.7

242.0

274.0

340.0

319.0

397.0

TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

(7.8)

(8.5)

(9.1)

2.6

42.2

(89.0)

(84.0)

(141.0)

7.0

135.0

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

7.39

7.63

9.55

9.23

14 45

IMPORTS

7.89

8.39

8.26

8.62

8.74

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

28.32

31.03

58.42

155.48

WORLD

24.18

4.74

63.82

63.19

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

20.42

22.17

-2.14

26.18

WORLD

13.22

24.09

-6.18

24.45

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations.

had no reason to oppose the aplication of this mechanism, since it enabled them to insist
on its compliance by its relatively more developed partners.
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c.3) Industrial programming.- Bolivia and Ecuador supported the Sectoral Programs
of Industrial Development (SPIDs), since import substitution industrialization was one
of the objectives. Being the least industrialized members, and only in the early stages of
industrialization—basically producing non-durable consumer goods—the SPIDs constituted
a challenge for Bolivia and Ecuador. The products included in the list of industrial
programming were mostly intermediate and capital goods, and some durable consumer
goods. The challenge was that products assigned to these countries were in sectors which
were little developed, where the country and its entrepreneurs had little experience, and
for which there was little or no trained labor. On the other hand, industrial programming
would push Bolivia and Ecuador to diversify their production, with the advantage that
the future market would be the Andean Pact. Support of the mechanism was warranted.
The usefulness of the mechanism, however, depended more on the ability of these
countries to know what they wanted and to negotiate skillfully, than on the mechanism
itself.

c.4) Decision 24.- The common treatment of foreign investment was a mechanism
Bolivia had doubts about. The implementation of the SPIDs and other products assigned
to be produced by Bolivia meant an investment of $350 million between 1970 and 1985.
This amount was more than 25 percent of 1973 Bolivia’s GDP which was $1,388 million
in that year (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 75; IDB, cl976: 378). The SPIDs had the
advantage of offering to investors the whole Andean market. On the other hand, being
the least developed country of the subregion, foreign investors would be less willing to
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go to Bolivia, since it could not compete advantageously with other members in terms
of domestic market, infrastructure, skilled labor and the like. Besides, Bolivia had fewer
resources to nationalize foreign firms, as agreed in Decision 24. Even though the
application of Decision 24 may have been disadvantageous to Bolivia, during the
reformist period of General Torres it was strictly observed (ECLA, 1973: 89). The more
capitalist regime of General Banzer promulgated a new Law of Investment in December
1971. It relaxed some of the regulations, but the law was still mostly within the rules of
Decision 24. In practice, both regimes supported the application of the common treatment
of foreign capital, although one more strictly than the other.
The common treatment of foreign capital posed for Ecuador the same dilemma
as for Bolivia. On the one hand there was the need to attract foreign capital to develop
the country, and more specifically to implement industrial and infrastructure projects that
would allow the country to take greater advantage of the Andean Group. On the other
hand, Decision 24 imposed controls over foreign investment. The reformist military
government that took power in early 1972 was in favor of the measure since it promoted
government intervention in the economy. Since the mid-1960s, moreover, Ecuador had
begun to receive a high influx of foreign investment not only for the oil sector but also
for industry and for banking. This eased the anxiety of the government about the possible
negative effects in applying Decision 24.
In brief, it can be said, that between 1969 and 1973, Bolivia and Ecuador
supported the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
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d) Conclusion
In summary, all the countries supported the main mechanisms of the Cartagena
Agreement. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela did so because the mechanisms
helped their countries to attain some economic policy objectives, or at least the
mechanisms did not adversely affect the countries. In the case of Chile during the
Allende years, and of Peru, even though some mechanisms were not correlated with the
governments’ economic policies, they supported all the mechanisms, and the Andean Pact
in general. Reasons of high politics (military and security) rather than of low politics
(economic and welfare) dictated this support. Table IV. 15 shows, the "unanimity" of
support for the Andean Pact’s mechanisms between 1969-1973.
TABLE IV. 15
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS
MECHANISM

BO

CH

CO

EC

PE

VE

(T)

The tariff reduction program

S

S
S

s
s
s
s

6S

s
s
s

s
s
s
s

S

Common External Minimum Tariff

s
s
s
s

S

6S

s
s

6S

Industrial Programming
Foreign Investment

S
S

6S
24S

S = Supportive

(T) = TOTAL

The analysis of the main mechanisms and their perceived effects on some
economic policies shows that progress of the Andean Group between 1969 and 1973 can
be correlated with the usefulness of the main mechanisms to the economic and/or
political aims of the member countries. The findings corroborate the hypothesis of this
research project.
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CHAPTER V
FROM CARACAS TO AREOUIPA (1974-19781: DOUBTS AND STAGNATION

1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN PROCESS

The years 1974 to 1978 were years of stagnation and doubts in the Andean
Group. According to the definitions used in this study, stagnation is characterized by: (a)
delays in the implementation of the mechanisms, (b) reduction in trade in some of the
years, (c) increasing violations of the agreement, and delays in fulfilling the agreement’s
obligations; and (d) a reduction in the Commission’s output. The underlying explanation
to this phase, according to the hypothesis, is that a minority of governments find their
interests not reflected by the Andean process because their strategies and/or policies are
changing.

1.1.- Overview
The entry of Venezuela and Chile’s exit required lengthy, time consuming, and
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exhausting re-negotiations of some aspects of the Cartagena Agreement and of the most
important decisions. After Chile’s withdrawal other problems persisted: continuous
violations of the agreement, demands by Bolivia and Ecuador for a greater access to the
benefits of the process, and diminishing political support from the member governments.
The changes in the international economic system of the 1970s forced the member
governments asynchronically, but surely, to shift to less interventionism in the economy.
The Commission correspondingly missed deadlines.1
For these reasons, the usefulness of the Cartagena Agreement was put into
question by the member countries. This resulted in the Protocols of Lima (1976) and of
Arequipa (1978) and the modifications of several decisions.2 They made the agreement
more flexible, established a new balance and synchrony among the mechanisms, and
reflected the changes of member states with regard to the Andean Pact, while reaffirming
the fundamental principles of the agreement.

1.2.- Changes due to Venezuela’s entry
Venezuela’s joining of the Andean Group strengthened the Pact politically, since
GRAN showed its capacity to attract a new, important—and wealthiest—member.
Economically, the size of the market increased (see table V .l).

'"The delay in these [first ten] years was due basically to internal problems of the member countries,
which were heavily affected by the international crisis, and by the search for the identity of the Group
[Venezuela’s entry and Chile’s exit] ..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 144).
2"Tbe delays in implementing the mechanisms, the imbalances between automatic and negotiated
mechanisms, the greater initial emphasis on some mechanisms over others, and the rigidity of some of the
stipulations of the agreement, were the factors, among others, which led the Member Countries to modify
deadlines, and to make adjustments, thus changing the Cartagena Agreement through the Protocols of Lima
and Arequipa in 1976 and 1978 respectively" (Ferrero, 1981: 39).
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TABLE V .l
VENEZUELA’S ENTRY INTO THE ANDEAN PACT: SOME INDICATORS

Without Venezuela

With Venezuela

Change

Per capita income

400 dollars

500 dollars

+ 25.00 percent

Population

60 millions

70 millions

+ 16.66 percent

Total savings

3 billions

4.5 billions

+ 50.00 percent

Consumption

25 billions

35 billions

+ 40.00 percent

Foreign trade

6.3 billions

10.4 billions

+ 65.08 percent

SOURCE: Llosa, 1973: Anexo estadfstico, Cuadro No 1.

Venezuela’s entry into also contributed to the stagnation of the process due to the
changes brought about by the Additional Instrument to the Cartagena Agreement for the
Admission of Venezuela, and by Decision 70. The approval of the common external
tariff and the programs for industrial rationalization were subjected to veto. The Junta's,
proposals on industrial programs had to be modified to incorporate Venezuela. The only
approved Sectoral Program of Industrial Development (SPID), the Metalworking
Program, had to be renegotiated to include Venezuela. The exemptions to the tariff
reduction program were increased.
The expanded membership also made more difficult the decision-making process.
Since the Commission’s decisions were in practice adopted by consensus, with the entry
of Venezuela, the Andean consensus for the sole reason of having more members, if not
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for something else, became harder to reach.3

1.3.- The withdrawal of Chile
The two main reasons which caused Chile to withdraw from the Andean Group
were its demands to make more flexible the rules on foreign investment and that the
average effective protection4 of the CET should be 30 percent (Tomic, 1980: 321-322),
as opposed to the Junta’s proposal of 65 percent. The member countries engaged in long
and difficult and eventually unsuccessful negotiations—from July 1974 to October 1976.
In the latter date, Decision 102 abrogated all the obligations and rights of Chile with
regard to the Agreement.
From a political view point, the basic reason which explained Chile’s exit was its
new strategy of development, "... show[ing] the open antinomy between the implicit
economic model of the Cartagena Agreement and the [Chilean] scheme..." (Rodriguez
Mancera, 1992: 8). The military government of Chile supported a neo-liberal strategy,
getting the government out of the economy, and granting the leading role to the private
sector.5 The other members still supported an import substitution strategy in which states

3\ . . other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between the number of member states
in a regional organization and its ability to adopt significant regional policies. ... Given the fact that all
regional decisions are essentially unanimous intergovernmental agreements, each additional partner
increases the national interests to be satisfied ... The package deal and trade-offs ... increase geometrically
..." (Axline, 1994b: 199).
■•Effective protection is protection to the value added of a given product. Nominal protection is the tariff
applied to a given product.
^ i s radical departure from the strategy of development pursued by Chile since 1974 was due first to
the interest of the dictatorship to mark very clear distance with the statism of the Socialist government, and
second as an attempt to improve its relations with the United States highly deteriorated by the harsh
repression pursued by the military dictatorship. For an analysis of the ideology of the Chilean experiment
see Foxley 1983; Maulian and Vergara, 1980, 109-125; Petras and Leiva, 1994.
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and plans played important roles. This divergence caused Chile’s departure.
The withdrawal of Chile diminished the Andean Group’s economic potential: the
size of its population by 13.3 percent; its GDP, by 10.5 percent; and its intrasubregional
trade, by 30.9 percent (JUNAC, 1977: 1.12). There were also other consequences like
the reduction of opportunities for profitable investment, and the "serious splits [that]
developed in the Commission, and a mood of weariness and waning enthusiasm [that] set
in" (Puyana, 1982: 10).
Negotiations with Venezuela and Chile clearly show that divergent interests
among the governments of the member countries, as stated in the hypothesis of this
research project, explains this phase of stagnation of the Andean Group. Professors
Vega-Centeno and Iguiiiez (1978: 179) concur
The lack of political accords ... prevents progress on basic aspects. On the
other hand, the dynamics of the process demand progress either by making
concessions, ... or by renouncing ... objectives, perhaps fundamental to the
national socioeconomic process. It is obvious that there is also the possibility of
breaking links with the Andean Group ... in order to pursue the national project
(italics added).

1.4.- The Protocols of Lima and Arequipa
Changes in membership weakened important decisions and led to the adoption,
in October 1976, of the Protocol of Lima. "These changes amounted to a very
perceptible dilution of the regional strategy itself" (Mace, 1988: 186).
The Protocol of Lima modified the Cartagena Agreement in important aspects.
First, the deadlines to adopt SPIDs, to approve the CET, and to comply in full the tariff
reduction program were extended by three years, to December 1978 for the first two,
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and the last to December 1983. Second, the CET became a tariff band, that is, for each
item there would be a minimum and a maximum level of protection. Third, SPIDs could
be approved with the participation of only four countries—rather than by all members—
and their adoption and implementation were made more flexible. Fourth, the list of
products reserved for industrial programming was to be reduced. This protocol "meant
the reaffirmation of the basic postulates of the Cartagena Agreement and a readjustment
of the deadlines" (JUNAC, 1979a: 37).
Because the new deadlines were not met, the Protocol of Arequipa was signed in
April of 1978. It again extended the deadlines to adopt the CET to December of 1979,
and to December of 1980 the approval of the industrial programs. The protocols were
necessary to reestablish the juridical order of the Cartagena Agreement. At the same
time, governments modified the agreement to make it more in harmony with their
changing interests and policies.

2.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN 1974 AND 1978
The stagnation of the Andean process between 1974 and 1978 can be
demonstrated by the lack of progress in deepening the process in the areas already subject
to integration and/or in expanding the process into other areas. Stagnation can also be
shown through increasing violations of the Cartagena Agreement and its decisions in
comparison to the previous phase; and by the smaller number of decisions approved.
Section 2 will deal with stagnation expressed by the lack of progress in the most
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important mechanisms of the agreement. Section 3 will deal with the increasing violations
of the agreement and its decisions. Section 4 will explain this phase of stagnation as a
reflection of the increasing divergences among the member countries.

2.1.- The common tariff
The common minimum external tariff, CMET, was reduced—by Decision 104—
from an average of 40 percent to 28.7 percent, to keep Chile within the Pact, and to
reflect the interest of Colombia in reducing tariffs.6
With regard to the CET, according to the original article 62 of the Cartagena
Agreement, "[p]rior to 31 December 1973, the Board [Junta] shall prepare a Draft
Common External Tariff, to be submitted for consideration of the Commission for
approval within the following two years."7 Clarifying the procedure, in May 1973 the
Commission (1973a: 4) requested the Junta to present before December 1973 the draft
of the CET, and to submit its proposal before June 30, 1975. The Junta presented
Proposal 70 (JUNAC, 1975) only on December 27, 19758 because consultations with the
government representatives were postponed several times (JUNAC, 1977f: 13). The
December 31, 1975, deadline was not met.
The Junta's proposal suggested that the objective of the CET should be "to help

6Decision 104 was in response "to the greater flexibility which some member countries required to deal
with their external sector, especially as a consequence of the international [economic] crisis [of the time],
and as a result of a general policy of less protection for industry..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 82).
7English version from International Legal Materials, Vol III, No 5, September 1969; reproduced in
Garcia-Amador, 1978: 261.
“For a detailed analysis of Proposal 70 and governments’ reaction to it see Garay, 1979.
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to allocate economic resources more rationally and efficiently" in order to create
employment and to develop technology (JUNAC, 1976d: 4-5).9 Proposal 70, as the
Junta acknowledged, "implied substantial modifications in the tariff policy traditionally
applied by the member countries with regard to the principles to determine the tariff
structure and the tariff levels..." (JUNAC, 1976: 91). Member countries disagreed with
the Junta and with each other on the basic terms of the CET, and on its structure and
levels (see table V.2). The countries, decided, in Article 2 of the Protocol of Lima, to
transform the tariff level into a tariff band. This meant that each product would have a
minimum and a maximum tariff instead of a single tariff.
By early 1978, the Junta presented Proposal 96, which included the tariff band.
By April of that year, the Protocol of Arequipa was signed postponing the adoption of
the CET until December 1979.

2.2.- The tariff reduction program
The tariff reduction program continued between 1974 and 1978. The number of
items included in the tariff reduction process—automatic tariff reduction mechanism, the
Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs—increased from 2,772 (66 percent of all
items) in 1970 to 3,212 (71 percent)10 by December of 1975 (JUNAC, 1976a: 1-6).

’Proposal 70 also included norms for the harmonization of Andean countries’ foreign trade, such as
elimination of import prohibitions, import quotas, unilateral tariff reductions, elimination of export
subsidies and common rules of government procurement of imported goods.
10As a result in the changes in the NABANDINA—the common customs nomenclature for the Andean
Group based on the internationally agreed Brussels Tariff Nomenclature—the total number of items
increased over time, thus in 1970 it had 4,188 items, by December of 1975 it had 4,532 items and 4,869
items by April 1981 (JUNAC, 1976a: 1-6; 1982: 48).
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TABLE V.2
ANDEAN TARIFFS AND
COUNTRIES’ POSITION TOWARDS ON THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF
(PROPOSAL 70) IN DECEMBER 1975
NOMINAL AVERAGE 1 ARIF]FS BY TYPE OF PRODUCTS
SECTOR

BO

CH

CO

EC

PE

VE

PROP 70

1.

AGRICULTURE

22

na

24

45

58

63

23

2.

MINING

20

na

17

15

63

36

15

3.

INDUSTRY

22

na

32

30

70

47

41

3.1

Consumer goods

52

na

54

78

127

143

41

3.2

Intermediate goods

16

na

26

19

60

34

34

3.3

Capital goods

17

na

31

20

55

16

57

4.

AVERAGE 1/

20

44

29

28

65

44

39

MAXIMUM LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION
For products reserved for
Sectoral Programs of
Industrial Development

90

30

60

The rest

80

30

60

100

More
than
150

150

100

80

150

100

90

U General averages do not coincide with similar data in other tables due to different
criteria to include items in each of the sectors,
na = Not available.
SOURCES: Average tariffs for Chile: Aninat, 1978: 180.
For the other countries: Garay, 1979: 293.
Maximum level of effective tariff: Puyana, 1982: 236; JUNAC, 1977f: 16, 30.

The tariff reduction process created a "margin of preference" in favor o f the
member countries.11 It varied from country to country and from time to time due to

“The margin of preference is the difference between the tariff applied to non-members countries and
the tariff applied to member countries.
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those economic policies not subjected to policy harmonization. Andean exports enjoyed
a greater margin of preference if the importing Andean countries applied tariffs higher
than the CMET and/or non-tariffs barriers on the products from non-member countries.
Exports enjoyed lower, nil, or negative margin of preference if countries applied tariff
reductions or no tariffs on imports from non-member countries. Thus, Andean "trade was
influenced by the internal policies of the countries" (JUNAC, 1976: 64).
Since at one time or another all the Andean Pact countries applied import
restrictions on non-member countries, in general, intrasubregional trade enjoyed a greater
margin of preference than the one allowed by the CMET. Peru and Venezuela offered
a margin of preference two and three times higher than the one set by the CMET, and
in the case of Colombia it was around 10 points above the CMET (JUNAC, 1979a: 83).
Bolivia and Ecuador, having to apply the CMET and the tariff reduction mechanisms to
only a few products, offered very little margin of preference.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from table V.3. The third column of each year
shows the average margin of preference given by the member countries. In 1970, Peru
offered a 40.1 percent margin of preference, while Colombia offered only 22.5%
percent. In 1975, again, Peru gave the largest margin of preference, 44.9 percent,
followed by Venezuela, 40.9 percent, and Colombia 31.5 percent. In 1980 the
differences of the margins preferences applied by these 3 countries narrowed. Still, Peru
offered the largest margin followed by Venezuela and then by Colombia. The margins
of preference given by Bolivia and Ecuador were the smallest but, they also increased
from 3.0 percent to 12.8 percent over time.
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TABLE V.3
MARGIN OF PREFERENCE FOR INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE
1970, 1975 AND 1980
1970

1975

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

Bolivia

50.0

48.5

3.0

23.3

21.4

Colombia

56.0

43.4

22.5

36.8

Ecuador

91.0

88.3

3.0

Peru

89.0

53.3

1/

1/

Venezuela

1980
(1)

(2)

(3)

8.2

18.0

15.7

12.8

25.2

31.5

35.0

16.9

51.7

30.9

28.4

8.2

33.0

28.8

12.8

40.1

69.1

38.1

44.9

55.0

23.9

56.6

1/

48.9

28.9

40.9

44.0

20.1

54.3

(3)

(1) Average Tariff Applied to non-member countries
(2) Average Tariff Applied to member countries
(3) Margin of Preference in favor of the member countries = [(l-2)/l] X 100
V Not a member
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1982: 42-43

2.3.- Intrasubregional trade
Trade among the member countries, as expected by the hypothesis of this
dissertation, increased between 1974 and 1976, and decreased in 1977 and 1978 (see
table V.4). The 1977 reduction was mostly due to Chile’s withdrawal, but the 1978
reduction reflected the effects of the changes in the international economic system. In
1978, exports decreased by 17 percent while imports fell by 22 percent.
The share of intrasubregional trade in total trade, between 1974 and 1978, was
never more than 6 percent of total exports, and 8 percent of total imports. In 1969, when
the Andean Pact began, these percentages were 1.9 percent for exports, and 2.5 percent
for imports (see table IV.3). "Such trade ... while diversifying, consisted] mainly of
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TABLE V.4
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE: 1974-1978

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
G R A N I/
WORLD

766.2

779.0

909.0

824.7

681.8

21,568.0

16,452.0

17,191.0

15,785.5

16,282.7

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 1/
WORLD

766.3

778.9

939.0

10,441,0

11,538.0

14,032.0

16,945.9

18,770.0

662.1

856.5

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 1/
WORLD

(0.1)

0.1

(30.0)

(31.8)

19.7

11,127.0

4,914.0

3,159.0

(1,160.4)

(2,487.3)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 1/

3.55

4.73

5.29

5.22

4.19

IMPORTS 1/

7.34

6.75

6.69

5.05

3.53

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
G R A N I/

236.68

1.67

16.69

-9.27

-17.33

WORLD

281.58

-23.72

4.49

-8.18

3.15

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 1/

331.89

1.64

20.55

-8.79

-22.70

WORLD

339.95

10.51

21.62

20.77

10.76

II Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25;
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47;
1976: INTAL, cl977: 143;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10
and author’s calculations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

agricultural products. There has been no obvious stimulus to growth and industrialization
beyond what would have [sic] probably occurred in any case" (Bawa, 1980: 185). The
limited effects on Andean countries’ trade due to the Andean integration process was
mainly because of "...

[t]he existence of red tape, ..., low levels of efficiency and

similar structures of production" (JUNAC, 1976: 65).
Economic theory of integration has given major attention to trade creation and
trade diversion effects due to the tariff reduction program.12 As has been mentioned in
chapter II, section 2.2., for most economists, the former was positive because it
increased world’s benefits, while the latter was negative for the opposite reason. If the
analysis was made, however, from the point of view of the objectives of the member
countries as a whole, then both, trade diversion and trade creation, were positive.13
Although the concepts are simple and clear, to measure them is far more difficult.14 "In

12As it was defined in chapter II, section 2.2, given the tariff preference in favor of member countries,
trade creation is a situation in which local production is replaced by imports from a more efficient member
country. Trade diversion is a situation in which cheaper imports from non-member countries are replaced
by more expensive imports coming from a member country.
,3Looking upon only from the point of view of the member countries, some economists (e.g., Dell,
1966; Kitamura, 1966; Linder, 1966, 1967; El-Agraa, 1989: 349) considered trade diversion as having a
positive effect. One of the reasons was that Andean countries aimed to further import substitution. By
definition, import substitution is a process by which governments choose, at the beginning, to replace less
expensive imports for more expensive local production. In the case of trade diversion, the replacement of
foreign cheaper imports for costlier imports from other members—thus furthering other members import
substitution—is a measure of success. Another reason to consider trade diversion beneficial is that increased
trade among members, increases interdependence among member countries and reduces it in relation to
non-members. This increase of interdependence tends, in theory, to improve relationships at other levels
(political, security, cooperation etc.). A third reason pertains to the fact that member countries do not pay
attention to the effects of their acts upon world welfare.
14 El-Agraa (1989: Pan II) has made a survey of the most important attempts to measure trade creation
and trade diversion effects. A brief survey of empirical studies of economic integration among developed
countries, especially the EEC, can be found in Jovanovic, 1992: chapter 5; Krauss, 1972:430-434; Mayes,
1982: 28-43; Robson, 1987: chapter 13; and Waelbroeck, 1976: 89-99. Attempts to measure the effects
of integration among developing countries on trade flows have been made by Brada and Mendez, 1985;
Elkan, 1984; Hazlewood, 1966; 1967; 1975; Kahnert et al., 1969; Newlyn, 1965; 1966; Pazos, 1973;
Pearson, 1970; Robson, 1968; 1983; 1987; Robson and Lury, 1969; Straubhaar, 1987; Willmore, 1976.
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an interdependent macroeconomic world, ... the problems of actual measurement [of
trade creation and trade diversion] are insurmountable ... therefore its empirical
estimation seems rather futile ..." (El-Agraa, 1989: 349).15 In general, it can be said
that, the studies’ conclusions have been inconclusive.
GRAN, is not an exception, measurements have been inconclusive. For example,
Chan (1972) in an ex-ante estimate calculated that one-third of the increase of Peru’s
trade with other Andean countries would correspond to trade creation, while two-thirds
to trade diversion. An ex-post study for Colombia showed no significant trade creation
or trade diversion.16 Results reported in one set of estimates of another ex-post study
covering the intra-Andean trade between 1969 and 1977 showed slightly higher trade
creation (52 percent) than trade diversion (48 percent) (Khazek and Clark, 1990).
Five studies summarized by Langhammer and Heimenz (1990: 24-25, 30-31, 85)
measuring trade creation and trade diversion in LAFTA and the CACM, and the study
made by the Secretaria General de la ALADI (1983: 20-26) for trade in LAFTA were
also inconclusive.

2.4.- Industrial programming
According to the original Article 47 of the Cartagena Agreement, by December

15As a consequence of tariff variations, trade creation and trade diversion have the effects of imposing
and eliminating tariffs. They influence from what country to buy, and what to buy. Other direct effects are
on fiscal revenues, price of goods, and on income distribution. There are also indirect effects on factors
of production, on relative prices, on terms of trade, and on balance of payments (Chan, 1976: 12-23).
Since empirical research cannot take into account these effects, they have to concentrate a priori to study
one or a few of them.
l6Garay, Luis Jorge, "Los efectos del programa de liberation sub-regional en el comercio exterior de
Colombia," mimeo, FEDESARROLLO, December 1979; quoted in Urrutia, 1981: 185.
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1975 industrial programming should be completed, but this deadline was not met. The
timetable was "excessively optimistic because ... [p]rograms were difficult to formulate.
They were not accepted by the member countries, they were not included in the national
plans, nor were they implemented as scheduled" (JUNAC, 1976: 69). There were two
reasons for this result, the first was, "industrial programming was, in reality, a totally
new activity, for which the member countries were not prepared either in providing basic
information and statistics, or in defining priorities, and even less in taking definite
decisions by fixed dates ..." (ibid.). The second reason was, "... the political change in
some of the countries with regard to industrial programming as a result of the neo-liberal
trends in economic policies" (JUNAC, 1979a: 68).
It took the Junta a long time to present its industrial programming proposals to
the Commission. It took the Commission several years to discuss, negotiate and finally
approve them.17 Implementation of the programs, left mostly in the hands of the private
sector, was far from assured since, because of the principle of the primacy of the state,
the private sector had little, if any, participation in their negotiations.18

17In general the whole procedure beginning with the preparation of a proposal by the Junta to its
adoption by the Commission was a long and cumbersome process. For details see Aninat, 1992: 36-43.
It took more than 3 years to prepare and approve—in 1972—the Metalworking Program; and it took more
than 6 years to adopt the Petrochemical Program (approved in April 1975), and the Automobile Program
(approved in September 1977). As for the Siderurgy and the Fertilizers Programs, the Junta spent two
years in preparing them. By the end of this phase of stagnation (1978) they had not been approved by the
Commission.
18"Proposals for industrial programming should take into account the motivations of the entrepreneurs
who must convert such ideas into reality. It is difficult to believe that entrepreneurs will assume the risk
of investment unless there are clear and tangible profits to be made" (Conesa, 1984a: 98).
"Until now the SPIDs have not been carried out. Governments approve these programs but it is
not their obligation to implement them. Private economic agents are the ones who should made them a
reality. For them, the relevant factors are profits, opportunity, power relations, markets, investment,
technological control rather than community interests" (Parra-Pena, 1979: 36).
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Governments of the member countries, were also reluctant to do their share.
Countries did not take into account their capabilities and tried to get as many production
assignments as possible.19 This led to long and protracted negotiations. "Industrial
Programming is creating more political problems than the other mechanisms...
...industrial programs are the Gordian knot of the Andean integration. It has to be
unknotted or destroyed at all costs" (Valencia, 1977: 49). On the other hand, "if the
SPIDs do not became a reality in the near future, several countries will radically change
their attitude towards the Andean Pact because the SPIDs represent for them the principal
source of benefits from integration" (Salgado, 1978: 239). The member countries also
failed to apply the CET and the tariff reduction program for the existing production of
the approved sectoral programs, and disregarded their obligation not to encourage the
production of goods not assigned to them (Hojman, 1981: 159; Hutcheson, Bolte,
Culagovski, Gonzalez and Morawetz, 1983: 35).
A report by the Junta (JUNAC, cl978: 26, 33) on the Petrochemical Program,
illustrate this point. By the end of 1978, Bolivia had still not incorporated this Decision
(approved in August 1975) into its national legislation. The tariff reduction program was
applied by Colombia and Venezuela in a piecemeal fashion. Every year these countries
were promulgating a decree lowering the tariffs. Ecuador and Peru applied the tariff
reduction program on a reciprocity basis. Out of the 111 petrochemical products being

I9For example, according to Puyana (1982:9), during the negotiation period the Petrochemical Program
was substantially modified, so there was no specialization, since every country could develop an integrated
petrochemical industry, if it wished.
"It is probably true that [the Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs] could have been
approved with a much better technical and economic structure. It is not possible, however, to ignore facts
like the existence of production, and of long-time projects waiting to be developed..." (JUNAC, 1976: 70).
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produced by the end of 1978, the CET was applied to only 36 (30 percent) of them. By
1978 only 54 items (33.5 percent), of the 161 dutiable items included in this program,
were being produced and only two productions began their operations after the
petrochemical decision was passed (JUNAC, 1979a: 76; cl978: 30-31).
By mid-1978, six years after the approval of the Metalworking Program,
production existed for 45 of the 72 units assigned in this sectoral program. This in turn
corresponded to 85 (42 percent) of the 202 dutiable items included in the program.20
Out of the 65 companies producing these goods, 49 were already in existence by the time
the program was adopted (JUNAC, 1979a: 69).
The results

of the two oldest sectoral programs—Metalworking,

and

Petrochemical—were "almost negligible ... regarding trade and investment ... and
represented] trade in goods from already existing plants" (Puyana, 1984: 302). In short,
"the mid-seventies witnessed the gradual stagnation of industrial programming ..."
(Mairal, 1989: 92) as a consequence of these delays.

2.5.- Common treatment of foreign investment
Decision 24, approved in December 1970, was modified seven times,21 giving
greater discretionary powers to the governments. By the end of 1978 "there was no
consensus to adopt common regulations to apply Decision 24 and its modifications"
(JUNAC, 1979a: 47). These changes can be explained as a reaction to the increasing

20This figure should be taken with caution, since a dutiable item usually covers more production lines
than the existing production, which are usually the simpler ones.
2lFor a detailed analysis of the changes see Tenorio, 1978; chapters X-XIII.
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scarcity of foreign investment (Ferris, 1979a: 67). Besides, each one of the governments
interpreted the common rules differently. It was not only a new and quite complex norm,
but it also affected political and economic interests in each country.22
As for the effects of Decision 24 on the flow of foreign direct investment
it can be concluded that it has not been negative, since the increase of foreign
capital during the period of existence of Decision 24 has been substantially
greater than in the previous period and similar to world trends in the case of the
developing countries. In the industrial sector, on which Decision 24 has been
more strict, the inflow of capital has been more dynamic than for the economy
as a whole... (JUNAC, 1979a: 55).
Between 1967 and 1971 the average annual rate of foreign investment in the Andean
Group was slightly negative,—0.4 percent mostly due to a decrease of investment in
Venezuela. From 1971 to 1977—when Decision 24 was in place—foreign investment
increased on average 7.6 percent annually, while for the industrial sector this rate was
8.3 percent (ibid.: 48, 51).23 Data provided by the Inter-American Development Bank
for private direct investment,24 table V.5, corroborates the Junta’s conclusions.

“ Case in point was the fact that transnationals targeted Colombia to anack Decision 24 (Mytelka, 1979:
64-65). The Colombian Supreme Court declared "inexecutable" the decree given by the executive power
to put Decision 24 into force. The problem was solved when in 1973 the Colombian congress passed a law.
23This data disproof the American assertion that Decision 24 would reduce foreign direct investments.
It seems that the opportunity to enjoy the whole Andean market overcome the initial skepticism about its
controlist nature.
24The Inter-American Development Bank defines Private Direct Investment "as investment in enterprises
located in one country but effectively controlled by residents of another country. As a rule, it takes the
form of investment in branches and subsidiaries in one country by parent companies located in another
country. The entries for the compiling country represent net changes between the inward and outward
movements of capital during the reporting period." See for instance: IDB, cl980: 427.
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TABLE V.5
NET PRIVATE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
(Millions of US Dollars)
1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

BOL

-76

2

-11

5

26

53

12

15

12

CHI 2/

41

-42

-1

-5

-557

50

1/

1/

1/

COL

39

40

17

23

35

35

14

43

68

ECU

89

162

81

52

77

95

-20

34

49

PER

-70

21

24

70

58

316

170

55

25

VEN 3/

1/

1/

V

1/

-343

418

-889

-4

68

GRAN

23

183

110

145

-704

967

-713

143

222

894

1387

945

2286

1760

3202

1465

3022

3196

L.A.

1978

1/ Not a member
2/ The outflow of capital between 1971and 1974 was due to the policies of the Allende
period and the turmoil after thecoup d ’etat.
3/ The decrease in (1974 and 1976)
wasdue
basically toitsoil nationalization program.
SOURCES: 1970-1971: IDB, cl975: 471; 1972-1977: IDB, cl980: 437; 1978: IDB,
C1986: 420

Sanchez and Bawa summarize the main problems faced by the Andean Group in
this phase of stagnation:
The decade of the seventies signaled the frustration of the principal
aspirations ... postulated by the agreement. Industrial programming failed, the
tariff reduction program was delayed, policy harmonization was weakened, and
the CET was postponed. All of this occurred within a context of rapid economic
changes and of the first symptoms of the external debt crisis (Sanchez, 1989: 12).
The original plan for the Andean Group was probably over-ambitious
[sic]. The foreign investment control regulations were too inflexible, being
consistent only with a single growth model. The sectoral production-sharing
agreements probably could not have been carried out in an economically
gratifying manner because of delays, lack of adequate transport networks, and
inexperience in manufacturing and quality control would have led to severe cost
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overruns. Multilateral coordination of industrial production without a strong
central authority is an extremely difficult planning task. The states appear to have
been too inexperienced to realize that the attempt was likely to encounter serious
difficulties (Bawa, 1980: 186).

3.- VIOLATIONS AND DELAYS

Following the procedure used in chapter IV, violations can be classified as (a)
non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement, (b) non-incorporation into
the national legislation of the approved decisions; and (c) failure to comply with decisions
once they have been incorporated in the national legislation.
During this phase violations of the Cartagena Agreement and the lack of
compliance of the decisions of the Commission became more prevalent than in the
previous phase. In this regard, "... the non-compliance of the member countries with the
Andean decisions ... [and] the lack of uniform application of the decisions..." were the
most important problems in this period (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979: 219).

3.1.- Non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement
By December 1975 the CET had not been adopted nor had the approval of all the
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development been completed.25 The non-fulfillment of
the deadlines, legally and technically, were violations committed by the Commission and

2sThus, it was not possible to establish the customs union between 1975 and 1980, and industrial
programming, the most important mechanism for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, was not being
implemented.
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the Junta. In practice they were not considered as such because the Protocols of Lima
and of Arequipa (which only went into effect in April 1979), gave the Commission and
the Junta the possibility to assume "de facto ” the validity of the new deadlines.
Although not subject to deadlines, there was also the lack of progress in
agriculture, infrastructure, rationalization of the existing industry, harmonization of
economic policies, and planning coordination. Among the reasons for this situation were:
(a) the concentration of efforts on the tariff reduction program and industrial
programming; (b) the negotiations and the additional work needed for the entry of
Venezuela, and the exit of Chile; and (c) the difficulties encountered in preparing the
SPIDs (JUNAC, 1976: 69-70, 87, 126, 158).26

3.2.- Non-incorporation in the national legislation of the approved decisions
As has been mentioned in chapter IV, decisions concerning policy harmonization
were not approved by the Commission, or when approved the Junta reported that they
were not put into practice by the member countries. During the phase of stagnation this
practice continued. One of the most important deficiencies of the process "was the lack
of will to harmonize ... national policies ..." (Salgado, 1978: 239). Because of this,
... the Andean process had suffered a serious disequilibrium, not only between
industrial programming and the tariff reduction program, but between the latter
and policy harmonization. This second disequilibrium had already affected the
credibility of the process ... and could lead to the stagnation and crisis of the
process (JUNAC, 1979a: 85).

26,1[T]he strategy adopted by the organs of the agreement was to create interdependency based
exclusively on trade flows resulting from the coordinated application of the tariff reduction program, the
CMET and the implementation of the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development" (Guerrero, 1979:418).
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The Andean process went into a phase of stagnation as is was alluded by the Junta, it
was due in part to the lack of progress in policy harmonization.
During the phase of progress (1969-1973) there were a maximum of 5 decisions
which were not incorporated by the member countries in their national legislation. In the
phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, the member countries had not incorporated 8 to 14
decisions (table V.6). By the end of 1978, out of the 14 decisions not incorporated,
one—Decision 49, Harmonization of Industrial legislation—was not incorporated by all
of the members. Three decisions were not incorporated by four members: Decisions 120
(Automobile Program), and Decisions 124 and 125 both dealing with treatment of neutral
capital within the common regime for foreign capital. Finally, Decision 85—industrial
property—was not incorporated by three countries (JUNAC, 1978b: I; 1979a: 132).

TABLE V.6
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1974-1978
DATE

SOURCE

03-25-76

BO

CH

CO

EC

PE

VE

(1)

6

6

3

8

5

11-24-76

(2)

7

1/

6

8

Jan-77

(3)

5

1/

4

03-14-77

(4)

6

1/

11-15-77

(5)

8

08-26-78

(6)

8

TOTAL

(*)

6

34

n.a.

5

6

32

11

5

4

6

24

8

4

6

6

6

28

12

1/

7

8

6

9

36

14

1/

6

5

7

9

35

14

11-16-78
8
1/
6
5
7
8
34
14
(7)
'*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation
one or more countries
1/ Not a member of the Andean Group at that time.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1976a; (2) JUNAC, 1976b; (3) JUNAC, 1977b; (4) JUNAC,
1977c; (5) JUNAC, 1977d; (6) JUNAC, 1978a; (7) JUNAC, 1978b.
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3.3.- Failure to comply with decisions incorporated in the national legislation
Decisions that were once incorporated but only partially complied with increased
in this phase. Table V.7 provides the available information about decisions pertaining
only to the tariff reduction program and the CMET that were in this situation.
Venezuela was the country with the most delays. Colombia and Pem showed
greater delays between 1974 and 1978 in complying with the tariff reduction program,
than in the 1969-1973 phase (see table IV.5). In contrast, these two countries complied
better with the CMET during the phase 1974-1978 than in the previous phase.
With regard to the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development already
approved—Metalworking, Petrochemical and Automobile—there were important delays
before incorporating them into the domestic legislation.27 There were even greater
delays by the governments in implementing these decisions.
Non-compliance with the minimum tariff levels approved in Decision
30—CMET—increased in this phase. In 1975 and 1976, Colombia did violate the
minimum levels for 29 items, Pem for 51 and Venezuela for 1,095 (JUNAC, 1979d: 23).
Regarding the application of the CET by 1976, all the member countries delayed
applying the CET to the Metalworking Program, Pem being the extreme case, since it
did not apply the CET (JUNAC, 1976: 95). As table V.8 shows us, the violations of the

^The Metalworking Program was approved in August 1972. Peru incorporated it into its domestic
legislation in September of that year. In April of 1973 Ecuador did it too, while Colombia did it in
September and Chile in October of the same year (Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 445). The Petrochemical
Program was passed in August 1975. Peru incorporated it into its national legislation in April 1976;
Venezuela did it in October of that year; Colombia in February of 1977; Ecuador in February 1978; while
Bolivia by the end of 1978 had not incorporated it (JUNAC, 1981: 13). The Automobile Program was
approved in September 1977. Ecuador was the only country to incorporate this decision—June 1978—before
the end of 1978 (JUNAC, ibid.: 15).
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TABLE V.7
DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING TRADE MECHANISMS BY DECEMBER 1978
(In months)
MECHANISMS

BO

CO

CH

EC

PE

VE

LAFTA’S COMMON LIST

N

"RESTRICTIONS OF ALL KINDS"

N

3

N

2

4 1/

Adoption of the lowest duty of Colombia,
Chile, or Peru

N

6

N

4

4 If

Liberalization of NON-PRODUCED goods

4

1

1

1

4 1/

AUTOMATIC TRADE REDUCTION
4th. reduction: 31-12-74

N

N

3

48 1/

5th. reduction: 31-12-75

N

N

na

36 1/

6th. reduction: 31-12-76

N

12

2/

N

7th. reduction: 31-12-77

N

9

2/

N

10

12 If

RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY BO

N

5

4

2

2

4 1/

RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY EC

5

5

4

N

2

4 1/

IMMEDIATE FREE TRADE FOR BO-EC

N

5

N

4

4 1/

COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF
4th. approximation 31-12-74

N

N

1

11

5th. approximation 31-12-75

N

N

Decision 104

N

4

2/

N

MARGINS OF PREF. FOR BO & EC

N

9

12

N

41/

Adoption of NABANDINA 3/

4

2

5

10

8 4/

N

3

4 1/

24 1/

3
12

Blank space means the country put into practice its obligation, in a timely fashion.
N = The country is not required to put into practice the mechanism.
1/ By April 30, 1974 Venezuela had to implement this mechanisms (Decision 70,
Chapter I).
2/ Not a member of the agreement.
3/ NABANDINA was the common tariff classification for the Andean Countries.
4/ Decision 70 in its Article 25 states that Venezuela should implement the
NABANDINA by December 31, 1993. The data reflects this deadline.
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1981: 1-10.
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CMET, the CET and the Andean liberalization program reached 2,760 items by July
1976. Chile and Venezuela were the major offenders. The situation improved after
Chile’s exit, which coincided with other members drastically reducing their violations.
The latter was also due to the reduction of the CMET by Decision 104.

TABLE V.8
DUTIABLE ITEMS OF THE COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF,
COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF AND ANDEAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION
PROGRAM VIOLATED BY MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1974-1978
DATE

SOURCE

BOL

07-26-76

(1 )1 /

69

11-24-76

(2 )1 /

11-15-77

CHI

COL

ECU

PER

VEN

TOTAL

1359

78

57

76

1121

2760

11

2/

23

2

32

483

522

(3 )1 /

14

2/

31

13

15

89

162

08-26-78

(4)

20

2/

28

19

5

91

163

11-16-78

(5)

11

2/

27

16

1

11

66

1/ Includes only the number of dutiable items violating the CMET (modified by Decision
104) and the CET of the Metalworking Program. Venezuela at that date was not
required to apply the CET.
2/ Not a member of the Andean Group at that time.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1976c; (2) JUNAC, 1976b; (3) JUNAC, 1977d; (4) JUNAC,
1978a; (5) JUNAC, 1978b

The violations to the articles of the Cartagena Agreement and to the decisions of
the Commission show a contradiction between the governments’ will and their actions.
For the Junta (JUNAC, 1979a: 27) the "contradiction between political will and facts ...
can be explained [as a] ... political act which attempts to harmonize long term objectives
with the vicissitudes that characterize ... the dynamics of social relations." In other words
there was a conflict between long-term aims and short-term interests. These conflicts

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175

have been expressed in the increasing violations in the phase.
The non-existence of an adjudication organ aggravated the situation.28 On top
of this, there was not even "a mechanism allowing a permanent and systematic follow-up
of the fulfillment of the obligations by the member countries (JUNAC, 1976: 9). To deal
with this last aspect, at the Junta’s suggestion, the Commission, in April 1977, "resolved
to examine in all its ordinary sessions [three times a year] the fulfillment of the
agreement and its decisions by the member countries" (Comision, 1977: 8).
The lack of an Andean organism to adjudicate supports the hypothesis of this
study that governments are the main actors of the process. They decide how to limit their
own sovereignty by adopting decisions through the Commission, which is composed of
governments’ representatives. Governments after freely negotiating and agreeing on
issues as shown by the Commission’s decisions can refuse to implement them without
fear of penalty.

4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF STAGNATION

4.1.- General factors
The situation the Andean Pact was going through during this phase of stagnation,
was more than "a crisis of growing" (Valdes, 1981: 454); and more than a "... growing
discouragement ... in some circles ... with regard to the governments’ will to comply

28The Andean Tribunal was created in May 1979, and only in September 1983 began to function (see
chapter VI, section 2.5.a).
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with their obligations contracted in the agreement" (JUNAC, 1976: 158).
A general factor which seems to explain the evolution of the Andean integration
process, and other integration processes is economic prosperity. When the economies of
the member are growing, integration is furthered, but when prosperity "decreases, socio
political mechanisms begin to function first affecting those peripheral components of the
economic process such as integration (Davila, 1984: 5(a)). By the end of the 1970s,
domestic and international circumstances were leading toward economic recession.
Another aspect, which is directly related to a main element of the hypothesis of
this dissertation, was the increasing differences in the strategies and economic policies
pursued by the member countries. During this phase, as the Andean countries began to
differ more and more in their economic policies and strategies, and the Andean process
became more and more stagnant, since the Cartagena Agreement reflected less and less
the interests of the countries. The agreement, however, was kept unchanged until the
partial and formal modifications introduced by the Protocols of Lima and Arequipa began
preparing the grounds for its next phase: regression.
The clearest case of divergence was between Chile and the other member
countries. The Chilean government drastically and rapidly changed the strategy of
development from inward to outward oriented, while other members were only willing
to be more "flexible" in some aspects of their strategies. The policies adopted by Chile,
"were divergent from the policies of the Andean integration" (JUNAC, 1979a: 36). Other
more important sources of divergence were the
increasing differences [among the member countries] in the conceptualization of
the models of development, in the political systems, in ideological orientations,
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and in positions towards the world economic, political and ideological reality.
That is, there was a gradual movement from basic homogeneity to the acceptance
of pluralism in the hemispheric relations, and from it to divergence (Valdes,
1981: 455).
Among the member countries now there was a "wide spectrum in the political and
economic positions" (JUNAC, 1976: 175), making it more difficult to reach accord and
thus to further Andean integration.
The entry of Venezuela, and Chile’s exit transformed GRAN into a hesitant
decision-making system, and instilling a low morale.29 Venezuela, supported by Chile,
introduced the practice of private meetings of the Commission which did not include the
members of the Junta and the Director-Secretary as it used to be.30 The consequence
was further delays by the Commission due to time consuming negotiations between 1972
(when negotiations about the entry of Venezuela began in earnest) and 1979 (when the
new Metalworking Program was approved).31
The lack of synchrony between the automatic mechanisms (e.g., the tariff
reduction program) and the negotiated ones (e.g., industrial programming) led to a
greater role for the former. The tariff reduction program was automatically applied and

29There was "the evident loss of some political coherence due to the political changes in the system.
... first... was the entry o f ... Venezuela. Another change was the exit of another country. An important
fact ... [was] the international [economic] crisis" (Valdes, 1977: 74).
"These private meetings were called when difficult problems arose and members of the Commission
wanted to deal with the issues as candidly as possible without the press, and other members of their
delegations.
3I"... until 1973 we progressed very dynamically... In that year we stopped ... because ... otherwise
... Venezuela would have not entered ... [0]nce it entered ... the Junta in 1973 and part of 1974 was
devoted to prepare new or to change the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development. ... in 1974, two
significant things happened: the substantial change in the economic policies of the Chilean government, and
also the beginning of the economic depression, which struck hard on at least two countries, Chile and Peru
... [T]he Junta and the Commission [in] ’74, ’75, and ’76 did nothing but act as fire fighters"
(Barandiaran, 1977: 69).
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viewed as a market mechanism, while industrial programming was to be negotiated and
perceived as a planning mechanism. The steady progress of the tariff reduction program
and the increasing problems in approving industrial programs led to the preponderance
of the former, and thus of market mechanisms.32 As a consequence there were fewer
warranties for a balanced and harmonic development, and for a fair share of benefits.
The uneven distribution of benefits was another factor.33 Trade benefits accrued
mostly to Colombia which, with Chile, exported 62.1 percent of the manufactured goods
(Puyana, 1982: 101). As regards the Metalworking Program, in 1975 Colombia’s share
was 56.4 percent of the total trade, while Chile’s share was 33.7 percent, and Peru’s was
9.9 percent (JUNAC, 1977:

n.2.4).

In 1978, with Chile out of GRAN and Venezuela

not yet in the Metalworking Program, Colombia’s participation was 44.0 percent, and
Peru’s was 21.2 percent (JUNAC, 1979a: 70). In the Petrochemical Program, excluding
Chile, the Colombian share between 1975 and 1977 was 49.3 percent, Venezuela’s 27.1
percent, and Peru’s 23.6 percent (JUNAC, cl979: 152). In the case of foreign direct
investment of US$8 billion, the cumulative investment in the subregion up to 1977, 45
percent went to Venezuela, 25 percent to Peru, and 17.5 percent to Colombia (JUNAC,
1979a: 49).
The most dissatisfied members were the relatively less developed countries. "In

32"[W]hile in the Andean Group the aspects concerning the tariff reduction program folIow[ed] more
or less their predicted course, the ones related to ... the industrial project lag[ged] behind" (Vega-Centeno
and Iguinez, 1978:176), because "the latter were cumbersome and hard to negotiate" (Salgado, 1978: 239).
33The most developed countries, Chile and Colombia, got most of the benefits, while Bolivia and
Ecuador, the RLDC, the least. This outcome is nor dissimilar in other integration schemes. The CACM
is a case in point. Nicaragua and Honduras, the RLDC of the CACM, complained that they were not
getting the benefits of the process. See Cochrane, 1969: Chapter 5, Fagan, 1970; Hansen, 1967: 55-64.
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1978, sales of manufactured goods from Bolivia and Ecuador represented 5.7 percent of
subregional trade in those products" (Puyana, 1984: 121). Bolivia’s share in trade of
products of the Metalworking Program was nil between 1975 and 1977, while Ecuador’s
share went from 0.04 percent in 1975 to 14.5 in 1976 and to 26.2 percent in 1978, five
percentage points above Peru (JUNAC, 1977: II.2.4; 1979a: 70).34 Neither Bolivia nor
Ecuador had any exports in petrochemical products between 1975 and 1977. As to
foreign investment, only 1.5 percent of the total US$8 billion accumulated until 1977
went to Bolivia and 11.0 percent to Ecuador (JUNAC, 1979a: 49).3S
Between the largest and the smallest countries stood Peru. This country expected
to reap benefits from the industrial programs, whose approval was increasingly delayed.
"Moreover, the progress of the tariff reduction program implie[d] for the country a
continuous increase of its trade deficit with the rest of the subregion [see table V.12].
This cost [was] absorbed by Peru in exchange for the potential benefits of industrial
programming" (Vega-Centeno and Iguinez, 1978: 177).
The marginal effects of integration in the economies of the member countries
contributed to the lack of response by the governments to further the process. According
to the Junta, in Bolivia the Andean integration had not produced the benefits this country

“ This was one of the few positive, albeit limited, effect for Ecuador. Total exports of the products
included in the Metalworking Program was only $8.5 million (up from $1.3 million in 1973; JUNAC,
1979a: 70). Ecuador’s share of 26.2 percent of this trade amounted to $2.21 million, which was only 1.2
percent of its exports to GRAN in 1977.
“ "Bolivia’s disenchantment stems from three factors, its concern over modest regional trade increases,
its complains concerning sectorial allocations, and its charge that other members are nor meeting their
obligations toward Bolivia" (Avery, 1983: 161)
"Bolivia and Ecuador ... were assigned exclusive rights to certain industries, but had neither the
technical know-how nor the financial capacity to take advantage of them" (Conesa, 1984: 98).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180

had expected, nor had it contributed significantly to the improvement of its standard of
living. From 1969 to 1978, Colombia reaped the greatest economic benefits from this
process; while the Andean integration contribution to the Ecuadorean economy was
small. In Peru and in Venezuela the impact of the Andean process was marginal
(JUNAC, 1979a: 139-143).
There were attempts to inject more dynamism into the process through two
summit meetings of the Andean presidents. The first was held in Washington in
September 1977, and the second in Bogota, in August 1978.36 In these meetings the
presidents officially supported Andean integration and gave instructions to approve
lengthy negotiated proposals. In 1978, however, all the member countries were in the
midst of holding elections37 which greatly overshadowed the relevance of integration.38
Another general factor contributing to the stagnation of the Andean process was
what has been termed for the European Community "the democratic deficit".39 In the
Andean case, this "democratic deficit" consisted of two issues. One was the need to end

“ The meetings were held taking advantage of the presence of the 5 Presidents. For Washington it was
the ratification of the Panama Treaty; for Bogota it was the swearing in of the Colombian president.
37In Bolivia elections were held in July 1978. In the same month, a coup d'etat ousted President
General Hugo Banzer, and the results of the elections were abrogated by the new government. Elections
in Colombia were held in the same year replacing Liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen by another Liberal,
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. Ecuador voted a constitutional referendum in January 1978. In that same year,
Peru elected a Constitutional Assembly; and in Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins was elected to replace
Carlos Andres Perez.
38"... from 1977 on, electoral processes began in Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, ... as we all
know, under these circumstances; the Andean issues and the integration issues became less important from
the political and decision-making points of view" (Barandiaran, 1977: 70).
39In the case of the European Union and its predecessors, the concept of "democratic deficit" was
loosely related to two aspects. One was the lack of control over the Council of Ministers by the European
and the national parliaments. The other was the contrast between the secrecy of the Council and the
openness of the European Parliament (Colchester and Buchan, 1990: chapter 4; Williams, 1991: 155, 162171).
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authoritarian governments in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, and to begin a
democratization process allowing the incorporation of diverse social sectors into the
integration process (Dooner, 1982: 35). The other issue was the monopolization of the
process by a bureaucratic elite and the lack of people’s consciousness that the process
could affect them (Salgado, 1978: 240).
There was also "the action deficit." According to Ferris (1979b: 86), "... there
is often a gap between what national leaders are saying, what they are feeling, and what
they are doing with respect to the Andean Pact. This gap may be due to insufficient
resources or to an unwillingness to move beyond the cost-free statements of public
support."
In summary, there were international and domestic changes; delays; increasing
violations of the Cartagena Agreement and its decisions; as well as the growing
dissatisfaction of the RLDC; and monopolization of the process by a bureaucratic elite.
All these factors led the Junta to warn that "it is clear that it is not going to be easy to
achieve the goals in the short timetable set by the Cartagena Agreement" (JUNAC, 1976:
3). Over time, this warning became a reality and changed the attitude towards the process
from one of "confidence and optimism, to one of doubts and hesitations about the
future..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 37). During this phase of stagnation, however, the member
countries were still interested in the Andean process as a tool to achieve some national
goals. This was illustrated by the members extending the deadlines twice, and holding
two summit meetings.40

4frThese facts can also be interpreted as the lack of interest of any country to follow the steps of Chile,
and thus put and end to the Andean Group.
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One consequence of the stagnation of the Andean process is shown in table V.9,
which summarizes the Commission’s activities. Between 1969 and 1973, 81 decisions
were approved while in the phase of stagnation—1974 to 1978—only 55 were passed. Of
the 81 decisions, 58 decisions concerned new issues adopted in the phase of progress
representing 72 percent of all decisions; while in the following phase, only 65 percent
of the decisions dealt with new issues. Of all the decisions on new issues approved
between 1969 and 1973, 55 percent could be considered important, while it was only 22
percent between 1974 and 1978.41 As for decisions modifying previous decisions, there
were 23 in the phase of progress and 19 in the phase of stagnation. In the first phase,
however, all but one were unimportant modifications; while in the second phase 12 were
unimportant, 7 were important, and out of these 7 decisions, 4 weakened the process.42

4.2.- The international environment at the end of 1960s and early 1970s
In the late 1960s, the international economic order created at the end of World
War II by the United States was on the verge of profound changes. The international

4lExamples of important decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 were: Decision 91: Petrochemical
Program; decision 97 authorizing Chile’s to sell its public enterprises to foreigners; Decision 99 adopting
a timetable to approve the remaining SPIDs; Decision 100 Decision proposing the governments to adopt
the Protocol of Lima; 120: Automotive Program; and Decision 128 proposing the governments to adopt
the Protocol of Arequipa.
42Modifying decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 which strengthened the Andean process were:
Decision 104 reducing the levels of the CMET; and Decisions 109 and 124 considering as neutral capital
the investment done by international organizations and foreign governments’ entities devoted to economic
development. The four modifying decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 which weakened the process
were: Decision 103 making more flexible the common treatment of foreign investment; Decision 105
postponing, in the light of the Protocol of Lima, the deadlines the Commission imposed itself by Decision
99 to approve the SPIDs; Decision 129 modifying the Metalworking Program; and Decision 130 modifying
the Petrochemical Program.
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TABLE V.9
DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1974-1978

69-73

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

74-78

81

15

5

15

15

5

55

2 NEW ISSUES

58

10

5

8

10

3

36

2.1 Important 1/

32

1

1

4

1

1

8

2.2 Unimportant

26

9

4

9

2

28

3 MODIFYING DECS

23

5

7

5

2

19

4

1

2

1

I DECISIONS

3.1 Important 11

4

1

- Strengthening
- Weakening

1

7

^

3
2

2

3.2 Unimportant

22

5

4 SESSIONS

25

4

4.1 W ITH DECS

22

- Ordinary

4

3

4

5

3

5

2

19

4

3

3

4

2

16

13

3

3

2

2

1

11

- Extraordinary

9

1

1

2

1

5

4.2 WITHOUT DECS

3

2

1

3

3

2

1

3

12

- Ordinary
- Extraordinary
5. 1/4

3.24

3.75

1.00

5.00

3.00

2.50

2.89

6. 1/4.1

3.68

3.75

1.77

5.00

3.75

2.50

3.44

11 Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact on the progress of the
principal mechanisms of the Andean process.
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-12; 1982c: Tomo I, 281-391, Tomo II, 1-584.
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monetary system, based on the dollar standard,43 had as a goal the stability of the
exchange rates through the International Monetary Fund. The international trade system
aimed at gradually freeing trade through negotiations called GATT Rounds.
By the early 1970s, the monetary system collapsed. The main reason was a major
feature of the system itself. For the dollar standard to function, dollars had to be
provided for international transactions. When the world economy recovered from the
devastation of WWII, the need for American dollars increased steadily. To furnish the
demand for dollars the United States had to run permanent balance of payments deficits
which were covered by printing money backed nominally by the federal gold reserves.44
The system allowed the United States to live beyond its means. In due time
United States gold reserves became just a fraction of the dollars held outside the
country.45 As deficits mounted, - the desire for dollars by the rest of the world
diminished. This meant that at one point United States deficits or the convertibility the
dollar into gold had to be stopped, or the dollar price of gold had to be increased.46 In
August 1971 President Nixon announced the non-convertibility of dollars into gold. In
December the Congress of the United States approved the increase of the price of gold

"Briefly, the Dollar Standard (or more technically known as fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar)
meant that the American currency replaced gold as the means of exchange in trade and in other
international transactions. The United States government, in 1947, fixed the relationship of the dollar to
gold at $35 an ounce, and committed itself to convert dollars into gold at that price. In mm, all other
currencies fixed their exchange rates in relation to the dollar.
"This situation by which a domestic currency is used also as an international means of exchange is
called international seignorage.
"By December 1971, the external liabilities of the United States were $51 billion, while the reserves
were only $11 billion (ECLA, 1973 : 46).
"This effect is known as the Triffin dilemma, after Robert Triffin, who was the first to point out this
inherent flaw of the system (Triffin, 1960).
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from $35 to $38 per ounce. This meant a de facto devaluation of 8.6 percent of the
dollar.47 A second devaluation of the dollar, 11 percent, came in February 1973. In
March 1973 the dollar standard was replaced by the generalized floating exchange rate
system which exists today.
Parallel to these changes, the international trade system began to move towards
protectionism. In August 1971, Nixon, heralding the return to trade protectionism,48
also announced a temporary ten percent surcharge on US imports. In that year the United
States had its first trade balance deficit of this century ($2 billion). These deficits
continued from then on with few exceptions.
This situation was the result of structural changes in the international economic
system. The most important were: (a) the loss of comparative advantage by the United
States, (b) a corresponding loss of competitiveness, and (c) stagflation (inflation
accompanied with slow or nil economic growth) in the developed world in the 1970s.49
Given that quotas and tariffs had been successfully limited and reduced, protectionism
in the form of non-tariff barriers were devised by the industrialized countries.
The situation was aggravated with the increase of oil prices in late 1973. This led
the developed countries to reduce their imports, while non-oil exporting developing

“ Most Latin American countries decided to maintain their existing exchange rate. The exception was
Venezuela which revalued by 2.28 percent (IDB, cl973: 69).
■
“Examples of protectionism are: government procurement regulations, customs procedures, health,
sanitary and security regulations, technical standards, subsidizing ailing industries, managed trade, and
voluntary export restraints.
“ The developed countries grew by 2.0 percent in 1970 and 1971 (ECLA, 1974: 14), and by 5.8
percent in 1972 (IDB, cl975:57). Inflation among these countries was 3.7 percent annual average between
1961 and 1971, 4.7 percent in 1972 and 7.7 percent in the following year (IDB, c.1975: 58).
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countries had to cope with higher oil prices combined with the stagnation of their
exports. The crisis was solved due to the initial inability of the oil exporting countries
to "use" the foreign exchange earned. They recycled the "petrodollars" by depositing
them in Western banks. The banks in turn began an era of commercial loans largesse
especially to Latin America.
In short, the international economic system in the 1970s was one of changes,
disarray, and turmoil. These changes in the international economic system created grave
problems for the Third World including the Andean nations. Among the most important
were high rates of inflation, low rates of growth, increase in the cost of imports,
decreasing participation in international trade, large fluctuations in exchange rates and
in the real and nominal rates of interest, and increasing external debt.50
At the domestic and at the Andean level, the governments did not correctly assess
the changing international situation, preventing them from understanding the profound
changes that were emerging in the world economy (Alegrett, 1989: 7).
The international crises affected the member countries differently. The oil
exporting countries—Venezuela and Ecuador, and to a lesser degree Bolivia—benefitted.
Colombia—an oil importing country—enjoyed an extraordinary boom in the price of
coffee—its major export—and a general increase in its exports. Chile the military
government applied recessionary policies to cope with the crisis. Peru—a marginal oil

“ During the 1970s other trends suggesting the deterioration of the external position of the Andean
countries were already in existence. One was the increase of food imports due to the explosive growth of
the cities and the stagnation of the agricultural sector. Another trend was the lack of dynamism in the
exports of manufactured goods which forced the countries to increase their exports of primary goods.
Finally, there was the increasing transfer of financial resources in the form of profit remittances and debt
payment. All of these factors led to increasing balance of payments deficits and to more debts.
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exporter and importer—was the most affected. This country did not take any measures
to deal with the OPEC decision because of the increased availability of commercial loans
at low or negative real rates of interest.
The major changes occurring in the international economic system in the 1970s
"directly affected the Andean integration process, since over time it became more and
more evident that the impact of integration on the transformation of the national
economies and the acceleration of their rates of growth was marginal..." (Carmona,
1984: 14). In other words, external forces beyond the control of the member countries
shaped their economic policies, and the Andean integration having marginal effects on
the countries, was not useful to reverse the effects of the external factors. More
importantly, "changes in the internal economic policies ... increased, among the member
countries, the differences with regard to the costs and benefits of the process, and to the
convenience or not of adopting neo-liberal policies supported by the Western
industrialized countries" (Davila, 1984: 19). Changes in the international environment,
thus, created a recession in the Andean economies forcing the governments to find
domestic solutions which—among other consequences—led to the stagnation of the
Andean integration process as hypothesized in this research project. 51

51"Economic nationalism and self-reliant measures could not survive rising inflation, unemployment,
and increasing indebtedness, all of which reduced the Andean countries’ margin for maneuver" (Mace,
1988: 186), relegating GRAN to a back seat.
"... the integration process came almost to standstill from 1974 to 1976 [and beyond] due to the
serious deterioration of the international economy precipitated by the oil crisis and nationalism superseding
the need for regional cooperation" (Bawa, 1980: 188).
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4.3.- The Commission, the Junta. and the governments, and the relationship among
them
At the

institutional level,

the Commission,

composed of government

plenipotentiaries, represented the interests of the governments, which were well protected
because decisions were taken, in practice, by consensus. The Junta as the secretariat and
the technical body of the agreement, was in charge of presenting the proposals upon
which the Commission had to decide. This power allowed the Junta to set the agenda,
and become the voice of the community interests. Its power was enhanced by its
participation in the Commission’s meetings. Although the Junta had no vote, in many
cases its interventions in the negotiations helped the Commission to solve impasses.
The Cartagena Agreement provided the GRAN with more dynamic and stronger
organs than LAFTA; but they were weaker than the European model. The Commission,
constituted by ministers in charge of the integration process, met only three times a year,
but could meet any time in extraordinary session. The meetings of the Commission were
frequently postponed.52 When the Commission met, it was not able to deal with all the
items on its agenda. Attempts to overcome the lack of agreement on specific and crucial
proposals led to adjournment of meetings.53 Proposals piled-up.54

52An indirect way to prove this assertion is the regularity of the meetings of the Commission (see table
V.9 above). Between 1969 and 1973—during the phase of progress—the Commission met 25 times. That
is an average of 5 meetings per year, including 1969 in which the Commission only met once in
November, its first session ever. The maximum interval between meetings was 3 months, but it happened
only 7 times in the years from 1970 to 1973. During the full five years of the phase of stagnation—1974
to 1978—the Commission met only 19 times, an average of little less than four times a year. The longest
interval was 5 months, between November 30, 1973 and April 29, 1974, coinciding with the entry of
Venezuela—December 1973.
53The Commission’s sessions were adjourned only 2 times—for 3 and 5 weeks—between 1969 and
1973. Between 1974 and 1978 recesses occurred 9 times. Three sessions were adjourned two or more
times. Adjournments lasted from as little as one week to as long as three months (JUNAC, n.d.).
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Members of the Commission when deciding issues within the realm of other
sectors (e.g., industrial programming) lacked authority to make compromises beyond the
instructions they had. The Commission members were also weak in making their
governments implement the decisions, "... national public organ[s], in many cases,
believed [they] have the right to determine whether or not to incorporate a decision into
the domestic legislation or to partially execute it" (JUNAC, 1979a: 147).
The Junta, as mentioned above, had powers, but it depended upon the
Commission for its budget, and the size of its capable staff was never large enough to
deal with the multiple tasks it had to perform within the exacting agreement’s timetable.
Thus, the Junta, and the Commission were not able to do their job.
The Commission, representing governments’ interests, and the Junta, representing
community interests, did not have in practice enough supranational authority to impose
subregional decisions onto the governments. On the contrary, the governments were able
to violate the Cartagena Agreement, and to ignore the decisions of the Commission with
impunity. Sovereignty, thus, was always preserved and protected.
Working relations between the Commission and the Junta deteriorated during the
stagnation phase. At issue was the power struggle between the Commission and the
Junta.55 This deterioration began in 1974 with the entry of Venezuela. This country,

^In contrast in the European Union, the Council of Ministers—equivalent to the Andean
Commission—meets regularly, and the representatives are the ministers—or their delegates—of the area
concerned with the agenda of the meeting. "Altogether there are some eighty Council of Ministers meetings
in an average year ...” (Nugent, 1989: 93). The Council, moreover, is assisted by its own secretariat of
around 2,000 members (ibid.: 97), and by the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
55"The struggle between the Commission and the Junta was due to the fact that Venezuela and Chile
were uneasy with the increasing power of the Junta ... Commission members of these two countries
pointed out that the Junta should not be so influential and that it was up to the member countries to freely
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supported by Chile, based on Article 15e of the Cartagena Agreement,56 introduced as
a practice private meetings of the Commission which did not include the members of the
Junta and the Director-Secretary as it used to be. Over time the Commission invited the
Junta to participate. The bottom line was, however, that the Junta was not another
member of the Commission but an invited actor. The supremacy of national over
community interests was reaffirmed.
Relations between the Junta and the governments of the member countries also
deteriorated during this phase of stagnation. According to Article 15i of the Cartagena
Agreement one of the responsibilities of the Junta was to "... maintain direct contacts
with the governments of the Member Countries through the agency which each one
indicates for that purpose" (JUNAC, 1983c: 16). The intention of Article 15i was to
facilitate communications between the Junta and the governments. The governments’
contact agencies, in practice, more often than not, made the flow of information from
and to the Junta more difficult. In order to solve this problem, the Junta unsuccessfully
proposed the establishment of Junta’s own offices in all the member countries.
Relations among the members of the Commission became less friendly during this
phase. Until the end of 1973 there was a high degree of consensus among the
Commission members, and they had a relatively long tenure in their posts. This allowed
them a great knowledge of the process and, fostered good relations among themselves
and with the Junta’s members, illustrated by the fact that the members of the

negotiate and adopt decisions best suited to their interests" (Guerrero, 1979: 139-140).
“ According to it, the Junta has the right "[t]o take part in the Commission’s meetings except when that
body deems it advisable to hold private sessions" (JUNAC, 1983c: 15).
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Commission and of the Junta addressed each other by their first name. Deterioration
began in 1974, with a faster turnover of the Commission members (for instance, between
1973 and 1975 Bolivia sent three different representatives, Colombia four, Chile 5,
Ecuador five, Peru four, and Venezuela two, Guerrero, 1979: 142), and the introduction
of formality and protocol, proper in any international meeting, reducing the possibilities
for frank exchanges and clear understanding.

4.4.- Disagreements among the governments of the member countries
Disagreements increased among the governments of the member countries with
regard to key Junta’s proposals. The major controversies were on the CET, the SPIDs,
the common treatment of foreign investment, the CMET, and how to deal with the lack
of compliance with the deadlines set by the agreement. These aspects constituted the most
important elements of the crisis of stagnation. The deepening division continued between
the "developmentalist" (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and the "commercialist"
(Colombia, and Chile) governments.
In the case of the CET, the developmentalist countries considered that it should
be an instrument for planning and for furthering import substitution industrialization; that
it should be supportive of the SPIDs, as such tariffs should be even more protective for
products contained in SPIDs; that it should aid the development of strategic sectors and
reduce foreign dependency as well as save foreign exchange. The commercialist members
were in favor of the CET as an instrument to reduce production costs, to improve the
allocation of resources, and to increase productivity. These disagreements were translated
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into different positions with regard to the Junta’s proposal on the CET. The
commercialist countries wanted lower tariffs than those proposed by the Junta while the
developmentalist countries wanted equal or higher tariffs (see table V.2).
Tariffs can be used for diverse purposes, although they may not be achieved
simultaneously.57 Besides tariff policy has been changed frequently to deal with
immediate problems.58 These factors made it very difficult to agree on a CET.
Since each government at a given moment in time confronts a diversity of
situations and has to attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and needs, it is rather
difficult for the governments to coincide on the objectives, the level and structure of the
CET. One author argues that it is then more realistic to consider "the common tariff of
a union ... a political act. ... The adoption of a common tariff is an act of faith and not
a scientific operation" (Touzelet, 1969: 324). The unwillingness or inability of the Junta

^For example, import tariffs can been raised across the board in order to deal with structural and
temporary balance of payments deficits, and to increase fiscal revenues. This coincides with the aim of
protecting local production. The same non-discriminatory increase in import tariffs makes more expensive
imported semi-finished goods and capital goods which in turn affects the production costs of the domestic
production. Increasing tariff to change consumption patterns is an example of opposition to promoting
domestic production of desired goods. The increase of tariffs on commodities for which the governments
want to reduce consumption increases their protection, and by doing so, they are promoting domestic
production of the very same products governments do not want people to consume (Chan, 1976: 4-12).
58For example, in the case of Bolivia, in early 1975, tariffs were reduced on raw materials, and
consumer goods, including cars. Due to the increase of imports between 1974 and 1975 by S141 million
(37.6 percent), prior deposits, prohibition in the importation of cars, and selective tariff increase were
imposed by the end of 1975 and in 1976 (ECLA, 1977: 75; IDB, cl978: 168).
Ecuador in 1973 and 1974 enjoyed large surpluses thus, prior import deposits were eliminated,
imports of food were subsidized, tariffs were reduced by an average of 33 percent but favoring especially
intermediate and capital goods for agriculture and industry (ECLA, 1976: 250; 1976a: 195, 202). From
1975 to 1978 surpluses began to dwindle. Imports of cars were suspended, application for imports
involving advanced payment were refused, tariffs were greatly increased, and prior deposits were
reinstalled affecting mostly consumer goods (ECLA, 1976a: 196; 1977: 182).
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to recognize the CET as a political act—rather than a technical/economic one59-has
made it next to impossible for the governments to agree on this crucial mechanism.
The basic disagreement on the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development was
over the different emphasis given to its objectives. The developmentalist countries wanted
it as an instrument for furthering their import substitution process in which planning and
state intervention played an important role. The commercialist members saw SPIDs as
a mean to increase efficiency, to reduce production costs, and to lead market forces to
play a increasingly important role. Colombia60 and Chile were interested in
programming only very few products, and their common external tariff should be low
and derived from the rules approved for the CET. The four developmentalist countries
favored programming most if not all the reserved products, and with high tariff levels
established independently from the methodology adopted for the CET.
In relation to the common treatment for foreign capital, the problem was the
Chilean violations as expressed in its Decree Law 600 promulgated in July 1974. The
Commission met in September 1974. Based on a report of the Junta the representatives

5*The Junta's staff in charge of the CET proposal—the Department of Political Economy—prepared
a proposal which "had a high academic value," however, it "only satisfied the professional interests of
some of the participants." "Unfortunately, this is not what the Andean Group required. The lack of
pragmatism to deal with a problem which was highly political and the obstinacy in proposing a CET which
the countries were not willing to approve, contributed to aggravate an already difficult problem" (Guerrero,
1979: 252, 227).
“ In April 1978, the Head of the Global Planning Unit of the National Department of Planning of
Colombia stated "that Colombia is only interested in the commercial aspects of integration and that the
country will prevent the approval of, or its participation in, other [industrial] programmes" (Puyana, 1984:
302). And since Colombia was the most important member of the agreement, there were few possibilities
to approve them. As a matter of fact only two programs were approved later (December 1980). The
Siderurgical Program (Decision 160) was just a list of products assigned to be produced. The Fertilizers
Program (Decision 162) was only the list of products of this sector, its the tariff reduction program and
a CET "no lower than three percent" (JUNAC, 1982d: 25).
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of the other countries declared "[t]hat Decree Law 600 ... is incompatible with the
Common Regime for Foreign Capital ..." (Comision, 1974: 4). After intensive
negotiations, the Chilean government promulgated Decree Law 746, in November 1974,
which expressly recognized that Decision 24 was part of the Chilean legislation. In
exchange, the Commission agreed to completely revise Decision 24, but the Commission
took no action due to the pressures to approve the CET and the SPIDs.
The lack of progress on the CET, the industrial programs, and the demand by
Chile to modify Decision 24 led to the first major crisis of the Andean Pact. In March
1975, with a veiled threat, the Peruvian representative urged the Commission to approve
the Automobile, Petrochemical and Fertilizers Programs "... otherwise [we] would sadly
have to reexamine our position towards the mechanisms which are functioning..."
(Comision, 1975: Anexo I). As a result special efforts were made to approve the SPIDs
under consideration, but only the Petrochemical Program was approved in August 1975.
From the political view point compromises were made so all countries could, in practice,
produce whatever they wanted, which from the economic point of view the result was
inefficiency.61 The rest of the year, the Commission did not make progress on the other
industrial programs.
By December 1975 negotiations began to modify the overdue deadlines. The
crucial issue was the future of the SPIDs. According to Article 53 of the Cartagena
Agreement, products reserved for SPIDs which were not programmed by December 1975

61It is not surprising then that studies found that the Petrochemical Program was inefficient from the
economic standpoint. One of them concluded: ”[t]he costs of supplying the area, ... with [our] model were
always less than ... [the model] designed by the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena ..." (Wengel, 1980: 134).
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should be included in the tariff reduction program. Developmentalist countries, however,
had already made clear their unwillingness to comply with this provision.62
By the end first of the meeting of 1976 of the Commission—which began in
February and ended in April—the Junta's members presented a new protocol proposal
which was approved as Decision 100. Chile insisted on a full revision of Decision 24
(Comision, 1976: 7).63 The other representatives were sympathetic with the Chilean plea
but no progress was made. As part of the solution, four other decisions were also
approved. Decision 97 allowed Chile to sell its public enterprises to foreigners. Decisions
98 and 101 approved programs and a special treatment of Bolivia to take advantages of
the agreement. This was the first case in which Ecuador accepted a special treatment not
common to both. Finally Decision 99 adopted a timetable to approve the SPIDs. There
were still two major issues to be agreed upon: the revision of Decision 24, and the
modification of the CMET, Decision 30. Two working groups were created by the
Commission to deal with these issues without success.
The six countries met unofficially on August 4, 1976. Chile wanted to discuss
Decisions 24 and 30 first, the others wanted to sign the Protocol first. Chile’s strategy

“ The Venezuelan delegate maintained: "it would be unrealistic to think that if a representative package
of sectoral programs is not approved, the countries would be willing to liberalize trade for the reserved
products, and at the same time continue to comply with the general tariff reduction program..." (Figueredo,
1975: 2).
The Bolivian representative stated: "[it] is fundamental to exhaust the possibilities of the reserved
products for industrial programming before these products are incorporated into the liberalization system.."
(Pereyra, 1975: 2).
The Peruvian Plenipotentiary declared: "Article 53, ... lacks operativity and is not applicable
inasmuch as there are a considerable number of programs whose approval is still pending. It is not possible
to refer to them as residual products, which are the ones being regulated by the aforementioned article"
(Du Bois, 1975: 1).
“ The Chilean delegation provided some explanations for its requests in Pipino 1975, and in a document
which became part of the Acta Final, as Annex VI: Proposition de Chile. Decision 24.
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was dictated by its perception that its veto power over the Protocol would yield for it
greater advantages. The other countries did not accept Chile’s demand and signed the
Protocol. The five countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—met
later in Sochagota (Colombia), where they defined a common position to Decision 24 and
the CMET. In informal talks the five countries presented the Sochagota accords to Chile,
and a special temporary treatment. Chile rejected them.
On October 5, since Chile did not want to sign the Protocol nor to withdraw from
the Cartagena Agreement, the six countries approved a protocol which created a
commission to analyze the conditions in which Chile would remain in the agreement.64
According to the protocol, if by October 30 consensus was not reached, Chile would
withdraw from the agreement ending all its rights and duties. On that date the
Commission adopted Decision 102. It spelled the conditions for Chile’s withdrawal. This
decision and the aforementioned protocol are clear examples showing that interests of the
governments are above the rules they have agreed upon.
The Protocol of Lima was subscribed, and other decisions were also approved.
By Decision 103 the Commission modified Decision 24. Changes included the
elimination of limits of profit remittances, the extension by three years of the time limit
for foreign companies to transform into national enterprises, and the access for foreign
enterprises to medium-term internal credit. Decision 104 reduced the levels of the
CMET. Finally, Decision 105 modified the timetable approved by Decisions 98 and 99

6tThe protocol was the solution because the Cartagena Agreement does not include the possibility of
expelling a member. Chile, on the other hand, did not consider "denouncing" the agreement since doing
so would have meant that some rights and obligations would remain in place for a few more years.
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dealing with the creation of the Special Program for Bolivia and the negotiations of
SPIDs.
By October 30, the Cartagena Agreement had changed, but the crisis created by
Chile was only one problem, albeit the most important, of the stagnation phase. If Chile
had been the only source of stagnation of the process, then after its withdrawal, the
Andean integration should have resumed its progress. Stagnation continued in 1977 and
1978. Only one important decision was adopted in each of those years (see table V.9).
From 1976 to 1978, little progress was made. Although efforts of both the Commission
and the Junta were focused on approving SPIDs,65 only the Automotive Program was
approved, in September 1977, and no progress was made on the CET. Key to this
situation was the lack of enthusiasm of Colombia. This country had consistently
supported, since the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement, a very limited role of
industrial programming. The Commission devoted the first quarter of 1978 to discuss and
adopt the Protocol of Arequipa postponing deadlines again.

4.5.- Strategies of development and the Andean objectives
The most important aims of the Cartagena Agreement were summarized, in
chapter ID, section 5.1, as: the primacy of government, a more efficient import
substitution industrialization, and the secondary role of foreign investment. As in chapter

“ "... the greatest efforts of the agreement’s organs were oriented towards approving the automobile
industrial program .... Once more they made the mistake of putting all the eggs of integration into one
basket" (Guerrero, 1979: 303-304).
"To concentrate the efforts in industrial programming is the correct strategy for the success of
[Andean] integration..." (JUNAC, 1976: 159).
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IV, a comparison will be made in this section between the main objectives of the
agreement and the relevant aspects of the strategies of development of the member
countries.66 If important differences are found, then it is possible to conclude the
existence of a relationship between the increasing differences in the strategies of
development of the member countries and stagnation of the Andean integration process.

a) Chile and Colombia
In Chile, with the coup d ’etat of September 1973, the strategy of development
changed. The new long-term aim, stated in the 1975-1980 Economic and Social
Development Plan, was: "to establish a more open economy in terms of world market
opportunities and competition, with a considerably smaller public sector, and with private
enterprise and the price system subjected to fewer controls and playing a more important
role than in the past" (ECLA, 1976a: 154). To accomplish these goals, among other
things, the plan "call[ed] for free operation of market mechanisms and the stimulation
of competition ...; a favorable climate for foreign investors; reduction of public spending
... and rationalization of public investment; ... transferring responsibilities to private
groups ...; reform of the welfare system; ... [and] support for productive sectors that are
capable of reducing imports and increasing exports in an efficient way" (IDB, cl976:
189). In other words, a change to a neo-liberal approach which assigns the state a passive
role as mere regulator and facilitator of private activities, and integration with the

“ Countries have been loosely paired by their similarities in their levels of development and
industrialization, and by the affinity of their strategies, and economic policies. This is why Chile is coupled
with Colombia, Peru with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador.
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international economy. The main goal was explicitly reiterated in the Development Plan
for 1976-1981, and later in its updated version as Development Plan for 1977-1982.67
The Colombian Economic and Regional Plan, 1975-1978, continued to support
import substitution but only in cases in which it could be done efficiently, provide jobs,
and increase exports and the supply of consumer goods (JUNAC, 1982d: 15, Caballero,
1978: 100). This emphasis on efficiency and competitiveness, especially since 1975,
constituted the clearest example of moving away from the goal of industrialization by
import substitution (Iguinez, 1983: 19; Caballero, 1978: 102). Colombia had gradually
transferred to the market a fundamental role in resource allocation (JUNAC, 1982d: 1516). Government intervention was to be reduced, according to the 1975-1978 Plan, to
"provide the adequate environment for the expansion of existing enterprises and the
creation of new ones ..." but at the same time the state participated in the primary and
basic industries (Iguinez, 1983: 23).
With regard to foreign investment, until 1976 Colombia was supportive of
Decision 24 and the government applied it as strictly as possible (Caballero, 1978: 116117). By 1976, the Lopez Michelsen administration favored a more "flexible approach
to foreign direct investment in view of the energy crisis" (Guerrero, 1979: 288).
In short, the three main principles of the Cartagena Agreement, primacy of the
state in the economy, import substitution industrialization, and subordination of foreign
investment were opposed by the Chilean military government. Colombia, on the other
hand, was indifferent to the three principles of the Cartagena Agreement.

67"The strategy for development of the Chilean economy has been conceived within the framework ...
in which the role of the state is regarded as subsidiary" (IDB, cl978: 190).
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b) Peru and Venezuela
The Peruvian long- and short-term plans, during this phase of stagnation, had
among their objectives the "direct and extensive participation of the public sector in the
economy, particularly in the production of basic commodities, domestic and foreign
marketing, and financial institutions. ..." (IDB, cl975: 400). In 1977, the second phase
of the military government installed in August 1975, released its Plan Tupac Amaru. It
reaffirmed "the pluralist structure of the economy in terms of the corporate property:
state, social, private and reformed private. In relation to industrial development, the Plan
intended "to revise the program of import substitution so that the productive structure
may be less dependent on imported inputs" (IDB, cl978: 355).
In 1974 Venezuela began to modify its development plan in order to take into
account the enormous inflow of foreign exchange due to the increase in oil prices in the
previous year. The Fifth Plan of the Nation, 1976-1980 had among other objectives to
increase and diversify industrial production, especially in iron, steel, petroleum, and
aluminum (IDB, cl979: 410) which were to be under the direct control of the state. At
the same time it aimed for increasing industrial efficiency, and for increasing the
production of goods of mass consumption (Iguinez, 1983: 29). The inflow of foreign
exchange reduced the need for foreign direct investment, and allowed the government to
be very supportive of the subordination of foreign direct investment.
In brief Peru and Venezuela supported import substitution, the primacy of the
state, and the subordination of foreign direct investment.
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c) Bolivia and Ecuador
One of the Bolivian aims of its 1974-1975 Biennial Plan, and its Plan for Social
and Economic Development, 1976-1980 was to diversify production through the
diversification of exports and markets, the increasing domestic supply of consumer and
agricultural goods, and the development of industrial production based on selective
import substitution of consumer goods for domestic and external markets (IDB, cl975:
208; ECLA, 1977: 71; JUNAC, 1982d: 14).
Government intervention in the economy to guide and manage it was made
explicit in its plans and in its acts. There was a large degree of direct state intervention
in the production of basic goods. Mining, oil and gas resources belonged to the state, and
run by public enterprises. Besides, only the state could invest in petrochemical,
metallurgy, and siderurgy (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 31).
As mentioned in chapter IV, section 4.4., the principle of subordination of foreign
investment, by which foreign investment should be directed only to areas of
governments’ interests, was not an aim of the Bolivian government in the phase of
progress nor the phase of stagnation. "[W]ith the exception of 1970 and 1971 [when
Decision 24 was not yet in application], the country has followed an open door policy
to foreign capital" (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 29). The Investment Law of 1972 was
quite generous in providing incentives for investment, national and foreign.
The reformist military government which took power in Ecuador in 1972 intended
to intervene more directly in the economy, especially in industry (Iguinez, 1983: 24).
The Integral Plan for Transformation and Development, 1973-1977, called for the
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government to exercise complete ownership of the steel, petroleum-refining, fishing, and
fertilizer industries (IDB, cl975: 276; Iguinez, 1983: 22, 24).
The import substitution industrialization pursued by the Ecuadorean military
government was a selective one. It was aimed toward an efficient production of goods
which could be exported to the Andean Group. It was based on state incentives, public
investment in infrastructure, and special treatment of foreign investment (Moncada, 1978:
151). Although the products in the tariff reduction program were important, more
emphasis was given to develop production assigned in the SPIDs (JUNAC, 1982d: 16).
Ecuador continued to favor a greater role of foreign direct investment. As such,
it maintained its indifference to the principle of its secondary role.
In brief, Bolivia and Ecuador supported the primacy of the state, and import
substitution. They continued to be indifferent to the secondary role of foreign investment.
To restate the relationship between the three main principles of the Cartagena
Agreement and the aims of the six member countries were as follows. The four
developmentalist countries—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—supported the
primacy of the state, while Colombia was indifferent and Chile was not supportive (see
table V.10). In the previous phase, all the member countries supported this principle.
Import substitution industrialization was also supported by the four developmentalist
countries, while Chile was not supportive of this principle, and Colombia was indifferent.
In the previous phase, the former countries and Colombia were supportive of import
substitution, while Chile was indifferent. Finally, the principle of subordination of
foreign direct investment was supported by Peru and Venezuela; while Bolivia,
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Colombia, and Ecuador were indifferent to it; and Chile was not supportive of this
principle. In contrast, during the phase of progress, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
were indifferent to this principle, while Chile, Colombia and Peru supported this
principle.

TABLE V.10
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES: 1974-1978
B
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Primacy of government

S

N

I

S

S
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4S 11 IN

Import substitution industrialization

S

N

I
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S

S

4S 11 IN

Subordination of foreign investment

I

N

I

I

S

S

2S 31 IN

ANDEAN AIMS

10S 51 3N
S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

N = Not supportive

The overall picture, in this phase of stagnation, was one of lesser support and
increased indifference, as opposed to the generalized support for the principles during the
phase of progress. Chile left because its national aims were not in agreement with those
of the Andean Group. Colombia became less identified with the principles of the Andean
Group. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru continued the same level of support as in the previous
phase while the new member, Venezuela, supported the 3 mechanisms.

4.6.- Domestic policies and the mechanisms of the Andean Group
It is apparent from the previous discussion that, during this phase of stagnation,
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the member countries became less identified with the principles of the Cartagena
Agreement. This can be validated by comparing economic policies pursued by the
governments with the four mechanisms of the Agreement. These mechanisms, as defined
at the end of chapter HI, and redefined in chapter IV sections 2.4 and 2.5, are: Tariff
reduction program, Common External tariff, Industrial Programming, Common
Treatment for Foreign Investment. In comparing this phase of stagnation with the
previous phase, much less correspondence should be expected between these four basic
mechanisms and the economic policies pursued by the governments.

a) Chile and Colombia
Based on the neo-liberal strategy of free market, Chile "maintained the policy of
periodic mini-devaluations of the Peso, promoted non-traditional exports, ... introduce[d]
progressive reductions in customs ta riffs

and step[ped] up the transfer to the

private sector of ... [state] companies ... not considered as key enterprises" (ECLA,
1976a: 154). Beginning in 1974 and speeded up from 1975 on, import tariffs were
reduced and non-tariff barriers were eliminated. By the time Chile withdrew from the
Cartagena Agreement, its policies had little, if any, affinity with the Andean mechanisms.
For Chileans the Andean trade liberalization mechanism was an obstacle, because
it introduced discrimination in favor of the Andean imports. Their gradual lowering of
tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers meant a position far removed from the
CET proposed by the Junta. The SPIDs represented for the Chilean government, "a re
edition on a larger scale of old protectionist and interventionist national policies"
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(Wilhelmy, 1982b: 142). Finally, since the military government was eager to attract
foreign capital, Decision 24 was considered an obstacle.
To sum it up, "the Chilean decision was to maintain ... a non-discriminatory
external opening, and to stimulate foreign investment ... [Because of these factors] the
Chilean withdrawal from the Andean Group, ..., [was] congruent with the policies and
characteristics of the regime and of the government..." (Wilhelmy, 1982b: 143, 147).
In Colombia the export promotion policy enacted in 1967 (Iguinez, 1983: 42)
began to bear fruits from 1973 on. This policy, and the fact that Colombia was more
developed than the other member countries, led to a permanent trade surplus for this
country (see table V .l l ) These results and the strategy of development pursued by
Colombia made this country support the tariff reduction program.
The Colombian industrial policy, established in the 1975-1978 Plan, aimed to be
in line with the compromises contemplated in the Andean Pact, especially as they relate
to industrial programming (Caballero, 1978: 100). In September of 1976, however,
during the crisis created by Chile, and in the middle of an anti-inflationary program, both
the President of Colombia, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, and his Finance minister—Rodrigo
Botero—voiced their concern about inefficient import substitution industrialization. For
them, SPIDs should aim to increase exports and to create jobs "based on industrial
efficiency" (Caballero, 1978: 120).
The president also suggested to make Decision 24 more flexible in order to deal
with the new international realities (Guerrero, 1979: 288, 290). In relation to the CET,
the Colombian government, in 1975, considered the CET a tool to improve the industrial
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TABLE V .l l
COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978

1973

1975

1974

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

66.7

140.5

189.9

218.0

298.8

304.2

1,177.0

1,352.0

1,465.0

1,773.0

2,443.2

3,002.7

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

41.8

103.0

90.5

210.0

170.6

228.0

1,062.0

1,337.0

1,503.0

1,990.0

2,028.3

2,836.3

8.0

128.2

76.2

(217.0)

414.9

166.4

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

24.9

37.5

99.4

115.0

15.0

(38.0)

INTRASUB REGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports

5.67

10.39

12.96

12.30

12.23

10.13

Imports

3.94

7.70

6.02

10.55

8.41

8.04

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/

-4.85

110.64

35.16

14.80

37.06

1.81

World

35.91

14.87

8.36

21.02

37.80

22.90

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 11

46.15

146.41

-12.14

132.04

-18.76

33.65

World

23.63

25.89

12.42

32.40

1.92

39.84

1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a:
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s
calculations.
competitiveness to avoid making the mistakes linked to import substitution (Iguinez,
1983: 48). This position was reiterated, in September 1976, by the Colombian President.
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In short, Colombia supported only the tariff reduction program. It was indifferent,
especially after 1976, to the CET—as presented by the Junta in its Proposal 70, to
Decision 24, and to the SPIDs. Chile, on the other hand, supported no mechanisms.

b) Peru and Venezuela
b .l) The tariff reduction program .- Peru felt the full impact of the changes in the
international economic system.
The loss of dynamism of the Peruvian economy between 1975 and 1978
went hand in hand with the deterioration of the balance of payments situation, a
growing negative position in the level of net international reserves, a substantial
fiscal deficit, and high external public debt service payments. In view of this
situation the government adopted a number of corrective measures in 1977 and
1978 ... (IDB, C1980: 354).
Given this scenario, Peru, with the exception perhaps of Chile, had the most difficult
political, economic and social problems to deal with among the Andean nations.
Andean trade liberalization was viewed by the government as a mechanism which
weakened its attempts to reduce trade deficits. As a matter of fact, Peru had trade deficits
with the Andean Pact in all the years of this phase, except for 1978 (see table V.12),
when the successive devaluations showed results.68 The government, however, was
indifferent to this mechanism instead of not supporting it because the tariff reduction

“ Peru’s exchange rate (Soles per one US dollar) and trade balance (millions of US dollars) between
1973 and 1980 were respectively as follows:________________________________________________
1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Exchange rate

38.70

38.70

40.37

55.76

84.24

156.35

224.73

288.85

Trade balance

79

-405

-1,097

-675

-422

304

1,722

826

Sources: Coronado et al., 1986: 63, 84; BCR, 1993: 1, 111.
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TABLE V. 12
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

35.8

68.9

130.1

140.0

72.4

138.2

1,050.0

1,521.0

1,315.0

1,393.0

1,665.8

1,819.6

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

81.8

213.3

226.0

270.0

408.9

87.2

1,024.0

1,531.0

1,386.0

2,109.0

1,918.0

1,464.0

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/

(46.0)

(144.4)

(95.9)

(130.0)

(336.5)

51.0

World

26.0

(10.0)

(71.0)

(716.0)

(252.2)

355.6

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports

3.41

4.53

9.89

10.05

4.35

7.60

Imports

7.99

13.93

16.31

12.80

21.32

5.96

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/

26.06

92.46

88.82

7.61

-48.29

90.88

World

11.23

44.86

-13.54

5.93

19.58

9.23

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/

50.09

160.76

5.95

19.47

51.44

-78.67

World

28.64

49.51

-9.47

52.16

-9.06

-23.67

1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a:
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s
calculations.

program was viewed as a trade-off with the SPIDs.
Venezuela enjoyed a short prosperity between 1974 and 1977. Its industrial policy
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changed from 1974 on. Emphasis was given to the development of basic metal
industries—e.g., steel, aluminum—and petrochemicals (ECLA, 1976: 333). By 1977
economic problems began to develop due to the reduction of oil income. The budget
deficit increased, external borrowing increased, trade surpluses were converted into trade
deficits,69 the rate of growth slowed, inflation augmented, and the rate of growth of
exports diminished, while consumption continued to increase.
To increase the supply of goods, during the oil bonanza, 1974-1977, the
Venezuelan government "made no attempt to retard the growth of imports, and in some
cases encouraged it by selective tariff reductions and the granting of credit for purchases
abroad" (ECLA, 1976a: 386). The government of Venezuela, however, considered that
"trade expansion [was] not an end in itself" (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 256), and that
industrialization was more important. Venezuela was able to obtain additional exemptions
to the tariff reduction program in the negotiations to its entry into the Pact, thus
increasing the number of goods protected from Andean competition. This showed that
the tariff reduction program could be more harmful than helpful for Venezuela. As such,
the government was indifferent to it. The Venezuelan intra-Andean trade figures show
increasing exports and imports, and a favorable, but decreasing, trade balance with the
rest of the subregion (table V.13).

b.2) Common external tariff.- During this phase, the Peruvian government was
indifferent to the CET. Lowering domestic tariffs, as expected by the Junta’s Proposal

“ In 1977 Venezuela had its first trade deficit in forty years (Iguinez, 1983: 34).
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TABLE V.13
VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

254.9
14,653.0

173.3
10,671.0

187.0
10,272.0

263.8

121.1

9,527.5

9,177.6

198.1

246.3

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

56.3
4,314.0

125.0

116.0

5,810.0

6,662.0

11,224.8

12,195.1

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

198.6
10,339.0

48.3
4,861.0

71.0
3,610.0

65.7
(1,697.3)

(125.2)
(3,017.5)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports

1.74

1.62

1.82

2.77

1.32

Imports

1.31

2.15

1.74

1.76

2.02

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/

-32.01

7.91

41.07

-54.09

World

-27.18

-3.74

-7.25

-3.67

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran II

122.02

-7.20

70.78

24.33

World

34.68

14.66

68.49

8.64

1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a:
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s
calculations.

(see table V.2), would increase imports in opposition to government’s aim. In this phase,
"[c]ommercial aspects [the tariff reduction program and CET] of the integration process
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were not promoted" (Iguinez, 1983: 49).
The successful demand of Venezuela to consider the approval of the CET as an
issue subject to veto (Annex I of the Cartagena agreement), demonstrate this country’s
protective stand.

b.3) Industrial programming.- The SPIDs were supported by the Peruvian government.
Peru’s industrial law, which was in effect, prioritized the production of goods similar to
the ones reserved for industrial programming.70
The 1976-1980 Venezuelan Plan supported the Cartagena Agreement. Particular
importance was given to industrial programming. SPIDs were considered "fundamental
for a greater expansion, specialization and diversification of production ... [and] there
was a similarity between the Venezuelan industrial development priorities and the
products reserved for industrial programming" in the Andean Group (JUNAC, 1982d:
20). Special importance was given to the Automobile Program.71

b.4) Decision 24.- The government of Peru was also in agreement with Decision 24 as
it was. Its domestic legislation in this matter remained in place during this phase.
Venezuela put into force Decision 24 in 1974. The government took advantage
of GRAN to avoid "a long [domestic policy] debate . . . " (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 256).

70"... there is a great correspondence between the priorities established by the General Law of
Industries and the type of products subject to industrial program m ing" (Iguinez, 1983: 48).
7,For the former Director of the Instituto de Comercio Exterior of Venezuela, and as such the
government representative to the Commission, "the Automobile Program is more important than all the
tariff reductions. With that industry, we will make fundamental progress in the integration process, ..."
(Alegrett, 1977: 68).
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Surplus of foreign exchange allowed Venezuela to strictly apply Decision 24 without
major economic or political consequences.
In brief, Peru and Venezuela were indifferent to the tariff reduction program, and
of the CET, while they continued to support industrial programming and the common
treatment for foreign investment.
The new Peruvian position reflected international and domestic changes which
during the second phase of the military government (1975-1980) assigned a very low
priority to integration.
[T]he crisis of the external sector and the domestic opposition [to the regime and
its adjustment policies] were of such magnitude that ... integration [was]
gradually relegated to the back seat." In practice, "... integration ... [was]
supported insofar as it [did] not go against the more pressing objectives like the
reestablishment of external credit, ... and internal peace (Wilhelmy, 1982a: 207,
195).
In the case of Venezuela, more important than the specific stands of Venezuela
to each one of the main mechanisms was its political stand. With the oil income,
Venezuela’s international position improved, resulting in a very active foreign policy.72
In this context, as a foreign policy objective of status and prestige, rather than one of
welfare,73 the Andean Group represented a forum for Venezuela in which it could

^Examples of it were its leadership in OPEC, and in the Non-aligned movement. In Latin America
and in the Andean Group, Venezuela aimed for a leadership based on integration and cooperation. An
example of this is the creation, in 1975, of the Latin America Economic System (Sistema Economico
Latinomericano - SELA) due to Venezuela’s support which was rewarded with the designation of Caracas
as the seat of the secretariat. Venezuela also expanded diplomatic relations very quickly. Between 1969 and
1979 it established relations with 27 states. For a recent study on Venezuela’s active foreign policy between
1969 and 1979 see Nones, 1994.
73There are four common purposes of foreign policies of all contemporary states: security, autonomy,
welfare, and status and prestige. "There is no precise meaning to these terms [status or prestige] as applied
to the relations between states, but let us simply use them in a common sense way: Political associations
seek to generate deference, respect, and sometimes awe among others. ... Many foreign policies reflect
or incorporate these values" (Holsti, 1995: 84, 107).
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became a leader. "For this country the political aspects of integration took priority over
the economic ones..." (Portales, 1982: 166).

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c .l) The tariff reduction program.- With regard to the tariff reduction program, Bolivia
became indifferent to this mechanism. In order to fight inflation, Bolivia, kept its
currency overvalued, at 20 pesos per dollar, from 1972 to 1979 (when the Peso was
devaluated by 25 percent). It unintentionally favored imports which increased almost by
fourfold from $204 million in 1973 to $770 in 1978 (see table V.14). This is also
reflected in its growing trade deficits with the Andean Group in 1975, 1977 and 1978.
These results made the government unwilling to begin the tariff reduction program by
December 1976, as stipulated in the original Article lOOf of the Cartagena Agreement.
The Protocols of Lima and of Arequipa postponed this issue until December 1981.
Ecuador began exporting oil by 1973 when its price skyrocketed. This provided
the government with resources to undertake projects aimed at taking advantage of the
Andean Group opportunities. To cope with the increased demand created by oil income,
imports rose almost four times in five years, from $397 million in 1973 to $1,505 in
1978 (see table V.15). This favored intra-Andean trade. At the same time Ecuador had,
except for 1974 and 1978, an increasing trade surplus with the Andean subregion.
Between 50 and 83 percent of the exports to GRAN from 1973 to 1978 were oil. With
these results, Ecuador, in contrast to Bolivia, continued to favor of the tariff reduction
program.
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TABLE V.14
BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

26.7

62.0

25.7

38.0

11.3

16.0

261.0

556.0

443.0

621.0

712.7

725.3

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

7.4

14.4

26.0

19.0

18.4

26.0

204.0

390.0

558.0

615.0

586.3

769.5

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/

19.3

47.6

(0.3)

19.0

World

57.0

166.0

(115.0)

6.0

(7.1)
126.4

(10.0)
(44.2)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports

10.23

11.15

5.80

6.12

1.59

2.21

Imports

3.63

3.69

4.66

3.09

3.14

3.38

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/

39.06

132.21

-58.55

47.86

-70.26

41.59

World

29.85

113.03

-20.32

40.18

14.77

1.77

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/

39.62

94.59

80.56

-26.92

-3.16

41.30

World

22.24

253.46

2.19

4.77

-4.67

31.25

\J Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25;
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47;
1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10,
and author’s calculations.
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TABLE V. 15
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

76.9

172.1

153.6

192.0

178.4

102.3

532.0

1,055.0

897.0

1,174.0

1,436.3

1,557.5

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/
World

34.7

159.8

87.1

89.0

60.5

74.6

397.0

959.0

943.0

976.0

1,188.5

1,505.1

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran I!
World

42.2

12.3

66.5

103.0

117.9

27.7

135.0

96.0

(46.0)

198.0

247.8

52.4

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE V
Exports

14.45

16.31

17.12

16.35

12.42

6.57

Imports

8.74

16.66

9.24

9.12

5.09

4.96

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/
World

155.48

123.80

-10.75

25.00

-7.08

-42.66

63.19

98.31

-14.98

30.88

22.34

8.44

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/

26.18

360.52

-45.49

2.18

-32.02

23.31

World

24.45

141.56

-1.67

3.50

21.77

26.64

i / Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25;
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47;
1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10
and author’s calculations.
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c.2) Common external tariff.- Although during this phase of stagnation, 1974-1978,
Bolivia did not have an explicit position with regard to the CET—that is, Proposal 70—it
is possible to conclude that it was indifferent to it. First, the lack of position meant that
the government had not decided on its future tariff policy. On the other hand, the tariff
levels in the intermediate and capital goods proposed by the Junta were much higher than
the Bolivian ones (see table V.2). Since Bolivia had little chance to develop industries
in these areas—except for the products assigned to it by the SPIDs—this meant increasing
trade diversion, and an increase in the costs of these products.74 Thus, Bolivia was
indifferent to this mechanism.
With regard to the CET, Ecuador supported it, and the Junta's proposals. The
tariff levels and the tariff structure supported by Ecuador were the same as those
proposed by the Junta (JUNAC, 1977f: 31).

c.3) Industrial programming.- Bolivia in the 1970s had a manufacturing sector which
was still in an early stage of development. The Investment Law of 1972 served as the
main stimulus. It set as the first priority the production of goods in the metallurgy,
petrochemical, metalworking, basic chemistry, pharmaceuticals, automobile, electrical,
and electronic industries (Iguinez, 1983: 22, 49). These areas were similar to the
products reserved for SPIDs. Beginning in 1973, Bolivia began to promote exports of

74"... import substitution at the regional level gives rise to trade diversion ... This may ..., bring
benefits to the union as a whole ... The crucial point is that all the benefits ... accrue to the particular
country where the new industry is located, while the importing countries face a net cost ..." (Williamson,
1981: 201). And Bolivia was, with those high CET levels, to be diverting cheaper imports of capital and
intermediate goods from non-member countries to more expensive ones from the other Andean members.
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manufactured goods, especially of products assigned to it by the SPIDs, and the products
for which Bolivia had immediate free access to the Andean market (JUNAC, 1982d: 14).
For Bolivia industrial programming was a tool to further its industrialization.
Another result of Ecuadorean oil revenues and government incentives was the
increase in the production of manufactured goods. The Industrial Development Law,
enacted in 1957 (Iguinez, 1983: 21) was modified in 1973 allowing more enterprises to
benefit from it (IDB, cl980: 241).75 "Industry grew 11.6 percent in 1974 compared to
an annual average of 7.8 percent in 1970-1973" (IDB, cl976: 227). Support for industrial
programming increased in this phase. For Ecuador, SPIDs were considered the
fundamental means allowing access to the benefits of the Cartagena Agreement and to
accelerate its development.

c.4) Decision 24.- The Bolivian Investment Law of 1972 took as many departures from
it as the decision allowed. Decision 24 was an instrument the government was indifferent
to because it was viewed as limiting Bolivia’s possibilities to attract foreign investment.
Foreign direct investment did not constitute a significant contribution to economic activity
or the financing of important investment (see table V.5).76
Until 1976 Ecuador’s indifference towards Decision 24 was because it was
seeking more foreign investment. Afterwards, the new Military Junta, in greater need

75Tax exemptions encouraged investment in industry. In 1975 it was about $100 million, and $80
million in 1977 (IDB, cl978: 229).
76The small domestic market, the lack of adequate infrastructure, and export difficulties due to Bolivian
landlocked geography have been factors contributing to this result.
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o f foreign capitals became even more indifferent to it, supporting the elimination of
Decision 24 (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 105).
In brief, Bolivia and Ecuador were supportive of the SPIDs. Bolivia was
indifferent to the tariff reduction program, the CET and to Decision 24. Ecuador
supported the tariff reduction program, the CET, and was indifferent to Decision 24.

d) Conclusion
In short, in the phase of stagnation, the countries were less supportive of the main
mechanisms of the Andean Group than in the phase of progress, when all the countries,
for their own interests, supported all of the mechanisms. The relationship between
government economic policies and the Cartagena Agreement’s main mechanisms, table
V.16, shows that three developmentalist countries (Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela)
supported or were indifferent to the main mechanisms, while Colombia and Bolivia were
indifferent, and Chile was not supportive.
Two countries—Colombia, and Ecuador—supported the tariff reduction program,
while Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela were indifferent to this mechanism, and Chile opposed
it. Four countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—were indifferent to the CET,
while Chile was not supportive of this mechanism, and Ecuador supported it. Industrial
programming was supported by Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia was
indifferent and Chile opposed. Finally, in the case of Decision 24, only Peru and
Venezuela supported it, while Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia were indifferent to it, and
Chile against it.
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Indifference was the most common position of the member countries towards the
main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, during this phase of stagnation and
doubts. In contrast, during the phase of progress support for the mechanisms was
widespread (see table IV. 15).

TABLE V.16
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS: 1974-1978
MECHANISM

BO

CH

CO

EC

PE

VE

TOTALS

Tariff reduction program

I

N

s

S

I

I

2S 31 IN

Common Tariff

I

N

I

s

I

I

IS 41 IN

Industrial Programming

S

N

I

s

s

S

4S 11 IN

Foreign Investment

I

N

I

I

S

S

2S 31 IN
9S 11I4N

S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

N = Not supportive

By the end of this phase the international economy had changed due to the oil
crisis and the demise of the Bretton Woods system. These changes affected the Andean
countries differently, leading to greater divergences in their long-term plans and in their
economic policies. In general, there was a trend to attract foreign capital, to increase
exports, and minimize the consequences of the economic crisis. For the Andean process
these changes meant increasing demands to make the common treatment of foreign
investments more flexible, to reduce support to the SPIDs, and to increase exports
outside the Andean market.
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CHAPTER VI
FROM AREOUIPA TO QUITO (1979-1986): PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION

1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN GROUP IN THE 1980s

During the 1980s the Andean process entered into a phase of regression. The
indicators showing regression, as stated in the hypothesis of this research project, are:
(a) reduction in intrasubregional trade; (b) widespread violations of the Cartagena
Agreement; (c) abandonment of the implementation of the Andean mechanisms; and (d)
decisions approved by the Commission were the fewest ever and concentrated on
unimportant issues or actually weakened the process.
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the hypothesis of this dissertation,
i.e., that regression was due to the fact that the majority of the governments of the
member countries did not find their current interests reflected in the existing Cartagena
Agreement. In other words, their national goals could not be achieved through the
Andean integration process.
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Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter corroborate the hypothesized indicators for the
phase of regression. The last section of this chapter (section 4), examines the evidence
and shows that regression is adequately explained by the hypothesis of this dissertation.

1.1.- The debt crisis
Due to the debt crisis, the 1980s has been termed "the lost decade" for Latin
I

America. This international crisis was spurred by the second oil price rise at the end of
the 1970s. The debt crisis produced major changes in Latin America. On the economic
front, governments began an asynchronous shift from the import substitution strategy of
development, to an export-oriented strategy. In the political front, military dictatorships
were peacefully and also asynchronously replaced by elected civilian regimes.
The crisis made the Andean integration process regress rather than progress as
expected after the adoption of the Protocols of Lima (1976) and of Arequipa (1978).
Three important facts in the early 1980s led to the regression. First, the disequilibria of
the external sector characterized by increasing balance of payments deficits and the
increasing inability to pay the external debt; second, border conflicts between Peru and
Ecuador (1981), and between Colombia and Venezuela (1980); and finally

natural

disasters (especially in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in 1983).
In 1979 oil prices skyrocketed again. As opposed to the first oil price rise of 1973
not many of the new "petrodollars" were deposited in banks. Banks did not increase
loans to the non-oil exporting developing countries, and did not roll-over the previous
loans. The developed world applied (1980-1982) restrictive monetary and trade policies.
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Interest rates and debts soared, exports by the developing countries decreased, and terms
of trade deteriorated for the Third World.1 The developing countries found themselves
in a no-win situation. They had to repay their increasingly costly loans due to raising
interest rates and the shift from long-term to short-term loans. At the same time they
were unable to earn enough foreign exchange because decreasing export’ pricesm and
reduced demand from the developed countries. The international debt crisis followed. It
was officially recognized as such after Mexico announced, in August 1982, a moratorium
of its debt payments. Generalized recession, hyperinflation, high unemployment, and
monetary and financial disarray ensued.
Latin American integration processes, including the Andean Group, were
paralyzed or suffered reversal because the economic, financial and negotiating capacities
of each country was devoted to dealing individually with its own the debt crisis (Axline,
1994: 4; Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 10). Moreover, these processes regressed from their
most common goal: trade. Intraregional trade accompanied the general trend of trade
reduction instead of being anti-cyclical (INTAL, 1990a: 26; Rodriguez, 1988: 127). This
was caused by trade barriers imposed in the 1980s.
The Andean economies went through adjustment programs of different degrees
of harshness and at different times. Peru applied several of them since 1976, Bolivia
since 1979, Ecuador and Venezuela since 1981, and Colombia since 1984 (JUNAC,

'In the case of Latin America, the total debt increased on an average of 27.3 percent yearly, going
from $161.4 billion in 1978 to $441.6 billion in 1987; interest payments on the extem i public debt
increased by 32.3 percent annually between 1978 and 1987; while the service of the public debt, in the
same period, increased at the rate of 16.9 percent per year (IDB, 1989: 503, 509, 511). The value of Latin
American exports decreased by 4.3 percent annually from 1980 and 1987, while their volume increased
by 4.4 percent per year during that period (IDB, 1988: 15).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223

1985: 2).2 The immediate aims were to reduce inflation, to diminish the balance of
payments, and fiscal deficits through recessionary policies. Longer-term aims were to
open the economies to international competition, to reduce state intervention in the
economy, and to increase productivity, efficiency, and economic growth.
The result was that the Andean countries began to pursue, at different times, and
with different degrees of intensity, similar strategies of development and economic
policies, ".. the changes in the world economy have made national economies become
more and more homogenized in their behavior and practices ..." (Alegrett, 1989: 14).
This provided the basis for the Andean countries to modify the Cartagena Agreement and
to make it a tool to fulfill redefined national interests.

1.2.- Winds of Democratization
In most Latin American countries, the debt crisis was one of the factors forcing
the military back to the barracks in relatively peaceful processes (Drake, 1989; Maxfield,
1989). In the Andean Group, this was the case in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. The new
civilian regimes had to deal with their legacies: economic recession, social unrest, and
domestic and subregional conflicts. As a result the Andean obligations were set aside.

2The economic consequences were devastating. In 1989, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for
GRAN was 7.5 percent below its 1980 level. Gross domestic product decreased at 2.1 percent annually
between 1981 and 1983, between 1984 and 1986 to grew at 4.3 percent average in each year, and in 1987
it decreased by 0.4 percent. The ratio between gross investment and the GDP went down from 20.7 percent
in 1980 to 14.9 percent in 1989. In the 1980s the Andean subregion was a net exporter of capital, in
amounts near 6 percent of its GDP. All countries, except Colombia went into arrears in paying interests
to the private banks; and in the case of Peru and Bolivia to the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Inflation went up to three digit levels or more in Bolivia in 1982, 1983 and 1984; reaching a record
of more than 8,000 percent in 1985. Peru had three digit inflation level in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987;
and four digit levels between 1988 and 1990. Venezuela had inflation rates between 20 percent in 1980 to
81 percent in 1989 (its highest); while in Ecuador it went from 11 percent to 84 percent in these years,
reaching its height in 1988 with 83.6 percent (JUNAC, 1991a: 42, 43; 1990c: 138).
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Bolivia had the most difficult transition from authoritarianism to an elected
regime. Between 1978 and 1982 there were several elections, coups d ’etat, and counter
coups. In September 1982 the Congress elected in 1980, was convened and chose the
leftist Heman Siles Suazo as president to rule until 1986. Conflicts between the Executive
and opposition dominated Congress over the expansionary economic policy of the former
led to economic havoc. Siles had to call early elections in 1985, and was replaced by the
veteran, and by then conservative, Victor Paz Estenssoro. He quickly enacted a liberal
economic policy stabilizing the economy and polity. In August 1989, Paz Estenssoro
became the first Bolivian president to finish a full term since 1964. He was replaced by
Jaime Paz Zamora, his nephew and a center-Ieftist.
The 1978 elections and the runoff elections in 1979 signaled the end of the
military regime in Ecuador. The reformist Jaime Roldos became president in 1980. In
1981 he died in a plane crash and was replaced by Osvaldo Hurtado, his vice-president.
In a highly contested election, in 1984, Hurtado was succeeded by the conservative Leon
Febres Cordero. In both governments, congressional opposition did not allow the
executive to fully implement the austerity economic measures due to oil revenue
shortfalls and increasing external debt in the case of the former, and the neo-liberal
economic program in the case of the latter.
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Peru, after the elections
of 1980, handed power to the centrist Fernando Belaunde Terry, the same person the
military had overthrown in 1968. Although economic conditions sharply deteriorated
from 1983 on, Belaunde was able to finish his term and pass the presidential band to
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Alan Garcia Perez of the left of center APRA party in 1985.
These transitions from authoritarian regimes to elected regimes changed the
political, social, economic, and strategic interests that guided the Cartagena Agreement.
Since GRAN’s inception, this was the first time all its members had elected governments.

1.3.- Regression of the Andean process
The debt crisis and the further changes in the international economic system made
the Andean governments concerned mainly to deal with the crisis. Little attention was
given to other issues, like integration.3 The international economic crisis induced the
Andean countries to slowly and asynchronically change their strategies of development.
This created a growing divorce between the interests of the countries, in a process of
finding a new strategy of development, and the usefulness of an Andean Group created
to complement the strategy of development that was being replaced.4 Due mainly to
these factors, the debt crisis and the ensuing changes in the strategy of development and
in the economic policies, the Andean Group suffered further erosion of political support
(Avery, 1983: 155; Puyo, 1989: 30).5 GRAN became dynamic again when the member

3"The international environment, the debt crisis, the growth problems of the countries of the region,
and the economic and social implications of adjustment programs and structural reforms are contributing
to hindering the integration process, since these factors are preventing the agreements from evolving in the
way it had been expected" (INTAL, 1990: 1).
"... during periods of economic stress, governments prefer national over multinational solutions
for economic problems ... in spite of the fact that, from purely national points of view, common ...
administered policies might be not only desirable, but also essential" (Feld, et al., 1994: 276-277).
presently [1982] there is a clear opposition between national models and policies, and the
integration model and policies" (de la Puente, 1988: 226).
5"In fact, towards the end of the seventies, it had already become clear that the application of the
principal instruments of the Cartagena Agreement was rendered unfit by reasons of an essentially political
nature. At that time, a plausible agreement on common interests of the Member States remained distant
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countries adopted a new and similar strategy of development.
General import restrictions reduced intra-Andean trade. Trade was one of the
most important mechanisms the countries had to assess the benefits that the Andean
integration was accruing to them (UNCTAD, 1989: 2). Deep concerns created the first
decrease in intrasubregional exports which occurred in 1982 (minus 4.4 percent in
relation to 1981, see table VI.2). There was a widespread consensus about the main
cause: the worldwide economic crisis.6 The direct cause was that "[i]n 1982, the
member countries adopted protective short-term policies, in some cases in conflict with
... the [Andean] trade liberalization program and the minimum common external tariff"
(IDB, cl984: 140). Violations of the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions of the
Commission with regard to trade and other mechanisms became widespread.7 None of
the Andean goals were achieved, and what was more important, achievement was not
expected in the near future (Aninat, Fffench-Davis, and Leiva, 1990: 162; Bawa, 1980:

on the horizon. This is especially true in relation to the implementation of sectoral programs of industrial
development... the establishment of a Common External Tariff, . . . the inobservance [sic] of the guaranteed
access to markets ..."
"Harmonization in external trade mechanisms had been sluggish, regulations for treatment of
foreign capital and technology had been questioned and unilateral restrictive measures applied to protect
themselves from the world crisis pointed to the need for a revision of the Cartagena Agreement to adapt
it to new circumstances" (Mairal, 1989: 94, 95).
6"The crisis of the Andean integration was in its worst in 1982 and 1983. In those years almost all the
countries had dire economic difficulties due basically to the international recessionary tendencies" (JUNAC,
1991a: 87).
7"... in the 1980s, the period of real stagnation ... was characterized by the contraction of ...
intrasubregional trade and the proliferation of violations" (JUNAC, 1989b: 6).
According to Taylor (1984: 72) "the timetable for realizing the goals of the Cartagena Agreement
has been procrastinated or often seemingly forgotten" affecting the tariff reduction program, common tariff
and industrial programming.
"... the accords and mechanisms defined at the beginning of the 1970s were eroded and noncompliance ensued ..." (JUNAC, 1991a: 87).
"... all the member countries ... shared generalized violations of the commitments with regard to
the [Andean] trade liberalization program and the common tariff, to which the failure of industrial
programming was added" (Hurtado, 1990: 3).
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xv; Carmona, 1984: 12; Ferrari, 1991: 68; Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 5-6; JUNAC,
1987: 2; Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 3).
This situation and the inability to find solutions for several years constituted the
major aspects of the crisis of regression of the Andean process. "Nineteen seventy-nine,
... marks the beginning of the crisis of the Cartagena Agreement" (JUNAC, 1987a: 6).
This regression phase ended when the Cartagena Agreement was again drastically
modified by the Protocol of Quito, signed in 1987.8

1.4.- The Quito Protocol
The changes brought about by the Quito Protocol reflected the immediate and
long-term goals the governments wanted to achieve through the Andean Group. These
goals were to make the Cartagena Agreement am efficient instrument to collaborate in
the economic development of the subregion (JUNAC, 1988a: 8; Marquez, 1989: 13); to
dependence on external factors" (Mairal, 1989: 97); and to make its mechanisms more
flexible and thus, more viable and similar to the interests of the member countries. In
other words, the Andean process of integration was affected by the changes in the
national strategy of development pursued by the governments (Tironi, 1976: 63).

“The changes in the 1980s in the international economic system not only the provoked regression in
GRAN but in all economic integration processes of the region (Bryan, 1984: 83; INTAL, 1992: 19). "[T]he
regional integration movement is in deep trouble. In the best cases, integration schemes are going through
periods of extreme difficulty characterized by a slowdown in the decision-making process, a reluctance to
adhere to regional commitments and obligations and, in some instances, even a reversal in decision-making
itself. In the worst cases, the schemes are in disarray, facing the prospect of complete collapse" (McIntyre,
1984: 15).
The Central American Common Market was paralyzed even before the civil wars in the region
virtually brushed it aside. The CARICOM languished due to the external effects on the economies of the
member countries. The Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA, after several years of intense
negotiations was scaled down and replaced, by the Latin American Integration Association, ALADI, in
1980. The main attributes of the ALADI treaty were flexibility and pragmatism (INTAL, 1981: 22).
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Practically no part of the Cartagena Agreement was left untouched by the Quito
Protocol. It profoundly modified the chapters dealing with the organs of the agreement,
economic policy harmonization, industrial programming, common external tariff, the
tariff reduction program, agriculture, and the special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador.
It also added a new chapter on social and economic cooperation.
With the approval of this protocol, the Commission also adopted a set of decisions
to facilitate ending of the phase of regression (see section 4.2).

2.- THE MECHANISMS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT AND THE PHASE
OF REGRESSION

2.1.- The tariff reduction program
With the Protocols of Lima and Arequipa, the three largest Andean
countries—Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—should have eliminated customs duties among
themselves by December 1983. They did it with some delays (see section 3.3). Bolivia
and Ecuador should have embarked on their tariff reduction process between December
1980 and December 1990, but by the end of this phase (1987), they had not begun it.
From 1982 on, restrictions on trade among Andean nations were unilaterally
imposed by member countries, due to increasing fiscal deficits, devaluations, external
debt and high interest rates (Abusada, 1981: 276; Schuldt and Urriola, 1991: 126-127).
Trade diminished (see section 2.6), and between 1982 and 1986 bilateral trade accords
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were signed to "address the most critical cases" (JUNAC, 1981: 6).
In October 1982, Venezuela became the first country to impose non-tariff barriers
to trade within the subregion. In that year, around 500 items were under trade
restrictions. By November 1986, of the 3,340 items in the tariff reduction program (70
percent of the total dutiable items) almost two-thirds were still under non-tariff barrier
restrictions, and 9 percent (301 items) were traded under bilateral accords By December
1987, 8 months after the Quito Protocol was signed, items under bilateral accords had
increased to 809 items (Figueredo, 1985: 161; JUNAC, 1986a: 6; 1988a: 22).
In brief, for most of the phase of regression, a large portion of intra-Andean trade
was subject to trade restrictions, and the attempts to eliminate them were unsuccessful.

2.2.- Common tariff
With the 1976 and 1978 changes made in the Cartagena Agreement, a common
external tariff band was to be approved by December 1979. In March 1978 the Junta
presented proposal 96 on the common tariff and related matters.9 Unsuccessful efforts
were made in 1978 and 1979 to meet the deadline to approve it. In 1989 and 1981 these
efforts continued, but without success.
In February 1980, the Junta presented to the Commission new guidelines for the
CET (JUNAC, 1980f), based on them governments reached accords, this resulted in the

’Using the concept of effective protection (that is, protection on the value added to the product) to
define the floor of the band, the proposal suggested 70 percent as the maximum protection to be granted
to any product. For agricultural products, the resulting nominal protections were to be adjusted downward,
and upward for capital goods, as well as for labor intensive and high technology products. The average
effective rate, considering the modifications, was 38 percent.
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Junta presenting a modified version of Proposal 96 (JUNAC, 1980g).10 The
governments’ positions vis-a-vis this proposal in 1980, are presented in table VI. 1.
As shown in table VI. 1, the basic disagreement among the governments was on
the level of protection. Two contradictory problems were the main issues. The first was
that a protectionist CET would recreate, at the subregional level, the short-comings of
the import substitution policies (Koopmann, 1979: 118); the second was that the
protection proposed for the floor of the band would not be enough to warrant production
at the subregional level."
In 1984, the Junta suggested that in the new protocol, which had to be adopted
in order to again restore the juridical basis of the Cartagena Agreement, no deadline
should be set to approve the CET. This "will facilitate its adoption when the conditions
are ripe." The Junta also recognized that "the viability of the [Andean] process depends
on the convergence of political will and the real capability of the member countries to
make commitments, and not on the setting of rigid deadlines" (JUNAC, 1984b: 26).
In short, the CET, a crucial mechanism, was not approved in this phase of
regression. Characteristic of this phase, as opposed to the phase of stagnation, was that

“The floor of the tariff band for 1990 was still 70 percent effective protection, but the ceiling was
limited to 2.5 times the level of the floor, or 100 percent ad-valorem, whichever was lower. Colombia,
Peru and Venezuela would reach gradually tariff levels within the band between December 1980 and
December 1990, while Bolivia and Ecuador would do it between 1981 and 1990. The width o f the band
would be reduced in 1983, 1987 and 1990 from 80 percent effective protection to the target of 70 percent.
The criteria to assign levels of effective protection were the same as in Proposal 96, but protection for
capital goods was reduced from 40-50 percent to 15-40 percent by considering only the potential generation
of unskilled jobs rather than considering both skilled and unskilled.
""Each country seem to have a different idea as to the optimum level of openness of the Andean
Group’s markets to imports from the outside, ...; and all the members seem to have different opinions as
well as ... what would constitute a reasonable degree of protection" (INTAL, 1982: 73).
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TABLE VI. 1
GOVERNMENTS’ POSITION IN RELATION TO THE CET PROPOSAL
MAXIMUM LEVEL OF THE TARIFF BAND
Protection

Levels

Dates of application

Ju

Effective

2.5 times the minimum

See the line below

Bo

Nominal

100

1990, but possible reductions
could be agreed upon

Co

Effective

120, 90, 80

1983, 1987, 1990

Ec

Either

Ample and flexible

No opinion

Pe

Effective

120, 105, 90

1983, 1987, 1990

Ve

Nominal

100

Permanent

MINIMUM LEVEL OF THE TARIFF BAND
Protection

Levels

Dates of application

Ju

Effective

Co, Pe, Ve: 80, 75, 70
Bo, Ec: 70

Co, Pe, Ve: 1983, 1987, 1990
Bo, Ec: 1990

Bo

Effective

70

Bo and Ec should adopt it 7
years after Co, Pe & Ve

Co

Effective

80, 70, 60

1983, 1987, 1990

Ec

Effective

80

Permanent, to be revised in
1987

Pe

Effective

80, 75, 70

1983, 1987, 1990

Ve

Effective

80

Same as Ecuador

Ju: Junta's proposal
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1980a: 1-2.

there were no attempts to solve the legal situation nor to pretend that the governments
were close to approving the CET. The different approaches of the member countries to
tariff policies was at the center of the problem.
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In December of 1980 the time span for adopting Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development—SPIDs—expired. In the five additional years for the adoption of Sectoral
Programs of Industrial Development (1975-1980), provided by the Protocols of Lima and
Arequipa, only the Automobile Program was approved (Decision 120, in September
1977). Between 1977 and 1987, several decisions were approved to "complement"
Decision 120.12
The Petrochemical Program (Decision 91) was modified by Decisions 130 (August
1978), and 170 (March 1982). Among other things, these decisions dealt with the
assignment of products originally allocated to Chile, and the inclusion of Venezuela in
this program. The incorporation of Venezuela into the Metalworking Program, and the
distribution of the products assigned to Chile were done in Decision 146, July 1979.
Finally in December 1980, Decisions 160 and 162 approved the Siderurgical and the
Fertilizers Programs respectively. The first was just a list of products to be part of the
program, while the second was only the tariff reduction program timetable for fertilizers.
In other words, no new industrial program, as defined in Chapter IV of the Cartagena
Agreement was approved after the Automobile Program.13

l2In January 1979 three decisions related to the Automobile Program were approved. Decision 131,
involved the rules for a balanced exchange of auto components; Decision 132, complementing rules on a
Bolivian assignation; and Decision 134, excluding an item from Decision 120. Some deadlines in Decision
120 were postponed by Decision 149 (September 1979); Decision 158 (June 1980); and Decision 159 (July
1980). Decision 181 (July 1983), suspended the obligations and set deadlines to review the Automobile
Program. Finally, in May 1987, as part of the package agreed for the adoption of the new protocol.
Decision 120 was abrogated by Decision 223.
l3Other proposals presented by the Junta were: chemical (Proposal 91), pharmaceutical (Proposal 92),
and electronic and communications products (Proposal 69). None of them were approved.
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The Junta and the Commission, following the clear interest of the majority of the
Andean governments for industrial programming continued to devote most of their
energies, resources and capacities to approve SPIDs. They considered that the prestige,
success, and uniqueness of the Andean Pact were basically centered on the advancement
of this mechanism. Its failure, first by not approving most of the industrial programs, and
second by not implementing the few approved programs, were the keys in the frustration,
lack of solutions, and widespread violations of the Agreement. This situation became
even more complicated when some governments began to withdraw approval for other
Junta's proposals and to threaten not to fulfill their obligations if SPIDs were not agreed
upon.14 Credibility in the Andean process reached a record low. "It could be said, ...,
that the whole scaffolding of the [Andean] scheme cracked" (INTAL, 1990a: 92).
Industrial Programming, turned out to be a very difficult mechanism to put into
practice. This mechanism failed because governments did not have their industrial
development objectives clearly defined; were unable to figure out the financial,
technological and human resources needed;15 and were too ambitious in reserving too
many groups of products for industrial programming (INTAL, 1988: 36). Industrial
Programming, having to harmonize the interests of the countries, became an illusion. In

14A typical case was this cryptic declaration: "... the government of Ecuador does not consider prudent
to continue to discuss new mechanisms aiming to ... define the Andean market [the CET], without solving
the most fundamental issue, that is, the consolidation of what has already been built [the existing SPIDs]
... Ecuador will have to abstain its position in issues dealing with new mechanisms defining the market
until substantial progress has been done in observing existing obligations..." (Salgado, 1980: 1).
15"If the industrial programming is to get ahead according to' the schedules $33bn are needed.
Apparently this sum cannot be raised on the domestic capital markets nor is the basic technological
infrastructure in the subregion developed sufficiently to carry our the ambitious industrial projects. As a
consequence, the Andean countries must to a considerable extent rely on capital and technology from
abroad, including direct investments by transnational corporations" (Koopmann, 1979: 120).
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November 1983 the Commission, with the adoption of a new Andean industrial strategy,
"virtually abandoned" industrial programming (INTAL, 1984a: 62, 81) in favor of
industrial cooperation.
With regard to the existing SPIDs, the Metalworking Program, after its
modification by Decision 146 of July 1979, was continuously violated. The worst offense
was that countries began to produce products assigned to other members (JUNAC, 1989:
33), violating the principle of industrial specialization. The lack of progress of this
program was mainly due to economic recession.
The principal factors working against progress in the Petrochemical Program were
the magnitude of the investment required (Venezuela was the only country able to afford
them), the debt crisis, the rise of oil prices, and the worldwide excess of production
capacity (INTAL, 1979: 115, 116; 1982: 82). In 1983, the Junta presented a proposal
to modify the Petrochemical Program, but the Commission did not act on it.
Against the implementation of the Automobile Program worked the changes in
technology, in consumer tastes, and in the direction of the industrial development policies
of the member countries brought about by the energy and economic crises of the 1970s.
From July 1983 all the rights and obligations derived from this program were suspended,
and the program was abolished in May 1987. The most ambitious and most well defined
industrial program—and for these

reasons the most rigid and difficult

to

implement—became the first industrial program to be abrogated.
According to 1986 data (JUNAC, 1986: 9-10), of the original 1,670 customs
items reserved for industrial programming, only 625 (37 percent) were the object of any
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SPID, or assigned—outside the Industrial Programming mechanism—to be produced by
Bolivia or Ecuador.16

2.4.> Common treatment of foreign investment
After the changes in common treatment of foreign investments (Decision 24) in
1977 (Decision 103), the governments of the member countries announced at different
times their interest in modifying Decision 24 again.17 The goal was to attract foreign
investment. To attain this aim, the governments decided that the best approach would be
to increase their autonomy on this issue (Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 19). In May 1987,
at the same time that the Protocol of Quito was approved, Decision 24 was again
profoundly modified by Decision 220.
The new common regime of foreign investment reduced the number of foreign
enterprises to be nationalized and delayed its process. The new regime required that only
foreign enterprises interested in having access to the Andean market should be

16In the Metalworking Program, of the 267 items, 48 percent (118 items) were being produced by
1986; in the Petrochemical Program 40 percent (64 items out of the 162 included in this program) were
in production by that year. In the Automobile Program only 11 items were being produced by the time it
was suspended in 1987. The Siderurgical Program (with 85 items) remained only a list of products. Out
of the 92 items assigned (in December 1970 by Decision 28) to be produced by either Bolivia or Ecuador
outside the SPIDs, Bolivia was able to produce 3, and Ecuador 7; but by 1986, only 5 items were still in
production, all of them in Ecuador.
l7In October 1980, during the XXXth. ordinary session of the Commission, the Peruvian representative,
in his first and last intervention and presence during his one year tenure as Minister of Industry, Tourism,
and Integration, proposed modifying this decision. In July 1983, in the XXXVth. extraordinary session,
the government of Peru again proposed that Decision 24 be more flexible, in order to attract foreign
investors. In November 1984, during the XLIIth. extraordinary session, Ecuador joined Peru requesting
modification of this decision. In September 1985, a meeting of the ministers of foreign relations of the
Andean Group pointed out the need to modify Decision 24 in order to promote foreign investment in
accordance with the national development plans of the member countries, and with subregional objectives.
Peru and Colombia in November (XLIIIrd. extraordinary session) and December 1986 (XLIVth.
extraordinary session) declared that changes in Decision 24 were an inseparable issue related to the
adoption of the new protocol.
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nationalized, whereas previously all foreign enterprises had to. It increased from 18 to
30 years the date by which foreign enterprises had to transfer 51 percent of their shares
to national ownership in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela; and from 23 to 37 years in
Bolivia and Ecuador. The minimum national participation was decreased from 30 percent
to 15 percent three years after the conversion agreement was signed in the largest
countries, and from 10 to 5 percent after five years for the smallest countries.
Governments, on the other hand, could unilaterally permit foreign capital to buy
national or subregional enterprises, and allow the reinvestment of profits without the
previous 7 percent limit. Governments could also decide about the access of foreign
enterprises to domestic credit; about what sectors originally reserved for national
enterprises—e.g., basic products, public services, banking, insurance, domestic transport,
etc—were not any more so; and about the transfer of profits. In addition, payment of
royalties between affiliates and the parent company was allowed, and it also permitted
national legislation to decide on the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
These changes in the common treatment of foreign investment increased the
discretionary powers of the governments and correspondingly decreased the scope of the
common rules. Control of foreign capital was retaken by the individual governments
within an emptier subregional shell.

2.5.- Other aspects
Regression characterized the Cartagena Agreement between 1978 and 1986,
however, there was a phase (1979-1982) in which the process had bright spots. There
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was a process of creating new institutions. During this phase some common foreign
positions were adopted. Finally, there were attempts at the highest levels to reinvigorate
the Andean integration process. This was considered to be a sign of "consolidation" of
the Andean process (JUNAC, 1980b: 5-7).

a) Expansion of the Andean integration process
In 1979, influenced by the entry into force of the Protocol of Arequipa, the
"transition from authoritarian rule" in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, and the presidential
meeting of May 1979, treaties were signed creating the Andean Tribunal and the Andean
Parliament. The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was also established.
The Andean Tribunal was created in May 1979, but only in January 1984 did it
begin to function. The Court is in charge of interpreting and unifying legal community
provisions, and enforcing the obligations derived from the Andean process. It sits in
Quito, Ecuador and is composed of five members. This means that each country has its
representative, a situation in which judges may not be seen as impartial (Paolillo 1981:
112). In practice, the Junta did not go to the Tribunal to make countries fulfill their
obligations because "violations were too widespread showing a conflict between the
juridical order and the new subregional realities" (JUNAC, 1987b: 8), and governments
agreed not to present claims against each other (Cardenas, 1994: 5).
In October 1979 the Andean Parliament was created by a treaty signed in La Paz,
Bolivia, it entered into force only in May 1984. It is composed of five members of each
of the national Congresses, elected by their peers. It only has the power to advise about
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political integration, and it has to be informed about the Andean integration process.
The Andean Council of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the member
countries, was established in November 1979 by the ministers of that area. Its functions
are to provide general guidelines for economic integration and political cooperation, to
determine the most adequate policies, and to coordinate foreign economic policies
(JUNAC, cl979a: paragraph 22, 24m). Although this Council is not an official organ of
the Cartagena Agreement, it became, in practice, a higher level body within the Andean
Group, because it decided the paths to follow. As a de facto higher level in the Andean
process, the Council ended up making crucial decisions with regard to the new
orientation of the process, thereby taking away an important function from the
Commission, which was nonetheless grateful for being relieved of having to make these
decisions.18 This council was the all important forum for the Andean countries to adopt
common positions in specific international and regional issues as is shown below.

b) Common Policies
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations and the Commission defined a
common policy for the renegotiation of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association)
and its conversion into ALADI (Latin American Integration Association). The Andean
countries displayed a tight cohesion enabling them to impose on the Big
Three—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—most of the Andean goals. At the meetings

l8”... the member states began to make accords about integration obviating, in pan, some of the official
functions of the Commission... increasingly politicizing the Andean process" (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 111,
112).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

239

organized by the Latin American Economic System—SELA—the Andean countries
developed common positions for the adoption of a Latin American view on specific issues
related to the New International Economic Order, and the GATT’s Tokyo Round.
On political matters, the Andean Council supported the democratization process
in the Andean countries. It condemned the July 1980 coup d ’etat in Bolivia, which made
the Bolivian government temporarily suspend its participation in the Andean process (see
footnote 19, 2nd. paragraph). Also in 1980, the Council, at the initiative of Peru, made
the Andean governments declare the Sandinista guerrillas as belligerent forces, thus
recognizing its international personality. Through Peru’s initiative, the Andean Group
supported, in 1982, the old Bolivian objective to regain access to the Pacific Ocean.
Negotiations between the United States and the Andean Group in the late 1970s
ended with the signing by the Commission of two Memoranda of Understanding, one on
economic cooperation, and the other on technological and scientific cooperation (Alegrett,
1989a: 4-6). Through these Memoranda, Venezuela and Ecuador gained preferential
access to the US market, which they had lost because of their membership in OPEC; and
the Andean countries got additional advantages in the US Generalized System of
Preferences. The Andean Group also negotiated as a unit with the European Community.
These negotiations led to a General Agreement signed in December 1983 between the
Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Andean countries and the President of the Council
of Ministers of the European Community.
The Andean Group was able to project a solid international image, and to gain
prestige with common positions beneficial to the interests of each of its members,
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achieving results that individually would not have been able to obtain. A major
drawback, however, was that there "has been no formal definition of the basic principles
of a joint Andean foreign ... policy" (INTAL, 1982: 101). With the border conflicts
between Colombia and Venezuela in 1980, and between Peru and Ecuador (January
1981), the debt crisis, and the economic crisis, the Andean countries concentrated on
their own urgent problems, and common foreign positions, which could have yielded
better results, were placed on the back burner.

c) Summit meetings
The Andean presidents met eight times, the first in August 1978 and the last in
December 1983. Out of these eight, the second meeting, in May 1979, and the seventh,
in July 1983, were the most important for the Andean process.19 These meetings,
however, failed to prevent the regression of the process. The presidents provided
guidelines, they declared their support to the Andean integration process, and reiterated

‘*The first summit meeting, in August 1978 was held in Colombia when Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala was
sworn in as president. The Declaration of Bogota was signed. It reaffirms the intention to achieve the
objectives of the Andean Group; the need for a judicial organ, which should be created in 1979; and the
urgency to update the Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs by the end of 1978. The presidents
also agree to meet in May 1979 to evaluate the progress of the Andean process in its first ten years
(Comision, 1978: Anexo III). Details of this latter meeting are given in the text. In October 1979, the
presidents met again in Panama, to witness acts related to the Panama Canal.
In 1980, some of the Andean presidents also met for three times. The first in July, in Lima, Peru;
the second in June, in Riobamba, Ecuador; and the third, in December, in Santa Marta, Colombia. In all
these meetings "the Presidents ... reaffirmed their integrationist commitment and their support for the
process, [but] no activities were undertaken at the national level to accelerate it (IDB, cl982: 109). Bolivia
self-excluded of all these meetings and also from the meetings of the Andean Council, and of the
Commission, until April 1981 (Comision, 1980: 2-4) because the other member countries did not
recognized the new government and condemned the July 1980’s coup d ’etat, acts which were considered
by the de facto regime as an inadmissible interference in the domestic affairs of Bolivia. On the other hand,
as a consequence of border problems, the presidents of Ecuador and Peru never visited each other’s
countries; thus the Ecuadorean president was absent in the meeting in Lima, and the Peruvian in the
gathering at Riobamba.
The last presidential meeting in this phase was in December 1983, on the occasion of the closing
celebrations in honor of Simon Bolivar’s bicentennial birth.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241

their conviction that the process went beyond the economic sphere covering social,
cultural and political aspects (Zelada, 1979).
In the meeting of May 1979, in Cartagena, Colombia, on the occasion of the tenth
anniversary of the Cartagena Agreement, the presidents signed the Mandate of Cartagena
(Mandato de Cartagena). "It was meant to confirm their countries’ continuing support
of the Andean movement" (Mace, 1983: 186). The Mandate reaffirmed that "integration
must be the principal instrument for attaining ... development...," and declared, for the
first time, that the Andean Group was "essentially a political undertaking" (JUNAC,
cl979a: 4, Paragraphs 5 and 6). The Mandate also proposed specific guidelines to
reactivate the Andean process and suggested concrete measures to have the process
progress with a pragmatic and flexible approach (Mace, 1983: 186-187; Montenegro,
1983: 59-67; Tobon, 1989: 19-21).
The seventh summit was held in July 1983 in Caracas, Venezuela. The presidents
met to commemorate the Bicentennial of the birth of Simon Bolivar (the liberator of the
five Andean republics and Panama). In this first meeting of all civilian elected presidents,
they adopted the Declaration "For Us, the Homeland is Latin America" (Para Nosotros
la Patria es America). The presidents reiterated their support of the Andean process, and
"decided to make it more dynamic by renewing its aims, actualizing its programs, and
perfecting its mechanisms" (JUNAC, 1983d: 3).
Notwithstanding all the political support and concrete measures to re-launch the
Andean process, this had to wait until 1987. Meanwhile, between 1983 and 1986 the
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process went deepest into the phase of regression and pessimism.20

2.6.- Trade among the member countries
Intra-Andean imports decreased between 1983 and 1986, and also exports in
1982-1984 and 1986. Between 1981 and 1986 trade decreased at the rate of 11.4 percent
per year.21 The record low in exports was in 1986 with $655 million (see table VI.2).
This value was the lowest since 1973 and it was just about half of the peak reached in
1981 ($1,238 million). The most successful of the Andean mechanisms, trade, had
regressed by 1986 to the levels of 13 years earlier. In 1987, the year after this phase of
decay, exports increased by 42 percent, but only reached $932.9 million.
Intra-Andean trade as a percentage of total trade, however, was quite similar to
the previous phases. It maintained its meager range of 3 to 5 percent of total exports and
of total imports (see table VI.2).22 These data tell us that intra-Andean trade was
marginal and its trends followed the general trade tendency rather than becoming an
instrument to ease the peaks and the valleys created by trade with third countries.
With the decrease in intra-Andean trade, trade flows were analyzed in detail. The
analyses found a high level of concentration of intra-Andean trade, which made the

“ "In 1983 ... the [Andean] integration process was considered to be at its lowest level ever ... because
the unfulfillment of the accords, the lack of political will of the governments, and the beginning of a
generalized economic crisis, showed that the conditions for the end of the Andean Pact were ad portas ’
(Zapata, 1991: 37).
21From 1970 to 1981 intra-Andean trade increased 22.7 percent per year (JUNAC, 1987b: 4).
-Trade with the United States, in contrast, was more than 30 per of the total trade. This meant that
in trade matters each one of the Andean nations was more integrated with the United States than with the
rest of the Andean Group (Kisic, 1989: 7; INTAL, 1980: 175-176).
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TABLE VI.2
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1,237.7

1,183.4

1983

1984

j

1985

1986

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN
World

1,066.2

1,188.9

16,282.7 23,801.3

30,214.8

681.7

752.6

749.5

797.3

655.2

932.9

29,026.4 25,469.3 23,197.0 25,534.0 24,565.0 18,957.4 ,20,537.5

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN
World

662.1

780.3

959.7

18,769.9 18,462.9 22,711.1

1,247.3

1,250.8

924.1

921.5

25,615.7 25,149.5 15,927.0 16,657.1

813.8

681.0

994.9

16,718.0 17,361.8 20,165.0

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN

19.6

285.6

229.1

World

(2,487.9)

5,338.4

7,503.7

(9.6)
3,410.7

(67.4)
319.8

(171.5)
7,270.0

(172.0)
8,876.9

(62.1)

(16.5)
7,847.1

(25.7)
1,595.5

372.5

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Exports

4.19

4.48

3.93

4.26

4.65

3.24

2.94

3.25

3.46

4.54

Imports

3.53

4.23

4.23

4.87

4.97

5.80

5.53

4.87

3.92

4.93

11.50

4.11

-4.39

-36.41

-0.42

6.38

-17.81

42.37

26.95

-3.93

-12.25

-8.92

10.07

-3.79

-22.83

8.34

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN
World

-17.34
3.15

56.41
46.17

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

-22.71

17.90

22.95

29.97

0.28

-26.12

-0.29

-11.69

-16.32

46.11

World

10.76

-1.64

23.01

12.79

-1.82

-36.67

4.58

0.37

3.85

16.15

SOURCE: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de Informacidn Estadi'stica. Decisidn 115.
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association very vulnerable to protectionist policies. In 1982, Colombia and Venezuela
accounted for 25 and 50 percent, respectively, of all Andean imports.23 This meant that
the actions of these countries had great impact on the intra-Andean trade, but also that
import restrictions imposed by these countries affected each other more than they affected
the other member countries.
Trade within the subregion was also concentrated in a small group of products.
In 1982, only 1,638 dutiable items registered trade among the members, and they
decreased to 1,210 in 1985. Ninety percent of the intra-Andean trade was concentrated
in 345 items in 1982, and only in 241 items in 1985 and for each country less than 100
items constituted more than 80 per of their intra-Andean trade (JUNAC, 1986a: 16-17;
1987b: 5). This situation made intra-Andean trade quite vulnerable to import restrictions,
since restrictions were not applied to all products but selectively and temporarily; hitting
hardest non-essential products, and products competing with national production (both
categories were the most likely to be the products transacted among the Andean
members). Unilateral restrictions were applied, at its height (1983), to more than 4,300
items (almost 90 percent of the total). In 1982 these items had a total intra-Andean trade
value of $230 million (27 percent of total trade excluding oil and derivatives), but only
291 items had subregional trade values of $50,000 each or higher (JUNAC, 1984b: 11,
13, 15). In 1985 and in 1986 this situation deteriorated (see table VI.6, lines 3, 5 and
section 2.1 above).

^In 1985, both countries still accounted for 65 percent of the Andean imports. Around 75 percent of
the decrease in 1983 intrasubregional imports was due to trade restrictions enacted by Venezuela in 1982
(JUNAC, 1986a: 16). Between 1984 and 1989 Colombia was the major importer from the Andean
countries with 39 percent of the total, while Venezuela was second with 27 percent (INTAL, 1990a: 99).
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Concerns about how to overcome trade declines were high. In June 1983, after
the first decrease in intra-Andean exports of more than 4 percent (1981-1982), the Junta
presented to the Commission an "Emergency and Cooperation Program" (JUNAC,
1983e) which diagnosed the situation, predicted a trade reduction of one-third for 1983,
(which in fact it decreased by 36 percent in 1983, see table VI.2), and proposed
measures. In March 1984 another study (JUNAC, 1984b) showed that the problem was
worse than expected and it also proposed measures. No important actions were taken by
the Commission until 1987.
With the abrupt decrease of trade in the early 1980s, the crisis of the Andean
process became obvious (JUNAC, 1987: 5). The general causes affecting the Cartagena
Agreement mentioned above also affected trade among the member countries. "The
decline of intra-Andean trade has been attributed to the particular economic situation of
the member countries caused by the debt crisis and the policies adopted by the countries
rather than by the mechanisms created by the Andean Group ..." (IDB, 1990: 11). This
situation of crisis caused widespread violations of the Andean trade norms, paralysis of
the community organs to overcome them, and an inability to further integration.

3.- THE VIOLATIONS AND THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE
PHASE OF PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION

Violations of the text of the Cartagena Agreement, and the decisions of the
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Commission, predicted by the hypothesis, became more pervasive than ever during these
years of regression. The Commission in its meeting of October 1989 taking into account
that the Andean presidents in their "Mandate of Cartagena" had ordered strict fulfillment
of the obligations (JUNAC,

1979a,

paragraph 20),

recommended

that the

plenipotentiaries overcome the existing violations as soon as possible (JUNAC, 1979g:
1). The Junta, however, continued to report increasing violations (e.g., JUNAC, 1983h:
4; 1984c: 1; 1984d: 1).
Violations are analyzed in this section following the same procedure as in chapters
IV and V. First the non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement will be
reviewed; second a presentation of the analysis of decisions not incorporated by the
member governments in their legislation, and third the violations of decisions already
made part of domestic legislation.

3.1.- Violations of the articles of the Cartagena Agreement
The new deadlines set by the Protocol of Arequipa (December 1979) were not
met. Even worse, after a time, there was no attempt by the governments, the
Commission or the Junta to fulfill these obligations, or to promptly reestablish the legal
order. The violations reduced the benefits of the agreement, weakened interdependency,
and diminished the credibility of the process (Carmona, 1984: 14).
As mentioned above, the CET was not approved, nor were all Sectoral Programs
of Industrial Development as mandated by Articles 2 and 6 of the Protocol of Arequipa.
In relation to the tariff reduction program the three largest countries continued to lag in
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their tariff reductions, and since 1982 import restrictions reversed the process towards
a free trade zone.
Bolivia and Ecuador did not begin their tariff reduction program process by
December 1980 as the new Cartagena Agreement stated. Between December 1980 and
October 1981, the Commission considered the problem without solving it (see for
example Comision, 1980: 4; 1981: 6; 1981a: 9). It later postponed sine die dealing with
this issue, and then faded away due to the crisis of the process (see for example:
Comision, 1984: 8; 1984a: 4; 1984b: 3). By 1986, the member countries agreed that
Bolivia and Ecuador would begin their tariff reduction program process 180 days after
the entry into force of the new protocol (Comision, 1986: 5).

3.2.- Non-incorporation of the Commission’s decisions bv the governments
During this phase of regression, the number of decisions which were not
incorporated into the national legislation of the member countries increased dramatically.
In the phase of progress the maximum number of decisions not incorporated by one or
more of the members were at least 11 (see table IV.4). During the phase of stagnation
this number increased to 14 (see table V.6). In the phase of regression the maximum
number of decisions not incorporated reached the record high of 24, in October 1979 (see
table VI.3), 13 being the lowest (except by the end of this phase when it reached the
record low of 6 decisions not being observed in May 1987). By then, the Quito Protocol
was being signed.
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TABLE VI.3
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1978-1987
DATE

SOURCE

BO

CO

EC

PE

VE

TOTAL

(*)

08-26-78

(1)

8

6

5

7

9

35

14

11-16-78

(2)

8

6

5

7

8

34

14

05-02-79

(3)

14

11

11

13

13

62

20

07-10-79

(4)

12

12

11

5

14

54

20

10-30-79

(5)

16

12

14

9

17

68

24

Feb-80

(6)

14

11

10

9

16

60

22

05-19-80

(7)

13

10

10

4

15

52

20

10-13-80

(8)

13

8

10

4

10

45

17

11-14-80

(9)

13

8

10

4

10

45

17

08-26-81

(10)

13

6

10

4

9

42

16

11-11-82

(11)

9

5

9

4

7

34

14

01-15-83

(12)

9

5

9

3

7

33

14

04-22-83

(13)

10

5

8

3

7

33

14

Jun-83

(14)

10

5

8

3

7

33

13

01-01-84

(15)

10

5

7

3

7

32

13

06-10-84

(16)

11

6

8

3

8

36

14

05-11-87

(17)

6

3

3

2

2

16

6

(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation
one or more countries
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1978a; (2) JUNAC, 1978b; (3) JUNAC, 1979e;
(4) JUNAC, 1979f; (5) JUNAC, 1979g; (6) JUNAC, 1980; (7) JUNAC
1980c; (8) JUNAC, 1980d; (9) JUNAC, 1980e; (10) JUNAC, 1981a; (11)
JUNAC, 1982a; (12) JUNAC, 1983f; (13) JUNAC, 1983g; (14) JUNAC,
1983h; (15) JUNAC, 1984c; (16) JUNAC, 1984d; (17) JUNAC, 1990b.
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It is interesting, however, to point out that during the depth of the recession,
(1982-1986), the number of decisions not being observed by the governments remained
the same (14) as in the phase of stagnation (1977 and 1978). This fact suggests that the
problem of not incorporating some of the Commission’s decisions began already in the
previous phase of stagnation. It also shows that these were a core of decisions which the
member countries consistently were reluctant to observe.24 Chief among the decisions
which were ignored by all the governments, was Decision 49 on the regulations for
harmonizing industrial development legislation. Among other decisions which more than
two countries had difficulties in observing were Decisions 50 and 69 dealing with
temporary entry of private vehicles; Decisions 56 and 56a on international highway
transportation25; Decision 85 on industrial property; Decisions 87 and 89 on
development of technology in copper and tropical forest resources; Decision 120 on the
Automobile Program and its modifications; and Decision 148 on Andean social security.

3.3.- Non-compliance with decisions incorporated into the domestic legal order of the
member countries
Trade within the subregion was heavily affected by the unilateral actions of the
governments. Beginning with 1982 a more extensive and intensive violation of decisions
already incorporated in their national legislation began. This situation led to claims

24"... there are a number of decisions which have not been incorporated in the domestic legal system
of the member countries even though some of these decisions have been approved several years ago. ...
the situation of widespread violations ... has no solution in the near future" (JUNAC, 1980c: 1).
25Although Ecuador was the only country which failed to observe these decisions, in practice this
situation made impossible unimpeded transportation within the subregion given the geographical position
of this country in the area: in the middle of the five members.
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against each government. These claims began to be recorded by the Junta in 1976. It
stopped presenting its reports on this issue in 1984 when the demands reached a record
high (see table VI.4) and the governments had been showing an unwillingness or inability
to comply (JUNACt 1980c: 1).

TABLE VI.4
CLAIMS MADE TO:
BOLIVIA BY 1/
DATE

C

E

P

V

COLOMBIA BY

T

B

E

112476

P

V

1

111577

1

2

ECUADOR BY
T

B

C

P

V

T

2

9

3

2

16

1

4

1

3

7

1

12

111678

1

2

3

2

2

2

2

8

3

050279

1

2

3

2

4

5

2

13

5

2

7

071079

1

2

2

5

3

4

7

2

16

5

5

10

103079

1

2

4

7

1

4

2

4

11

4

4

1

9

051980

1

3

4

1

2

4

3

10

2

4

1

7

101380

1

2

3

2

2

4

2

10

3

4

2

9

111480

1

2

3

2

3

4

2

11

1

3

5

3

12

082681

1

3

4

3

4

6

3

16

1

6

11

4

22

1

1

2

4

6

1

1

111182

1

3

2

011583

4

4

2

7

6

6

21

2

8

9

4

23

042283

4

4

2

7

7

6

22

2

8

9

4

23

060783

4

4

2

8

7

6

23

1

8

9

4

22

030184

4

4

2

8

7

7

24

1

8

9

5

23

063084

4

4

2

8

9

7

26

1

8

9

5

24

Continues in the next page
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TABLE VI.4
CLAIMS MADE TO:
PERU BY

(Continued)

VENEZUELA BY 2/

DATE
V

B

C

E

112476

6

20

2

111577

2

9

3

111678

4

3

3

050279

3

5

1

1

10

071079

1

2

3

1

7

103079

1

1

051980

2

1

101380

3

1

111480

3

1

082681

6

2

111182

5

011583

8

042283

2

T

B

C

28

2

1

16

6

E

TOTAL
P

4

33

10

45

3

3

27

4

10

T

3

1

3

7

40

1

2

2

4

9

47

2

1

8

2

7

18

47

1

4

1

9

5

9

24

49

1

5

1

5

6

6

18

46

2

6

5

9

6

6

26

58

3

11

6

13

6

9

34

87

6

5

16

1

7

7

8

23

48

3

2

5

18

6

31

6

11

54

120

8

3

4

6

22

7

32

7

11

57

128

060783

8

4

5

8

25

6

20

6

9

41

115

030184

9

4

6

9

28

6

20

6

10

42

121

063084

9

4

6

9

28

7

33

7

12

59

141

i / Includes one claim made by the Junta on 11/15/77
2d. Includes one claim made by the Junta on 11/24/76
SOURCES: JUNAC, 1976b; 1977d; 1978b; 1979e; 1979f; 1979g; 1980c; 1980d; 1980e;
1981a; 1982a; 1983f; 1983g; 1983h; 1984c; 1984d.

A working group which was routinely created by the Commission to discuss the
compliance with the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions, reported its "worries about
several-years-old claims presented by the countries without any action being taken by the
governments of the violating countries, rendering fruitless the activities of this working
group" (JUNAC, 1979h: 1). In May 1980 the group suggested to the Commission that
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it devote a session considering exclusively with this issue (JUNAC, 1980h: 2), but the
Commission never acted on it. The working group existed until the mid-1980s, when the
Commission itself stopped dealing with this intractable problem. Meanwhile, "specific,
critical and sensitive cases were abundant in which legitimate interests were being
affected eroding confidence in the process..." (JUNAC, 1981b: 1).
These unsolvable violations show that the deeper problems confronted by the
Andean process had to be dealt with first, even though all the governments were in
agreement that it was a priority task to overcome these violations (Comision, 1984: 4).
The tariff reduction program among the three largest members, which should have
been accomplished by December 1983, was consistently delayed. The worst offender was
Venezuela. This country was 23 months late in implementing the 8th tariff reduction
corresponding to December 1978 (JUNAC, 1981: 5). By August 1981, Venezuela still
owed tariff reductions for 1979 and 1980. By November 1982, this country had not made
the reductions for 1981; and by December 1984, it had yet to institute tariff reductions
for 1982 and 1983. Colombia was best in fulfilling its tariff reductions. It was 6 months
late for the 1978 decrease, and 7 months those for 1979 and 1980. Peru, having a good
record of reducing its tariffs, only 4, and 2 months and 1 month late for the years 1978
to 1980; was as late as Venezuela for the last three tariff reductions, 1981-1983. By June
1984, however, Peru had already completed the tariff reduction program (JUNAC,
1983i; 1984c). These delays on the part of Venezuela and Peru, show the effect of the
international economic crisis on these two countries. It is also not by chance that the
delays coincided with the worst years of the crisis, from 1982 onward.
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TABLE VI.5
DUTIABLE ITEMS VIOLATED: 1978-1987

DATE

SOURCE

08-26-78

BOL

COL

ECU

PER

VEN

TOTAL

(1)

20

28

19

5

91

163

11-16-78

(2)

11

27

16

1

11

66

05-02-79

(3)

14

23

17

1

11

66

07-10-79

(4)

14

38

17

1

11

81

10-30-79

(5)

83

153

97

106

211

650

05-19-80

(6)

83

152

97

73

211

616

10-13-80

(7)

88

309

113

362

357

1289

11-14-80

(8)

178

307

136

208

364

1193

08-26-81

(9)

178

309

135

345

355

1322

11-11-82

(10)

370

352

371

497

1084

2674

01-15-83

(11)

370

352

99

497

1076

2394

04-22-83

(12)

235

308

121

380

2026

3070

Jun-83

(13)

235

344

87

411

2800

3877

03-01-84

(14)

289

323

1405

509

2811

5337

06-10-84

(15)

311

278

1311

455

2911

5266

05-11-87

(16)

25

2

806

1650

1793

4276

SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1978a; (2) JUNAC, 1978b; (3) JUNAC, 1979e; (4) JUNAC,
1979f; (5) JUNAC, 1979g; (6) JUNAC, 1980c; (7) JUNAC, 1980d; (8) JUNAC,
1980e; (9) JUNAC, 1981a; (10) JUNAC, 1982a; (11) JUNAC, 1983f; (12)
JUNAC, 1983g; (13) JUNAC, 1983h; (14) JUNAC, 1984c; (15) JUNAC, 1984d;
(16) JUNAC, 1990b.

The number of items violated by the member countries during this phase of
regression grew constantly. Influenced by the presidents’ meetings, however, a record
low has been achieved in 1978 and 1979, with only 66 items violating either the CMET
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or the tariff reduction program. By 1984, after a sharp increase in 1982, the member
countries had combined violations of more than five thousand dutiable items, and by the
time of the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987), this number was still more than
four thousand (see table VI.5).
In relation to existing industrial programs, member countries, which had
incorporated these decisions into their domestic legislation, consistently refrained from
applying the CET to products already in production (see for example, Comision, 1981a:
Anexo IV) and to implement other aspects of these decisions (JUNAC, 1989: 33-34).
By 1985, all the countries were applying restrictions to most of the products,
without discriminating between the Andean and third country imports. Bilateral
agreements had been signed to reestablish some of the trade movements while at the
same time protecting sensitive products from Andean competition. Table VI.6 line 2
shows that a large percentage of the decreased trade in 1985 was traded under bilateral
accords, reaching 50 percent of its intra-Andean trade for Venezuela, 47 percent for
Colombia, and 45 percent in the case of Peru.26 Peru and Venezuela were the countries
which had the largest percentage of their intra-Andean trade under restrictions (see line
3). With regard to the 295 items that constituted 90 percent of the intra-Andean trade
(line 4), only 26 percent of the items were free of restrictions, and 10 percent of these
items had their CMET violated by the member countries.

26In 1986, Venezuela had 54.1 percent of its intra-Andean trade under bilateral accords, Peru had 50.0
percent, Colombia 37.8 percent, Ecuador 23.3 percent, and Bolivia zero percent (JUNAC, 1988a: 23).
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TABLE VI.6
TRADE SITUATION IN THE ANDEAN GROUP IN 1985
(Excluding oil and derivatives)
GRAN

BOLIVIA

COLOMBIA ECUADOR

PERU

VENEZUELA

(1)

26.2%

n.a.

50%

n.a.

15%

16%

(2)

38.8%

n.a.

47%

n.a.

45%

50%

(3)

35.2%

n.a.

3%

n.a.

40%

34%

(4)

295

5

169

21

78

22

(5)

76

1

49

4

17

5

(6)

27

5

12

3

7

0

(1) Percentage of intra-Andean trade free of restrictions.
(2) Percentage of intra-Andean trade in bilateral accords.
(3) Percentage of intra-Andean trade under restrictions.
(4) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports.
(5) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports which werefreeof restrictions
(6) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports which theirCMET wereviolated.
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1986a: 19-21.

The widespread violations of the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement and of
the decisions of the Commission, and the "poor record in implementing [sub]regional
decisions" were "the most significant factor[s] explaining the crisis...: (Mace, 1983:
188). Given this situation, the Junta (JUNAC, 1986a: 17) reiterated the need to adopt
an additional protocol to the agreement.
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4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF REGRESSION

The phase of regression was due primarily to the crisis of the international
economic system during the 1980s characterized by stagflation (economic stagnation
accompanied with high inflation) in the industrialized countries, stagnation of world trade
due to protectionism, high interest rates, external debt, high unemployment, and oil price
fluctuations (JUNAC, 1982a: 11-12). The Andean governments had to adapt to the new
circumstances by often modifying their economic policies, and by doing so they were
redefining their strategy of development or the other way around. During these years of
trial and error,27 the Andean process, in turn, suffered because the countries were at the
same time trying to redefine the objectives for the pact which would reflect the changing
national interests.28
The changes in economic policies and eventually in the strategy of development
led to an alliance between governments and domestic entrepreneurs (Schuldt and Urriola,
1991: 126-127; Cox, 1989: 2). They agreed that local production had to be protected,
and that balance of trade had to be improved by reducing foreign competition. Imports

^Supporting the hypothesis of this dissertation, the Junta (JUNAC, 1985: 3) argued that the regression
of the Andean process could be explained by "changes in the economic policies and strategies of
development, which in many cases have been in conflict with the explicit Andean objectives and
mechanisms. In effect, the abandonment of the strategy of import substitution and the adoption of open
economy policies provoked a sort of "identity crisis" in the Cartagena Agreement which affected the most
important instruments of the agreement."
“ Other factors contributing to the crisis of the process were the marginality of the Andean integration
in the national development plans, which gave greater importance to integration with the world market than
the Andean; diplomatic and political conflicts; different levels of development; structural heterogeneity of
the member countries; lack of agreements to distribute costs and benefits; political instability; the lack of
long-term view which precluded sustained efforts; the lack of macroeconomic policy harmonization; and
that the agreement was as too statist, too rigid, and unrealistic 1985: 3; Kisic, 1989: 7; Caretas, 1989: 2).
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from the Andean countries were curtailed, leading to a series of retaliatory measures and
to bilateral trade agreements and widespread violations of the agreement ensued. The
violations showed the Andean Pact’s failure to increase interdependence, and also
weakened the credibility of the process, especially by investors who lost money because
of the closing of the Andean market (INTAL, 1988: 34; JUNAC, 1981a: 7-8; 1985: 35).
The regression of the Andean process epitomized by the decrease of subregional
trade29 led to the realization that solutions for the existing problems demanded extensive
modifications of the Cartagena Agreement, which made the Commission and the Junta
begin a process of "soul searching. ',3°
This section analyzes the effects of the changes in the international system on the
Andean process, the attempts of the community organs and of the governments to
redefine the Andean process, the paralysis of the Commission’s work, and how the
strategies of development and economic policies were in conflict with the original aims
and mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.

M"The unprecedented decrease of intra-subregional trade in 1983 made evident the internal problems
of the process and the crisis of the Andean model" (JUNAC, 1987: 5).
“ The deepest crisis of the Andean Pact made the community organs, especially the Junta, devote much
time and effort to find out the causes and suggest solutions. Studies done by the Junta and individuals
interested in the Andean process were presented at seminars and conferences. The Junta, also submitted
some of its studies to the Commission, the governments, and the public in general.
For examples of the Junta’s concerns, besides the documents quoted in this chapter, see: JUNAC,
1981c; 198Id; I984e; 1986b; 1986c; I986d, 1986e.
The Junta also organized several seminars and publicized them. See for instance: Schuldt, 1983;
Pacheco, 1983; Aponte 1983; Maza 1984; Quijano, 1984; Lagos, 1984; Abugattas, 1985; JUNAC, 1984f;
1985a; FEDESARROLLO 1984; JUNAC-INTAL, 1985.
The Junta, besides, published works by members of the Junta and observers of the process. See
for example: Carmona 1982; 1984; Florez, 1983; Romero, 1983; Paz, 1985; Ground, 1985; Davila, 1986.
Other publications dealing with the Andean Group problems during this phase are: Perez, 1985;
Lleras, 1985; Carmona 1985; Lloreda, 1985; Moncayo, 1985a; Cardenas and Gonzalez 1986; Cardenas,
1986; Salazar, 1988.
Among the studies on the crisis of the integration processes in Latin America are: Cornejo, 1983;
INTAL, 1984b; Penaranda, 1984; Nunez, Margain and Cherol (eds.), (1984); IDB, cl985: 1-180.
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4.1.- The effects of the changes in the international economic system on the Andean
countries and on the Andean process
The developed world dealt with the crisis brought about by the second oil price
rise (1979), by applying recessionary measures in the form of strict monetary policies.
Chief among them were reducing public expenditure, increasing real interest rates,
raising the price of oil, and augmenting trade protectionism. These actions, and the net
outflow of financial resources from the Third World created the debt crisis.
For the Andean countries, the crisis was "the deepest and the longest in the last
50 years..." (JUNAC, 1985: 1). With balance of payments deficits, the prices of their
exports decreasing, and their export markets closing, these countries limited their imports
through continuous devaluations, multiple exchange rates, and non-tariff barriers. The
gross domestic product of the subregion grew at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent
between 1980 and 1987. In the same period, the population increased by an average of
2.4 percent per annum. The balance of payments for the Andean Group was negative in
1982, 1983, 1986 and 1987 by $1.3, $1.8, $3.3 and $2.0 billion respectively; and in
1988 this deficit jumped to $4.9 billion (JUNAC, 1990c: 106, 10, 90). The external debt
increased from $24.2 billion in 1977 to $77.2 billion in 1987 or more than three times
in 11 years, and the ratio of total debt to gross domestic product was 69 percent, up from
39 percent in 1980 (JUNAC, 1985: 1; 1990c: 126). The result was inflation combined
with recession (stagflation) in the subregion, accompanied by an unemployment rate of
10 percent and higher of the economically active population (JUNAC, 1985: 1).
The consequences for the Andean process, during the first half of the 1980s, as
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previously mentioned, were the indiscriminate closing of the members’ markets (Aninat,
Ffrench-Davis and Leiva, 1990: 166), the loss of importance of industrial development
and planning, and the elimination of deadlines to create free trade (Langhammer, 1990:
24). Integration became unimportant. By 1987, however, coinciding with the regional and
international trend, the Andean countries agreed to drastically modify the Cartagena
Agreement and re-launch the Andean integration process (Grabendorff, 1990: 20).31

4.2.- The community organs, the governments, the relations among them and the
long march to revitalize the Andean integration process
The basic problem confronted by the Andean process in this phase of regression
was that the original Andean integration model—import substitution industrialization at
the subregional level—no longer reflected the interests of the majority of the member
countries.32 The Andean organs and the Andean governments had to pursue a new path
between a neo-liberal and outward oriented industrialization model (El-Nagger, 1989: 14;
Fernandez, 1982: 46), and an inward oriented industrialization based on comparative

3lIn Latin America, the prime example was the Economic Integration and Cooperation Program agreed
between by Brazil and Argentina in 1986. It became, in 1991, the MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common
Market - Mercado Comun del Cono Sur) which also included Uruguay and Paraguay. In the case o f the
Central American Common Market, the Esquipulas I and II declarations, signed in 1986 and 1987,
attempted to revitalize it. Finally, the meeting of the Heads of Governments in St. Lucia, 1987, aimed to
further the Caribbean Common Market process.
In Europe, the European Community (which in November 1993 became the European Union)
agreed in 1985 to create a full-fledged common (single) market by January 1993. In 1988 the United StatesCanada Free Trade Agreement was signed, and in 1993, with the inclusion of Mexico, it became the North
American Free Trade Agreement. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Magreb
in the mid-1980s agreed also to further their integration schemes.
32"In fact, towards the end of the seventies, it had already become clear that the application of the
principal instruments of the Cartagena Agreement was rendered unfit by reason of an essentially political
nature" (Mairal, 1989: 94).
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advantages (INTAL, 1980: 21-24; Sanchez, 1981: 46-50; Schuldt, 1985: 46).
Up to 1979, the Commission and the Junta pursued the existing import
substitution path by approving industrial programs. The Mandate of Cartagena, adopted
by the Andean presidents in May 1979, attempted to increase the importance of trade and
agriculture. The Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987, showed that the member countries
wanted an Andean process with more open market policies. Subregional tariff reduction
program became the most important mechanism, the role of industrial programming was
reduced, and the common treatment of foreign capital was eliminated, for all practical
purposes.
The Commission and the Junta dealt unsuccessfully with the violations and with
furthering the process. By 1980, the process lost momentum. The changes in
governments in Ecuador (1979), and Peru (1980), the political turmoil in Bolivia (a new
round of coups, between 1978 and 1982), and the border conflicts between Colombia and
Venezuela in 1980, and between Ecuador and Peru in 1981 made it impossible for the
Commission to meet for most of 1981 and 1982. The consequence was that deadlines
were not met. Soon after the international economic crisis hit the Andean countries
(1982), violations became widespread (1983), especially in the area of trade and
industrial programming, the two most important mechanisms of the agreement.
Efforts were made by the Junta and the Commission to overcome this situation,
which needed a new set of guidelines to redirect the process based on the ongoing and
anticipated changes in the international and domestic realms. This demanded changes in
the conceptual and pragmatic frameworks from one in which the international
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environment was favorable to the subregion, to another in which this environment was
adverse to the Andean process (Moncayo, 1984: 191). The new roles the Andean process
could play according to the Junta (JUNAC, 1982a: 30-31) were to help ease the
consequences of the international economic changes and to coordinate efforts to
renegotiate the external debt.
A comprehensive attempt to rescue the Andean integration from its crisis was
adopted by the Commission in early July 1983: The Plan for the Reorientation of the
Andean Integration Process {Plan de Reorientacidn del Proceso Andino de Integracion).
This plan (JUNAC, 1983a: 11-83) was based on a series of proposals presented by the
Junta (JUNAC, 1982a; 1983a; 1983e; Camacho, 1984: 14-18),33 and discussed by the
Commission between 1982 and 1983.
The plan reaffirmed that integration was a complement to the development efforts
of the member countries and that the activities proposed were aimed at dealing with
common problems (JUNAC, 1983d: 23-24). There were seven priority areas of action:
foreign relations, agriculture, trade, industry, finance, science and technology, and
infrastructure, border and tourist integration. In each area the focus was on pragmatism
and flexibility in order to reactivate the Andean process and to contribute toward defining
the new roads of development of the member countries, "... [and] implied the eventual
modification of the economic integration program..." (INTAL, 1985 126).
Based on this Plan, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations

33"When at the beginning of the eighties it became clearly evident that actions relations to the
Agreement had come to a stand still and that there was even retrogression in past achievements, the Andean
countries began to put forward new proposals to overcome the situation" (Mairal, 1989: 95).
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prepared a declaration which was approved during the Andean summit by the presidents
in late July 1983, "For Us, the Homeland is Latin America" (Para Nosotros la Patria
es America).
The Presidents’ Declaration and the Plan, however, failed to revitalize the process
due mainly to the deepening economic crisis in the Andean countries (ECLA, 1992: 26;
JUNAC, 1984b: 1; Camacho, 1984: 18). Both were adopted in 1983, the only year when
the Andean nations recorded collectively and individually (with the exception of
Colombia) a negative growth in their gross domestic products. It was -4.5 for the Andean
Group, -12.3 for Peru, -6.5 for Bolivia, -5.6 for Venezuela, -2.8 for Ecuador, and 1.6
for Colombia (see table VI.7). The economic crisis increased the violations.34 Again,
the contradiction between support at the highest political level and of violations went
hand-in-hand.
This glaring failure, at the highest political level, reconfirmed the fact that politics
and economics are intertwined, that political wishes should be based on economic
realities, and that economic changes are determined by political decisions. This
unsuccessful attempt to revitalize the process based on the existing agreement led to more
resolute suggestions for a new protocol (Carmona, 1984a: 37), in which the principles
and mechanisms of the Andean model would be redefined based on the premise "that the
Andean Pact always was more a political than an economic initiative ..." (Valdes, 1984:
66).

MIn this phase of regression the number of decisions not incorporated by the member countries were,
on average, equal to the highest number recorded for the previous phase (see tables V.6 and VI.3), trade
claims (table VI.4) rose to more than a hundred in 1983, and continued to rise in 1984; and the number
of items violated (table VI.5) rose almost continuously in this phase having a sharp increase from 1983 on.
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TABLE VI.7
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1978-1987 (RATES OF GROWTH)
Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

Venezuela

GRAN

1978

3.4

6.2

6.6

0.3

2.1

3.9

1979

1.8

4.3

5.3

5.8

1.3

3.0

1980

0.2

5.5

4.9

4.5

-2.0

1.7

1981

0.9

2.9

3.9

4.4

1982

-4.4

0.5

1.2

0.2

0.7

0.4

1983

-6.5

1.8

-2.8

-12.3

-5.6

-4.5

1984

-0.3

2.9

4.2

4.8

-1.4

1.4

1985

-0.1

2.9

4.3

2.4

1.3

2.2

1986

-2.9

4.9

3.1

9.5

6.8

6.0

1987

2.1

6.0

-5.5

7.8

3.0

3.8

t
o

Bolivia

1.8

SOURCES: 1978-1979: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela: Programa de
Armonizacion de Cuentas Nacionales (Decision 114); Unidad de
Informatica - JUNAC; Andean Group: calculated by the author with data
from IDB, cl983: 351.
1980-1987: JUNAC, 1990c: 95-106.

In March 1984, the Commission requested the Junta to prepare a draft of a new
protocol. It was presented to the Commission in June 1984.35 The discussions of the
draft made clear that the governments wanted a more pragmatic Andean Pact "even
though ... [it] might mean, ... a significant retreat in terms of the actual scope of the
Andean process (INTAL, 1985: 74). In December of that year, the Commission asked
the Junta to present a new proposal with the accords it had reached. In February 1985,

“ For a comprehensive summary of this draft see INTAL, 1985: 127-146.
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the Junta fulfilled this request.
Based on the previous documents, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs in its meeting of September 1985, in Cartagena, Colombia, agreed on the
political guidelines to reform the Cartagena Agreement. The Commission concentrated
on negotiating the new changes of the agreement between the last quarter of 1985 and
May 1987. In May 11, 1987,36 the Commission approved Decision 217: a proposal to
adopt a protocol to modify the Cartagena Agreement, and signed it the following day in
Quito, Ecuador.
The Quito Protocol (JUNAC, 1987c)37 made the Andean Tribunal and the
Parliament principal organs of the Cartagena Agreement. The Protocol, however, did not
incorporate the Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations as an organ of the agreement
because the Ministers wanted to remain outside of and above the Andean process.
Member countries acquired the right to make proposals, which until that time had been
monopolized by the Junta.
Policy harmonization and planning coordination were formally retained, but no
deadlines were set. The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development were replaced by

“ Attempts by the Commission to deal with the increasing problems in the Andean process began in
earnest in the last quarter of 1981. The Commission devoted several of its meetings analyzing the
mechanisms, programs and activities, and to find ad-hoc and long-term solutions. Among these meetings
were: XXXth. extraordinary session; XXXVth. ordinary session; XXXVIth. ordinary session; XXXVIIIth.
extraordinary session; XXXIth. extraordinary session; and XXXVIIth. ordinary session (Comision, 1981:
3-11; 1983: 4-14; 1983a: 3-18; 1983b: 6-9; 1983c: 5; 1983d: 4). From the first meeting of 1984, the
Commission’s discussions dealt with the new protocol, the issues and the wording. During this time, in
each of the sessions of the Commission, the main item of the agenda was some aspects of the future
protocol (Comision, 1984: 3-8; 1984a: 3-4, Anexo III; 1984b: 2-3, Anexo II and Anexo III; 1985: 3-4;
1985a: 2-8, Anexo I, and Anexo II; 1986: 3-6; 1986a: 4-6; 1986b: 2-7; 1987).
’’For a detailed summary of the changes brought to the Cartagena Agreement by the Quito Protocol
see: Salazar, 1987; Carmona, 1988; Mairal, 1989: 97-109.
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three modes of programming: Industrial Integration Programs, Industrial Complementary
Agreements, and Industrial Integration Projects.38
Bolivia and Ecuador were to begin their tariff reduction program process in
December of 1988. Colombia, Peru and Venezuela could maintain their unilateral lists
of exceptions to the tariff reduction program until 1993, and then gradually reduce them
until 1995. After 1995, these 3 countries could exempt sine die up to 75 items each.
Bolivia and Ecuador would reduce their lists between 1997 and 1999, and could maintain
sine die up to 180 items each. The list of products reserved for industrial programming
could be maintained until 1995, when the tariff reduction program for them would begin.
Two new forms of exemption from the tariff reduction program were created: 1)
unilateral lists of products subject to "administered trade," in which countries could set
import quotas; and 2) a new safeguard clause allowing limits on imports of goods which
could cause problems for domestic production of specific products.
The Quito Protocol established that Bolivia and Ecuador would begin to adopt the
CMET when the Commission decided it. The approval of the common external tariff was
left without a deadline.
The new protocol had a more ambitious agricultural integration program. It
established actions for promoting agricultural trade, and the adoption of a common
development program for this sector in production and technology. Cooperation was to

“ The Industrial Integration Programs were similar to the old Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development. At least four countries had to participate. It could include several sectors, and production
assignation was not mandatory. Industrial Complementary Agreements could be made by two or more
countries. These agreements aimed to promote co-productions, distribution of markets, joint international
trade operations and a more articulated production and entrepreneurial activity. In the Industrial Integration
Projects all members had to participate. Countries were to cooperate to develop new productions in one
or several sectors.
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be increased in technology, natural resources, tourism, services, social development,
border integration, and social communication.
In the same meeting during which the Quito Protocol was adopted (May 1987),
the Commission also approved a package of decisions. The most important one was the
transition program, Decision 225. It set the framework for the Andean process to restore
its vitality, to gradually reduce the violations, to decrease trade restrictions, to oblige the
governments not to impose new restrictions, and to overcome the crisis.
Other decisions were: Decision 220 which made more flexible the common
treatment of foreign investment (see section 2.4). Decisions 221 and 223 abrogating the
Automobile Program and the rules for harmonizing industrial development legislation.
Decision 218 made all decisions automatically part of the domestic legislation, with the
exception of those which modify existing regulations. In the latter cases, the decisions
would be formally incorporated into the national legal system. Finally, Decision 224
approved a joint program to aid Bolivia in transport and communication, and Decision
229 adopted a timetable to eliminate most of the trade restrictions by December 1988.
All these changes signaled the primacy of Andean trade liberalization over the
other mechanisms. The adoption of the common external tariff was postponed sine die.
Industrial programming was left for the future, and its life was extended to 1995, with
much more flexible rules. Finally, the common treatment of foreign investment, was
made less common and more unilateral.
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4.3.- The decisions of the Commission between 1978 and 1987
During this phase of recession, the Commission devoted much of its time to
discuss the Junta’s proposals and to mold them to the changing needs and interests of the
member countries so that the Andean Group could again become a useful instrument for
the member countries.
Under these circumstances, between 1979 to 1987, the Commission’s output of
decisions per session, anticipated by the hypothesis of this dissertation, was the lowest
in its history. The Commission approved 105 decisions in its 52 sessions, which means
an average of only 2.02 decisions per session, reaching its lowest level in 1985 with 0.7
decisions per session. In the phase of progress (1969-1973) this average was 3.24, and
in the phase of stagnation (1974-1978) it was 2.89 (see table VI.8). No decisions were
made in 13 sessions (a record number). This gives an average of only 2.69 decisions
approved per session in which decisions were adopted. These figures, again, were the
lowest for the entire history of the Andean process.
The number of decisions approved is highly correlated with the situation of the
process. It went up from 5 to 21 between 1978 and 1979. The high output of 1979 was
due to the boost given by the presidential meeting commemorating the 10th anniversary
of the Andean integration process (May 1979). In this meeting the presidents directed the
Commission to approve measures to inject a new dynamism into the process. From then
on until 1983, the Commission’s output dwindled.
In 1983, 25 Decisions were approved in 10 meetings. This increased output by
the Commission was the result of the two presidential meetings of that year. Twenty-one
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TABLE VI.8 - DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1979-1987
69-73

74-78

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1 DECISIONS

79-87
105

2 NEW ISSUES
2.1 Im portant!/
2.2 Unimportant
3 MODIFYING DECS
3.1 Important j /
- Strengthening
- Weakening
3.2 Unimportant
4 SESSIONS
4.1 WITH DECS
- Ordinary
- Extraordinary
4.2 WITHOUT DECS
- Ordinary
- Extraordinary
5. 1/4

3.24

2.89

2.50

2.63

1.71

1.00

2.00

2.50

1.00

0.714

2.33

4.00

2.02

6. 1/4.1

3.68

3.44

2.50

2.63

2.40

1.66

2.00

2.70

4.00

1.25

3.50

5.00

2.69

\J Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress of the principal mechanisms of the Andean process.
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-20; 1982c: Tomo II, 585-594; Tomo III, Tomo IV; Actas de la Comisi6n.
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of the 25 decisions taken were unimportant.39 Out of the four decisions which were
important, two (184 and 185) dealt with new issues (the Statute of the Andean Tribunal
and the program to help Bolivia with its transport and communications problems caused
by its landlocked geographical situation); and two (Decisions 181 and 189) modified
previous decisions weakening the process (the first postponed deadlines set in Decision
120 which approved the Automobile Program; the second made more flexible the
common treatment of foreign investment).
From 1984 to 1986, the Commission’s output was very low, only 4 decisions in
1984,40 5 in 1985, and 7 in 1986, most of these decisions being just of an administrative
nature, like approving budgets, and naming members of the Junta. It was in these three
years during which both the Commission and the Junta devoted their efforts to the
modifications of the Cartagena Agreement.
With the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, the Commission’s production
of decisions increased. In the session in which the Protocol was adopted, 11 decisions
were approved; all of them were important for the process. In the December meeting the
Commission approved 7 more decisions, of which 4 were important.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that during this phase of regression of the
process the activity of the Commission, as indicated by the number of decisions adopted,
diminished to its lowest levels ever. This is another important element showing the

39For example the Entrepreneurial and Labor Consultative Councils, the Councils on Industrial Policy,
on Science and Technology were created by decisions 176, 177, 178 and 178 respectively but nothing of
consequence came from them. Decisions 191 and 199 approved the budgets of the Andean Tribunal and
of the Junta. And Decisions 192 through 197 approved several aspects of cooperation in agriculture.
“ "During 1984 the Commission .... met only four times and approved only four decisions, ... none
of them of any great significance ..." (INTAL, 1985: 77).
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situation of crisis and regression of the Andean Group.

4.4.- Changes in the strategies of development, and the regression of the Andean
process
As in chapters IV and V, the relevant aspects of the strategies of development of
the member countries expressed in their development plans will be contrasted here with
the three principles of the Cartagena Agreement presented in section 5.1 of chapter III.
These principles are: primacy of the government in the integration process, a more
efficient import substitution, and the subsidiary role of foreign investment. If the
principles of the Cartagena Agreement were not useful to attain the relevant aims of the
long-term development plans, short-term emergency plans, structural adjustments, and
economic stabilization programs of the majority of the Andean countries, then the phase
of regression has a plausible explanation.
The hypothesis of this study leads us to the following explanation: the original
aims of the Andean Pact did not reflect the current interests of the majority of the
member countries. As in the previous chapters, countries are loosely grouped according
to the similarity of their levels of development (industrialization), and economic policies.
Colombia is analyzed alone, Peru with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador.

a) Colombia
This country continued to move towards an export promotion strategy of
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development.41 Some development plans were aimed to correct imbalances created by
external turmoil and others to provide guidelines for long-term development. The 19831986 plan is an example of the former. Its basic objective was the reactivation of the
economy in the short-run (IDB, cl985: 263). A plan setting long-term guidelines was the
1978-1982 plan. Among other things, it encouraged foreign investment especially for the
exploration and exploitation of energy resources, in mining and in industry, and to
increase industrial efficiency (ECLA, 1981: 137; IDB, cl980: 214). In this plan the role
of the state was reduced to maintain an economic environment favorable for investment"
(Iguinez, 1983: 19, 23; JUNAC, 1991a: 74).
Colombia’s long-term plan to shift to an export-oriented model, was thus
indifferent to the primacy of the state, and not supportive of import substitution
industrialization, and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment.

b) Peru and Venezuela
Peru had plans aiming at both to deal with the imbalances, and to set new long
term bases for development. From 1978 to 1983 the country moved towards trade
liberalization demanded by the IMF as a condition for rescheduling its external debt. The
last Economic Program (1978-1980) of the Peruvian military government, "involved
reducing fiscal deficits ...; pursuing the policy of mini-devaluations ...; reducing the
level of effective protection for industry; liberalizing imports and external payments in
general; restricting public indebtedness; ... as well as pursuing a cautious wage policy"

41"With time, ... the Colombian export-oriented model became ... more incompatible with the import
substitution and proindustry bias of the Andean Group ..." (Urrutia, 1981: 193).
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(ECLA, 1981: 440, 448).
The civilian government, which took power in July 1980, moved more rapidly
towards economic liberalism until 1983. It aimed to stimulate the efficiency and
competitiveness of domestic production and to control the main financial imbalances
through the liberalization of imports, the introduction of market mechanisms, the greater
role to private sector. The role of the state was to be limited to setting policy and
regulating market forces (IDB, cl982: 355; ECLA, 1982: 449; 1983 : 659; JUNAC,
1991a: 76). By 1983 with the collapse of the prices of the major Peruvian exports
coupled with torrential rain in the north of the country and drought in the south, the
government had to apply recessionary policies which expanded its intervention in the
economy, and increased trade restrictions.
From 1985 to 1987, the second elected government, which took office in 1985,
moved in the opposite direction. The economy was to be stimulated through government
intervention in the economy, by protecting domestic production, and by reducing the role
of foreign investment (Iguinez, 1990: 15; JUNAC, 1991a: 76).
In brief, Peru moved—between 1978 and 1983—from a process of outward
oriented strategy of development to an inward orientation after 1983. The government
of Peru was between 1979 and 1983, not supportive of the primacy of the state, of
import substitution, and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment. From 1984 to the
end of this phase of regression, the government’s interests coincided with the principles
of the Cartagena Agreement.
The principal objectives of Venezuela’s VI and VII Development Plans (1981-
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1985 and 1986-1989), were, among others: (a) to increase productive capacity through
government investment in such basic sectors of the economy as petroleum, aluminum,
iron, and petrochemicals; (b) to stimulate domestic and foreign private investment; (c)
to increase the efficiency of the productive sectors and of public finance; and (d) to
search for economic and financial equilibria. The aim of the investment strategy was to
invigorate the import substitution, and the diversification of exports (IDB, cl982: 387).
In both plans tariffs on consumer goods were to be reduced, foreign trade was to be
selectively liberalized, and the role of the state and of public investment were very
important (JUNAC, 1991a: 77).
From these plans, it is clear that the Venezuelan government was supportive of
the primacy of the state, and of import substitution, but it was not supportive of the
subsidiary role of foreign investment.

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
Bolivia, being the weakest of the five members, and subject to more economic,
social and political instability than the others, went into important changes between 1981
and 1985. The Three Year Plan promulgated in October 1981 was the first attempt to
apply neo-liberal policies in the country. It "aimed at establishing a new economic
development, political and social model characterized ... by ... the elimination of
subsidies and artificial prices, the attraction of foreign capital, a more realistic exchange
policy based on the market forces, and the participation of the private sector in state
enterprises" (ECLA, 1983: 145).
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In August 1985, the new government, adopted an outward oriented strategy of
development. It aimed to increase the importance of the market’s role as a mechanism
of resource allocation, while simultaneously reducing the participation of the state in
economic activities (ECLA, 1987a: 101); to encourage the participation of the domestic
and foreign private sector in the economy (IDB, cl987: 215), and to increase efficiency
of domestic production.
From 1981 on, the principles of the Cartagena Agreement did not reflect the
relevant interests of Bolivia. This country was not supportive of the primacy of the state,
of import substitution and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment.
The National Development Plan, 1980-1984 of Ecuador pointed to, among other
things, more participation of the state in productive activities, but at the same time to
further participation of foreign investment (IDB, cl982: 245; cl980: 247; JUNAC,
1991a: 75). In 1982 Ecuador adopted measures which amounted to the adoption of a new
strategy of development whose purposes were, among others, to give more importance
to market mechanisms and to produce goods in which the country has comparative
advantages (IDB, cl984: 214).
The new government, which took office in August 1984, moved towards a more
neo-liberal strategy of development to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources
through decontrolling the economy and increasing the participation of the private sector
in economic activity (IDB, cl988: 288), and reducing the participation of the state in the
economy (JUNAC, 1991a: 75).
In short, Ecuador during this phase of regression moved towards a strategy of
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development which was indifferent to the primacy of the state, and not supportive of
either import substitution or the subsidiary role of foreign investment.
In summary the member countries’ were mostly not supportive of the principles
of the Cartagena Agreement (see table VI.9). The two smallest members were not
supportive of the Andean aims, Bolivia being more dissatisfied than Ecuador.

TABLE VI.9
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN 1987
ANDEAN AIMS

BO

CO

EC

PE

VE

TOTAL

Primacy of government

N

I

I

S

S

2S 21 IN

Import substitution industrialization

N

N

N

S

S

2S

3N

Subsidiary role of foreign investment

N

N

N

S

N

IS

4N

5S 21 8N
S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

N = Not supportive

Of the three largest members, only Peru had, by 1987, an economic orientation
with aims similar to the principal objectives of the Andean Pact. This was mostly due to
the conffontationalist stance chosen by the government of the time with the international
banking establishment regarding the non-payment of the external debt. Venezuela, for its
part, was still committed to import substitution and to government intervention in the
economy, but with the economic crisis it began to seek a greater role for foreign capital.
Colombia, like Bolivia and Ecuador, was not supportive of the goals of the Cartagena
Agreement due to Colombia’s gradual shift to export-oriented industrialization.
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Two countries supported, two were indifferent and one did not support the
principle of the primacy of the state. Three of the five did not support import
substitution, and four of the five were not supportive of the subsidiary role of foreign
investment.

4.5.- Economic policies of the member countries and the Andean mechanisms during
the phase of regression
Comparing the relevant economic policies applied by the governments of the
member countries to the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, as
anticipated by the research hypothesis for this phase, the loss of support for the Andean
process can be substantiated. The four main mechanisms of the Andean Group, as
defined in chapter HI, section 5.2, are: Tariff reduction program, Common External
Tariff, Industrial Programming, and Common Treatment of Foreign Investment. In this
phase of regression almost no correlation should be expected between these four basic
mechanisms and the economic policies pursued by the governments.
The dramatic changes of the economic policies of the member countries affected
all four mechanisms. Attempts to approve a CET were abandoned due to the crisis which
began with the application of restrictions to intra-Andean trade. A deeper motive was the
need of the members to have complete freedom to use their foreign trade instruments to
cope with the looming economic problems from 1982 on. Therefore, this mechanism will
not be specifically considered here. Suffice it to reiterate that with the continuous changes
by the member countries in tariff rates and in import controls, as well as with changes

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill

in the exchange rates and the foreign exchange system,42 it was meaningless for the
community organs and the governments to try to adopt a common external tariff. All the
member countries were unwilling to adopt the CET, and for this reason they were not
supportive of this mechanism.

a) Colombia
a .l) The tariff reduction program .- Exports to the Andean partners decreased in 1980,
and 1982-1984, reaching in 1983 its record low of 60 percent (see table VI. 10).
Colombian imports from the Andean Group diminished in 1982 and 1984-1987. Trade
balance with the rest of the Andean countries was negative between 1981 and 1985, as
well as with the rest of the world, which led the Colombian government to apply a
restrictive import policy mostly to non-Andean trade.43 Colombia, however, continued

“ Governments used, at different times, a variety of devices single, multiple, fixed, floating exchange
rates or any combination of them. They actively intervened in the market by setting the price of the dollar,
by officially monopolizing its selling and buying, by auctioning dollars; by assigning a quota to be used
by different economic sectors, for a period of time, and by setting priorities.
■
“ Colombian trade policies changed in response to external changes. Whenever there was an increase
in foreign exchange, imports were gradually liberalized, so the additional exchange would not fuel inflation
and create more disequilibria in the economy. This happened from 1975 to June 1980, due to the increase
in the price of coffee; and in 1986, again due to increases in the price of coffee, and also to the growth
of oil and coal exports. The main policy changes were: decreasing the number of items subject to prior
import license, or subject to import prohibition; reducing the tariff rates, especially on capital and
intermediate goods; simplifying custom formalities; increasing the amount of foreign exchange to be
allocated for imports; and devaluations at a slower rate than domestic inflation (ECLA, 1981: 149-150;
1982: 149, 150; 1989: 173; 1989a: 183; IDB, 1988: 378-379).
When foreign exchange was unexpectedly low, imports were restricted and exports promoted. This
was what happened from the mid-1980 to 1985. In these years the government pursued policies opposite
to the ones mentioned above. It also increased the support to exports, by financing working capital and
exports; providing more tax credit certificates; covering the premiums on commercial, political and
extraordinary risks in respect of exports; and providing assistance to exporting enterprises in areas related
to the production, packing, wrapping, marketing and transport of merchandise (ECLA, 1982: 137, 148;
1983: 217; 1985: 194; IDB, cl985: 263; cl986: 229; cl987: 238; cl988: 265).
Changes in trade policy were also affected by the fluctuations in income from drug traffic. From
1975 foreign exchange from drugs increased steadily to reach $2.5 billion in 1982. From then on it
decreased to a "mere" $885 million in 1985 (Thorp, 182-183). Raising income in the first period and its
posterior decrease forced the changes in policies to be more severe.
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TABLE VI. 10
COLOM BIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

|

1986

|

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

304,224

417,685

387,888

456,668

452,909

181,870

168,593

217,975

281,338

404,980

World

3,002,691

3,300,443

3,945,048

2,956,400

3,094,967

3,080,893

3,483,140

3,551,886

5,107,936

5,024,423

554,672

433,447

248,734

227,874

3,852,085

4,227,978

IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

227,951

257,304

378,883

607,683

603,022

620,325

World

2,836,315

3,233,194

4,662,604

5,199,156

5,477,701

4,968,080

4,492,392

4,130,686

TRADE BALANCE (1'housands of dollars)
GRAN

76,273

160,381

9,005

(151,015)

(150,113)

(438,455)

(386,079)

(215,472)

32,604

177,106

World

166,376

67,249

(717,556)

(2,242,756)

(2,382,734)

(1,887,187)

(1,009,252)

(578,800)

1,255,851

796,445

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

10.13

12.66

9.83

15.45

14.63

5.90

4.84

6.14

5.51

8.06

Imports

8.04

7.96

8.13

11.69

11.01

12.49

12.35

10.49

6.46

5.39

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

1.80

37.30

-7.13

17.73

-0.82

-59.84

-7.30

29.29

29.07

43.95

World

22.90

9.92

19.53

-25.06

4.69

-0.45

13.06

1.97

43.81

-1.63

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

33.60

12.88

47.25

60.39

-0.77

2.87

-10.58

-21.86

-42.61

-8.39

World

39.84

13.99

44.21

11.51

5.36

-9.30

-9.57

-8.05

-6.74

9.76

SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistem a Subregional de Informacidn Estadfstica, Decisi6n 115, and author’s calculations.
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backing this mechanism because this country was promoting exports rather than aiming
for import substitution.44 As shown in table VI.6, Colombia had only 3 percent of its
intra-Andean trade under restrictions in 1985, while Peru had 40 percent and Venezuela
34 percent.

a.2) Industrial programming.- The Colombian government did not support this
mechanism during this phase. Only the already approved industrial programs were
accepted because they related to "areas where state intervention is strong ... [but] in all
other areas, ... one would ... expect Colombia to be reluctant to allow progress in the
industrial programming effort" (Urrutia, 1981: 193). It is not by chance that no other
industrial programs were approved after the Automobile Program.

a.3) Decision 24.- With regard to foreign investments, the 1978-1982 administration
welcomed foreign capital to finance huge investment for the development of coal and
oil;45 and "for the execution of industrial projects related to chemicals ..., petroleum
and coal derivatives, and the rubber and plastic industries" (ECLA, 1982: 150). More
importantly, 1987 "saw important changes in the foreign investment requirements; these
... created more flexible procedures governing remittances of profits abroad, the
reinvestment and capitalization of profits and the time limit for forming mixed enterprises"

**”... Colombia was the only Andean country, during the 1980s, with a comprehensive export
promotion program for manufactured goods" (JUNAC, 1991a: 71).
■“Foreign capital went into Colombia in increasing amounts until 1987 when the coal and petroleum
projects were completed (ECLA, 1989a: 184).
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(IDB, 1988: 379). In other words, although Colombia was not supportive of Decision 24
on the common treatment of foreign investment, the government promoted its
modification in the Commission and, only then, implemented the changes.
In short, Colombia was supportive of the tariff reduction program, but it was not
supportive of the other three mechanisms: the CET, the SPIDs and the common regime
of foreign investment.

b) Peru and Venezuela
b.I) The tariff reduction program .- Trade policy between 1978 and 1983 aimed to
increase competition in the domestic market, and augment the availability of foreign
goods through import liberalization and the reduction of import tariffs (ECLA, 1982:
459, 463; 1983: 671; 1985: 579). As a result of these changes the margin of preference
for Andean imports was reduced, and Peruvian imports from the other Andean members
as a percentage of total imports decreased from 1978 to 1983 (see table VI. 11).
From 1983 this policy was reversed. Tariffs were increased, some imports were
prohibited, the import license was reintroduced, exchange controls were enacted, and
multiple exchange rates were imposed (ECLA, 1986a: 543; 1989a: 569; IDB, cl987:
349; 1988: 491). Most of these restrictions were not applied to the Andean partners,
thereby increasing the margin of preference their products enjoyed in the Peruvian
market creating trade deficits for Peru with its Andean partners in both 1986 and 1987.
Therefore, by 1987, can be said that Peru was not supportive of the tariff reduction
program.
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TABLE VI. 11
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

J

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dol lars)
GRAN

138,154

320,915

308,126

242,613

238,957

112,926

186,793

249,801

145,784

157,025

World

1,819,622

3,363,841

3,700,054

2,818,825

2,890,612

2,577,361

2,787,659

3,058,212

2,359,077

2,476,898

IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dot ars)
GRAN

87,170

59,589

107,836

140,904

109,317

68,944

74,843

85,291

166,495

242,162

World

1,463,975

1,737,172

2,879,778

4,017,848

3,296,280

2,254,034

1,988,058

1,730,561

2,431,070

3,247,314

101,709

129,640

43,982

111,950

164,510

(20,711)

(85,137)

(405,668)

323,327

799,601

1,327,651

(71,993)

(770,416)

TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

50,984

261,326

200,290

World

355,647

1,626,669

820,276

(1,199,023)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

7.59

9.54

8.33

8.61

8.27

4.38

6.70

8.17

6.18

6.34

Imports

5.95

3.43

3.74

3.51

3.32

3.06

3.76

4.93

6.85

7.46

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

90.92

132.29

-3.99

-21.26

-1.51

-52.74

65.41

33.73

-41.64

7.71

World

9.24

84.86

9.99

-23.82

2.55

-10.84

8.16

9.71

-22.86

4.99

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

-78.68

-31.64

80.97

30.67

-22.42

-36.93

8.56

13.96

95.21

45.45

World

-23.67

18.66

65.77

39.52

-17.96

-31.62

-11.80

-12.95

40.48

33.58

SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistem a Subregional de lnform aci6n Estadistica, Decisi6n 115, and author's calculations.
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By the end of the 1970s Venezuela liberalized its trade by lowering its tariffs in
order to strengthen competition and efficiency (ECLA, 1982: 532). Due to the external
disequilibrium,46 this policy was reversed and imports were increasingly restricted and
controlled from 1982 on.47 These restrictions were also applied to imports from the
Andean area. As is shown in table VI. 12 Venezuelan imports from the subregion
decreased in 1980, 1983, 1985 and 1986, while exports did so in 1978, 1982, 1985 and
1986. Between 1983 and 1987 the balance of trade with the Andean area was positive,
thanks to these indiscriminate restrictions, while before, thanks to better times for the
Venezuelan economy, it ran deficits. Thus, Venezuela during this phase was not
supportive of the tariff reduction program.

b.2) Industrial programming.- As part of the conditions imposed by the IMF to deal
with its balance of payments problem, Peru had to reduce protection to industry Peru
between 1978 and 1983.48 In April 1982 a new General Law on Industries was

wIn 1982 the current account showed a negative balance of approximately $3.5 billion, and a loss of
$7 billion in the country’s international reserves was recorded (ECLA, 1984: 633). In the following year,
there was a net outflow of long-term capital, the first since 1974. The amortization payments for 1983 were
equivalent to 95 percent of total expons, forcing the government to ask for moratoria (ECLA, 1985: 670,
674-675; 1986a: 601; 1989: 705).
The single fixed exchange rate in place for 18 years, was replaced in 1983 by a multiple exchange
rate with three rates. The bolivar was devalued, on average, by 16 percent in that year, in 1984 by 30
percent, in 1985 by 9 percent, in 1986 the bolivar was devalued by 50 percent, and in 1987 by 60 percent
(ECLA, 1985: 664-665; 1986a: 589; JUNAC, 1990c: 128).
47Customs tariffs were increased, the list of prohibited imports was expanded, import quotas were
established, and prior licenses were introduced (IDB, cl985a: 406; ECLA, 1984: 649-650; 1985: 669).
wIn March 1979, the National Register of Manufactures (a protective mechanism which prohibited
imports of goods similar to those manufactured in the country and which was one of the main protective
mechanisms in the 1970s), was abolished and replaced by a list of imports prohibited up to 1980. In
December 1979, the new custom tariffs came into force. It had the express purpose of improving the
efficiency of domestic industry and forcing prices down by reducing effective rates of protection to 90
percent or less (ECLA, 1981: 450).
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TABLE VI. 12
VEN EZU ELA : ANDEAN TRAD E 1978-1987

1978

1979

|

1980

J

1981

1982 •

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

121,059

202,233

303,006

354,798

298,845

301,968

322,015

238,885

160,946

215,076

World

9,177,638

14,176,739

19,051,709

20,099,221

16,347,774

14,495,106

15,919,720

14,377,444

8,664,150

10,538,726

IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

246,302

315,197

303,717

357,460

401,504

143,883

187,436

185,207

157,228

199,845

World

12,195,073

11,051,271

12,249,979

13,560,999

13,396,956

6,653,492

8,058,228

8,399,112

8,594,399

9,765,288

(2,662)

(102,659)

158,085

134,579

53,678

3,718

15,231

7,841,614

7,861,492

5,978,332

69,751

773,438

TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dol ars)
GRAN

(125,243)

World

(3,017,435)

(112,964)
3,125,468

(711)
6,801,730

6,538,222

2,950,818

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL T RADE
Exports

1.32

1.43

1.59

1.77

1.83

2.08

2.02

1.66

1.86

2.04

Imports

2.02

2.85

2.48

2.64

3.00

2.16

2.33

2.21

1.83

2.05

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

-54.10

67.05

49.83

17.09

-15.77

1.05

6.64

-25.82

-32.63

33.63

World

-3.67

54.47

34.39

5.50

-18.66

-11.33

9.83

-9.69

-39.74

21.64

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

24.32

27.97

-3.64

17.70

12.32

-64.16

30.27

-1.19

-15.11

27.11

World

8.64

-9.38

10.85

10.70

-1.21

-50.34

21.11

4.23

2.33

13.62

SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de lnform aci6n Estadlstica, Decisidn 115, and author’s calculations.
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promulgated. Its main characteristics were trade openness and competitiveness. The role
of the state was limited to planning, setting standards, and promoting national industry
(ECLA, 1984: 563). The changes in industrial policy in Peru from 1978 to 1985 meant
that the Andean industrial programming lost support of the government. Between 1985
and 1990, the second civilian government, immersed in widespread mismanagement and
in growing debt problems, was indifferent to this mechanism.
Industrial programming was supported by Venezuela until the mid-1980s. For
example, in order to take better advantage of the Petrochemical Program, in 1979, the
Venezuelan petrochemical industry was attached to the petroleum state company,
Petroleos de Venezuela S./4. (IDB, cl980: 392). Earnest attempts were also made to
implement the Automobile Program. In 1979, agreements in this sector were reached
with Bolivia, Peru and Colombia (ECLA, 1981: 523).

b.3) Decision 24.- With regard to the common treatment of foreign investment, the
government which took power in Peru in 1980 adopted incentives for domestic and
foreign private investment in oil and mining through new laws in these areas enacted in
1980 and 1981 respectively (ECLA, 1983: 659, 668, 679). During the second civilian
government, Decision 24 was kept in place even after Decision 220 (which made the
common treatment of foreign investment more flexible), was approved by the
Commission (Iguinez, 1990: 124). This was, however, a support by default since there
was a "lack of a clearly defined policy regarding foreign investment" (EIU, 1990d: 37).
Due to the increasing balance of payments deficits, the Venezuelan support for
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the common treatment of foreign investment began to wane in 1983. In 1986 legal
provisions inhibiting or deterring direct foreign investment were amended (IDB, cl988:
411). This country, by the end of the phase of regression, was not supportive of Decision
24.
In brief, by 1987, Peru and Venezuela were not supportive of the tariff reduction
program, or the CET, and indifferent to industrial programming. Peru was supportive
of the common treatment of foreign investment, but Venezuela was not.

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c .l) The tariff reduction program.- For Bolivia and Ecuador Andean the tariff
reduction program became less important than before. Even though they had not opened
their markets to the other members, intra-Andean trade was becoming more and more
onerous. Bolivia had increasing deficits with the rest of its Andean partners between 1977
and 1979, and in 1984 and 1985 (see chapter V, table V.13; and table VI. 13), due to its
overvalued peso.
Ecuador’s exports diminished in 6 of the 10 years of this phase of regression and
as a result the balance of trade with the Andean Group was negative from 1984 to 1987
(see table VI. 14) Ecuadorean trade policies also changed in response to international
influences.49 As a result, Ecuador remained basically indifferent to this mechanism.

49Changes in the price of oil, bananas and coffee were determinant for introducing restrictive or
expansive import regulations. From 1980 to 1983 prior deposits for import were raised; tariffs on luxury
items were raised, and imports restricted or prohibited (ECLA, 1982: 243; 1983; 380; 1984: 321; 1985:
311-313;). From 1984 on, the new government liberalized trade. Import prohibitions were eliminated, some
import duties, especially on intermediate goods, were reduced ((ECLA, 1986a: 297; 1987a: 301, 1989:
311; IDB, C1986: 253).
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TABLE VI. 13
BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987

1978

1979

1980

1981

|

1982

|

1983

1984

|

1985

1986

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

15,954

22,102

42,595

44,514

34,232

23,817

15,634

16,853

24,250

30,711

725,274

855,998

1,037,185

983,968

898,531

817,954

781,508

672,766

640,338

569,793

IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dol lars)
GRAN
WORLD

26,021

51,211

30,111

33,689

19,338

21,749

27,755

27,544

17,385

15,351

1 769,482

841,544

665,393

917,081

554,135

576,746

488,477

690,867

674,033

766,296

12,484

10,825

14,894

2,068

(12,121)

(10,691)

6,865

15,360

371,792

66,887

344,396

241,208

293,031

(18,101)

(33,695)

TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

(10,067)

(29,109)

WORLD

(44,208)

14,454

(196,503)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

2.20

2.58

4.11

4.52

3.81

2.91

2.00

2.51

3.79

5.39

IMPORTS

3.38

6.09

4.53

3.67

3.49

3.77

5.68

3.99

2.58

2.00

RATE OF GROWTH 0 F EXPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

1.76

18.02

21.17

-5.13

-8.68

-30.42

-34.36

7.80

43.89

26.64

41.41

96.81

-41.20

11.88

-42.60

-8.97

-4.46

-13.91

-4.82

-11.02

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

41.45

38.54

92.72

4.51

-23.10

12.47

27.62

-0.76

-36.88

-11.70

WORLD

31.25

9.37

-20.93

37.83

-39.58

4.08

-15.30

41.43

-2.44

13.69

SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistem a Subregional de Informacidn Estadlstica, Decisidn 115, and author’s calculations.
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TABLE VI. 14
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRAD E 1979-1987

1978

1979

1980

J

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousatids of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

102,296

103,288

147,248

139,106

158,459

131,999

56,416

73,767

42,929

125,061

1,557,491

2,104,233

2,480,804

2,167,975

2,237,416

2,225,646

2,561,944

2,904,736

2,185,849

1,927,694

IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN
WORLD

74,612

97,281

139,201

107,607

117,596

69,203

76,749

82,288

91,128

309,708

1,505,056

1,599,714

2,253,305

1,920,617

2,424,457

1,474,625

1,629,953

1,766,724

1,810,224

2,158,136

(8,521)

(48,199)

(184,647)

375,625

(230,442)

TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN

27,684

6,007

8,047

31,499

40,863

62,796

(20,333)

WORLD

52,435

504,519

227,499

247,358

(187,041)

751,021

931,991

1,138,012

1NTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS

6.57

4.91

5.94

6.42

7.08

5.93

2.20

2.54

1.96

6.49

IMPORTS

4.96

6.08

6.18

5.60

4.85

4.69

4.71

4.66

5.03

14.35

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN
WORLD

-42.66

0.97

42.56

-5.53

13.91

-16.70

-57.26

30.76

-41.80

191.32

8.44

35.10

17.90

-12.61

3.20

-0.53

15.11

13.38

-24.75

-11.81

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

23.30

30.38

43.09

-22.70

9.28

-41.15

10.90

7.22

10.74

239.86

WORLD

26.63

6.29

40.86

-14.76

26.23

-39.18

10.53

8.39

2.46

19.22

SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistem a Subregional de Informacidn Estadistica, Decisidn 115, and author’s calculations.
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c.2) Industrial programming.- At the beginning of the phase of regression, industrial
programming was still producing some benefits for Bolivia and Ecuador. In Bolivia in
1979, "the manufacture of metal products ... increased by 6% as the result of the
installation of various industries, under the auspices of the Andean Group’s allocations
of fields of production, for the manufacture of tools and compressors and the assembly
of motorcycles and motor-vehicles" (ECLA, 1981: 101). Over time, the manufacturing
sector suffered serious decay due to the structural adjustment programs, and the
recessionary short-term policies derived from them. In 1985, new policies focused on
export-oriented industrialization. The result was that industrial programming lost
government support. From 1985 on, the new economic policy left the industrial sector
subject to the free market (JUNAC, 1991a: 78).
Ecuador continued to implement the sectoral programs. This interest, however,
was short-lived. The authorities decided, in 1983, to begin to gradually eliminate
subsidies to industry and the customs protection regime (IDB, cl983: 243; ECLA, 1986:
263). With the new government in office, changes were more comprehensive from 1984
on. They aimed toward "a progressive withdrawal from the decades-old protectionist
framework of manufacturing ... " (ECLA, 1987a: 297), to improve production
efficiency, and to export manufactured goods (IDB, cl986: 253).

c.3) Decision 24.- Between 1974 and 1982 foreign direct investment in Bolivia did not
play a major role. Some of the reasons were the country’s institutional problems, the
small size of the domestic market, transport and marketing difficulties, and the lack of
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progress with respect to regional integration programs (ECLA, 1984: 124). In 1982 a
new investment law was decreed. It promoted industries with a high degree of import
contents (JUNAC, 1991a: 74). During the 1980s, Bolivia was supportive of either
making the Andean common code more flexible, or of eliminating it. Therefore, this
country was not supportive of this mechanism.
Ecuador began encouraging foreign investment from 1982 on, especially in the
hydrocarbon and mining sectors.50 Decision 24 was suspended in 1985. Any foreign
enterprise in the country that exported more than 80 percent of its production was not
required to become a mixed or national enterprise. In addition, the ceiling on the
remittance of profits was eliminated (ECLA, 1986a: 293; IDB, cl987: 263, Hey, 1995:
204-209).
To restate, Bolivia and Ecuador were indifferent to the tariff reduction program,
and not supportive of the CET, industrial programming, and the common treatment of
foreign investment.

d) Conclusion
Table VI. 15 shows the summary positions, by 1987, of the member countries with
regard to the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement. The general conclusion
is that the member countries were not supportive of the most important Andean
mechanisms. In this sense, both the phase of regression and the deep changes in the

“ In that year, amendments were introduced into legislation to encourage foreign contractors to
participate in the exploration and development of new oil fields (IDB, cl984: 215; ECLA, 1984: 315). In
1985 the government amended the mining code to attract a greater flow of private investment, both national
and foreign (ECLA, 1987a: 297-298; 1989: 308; IDB, cl987: 263).
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TABLE VI. 15
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS IN 1987

BO

CO

EC

PE

VE

TOTALS

Tariff reduction program

I

s

I

N

N

IS 21 2N

Common Tariff

N

N

N

N

N

5N

Industrial Programming

N

N

N

I

S

IS 11 3N

Foreign Investment

N

N

N

S

N

IS

MECHANISM

4N

3S 31 14N
S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

N = Not supportive

Cartagena Agreement introduced by the Quito Protocol find an explanation.
Out of the four mechanisms, three were clearly not supported by the member
countries, the CET, industrial programming, and the common treatment of foreign
capital; while the tariff reduction program had relatively more support. This can explain
why Decision 24 on the common treatment of foreign investments was radically
modified, that the CET was maintained in the new Cartagena Agreement but without a
deadline, and that industrial programming was made very flexible. On the other hand,
the tariff reduction program had only its timetable extended. Given this situation, it is
pertinent to ask why the governments did not abandon this enterprise, and instead they
chose to profoundly modify it?
Bolivia and Ecuador although they were not supportive of the aims, or the
mechanisms, did not leave the Andean Group. They remained because being lesser
partners they would lose access to the other markets, as well as the increased political
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clout the pact provided at the international level. Being the least important members,
their withdrawal of the process would not have had much impact on the process.
Colombia had also political reasons to stay. The Andean Pact was viewed as a
tool to manage its "boundary problems with Venezuela," which was "Colombia’s major
foreign policy problem" (Urrutia, 1981: 191-192); and as a medium "... for an active
and permanent international economic policy" (Moreno, 1982: 190).
In the case of Venezuela, the main reason to remain in the process was economic.
Its interest in pursuing import substitution made industrial programming the sole
mechanism Venezuela was in support of. At the same time Venezuela expected that the
CET would not be adopted, and Decision 24 would be changed. All of these factors
provided Venezuela with the necessary incentives to stay in the process.
Finally, Peru being in a chaotic political and economic situation, did not have
time to deal with Andean issues. This country remained in the Andean Pact by default.
The main reason for this lack of support for the principles and mechanisms of the
Cartagena Agreement lies with the changes in the international economic system
(increasing protectionism and recessionary economic policies of the industrialized world).
This in turn forced the Andean governments to began a process of changing and adapting
their policies and eventually their strategies of development. The Andean process, in turn
went to this phase of regression, which eventually led to the changes in the principles and
relative importance of the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
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CHAPTER V n
FROM QUITO TO .... (1987-1995):
RE-ROUTING SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION

1.-

THE

RECENT

EVOLUTION

OF

THE

ANDEAN

SUBREGIONAL

INTEGRATION PROCESS: 1987-1995

The last nine years of the Andean integration process can be periodized in two
phases: a short phase of stagnation, from 1987 to 1989, and a phase of progress, from
1990 to the present (1995). The common thread of these phases is that there were new
principles and the importance of the mechanisms was reordered. These modifications in
fact changed the Andean model and re-routed the process, shifting its orientation from
an industrialization endeavor to a commercial undertaking.
The indicators show stagnation if: (1) trade within the subregion diminishes in one
or two years; (2) implementation of the mechanisms suffers delays; (3) the output of the
Commission is limited, and more focused on modifying existing decisions and on
weakening the process; and (4) violations are more numerous than during the phase of
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progress. Progress is demonstrated, as proposed in this dissertation, by the following
indicators: (1) increasing intra-Andean trade during all years of the phase, (2) the
mechanisms are implemented without major delays; (3) decisions by the Commission are
adopted in a timely manner; and (4) violations are minimal. Sections 2 and 3 analyze
these indicators for the last two phases.
The explanation for the phase of progress, as advanced in the hypothesis, is that
the governments of the member countries find that some of their goals can be achieved
through the Andean Pact. For the phase of stagnation the explanation is that one or more
of the countries do not find their interests reflected in the aims and mechanisms of the
Cartagena Agreement. Section 4 of the present chapter corroborates these ideas.

1.1.- The two phases during the re-routing of the Andean process
The expected revitalization of the Andean Pact did not crystallize after the signing
of the Quito Protocol in May 1987. The reduction of the violations, especially non-tariff
barriers to trade, was far from accomplished by 1989. From 1987 on, intrasubregional
trade, however, began to increase. This fact again proves that results in the Andean
endeavor were much more dependent on the conditions of the member countries and on
governments’ interests, than the process itself.
It is only by the end of 1989 that the Andean Group not only recovered its vitality
but progressed rapidly. Deadlines, between 1989 and 1992, were progressively
shortened, obligations were fulfilled, decisions furthering the process were adopted by
the Commission, and intra-Andean trade grew quickly. Behind these facts were the rapid
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convergence of the economic policies of the Andean countries, and the direct
participation of the presidents in the process through summit meetings.
Over time, the different speeds at which the various governments moved away
from an inward to an outward oriented development strategy created disagreements
among the Andean members. These disagreements were related to key issues, such as
the implementation of the free trade zone, the definition of the common external tariff
(CET), and the scope of policy harmonization. The result was the slow down of the
process from 1992 until this writing (1995).

1.2.- The new Andean model of economic integration
With the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, the Cartagena Agreement
was profoundly modified (see chapter VI, section 4.2), and through the accords of the
Andean presidents, the member countries showed what these changes meant. Based on
both the Quito Protocol and the actions of governments, the new aims and the reordering
of the importance of the mechanisms can be discerned.
The Quito Protocol, continued to assign the Andean Group the role of "a tool to
contribute to the economic development of the subregion" (Marquez, 1989: 9). The
principles and main mechanisms, however, were modified in order to make the
agreement more flexible, and to keep it in tune with the changes the countries had
already undergone, or were continuing to go through. The Cartagena Agreement became
a more pragmatic and realistic instrument reflecting the interests of the countries (ECLA,
1992: 26; JUNAC, 1987b: 14; 1989c: 1). These interests dictated the replacement of the
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state by the private sector as the leader in the economy, and the attraction of foreign
investment. At the same time, Salgado (1992: 38) lamented that "the Quito Protocol ...
took away from the original Cartagena Agreement all the aspects that made it the
quintessence of a Latin American version of economic integration."
Salgado was referring to the loss o f primacy of industrial programming, to the
relaxed rules on the common treatment of foreign investment, and to the watering down
of the formation of the Andean market. All existing mechanisms were made more
flexible, important obligations were abolished, some deadlines were eliminated, while
others were reset, "facilitat[ing] the return to legality with regard to the existing
obligations..." (Vacchino and Solares, 1992: 5).
In the case of the tariff reduction program, the Quito Protocol, and the transition
program approved by Decision 225, allowed the continuing existence of non-tariff
barriers under the guise of bilateral "managed trade," and under three new forms of trade
safeguards (INTAL, 1990a: 92; JUNAC, 1988b: 7; EIU, 1992b: 42).1 There was no
deadline for completion of the tariff reduction program.
The Protocol also meant the replacement of the Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development by three new forms of industrial integration,2 which in practice led to the
demise of industrial programming. The common treatment of foreign investment was

‘"In the Transition Program the member countries gave legal coverage to their violations ... Safeguards
became automatic and unilateral, and the non-tariff barriers were given an indefinite time to be lifted. ...
The only real effect of the Quito Protocol was to mutilate the [Andean] Liberalization Program through
managed trade" (Puyo, 1989: 31).
2They were an industrial integration program, industrial complementation agreements, and industrial
integration projects. See chapter VI, section 2.3 for details of these new modalities of industrial
programming.
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made even more flexible and less common. "In other words, given the impossibility of
achieving an Andean production zone ... governments opted explicitly ... to concentrate
efforts on trade liberalization ..." (Rodriguez: 1988: 127). The objective was to achieve
international competitiveness and efficiency as an indispensable condition of guaranteeing
subregional integration, which meant leaving behind the import substitution model
(JUNAC, 1991: 7).
The Andean presidents (JUNAC, 1991b: 105-133) explicitly stated that the
creation of a common market was the Andean Group’s new long-term objective. The
means to achieve this objective were: the establishment of a free trade zone, and of a
customs union; the progressive harmonization of economic policies; the gradual
liberalization of the movements of capital, people and services; physical, and border
integration; activities to further competitiveness and technological development; as well
as cooperation in specific foreign policy issues. The main mechanisms in the economic
sphere were: the tariff reduction program, a common external tariff, and gradual and
narrowly defined economic policy harmonization.3
From the above it is possible to assert that the new aims of the Andean Group
were: the primacy of market mechanisms, export-oriented industrialization, and a greater
role of foreign investment. The main mechanisms to be used in the GRAN to achieve
these aims were: the tariff reduction program, a common external tariff, and a minimum
policy harmonization.

original long-term objective, although never explicitly stated (see chapter III, section 5.1) was the
creation of an economic union; that is an integration in which policy harmonization and common planning
were essential as opposed to a long-term aim in which limited policy harmonization and no common
planning was considered.
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1.3.- Factors influencing the Andean economic integration process from 1987 to 1995
The Quito Protocol signed in May 1987, was not an isolated fact but part of the
reinvigoration of economic integration movements in the world. Since the mid-1980s,
there has been a renewed interest in pursuing some form of economic integration, either
at regional or subregional levels.4
For Latin America, including the Andean countries, the end of the Cold War and
the disappearance of the Soviet bloc brought, among other things, the cessation of the
civil wars in Central America, and a growing concern about the need to reverse its
increasing marginality in both the international polity and the international economy (see
table V H .l).5 The adoption of market oriented policies, opening of their economies to
global trade, reduction of the role of the state, and economic integration were means to
increase the efficiency needed to reverse trade, production, investment and technological
marginality (INTAL, 1990a: 36; Rico, 1992: 61).

4Besides MERCOSUR (mentioned in chapter VI, footnote 31 new integration processes aiming mostly
to establish free trade zones in Latin America, are the agreements between Colombia and Venezuela;
Mexico and Chile; Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, also known as the Group of Three or G-3; Argentina
and Chile; Chile and Venezuela; Mexico with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras;
Colombia and Venezuela with the Central American Common Market; Venezuela and CARICOM (a nonreciprocal free trade zone for Caribbean products); Colombia and CARICOM. In July 1994, twenty-five
countries surrounding the Caribbean Sea established the Association of Caribbean States. It began to
function in August 1995. It is composed of the Caribbean islands, the nations of Central and South America
bordering the Caribbean, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.
5"... during the 1980s ... [w]ith an annual rate of growth of 1.2 percent; a decrease in per-capita
product of 1.0 percent; and an annual decrease in investment of 4.3 percent, and of the terms of trade by
3.1 percent, Latin America confronts a real process of increasing marginalization in the world economy"
(Rico, 1992: 60).
"... the challenge was no longer dependencia but something worse, prescindencia: the rich
countries were largely ignoring the Third World, including Latin America" (Berryman, 1995: 113).
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TABLE V n.l
LATIN AMERICA’S SHARE OF WORLD TOTALS (%)
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

GDP

6.0

7.0

7.5

6.8

6.4

Foreign direct investment

10.3

15.2

11.8

8.1

5.8

Credit

3.0

12.0

4.7

2.9

3.6

Exports

5.7

5.7

5.5

5.3

3.8

Imports

5.7

6.3

5.8

3.9

3.1

SOURCE: Martinez, 1992: 57

At the same time, changes in the international economic system caused by the
weakening of the dollar, the increasing protectionism of the developed countries,6
President Bush’s proposal for a Western Hemispheric free trade area,7 the need to
coordinate positions in GATT’s the Uruguay Round, the democratization process, and
the shift to outward oriented development strategies, were additional factors leading to
the revival of the Andean integration process (Hirst: 1992: 19-20).
Most of the Andean governments, due to their external debt problem, found out

6"... in the results of the international business cycle survey, "Economic Survey International" (ESI)
published in January 1991 ... the majority of the experts consulted in Latin America expect increased
protectionism on the part of the USA in the next five years, ..." (Brand, 1991: 289).
For a recent study on American protectionism see: US Barriers to Latin American and Caribbean
Exports 1994. New York: United Nations, Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean,
1995. LC/G 1861, LC/WAS/L.28.
7In June 1990, President Bush proposed new economic relations with Latin America through the
"Enterprise for the Americas." It contained the creation of a free trade area from Anchorage to Tierra del
Fuego; to encourage American investment in the region; and to reduce the external debt (INTAL, 1991:
8-9). This program was revived during the first summit meeting of presidents of the Americas since 1967,
held in Miami in December 1994. It was agreed, as one of the eight initiatives, to create a hemispheric free
trade zone by the year 2005 (LAWR, WR-94-49, December 22, 1994: 577).
"In order to create appropriate conditions for the realization of the Bush plan, the Latin American
countries have, ..., increased their integration efforts" (Brand, 1991: 287).
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that they had to follow the advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (Green, 1995: Chapter 2). This meant neo-liberal policies such as the unilateral
opening of their economies. Under these circumstances, the Andean Pact could be used
by the member countries as a springboard,8 and as a safety net.9 By focusing on an
accelerated Andean trade liberalization process, the member countries would be able to
increase their exports to each other. By lowering import tariffs to non-members, trade
diversion would be reduced and the competitiveness needed to conquer the international
market would be improved. The expanded market would provide some safeguard against
the increasing protectionism of the industrialized world, "to develop their potentials in
an uncertain and fiercely competitive international economy" (Rosenthal, 1993: 18).
Integration with the international economy and within the region was then seen
as complementing each other (Fauriol, 1993: 3; Rosenthal, 1993: 13, 18) rather than
being mutually exclusive.10 The increase of exports and competitiveness became the
immediate goals (Fuentes and Villanueva, 1989: 15-17; Esser, 1989: 18; Lahera, 1992;
Massad, 1989: 102-105; Pena: 1990: 8; Weintraub, 1993: 10).

8"... integration could be an efficient springboard for attaining integration into the world market ..."
(INTAL, 1992: 22).
"... the regional market should be a mean to increase exports to extra-regional zones as part of
the strategy of international integration,...” (ECLA, 1991: 21).
"... the Andean market is perceived by many entrepreneurs as a secondary and temporary arena
vis-a-vis the world markets ... the subregional integration process is the arena to facilitate integration with
the rest of the world" (Schuldt and Urriola, 1991: 129).
’"... integration ... offers a way of diversifying risk in an international economy that is rife with
uncertainty" (Rosenthal, 1993: 13)
"This new form of integration was called "open regionalism." There is a growing literature on this new
phenomenon. See for example: Baumann, 1995; Bekerman, 1993; Cardenas, 1994; ECLA, 1994a; de Melo
and Panagariya (eds.), 1993; Flores, 1995; Fuentes, 1991; Lahera, 1992; 1992a; Massad, 1989; Palacios
1995; Porta, 1993; Robson, 1993; Salazar, 1990; Salgado, 1991; SELA, 1992; Ventura, 1995.
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At the Andean domestic level, the asynchronous replacement of the import
substitution strategy of development by an export-oriented strategy, allowed the Andean
countries to have new shared aims to revitalize economic integration." The revival,
however, also recognized that the existing approach to integration failed to expand intraAndean trade and to form a subregional market. This led to a new and more pragmatic
concept of integration as an open, flexible process of economic cooperation for the
purposes of expanding trade and creating conditions for increased competitiveness in
world markets (IDB, 1991: 9). The new approach (see table VII.2) basically followed
the orthodox economic theory on economic integration, aiming to create a common
market (ECLA, 1991: 5-6; Gana, 1991: 10-11).
Progress, however, slowed down from 1992 on due to the different speeds in
implementing the neo-liberal approach to development by the member countries. Peru
(and Bolivia) wanted a free trade zone without distortions (meaning full harmonization
of policies directly affecting trade), while Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela wanted to
go at slower pace. This, eventually, led to Peru’s temporary and partial withdrawal, in
August 1992, in matters related to trade, policy harmonization, and negotiations with
third countries.12 In other words, domestic factors were most important in slowing down

“ "One of the permanent difficulties GRAN was confronted with, had been the lack of shared
commitments to common long-term objectives by the countries. This is the determining factor for a steady
progress of the integration process" (Peiiaranda, 1990: 8). "In the last three years [1989-1992], the Andean
Group has developed [sic] great impetus due to two fundamental factors. First, through the coincidence in
the Member Countries’ economic policies, and secondly, through the Andean Presidents’ decision to
directly steer and conduct the integration process" (Cardenas, 1993: 1).
l2Another plausible explanation for Peru’s behavior was that it is creating problems as a means to
prepare its way out of the Andean Group, as voiced by Carlos Bolona, the minister o f Finance (El
Comercio, 1992b: A2).
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TABLE VII.2
ANDEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION APPROACHES: 1960s AND 1990s

1960s-1980s

1990s
END PRODUCT

Creation of common markets in the
long-term.

Creation of common market in a very
short period of time.

PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS
Basically, trade diversion through
import substitution.

Preference for subregional trade
creation and open trade.

Primacy of joint industrial
programming.

No preferred sector.

Common treatment of foreign
investments.

Equal treatment of foreign and
domestic investments.

Special treatment to relatively less
developed countries.

Principle of reciprocity and limited
special treatment.

Primacy of the state and its direct
intervention in the economy.

Market economies and primacy of the
private sector.
PRACTICES

Multilateral trade liberalization was
progressively replaced by bilateral
accords.

Accelerated trade liberalization
encompassing the whole universe of
products.

Gradual process toward adopting a
common external tariff with high levels
and with many rates, and the adoption
of a common minimum external tariff.

Rapid process toward adopting a
common external tariff with low levels
and with few different tariff rates.

Increasing proliferation of non-tariff
barriers.

Rapid elimination of all non-tariff
barriers.

Integration limited basically to
products.

Integration expanded to services.

Economic policy harmonization was
agreed but never pursued.

Limited economic policy harmonization
is expected.

SOURCE: Adapted from ECLA, 1991: 3-4.
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the recent progress of the Andean process, but these factors have not been powerful
enough to stagnate it.

2.- MAIN ASPECTS OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN
1987 AND 1995

2.1.- The presidential summit meetings
The phase of regression in which the Andean Group was immersed was replaced
not by a phase of progress but by one of stagnation after the Quito Protocol was signed.
By May 1988, all the member countries had ratified the protocol. The entry into force
of the protocol, however, did not make the governments comply with the laxer rules they
had agreed upon.
From 1989 to the end of 1991, progress was swift due mainly to the meetings of
the Andean presidents.13 They held nine meetings in this three-year period. Three of

13The Andean presidents got together in Caracas (February 1989), for the first time since December
1983, on the occasion of the swearing in of Carlos Andres Perez as President of Venezuela. In this meeting
the presidents decided to participate directly in the integration process. This personal involvement imitated
the example set before by the summit meetings of the Group of Eight, and of the presidents of the
MERCOSUR countries. These meetings had shown that high level reunions were needed to solve the
impasses arisen at the lower levels which had prevented furthering the integration process elsewhere.
Several other reasons also explain the need for presidential leadership to accelerate the Andean integration
process from 1989 on. First, the potential beneficial impact of President Bush’s proposal of the "Enterprise
for the Americas" made in June 1990. Second, the revitalization and acceleration of the integration
processes all over the world, especially the European Community and MERCOSUR. Third, the increasing
similarities of the Andean countries’ economic development strategies and economic policies. Fourth, the
creation of continental trading blocs such as NAFTA, APEC and ASEAN. Fifth, the increasing
protectionism in the industrialized world. Sixth, the delays in the negotiations of GATT’s Uruguay Round.
And, seventh, the belief that the Andean process was still a relevant tool to help the countries dealing with
their economic crises, furthering economic development and reducing their marginalization in the
international economic system.
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these meetings were the most important: Galapagos, Ecuador in December 1989; La Paz,
Bolivia in November 1990; and Cartagena, Colombia in December of 1991.14 During
these years, the Commission became a rubber stamp of presidential decisions accorded
in advance by the ministers of foreign relations. From 1992 onwards the presidents’
meetings were suspended and the process slowed down because of the different speeds
and depths with which the member countries were liberalizing their economies.
Besides the accords to create a common market (detailed below), the presidents
declared in several of the meetings that the Andean process was a political endeavor. For
example, in February 1989 (in their first meeting), the presidents proclaimed that
"Subregional integration ... besides being an economic project is a political, social and
cultural task" (JUNAC, 1991b: 11). In the following meeting (May 1989) they
recognized "that the Andean integration is a comprehensive process aimed at ... the
achievement of the shared objectives of the member states ... for which is required an
adequate harmonization of the legitimate interests of each one of the member countries"
(JUNAC, 1991b: 15, italics added).

a) The "Strategic Design," Galapagos, December 1989
The most important and detailed document issued by the Andean presidents setting

l4The other six meetings were: (1) Caracas, Venezuela, when President Carlos Andres Perez took
power. A "Joint Declaration" was signed. (2) Cartagena, Colombia, in May of 1989; the presidents signed
the "Manifesto of Cartagena." (3) Machu Picchu, Peru, May 1990; the Andean Presidential Council was
created. (4) Lima, Peru, in July of 1990 when President Alberto Fujimori took power. The presidents
decided that President’s Bush "Enterprise for the Americas," should be carefully studied. (5) August, 1990,
Bogota, Colombia, when the Colombian president Cesar Gaviria Trujillo assumed office; they adopted a
"Declaration on Enterprise for the Americas." (6) Caracas, Venezuela, May 1991. The "Caracas
Declaration" was signed.
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the new aims of the Andean process and the relevant mechanisms was the "Strategic
Design for the Orientation of the Andean Group" (JUNAC, 1991b: 35-78), approved in
Galapagos, Ecuador, in December 1989. The Design changed the process drastically,
setting the path for the reactivation of the Andean Group (Lora, 1992: 167; Gonzalez,
1992: 71). Even more important, "politically, ..., economic integration became guided
by a Strategic Design which adapted the original [Andean] approach to the new national
policies and the current world environment" (Serrano, Sanz and Gabaldon, 1991: 7).
The Strategic Design was based on the assumption that the Andean integration
was still a valid instrument to cooperate with the development of the Andean countries.
According to the Andean presidents, integration was possible at that moment because the
economic policies of the member countries coincided in fundamental aspects.
The Design had two main objectives: the consolidation of the Andean economic
area, and to improve the Andean Group’s integration with the rest of the world. The first
objective was viewed as contributing to the development of competitiveness within the
subregion, as a springboard for conquering other markets, as a means to use resources
more efficiently, and as a way to share the costs of scientific and technological
development. The second objective would increase the negotiating power of the Andean
Pact as an economic bloc, and would improve Andean competitiveness in the world. In
other words, the presidents changed the Andean Group model, making it not only
compatible with but reinforcing international integration.
The creation of a common market was the practical way to achieve these
objectives. Therefore, the presidents decided, as a first step, to create a customs union
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by 1999 (thus, de facto, restoring deadlines into the Cartagena Agreement); and a gradual
liberalization of the movement of capital and labor.

b) The "Act of La Paz," La Paz, November 1990
The presidents met for the seventh time in La Paz, Bolivia, in November of 1990.
They approved the Act of La Paz (JUNAC, 1991b: 105-133). The most important accord
(from which Ecuador abstained)15 was the decision to accelerate trade integration. The
basis for this acceleration was the increasing convergence of the economic policies of the
member countries. All the governments pursued greater efficiency and competitiveness
of their economies through liberalization and opened them to foreign trade and
investment. They also implemented an economic program based on private initiative,
fiscal discipline, and a restructured and efficient state (JUNAC, 1991b: 107).
Deadlines to fully implement the tariff reduction program and CET were
shortened from 1999 to 1995. Measures were also agreed upon to speed-up policy
harmonization, to relax the common treatment of foreign investment, and to begin easing
the movement of people. These measures meant that "State planning and sectoral
programming [were] abandoned and replaced by the market, ..." (ECLA, 1992: 29).

15"The Ecuadorean reservations had been a major stumbling bloc during the discussion at the summit,
with Botja’s [the president of Ecuador] counterparts refusing to accept a ‘twin-track’ solution that would
allow Ecuador to move forward at a slower pace. In the event Ecuador was given six months [until June
1991] in which to decide whether or not it would go along with the measure" (AGR, RA-90-10, December
20, 1990: 1).
"There is a fear in influential circles that Ecuador’s highly protected industrial sector will not
withstand the strong competition from the partner countries—especiily Venezuela—after the trade barrier
are removed" (Brand, 1991: 293).
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c) The "Act o f Barahona," Cartagena, December 1991
The last presidential meeting was on December 1991, in Cartagena, Colombia.
They signed the Act of Barahona (JUNAC, 1991m). They agreed that the tariff reduction
program should be accomplished by January 1993, and that Ecuador would do it by July
1994. The CET would be approved in the same month and applied as of January 1992.
They also agreed that by January 1993, subsidies of exports should be eliminated.
Without precedent was the accord of the presidents on specific issues about the
CET detailed in section 2.4. The Commission, however, was unable to agree on the CET
by the end of December 1991, and the first crucial deadline of this phase was not met
which marked the slow down of the process.
The accords the presidents made in these nine meetings, not only gave the Andean
Group a new aim, the creation of a common market, but also touched on other areas;
such as policy harmonization, common treatment of foreign investment, industrial
programming, transportation, agriculture, services, infrastructure, border integration, and
last, but not least, common foreign policy positions. Most of the agreements were made
in order to allow for free competition.16

2.2.- The tariff reduction program
The Quito Protocol, in practice, made the process of the tariff reduction program
to have infinite existence, since some products would be exempt forever from this

16Case in point were the accords on infrastructure and transportation. A coordinated improvement in
these areas aimed to reduce the costs of transportation (e.g., road repairs), and the delays and additional
costs due to the lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g., pons).
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process. In May 1987, concomitant to the approval of the protocol, a transition program
(Decision 225) was also adopted. It spelled out the procedures to eliminate the existing
violations. The program would be in place until the Quito Protocol entered into force,
then all the violations would be immediately eliminated. The Protocol went into effect
in May 1988 but violations continued. Bolivia and Ecuador did not begin their tariff
reduction process in 1988 as stipulated in the new Cartagena Agreement. Between 1987
and 1989, little progress was made to fulfill the new obligations because of the difficult
economic circumstances of several member countries.
As a result of the summit meetings the tariff reduction program quickly
progressed. Bolivia and Ecuador began their tariff reduction processes, and non-tariff
barriers and violations of the tariff reduction program were reduced. The presidents
successively shortened the deadline to create the free trade zone from December 1999
to January 1993 (see table VII.3).17
The presidential accords were formalized by the Commission. After the end of
the presidential meetings (December 1991), the Commission regained its importance. Its
Decision 324 (August 1992) moved forward the deadline to create the Andean free trade
zone from July 1994 to February 1993.
Peru, however, did not vote, nor participate in the free trade zone, because in
August 1992 the Commission agreed to suspend its participation in the negotiations of
trade issues until December 1993. The main reasons for Pern’s withdrawal were its

l7In the meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, in early December of 1991, the presidents decided to create
the free trade area by January 1993. Ecuador (which was lagging behind the application of neo-liberal
policies), would join by July 1994. At the summit of In November of 1990 (La Paz, Bolivia), Ecuador was
already allowed to begin trade liberalization by January 1992.
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TABLE VII.3
SHORTENING OF DEADLINES FOR THE CREATION OF THE FREE TRADE ZONE
Cartagena
Agreement
May 1987

Galapagos
December 1989

La Paz
November
1990

Barahona
December
1991

ANDEAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION PRO GRAM
AUTOMATIC TARIFF REDUCTION
Dec. 1970

Not appl.

Not appl.

Not appl.

Bolivia

Nov. 1988

Dec 1991

Dec 1990

Not appl.

Ecuador

Nov. 1988

Dec 1989

Jan 1992 5/

Not appl.

Dec. 1983

Not appl.

Not appl.

Not appl.

Bolivia

Sine die

Dec 1995

Dec 1991

Dec 1991

Ecuador

Sine die

Dec 1995

Jul 1992 5/

Jul 1992

BEGINS: Col, Peru, Ven

ENDS: Col, Peru, Ven

ELIMINATION OF THE LIST OF EXCEPT! ONS
BEGINS: Col, Peru, Ven

Dec 1993

Dec 1991

Dec 1990

Not appl.

Bolivia

Dec 1997

Dec 1995

Dec 1990

Not appl.

Ecuador

Dec 1997

Dec 1995

Dec 1992

Dec 1992

ENDS: Col, Peru, Ven

Dec 1995

Dec 1993

Dec 1991

Dec 19917/

Bolivia

Dec 1999

Dec 1997

Dec 1991

Dec 1991

Ecuador

Dec 1999

Dec 1997

Dec 1994

Jul 1992

Sine die 1/

Dec 1995 3/

Dec 1995 3/

Jan 1993 3/

Bolivia

Sine die 21

Dec 1999 4/

Dec 1995 4/

Jan 1993 4/

Ecuador

Sine die 2/

Dec 1999 4/

Dec 1995 4/

Jul 1994 4/

80 % reduction of the lists

Not appl.

Dec 1990

Not appl.

Not appl.

Elimination

Dec 1997

Dec 1991

Dec 1990 6/

Not appl.

Reserve list for Industrial
Programming

Not appl.

May 1990
(80% of the list)

Jun 1991
(Rest)

Not appl.

Sine die

Dec 1999

Dec 1995

Jul 1994

RESIDUAL: Col, Peru, Ven

MANAGED TRADE

FULL FORMATION OF
THE FREE TRADE ZONE
\j
2/
3/
4/
5/
6/
7/

Up to 75 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions of each country.
Up to 180 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
Up to 50 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
Up to 100 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
Accord reached in May 1991, Acta de Caracas (JUNAC, 19911: 2).
Ecuador: July 1991. Accord reached in May 1991, Acta de Caracas (JUNAC, 19911: 2).
Peru: July 1992.
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increasing trade deficit originated by its overvalued currency, and its inability to make
other members support policy harmonization (see section 4.3 below). More importantly,
through this decision Peru revoked tariff reductions (which were irreversible according
to Article 45 of the Cartagena Agreement), and negotiated bilateral agreements with the
other members which would provide free access to a limited number of items only.
In April 1994, through Decision 353, Peru agreed to gradually rejoin the tariff
reduction process. By December 1994 Peru was to reduce its tariffs for a large number
of products.18 The remaining products would follow suit provided that there was
substantial progress in the harmonization of the different policies and mechanisms
directly related to trade. The reintegration of Peru, however, was postponed twice.
According to Decision 377, adopted in June 1995, January 1996 was the latest deadline.
The free trade zone is not a reality because Peru still has to complete its tariff
reduction.

2.3.- The external tariff
a) The common external minimum tariff (CMET)
The common external minimum tariff (CMET) continued its existence for a much

18Peru did apply these tariff reductions to Colombia and Venezuela, based on simultaneity and
reciprocity. Ecuador delayed its tariff reduction in favor of Peru. With the conflict between them during
the first quarter of 1995, all plans to grant each other tariff reductions were shelved. Border disputes like
this, and the one in January 1981, did not have dire consequences beyond delaying for a while meetings
of the Commission and disrupting border trade. In any case they were in no way as disruptive as the July
1969 "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador which accelerated the collapse of the Central
American Common Market leading it to a profound crisis of this process (Fagan, 1970: 1; Lizano, 1982:
255).
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longer time than expected because the CET was not approved until November 1994.19
Its level and range, however, were reduced after the Quito Protocol by Decisions 260
(February 1990), 273 (November 1990), and 309 (September 1991). Decision 309
lowered the average from 13.7 percent (as already reduced by Decision 273) to 7.9
percent; decreased the number of levels from 7 to 5; reduced the maximum level from
30 to 20 percent; and raised the minimum from 0 to 5 percent (JUNAC, 1991: 5).
The modifications aimed at making the CMET more similar to the tariff levels
the member countries were adopting, and by so doing, reduced the violations of this
mechanism. These changes also aimed at fulfilling the presidents accords, who in May
1989, ordered the CMET to be "revised and adapted to the present needs of the
subregion" through "the substantial reduction and simplification of the CMET [to be
accomplished] by the first quarter of 1990" (JUNAC, 1991b: 18, 50).

b) The common external tariff (CET)
The Quito Protocol did not set any deadline for the approval of the CET,20
because "it has been one of the most difficult problems to deal with in the subregion"
(Aninat, 1992: 21). As in the case of the tariff reduction program, the president set a
deadline and successively shortened it December 1999 to January 1992 (see table VII.4).

'T h e CMET was a transitional device to give time to adopt the CET by December 1975. It was easily
approved in December 1970, because it allowed the countries to set any tariff above the minimum agreed
upon.
“ The present article 62 of the Cartagena Agreement, dealing with the CET, reads: "At the Junta's
proposal, the Commission will approve the Common External Tariff which should provide adequate levels
of protection to subregional production, taking into account the agreement’s objective of gradual
harmonization of the diverse economic policies of the member countries" (JUNAC, 1988: 33).
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TABLE VII 4
SHORTENING OF DEADLINES FOR THE CREATION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
Cartagena
Agreem’t
May 1987

Galapagos
December
1989

La Paz
November
1990

Barahona
December
1991

COMMON EXTERNAL TARII:F
APPROVAL

Sine die

Dec 1992

Dec 1991

Dec 1991

FULL IMPLEMENTATION:
Col, Peru, Ven

Not appl.

Dec 1997

Dec 1993

Jan 1992

Bolivia and Ecuador

Not appl.

Dec 1999

Dec 1995

Jan 1992

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ANDEAN CUSTOMS
UNION

Not appl.

Dec 1999

Dec 1995

Jan 1992

An important internal factor influencing the acceleration of the adoption of the
CET was the increasing similarities in tariff policies. Governments were reducing tariff
rates and simplifying tariff structure (see tables VII.5 and VII.6).
Given the successive reductions of the time span to adopt and implement the CET,
in September 1991 the Junta presented preliminary ideas on this topic (JUNAC, 1991c),
and later presented proposals 245 , 245/Mod 1, 245/Mod 2 suggesting three levels of
tariffs, and only 10 percentage points difference between each level. The Commission
was unable to agree on these, and other issues related to the proposal on the CET. In the
meeting in early December 1991, in Cartagena, Colombia, the presidents agreed on the
specifics of the CET.21

21The CET would have four levels: 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent until January 1994, when the 20 percent
level would be eliminated. Bolivia’s current tariffs of 5 and 10 percent required no change. Automobiles
were granted a 40 percent special tariff. The application of a common tariff on products not produced in
the subregion could be deferred until the beginning of their production. A list of products with zero tariff,
and another with 5 percent were to be adopted. Finally, a flexible tariff system would be applied to some
agricultural products.
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Later in that month, the Commission met but could reach no accord. Peru and
Bolivia supported a CET containing only the four tariff levels agreed upon by the
presidents.22 Colombia and Venezuela argued that the other criteria should be included,
and declared that by March 1992 they would unilaterally apply a CET based on the
presidential accords and the Junta’s latest proposal.23 The missed the deadline
constituted a major factor for the slow down that ensued, especially after the temporary
and partial withdrawal of Peru in August 1992.
In February 1992 the Commission made some progress but was unable to approve
the CET because of the unexpected request of Ecuador to apply a lower tariff24 for
1,022 customs items.25 Colombia and Venezuela decided to immediately apply the CET
they had agreed on beforehand. Ecuador, for its part, announced that it would soon
modify its tariff structure to make it more similar to the Junta’s proposal, and the special
regime this country had requested. It did so by May 1992.

-"O n the CET Peru was pressing for the simplest, lowest and speediest formula, while others were
holding out for higher initial levels and slower transition. ... On export subsidies, Peru was alone in
pressing for the other to emulate its own decision to eliminate them completely" (LAWR, WR-91-49, 19
December, 1991: 4).
23This decision became unavoidable after ”[t]he Presidents of Colombia and Venezuela, the two major
partners of the Andean Group, ... agreed ... in January 1992 ... on a [bilateral] C E T ..." (LAWR, WR-9206, February 13, 1992: 9).
24"The principal obstacle to the adoption of the CET by some countries is probably the tariff increase
for basic products ... once this conflict is solved the other problem is to adopt a CET which fits all
interests" (Abusada, 1991: 17).
25In this issue, Colombia was willing to allow Ecuador only 5 percentage points above or below the
CET, and Peru proposed that 50 percent of the list would be left to Ecuador to set tariffs while for the rest
the tariff should be negotiated (Integration Latinoamericana, 1992: 57).
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The CET was vetoed by Peru in the Commission’s June 1992 meeting,26 and
thereafter abstained. The other countries, however, were not able to agree, although
progress was reported.27 Two "incomplete" decisions were approved: Decision 324 on
August 1992, and Decision 335 on March 1993, but the implementation of the CET was
postponed three times. Finally, in November 1994, the Commission approved Decision
370 on the CET (Comision, 1994b). The structure approved was: 5 percent for raw
materials, 10-15 percent for semi-manufactured goods, and 20 percent for finished goods.
The average of the CET was 13.5 percent (JUNAC, 1995: 2, 1995a: 6-7). All the special
treatments agreed to by the presidents, and more, were included in Decision 370
(LAWR, WR-94-47, December 8, 1994: 562; AGR, RA-94-10, December 22, 1994: 1;
JUNAC, 1995: 2-3; 1995a: 6-7; 1995d: 8-9).28 The CET was implemented in February
1995 by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela only.

:6Peru argued that "the draft decision ... establishes several "Common External Tariffs," there were
too many products exempt from the general rules, and it did not follow the political guidelines agreed by
the Andean presidents ..." (Comision: 1992:4). The deeper reason was that the Junta's proposal was quite
different from Peru’s tariff goals of a single level of 15 percent. In the same session, Peru also vetoed the
Junta's proposal on the acceleration of tariff reduction among the Andean countries and on trade policy
harmonization. In casting its negative vote, Peru stated that "the free trade zone, the common external tariff
and the harmonization o f export policies should be dealt together by the Commission since these are
interrelated issues" (ibid.: 5). Casting two vetoes in a single meeting of the Commission was without
precedent. In this case meant that the CET and the creation of the free trade zone were postponed.
27"... the Commission having made important progress on the Common External Tariff, decided to
continue to consider the issue in its next meeting" (Comision, 1992a: 4).
”... there were a 87 percent consensus and 13 percent discrepancies among Colombia, Ecuador
and Venezuela..." (Comision, 1994: 4).
"... the Junta ... stressed the important progress reached [on the CET]" (Comision, 1994a: 3).
28There were special treatments for Bolivia and Ecuador, for automobiles, for agricultural products,
for items related to health, education and mass media, and for products not being currently produced in
the subregion. In case of temporary scarcity, countries could lower their tariffs to 5 percent, and to zero
percent if the scarcity lasts more than 6 months. In addition, for 4 years Colombia, Venezuela, and
Ecuador could apply their national tariffs to 230 items for the first two countries, and to 400 items for
Ecuador. In each of the first three years these countries should reduce their lists by 50 items; and in the
fourth year they should eliminate the rest.
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By 1995 no unique and all encompassing CET was in existence. Peru and Bolivia
were applying their national tariffs; while Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were
applying a common tariff to only 44 percent of the dutiable items. For most of the other
items countries were free to apply any tariff.
Adopting the CET was again the most contentious issue in the Andean process.
Its protracted negotiation led to the slow down of the process. The similarities of the
member countries’s foreign trade policies and of their tariff levels were not enough to
reach an agreement.29 Different economic performances, different rhythms in adopting
neo-liberal policies, especially reducing tariff and the number of rates (see tables VII.5
and VH.6), and different effects of economic policies pursued, led to these difficulties.
Countries with more open and liberal economies like Peru and Bolivia, demanded a quick
harmonization of economic policies in order to reduce the negative effects of their
asynchronous and dissimilar application. Countries with a less liberal approach,
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, wanted to maintain some interventionist economic
policies which gave them undue advantages.
More specifically, the aforementioned considerations meant that Peru was not
willing to provide more protection to Andean products than it allowed to its own.
Countries, however, were not willing to relinquish control of this fundamental policy tool
(Penaranda, 1990: 12),30 unless the CET reflected very closely the present and potential

J9"... it is expected that an external tariff scheme [with low and relatively uniform levels] will be
difficult to adopt even though it could have ample political support in each one of the member countries’’
(Abusada, 1991: 15).
30"... a common external tariff... means ceding some sovereignty with regard to the .... protection of
national production in each one of the member countries” (Gana, 1991: 16).
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TABLE VII.5
TARIFF AVERAGE IN THE ANDEAN GROUP: 1986-1992

PHASE

YEAR

BOL

COL

ECU

PER

VEN

S
T
A
G
N
A
TION

1986

19.99

46.08

38.54

63.53

31.44

1987

19.99

48.04

39.23

67.46

33.59

1988

18.85

48.20

39.22

70.36

33.59

1989

16.65

44.53

42.50

72.13

27.77

1990

9.80

39.30

32.80

26.30

17.80

1991 1/
(*)

9.80

14.29
6.72

18.52
15.52

17.60

15.60

1992 2/
(*)

9.80

11.79

11.94
9.27

17.65

11.74

1993

9.80

11.60

11.94

16.30

11.80

P
R
0
G
R
E
SS

\J November 11, 1991
2/ May 28, 1992
(*) Average without tariff surcharges.
SOURCES: JUNAC, 1992: 3; 1994c: 26.

future tariffs of the member countries.

2.4.- Industrial programming
The Quito Protocol replaced the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development
with three forms of industrial programming: industrial integration program, industrial
complementation agreements, and industrial integration projects.31 In the implementation

3lSee chapter VI, footnote 38.
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TABLE VII.6
ANDEAN GROUP: DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIABLE ITEMS (MAY 1992)

Tariff
level

Junta’s
Proposal

Bolivia

0

Colombia
29

2

Ecuador

Peru

Venezuela

24

118

1,014

5

1,799

256

2,554

7

957

2,371

54

10

769

6,013

1,124

12

1,128
5

15

2,088

1,800

667

20

1,545

1,534

975

25

1

30

1,358

35

10

322

40

30

25

50
Total

1,123

4,766

1,706
1,645

1,716

13

6
6,201

6,269

7,081

6,536

6,482

6,976

Average

12.72%

9.80%

11.79%

15.51%

17.65%

11.74%

Number
of levels

4

2

7

13

2

6

SOURCE: JUNAC, 1992a: 2.

of these new forms market forces and entrepreneurial initiatives would play a more
important role than planning (JUNAC, 1991: 8; ECLA, 1992: 27; Garay, 1990: 93).
In practice, little was done from 1987 on with regard to industrial programming.
The Automobile Program was abrogated by Decision 223 (May 1987), and also the
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Fertilizers Program by Decision 303 (July 1991).32 Industrial programming in any of
its forms ceased to exist when the Commission, in March 1993, adopted the "first
incomplete" CET through Decision 335. Article 11 of this decision abrogates, among
others, all the decisions concerning industrial programs.33 The CET and market
mechanisms now determine industrial production in the subregion.

2.5.- Common treatment of foreign capital
The influx of private foreign capital became crucial to aid the Andean goals of
modernization,

increasing efficiency

and competitiveness,

and acquiring new

technologies. In the Andean summit of November 1990, La Paz, Bolivia, it was agreed
"to remove obstacles to foreign investment ... especially with regard to the access of
foreign enterprises to the advantages of the expanded market" (JUNAC, 1991b: 110).
The common treatment of foreign investment, Decision 220, was modified by Decision
291 (March 1991) which made "such treatment more flexible and ... adapted it to the
Member Countries’ policy of opening up to the world" (Cardenas, 1993: 9).
Decision 291 provided that treatment of foreign capital be the same as that applied
to domestic capital. Article 2 of Decision 291 stated that foreign investors have the same
rights and duties as national investors unless national legislation states differently. As a

“ In May 1989, at the presidents’ insistence the existing Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development
(Metalworking, Petrochemical and Siderurgy) were transformed into Industrial Integration Programs
(Decisions 296, 299 and 300) in May 1991, but they were not implemented.
“ The only remaining program is the industrial complementation agreement among Colombia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela (November 1993) related to automobiles. It is paradoxical that the last industrial program
to be approved (Decision 120, September 1977) and the first to be abolished (Decision 223, May 1987),
is now the only existing form of industrial programming.
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consequence there were no more limits to profit remittances or reinvestment, and no
more obligation to nationalize the enterprise (that is, to sell the majority of their assets
to nationals). There was, also, equal access to domestic credit, and governments were
free to compete among themselves to attract investment. "In other words, with regard to
foreign investment full authority ... returned to the national level" (ECLA, 1992: 31).

2.6.- Policy harmonization
The need for at least some policy harmonization became more acute the closer the
integration process came to eliminating tariffs among the members, and the lower the
CET was going to be. Policy harmonization prevented any government from protecting
inefficient producers. To do otherwise would have made the increase of production
efficiency at the Andean level secondary to the protection of domestic production.34
The Quito Protocol completely relaxed the mechanism of policy harmonization,
and decisions related to policy harmonization were made more flexible or abrogated.35
From 1989 to 1992 the trend changed. In their summit meetings, the presidents
first set deadlines to harmonize customs tariff exemptions, and set a cap on incentives
to Andean exports. They also ordered the adoption of a common treatment on dumping,

34"... if the member countries really want to have stable and real free trade then they should harmonize
key economic policies such as tariffs on third countries, exchange and fiscal policies, government
procurement, norms of origin and of safeguards, anti-dumping surcharges, and foreign investment" (ECLA,
1991: 24).
" ... [the] Andean Common Market implies a gradual process of harmonization of economic
policies directly related to the functioning of the expanded m arket... to avoid distortions in competition"
(JUNAC, 1991: 6).
“ For example, the norms to prevent distortions in trade competitiveness were made more flexible by
Decision 230; and the common rules for industrial development were abrogated by Decision 231.
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on export subsidies, and on restrictive practices to free competition; the tightening of the
existing Andean norms of origin of the merchandise; the elimination of tariff exemptions;
the harmonization of export promotions measures; the adoption of a common customs
valuation system; and the definition of guidelines for exchange and monetary policies.
Finally, the presidents agreed on the approval of guidelines for the harmonization of
fiscal, monetary, financial and payments, and labor policies.
Not all the presidential accords were adopted by the Commission.36 The ones
adopted were directly related to trade or to aspects facilitating trade. In many cases,
however, these decisions meant only the approval of general principles, or procedures,
or a timetable to continue to debate the issue.37 No decision, however, was approved
to harmonize other policies, such as exchange and monetary policies, but preliminary
ideas have been exchanged and studies have been proposed.38 The basic reason for this
lack of progress was that "the coordination of macroeconomic policies means a restriction
of the degree of freedom to manage domestic policies, and .... to abandon part of

3<The Commission, from 1989 to 1995, approved decisions concerning a common tariff nomenclature,
the adoption of GATT’s customs valuation system, the mechanisms to insure free competition, common
norms about dumping and countervailing duties, and a common customs document. Decisions were also
adopted about the elimination of customs tariff exemptions, the prohibition of export restrictions, and
actions aiming to restrict competition, the elimination of subsidies, the harmonization of incentives for
intrasubregional exports, and the adoption of norms of origin of merchandise (JUNAC, I992d). Other
decisions dealt with industrial property, copyrights, and international road and air transportation of persons
and merchandises.
37An example is the harmonization of incentives to export. Decision 330 of October 1992, approved
with Peru’s abstention, in reality, defined only concepts, types, and forms of incentives to be harmonized.
Until now, nothing concrete has been done.
MSee for example: JUNAC, 1992d: 6-8; 1992e; Morales, 1994; Espejo 1994; Gordillo, 1994; Pasco
1994.
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national sovereignty..." (Gana, 1991: 7).39

2.7.- Trade within the Andean Group
Among the Andean countries, trade increased steadily in the two phases. Up to
a point, then, it can be said that the hypothesis that in times of stagnation trade decreases
at least in one year, and in times of progress it increases in all years seems not to be
validated for the phase of stagnation, 1987-1989. A closer look at trade figures (table
VH.7), however, shows that this is not quite so. During the phase of stagnation intraAndean exports increased only by the very low rates of 4 and 7 percent in 1988 and
1989, while imports among Andean countries increased by 1 percent in 1988 and, in
1989 actually decreased by 10 percent. The 42 and 46 percent increases in exports and
imports respectively in 1987 can be mostly attributed to the relative improvement of the
Andean economies in 1986 and 1987 (see chapter VI, table VI.7, and table VII. 11), to
the very low levels of trade reached the year before (see table VI.2), and to the fact that
the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987 created new hopes in the subregion.
Between 1990 and 1994, both, Andean trade increased by 20 percent or more
each year, and from January to September of 1995 by 42 percent (El Comercio, 1995g:
E2).40 The rapid progress in the elimination of non-tariff barriers and in the reduction
of tariffs were the reasons for this improvement, especially due to the full elimination of

39"With regard to policy harmonization, it is evident that members are not yet ready to relinquish
sovereignty because they prefer their own interests instead of subregional interests" (Kisic, 1992a: 63).
■“It is important to point out that intra-Andean trade in 1990 (the first full year of the last phase of
progress) surpassed the highest trade level attained so far (which was in 1981, just before the Andean
Group went into accelerated regression, see table VI.2).
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TA B LE V II.7
ANDEAN G R O U P TR A D E: 1987-1994

Phase->

|
|

STAGNATION
1987

PROGRESS
1989

|_ 1988

1990

I 1991

1992

1993

2,227.5

2,867.8

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN
World

932.9

972.0

1,038.6

1,328.9

20,537.5

20,420.1

25,264.1

31,407.1

1,812.6

29,494.7 28,562.8

3,428.0

29,740.0 34,252.4

IMPORTS (CIF) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN

994.9

1,002.0

905.8

1,260.2

World

20,165.0

22,911.0

17,339.1

(30.0)

132.9

68.7

7,924.9

13,351.6

1,716.8

2,045.7

2,653.0

3,280.3

18,055.5 22,695.4 26,860.6 29,411.2 30,731.0

TRADE BALANCE
GRAN

(62.1)

World

372.5

(2,490.9)

95.9
6,799.3

214.8

147.7

1,702.2

328.9

3,521.4

181.8

INTRASUBREGIONAL AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

4.54

4.76

4.11 1

4.23

6.15

7.80

9.64

10.01

Imports

4.93

4.37

5.22 1

6.98

7.56

7.62

9.02

10.67

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

42.37

4.19

6.86

27.95

36.40

22.89

28.74

19.53

World

8.34

-0.57

23.72

24.32

-6.09

-3.16

4.12

15.17

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

46.11

0.71

-9.61

39.13

36.23

19.16

29.69

23.64

World

16.15

13.62

-24.32

4.13

25.70

18.35

9.50

-4.49

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28,
30, 40 and author’s calculations.

duties in Colombo-Venezuelan trade in 1992,41 and to the free trade zone formed by
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela at the beginning of 1993 (EIU, 1993e: 38,
46). Another reason was the improved performance of most of the Andean economies.
Between 1990 and 1992 the Andean Group as a whole had its highest GDP growth of this
phase (see table V II.ll).

41Trade between Colombia and Venezuela went from $594 million in 1990 to $1.7 billion in 1994,
increasing its sharing of total intra-Andean trade from 45 percent to 50 percent (JUNAC, 1995c: 21).
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3.- VIOLATIONS OF THE ANDEAN OBLIGATIONS

As in the previous chapters, the first type of violations to be analyzed are those
infringing the articles of the Cartagena Agreement. The second type of violations are
related to the non-incorporation of decisions of the Commission by the member
governments. Finally, the third type of non-fulfillment refers to violations of decisions
which have already been incorporated to the domestic legal system by changes in national
laws.

3.1.^ Violations of the Cartagena Agreement
Between the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987) and 1989, the violations
of the old Cartagena Agreement continued.42 With the entry into force of the Quito
Protocol, many of the violations of the old agreement ceased for the simple reason that
most deadlines were abolished. Some of the remaining commitments, however, were not
met. For example, member countries did not eliminate non-tariff restrictions to trade
once the protocol went into force; and the tariff reduction program was not started by
Bolivia and Ecuador in December 1988. Industrial programming continued its paralysis.
Finally, with regard to the CET, the member countries did not deal with it. Thus, the
situation could be characterized as one of stagnation, since there was no sign of
diminishing violations of the Cartagena Agreement.

42"Today [October 1987] trade can be characterized by the coexistence of the multilateral order of the
[Cartagena] Agreement with an informal scheme based ... on unilateral non-tariff restrictions and on
bilateral accords" (JUNAC, 1987b: 22).
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The presidential accords in the summit meeting of December of 1989 meant
stricter obligations than the commitments the member countries had agreed to in the
Quito Protocol. It can be said, then, that after 1989 violations of the agreement ceased.
Once the presidential meetings stopped (1992), there was little progress, but there
were no violations of the agreement. One exception was Decision 321, approved in
August 1992. This decision dealt with the temporary cessation of Peru’s obligations with
regard to the tariff reduction program and the CET; and its abstention from decisions in
these areas and in policy harmonization. This meant that Peru reversed its tariff reduction
program, and did not apply the CET or any policy harmonization decision even though,
from the legal point of view, it would have had to comply with them.

3.2.- Failure to incorporate the Commission’s decisions into the domestic legal
systems of the member countries
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), nine was the maximum number of
decisions not incorporated by the member countries into their national legislation (see
table VH.8). This number compares favorably with its similar during the phase of
regression, which was 24 (see table VI.3). The minimum number was 6, it, again,
compares again favorably with the minimum number, 13, in the previous phase.43
In the present phase of progress, the maximum number of decisions not
incorporated into the domestic legal systems of the countries dropped from 8 to zero

43The first datum (05-11-87) is repeated from table VI.3. It technically belongs not to the regression
phase (which ended with the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987) but to this phase of stagnation. This
is why, in the text above it is stated that the minimum number of decisions not incorporated during the
previous regression phase was thirteen.
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TABLE VII.8
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1987-1992
Phase

Date

Source

BO

CO

EC

PE

VE

TOTAL

05-11-87
03-08-89
07-18-89
09-22-89
ON

11-10-89
02-28-90
03-26-90
09-21-90
01-16-91
03-15-91

(10)

05-03-91

( 11)

06-18-91

( 12)

10-04-91

(13)

11-22-91

(14)

06-10-92

(15)

(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation one or
more countries
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) Ibid.; (3) JUNAC, 1989d; 1989e; (4) JUNAC,
1989f; (5) JUNAC, 1989g; (6) JUNAC, 1990b; (7) Ibid.; (8)
JUNAC, 1990b; (9) JUNAC, 1991d; (10) JUNAC, 1991e (11)
JUNAC, 1991f; Abusada, 1991; (12) JUNAC, 1991g; (13)
JUNAC, 1991h; (14) JUNAC, 1991i; (15) JUNAC, 1992.
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(June 1992 on). One explanation is "the favorable effects of the convergence of national
policies and subregional policies ..." (Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 22). Another reason
for this fulfillment was the abrogation of decisions the member countries found too hard
to comply with, or were simply not willing to do so. Between 1987 and 1994 seven
decisions were eliminated, which more or less coincided with the maximum number of
decisions not incorporated in the domestic legislation during this phase. A third reason
was that the Commission postponed deadlines and modified decisions whenever it was
apparent that the member countries were not going to fulfill their obligations.44
To summarize, as expected by the hypothesis of this research project, during the
phase of stagnation (1987-1989) the number of decisions not incorporated into the
national legislation was less than in the previous phase of regression (1978-1987), but
more than in the phase of progress (1990-1995).

3.3.- Violations of decisions already incorporated into the legal systems of the
member countries
The most relevant violations of decisions already incorporated into the domestic
legislation of the member countries were related to not applying the agreed upon tariff
levels. As expected in this study, during the phase of stagnation, the number of dutiable
items violated was high (see table VII.9) although not as high as during the phase of
regression, when it reached 5,300 items in March of 1984 (see table VI.5). The

44An example is the second decision about the CET, Decision 335, approved in March 1993. Its
deadlines were postponed three times (Decision 350, December 1993; Decision 357, April 1994; and
Decision 365, July 1994).
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TABLE VII.9
DUTIABLE ITEMS VIOLATED: 1987-1992

Phase

Date

Source

BOL

COL

ECU

PER

VEN

TOTAL

S
T
A
G
N
A
T
I
O
N

05-11-87

(1)

25

2

806

1650

1793

4276

03-15-88

(2)

0

765

95

3835

1608

6303

11-15-88

(3)

0

108

123

325

120

576

03-08-89

(4)

144

252

3321

85

655

4457

07-18-89

(5)

139

160

395

53

315

1062

09-22-89

(6)

139

127

275

34

545

1120

11-10-89

(7)

139

127

275

34

354

829

P

02-28-90

(8)

138

15

275

3

224

655

R

03-26-90

(9)

0

15

9

3

224

251

09-21-90

(10)

11

728

339

865

1915

3858

01-16-91

(ID

0

22

319

867

1924

3132

G

03-15-91

(12)

0

28

3716

1346

1602

6692

R

05-03-91

(13)

0

0

107

1321

1555

2983

06-18-91

(14)

0

24

3

1347

951

2325

10-04-91

(15)

8

203

4

281

206

702

11-22-91

(16)

8

287

2

73

205

575

06-10-92

(17)

562

282

390

213

302

1749

O

E
S
S

SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) JUNAC, 1988c; (3) JUNAC, 1988d; 1988e; (4)
JUNAC, 1990b; (5) JUNAC, 1989d; 1989e; (6) JUNAC, 1989f; (7)
JUNAC, 1989g; (8) JUNAC, 1990b; (9) Ibid.; (10) JUNAC, 1990b; (11)
JUNAC, 1991d; (12) JUNAC, 1991e; (13) JUNAC, 1991f; Abusada,
1991; (14) JUNAC, 1991g; (15) JUNAC, 1991h; (16) JUNAC, 1991i;
(17) JUNAC, 1992.

exception was the 6,300 items violated by March of 1988, which could be partially
explained by the reduction of tariffs by the member countries, thereby increasing the
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violations of the CMET.
The number of violations steadily declined from September 1989 (after the second
presidential summit held in May 1989), until March 1990 (after the summit meeting in
Galapagos, Ecuador, held in December 1989). Thereafter the figures were high
principally due to the acceleration of the tariff reduction program after each presidential
meeting. These high numbers show, not the lack of political will, but more likely than
not, the cumbersome domestic procedures to enact tariff reductions.45
Another reason for the high number of items violated was that the rapid reduction
of tariffs on imports from non-member countries (see table VII.5) placed them below the
common minimum tariff (CMET).46 Since the Junta has not reported on these issues
from 1992 on, there is no way to know if the member countries are fulfilling these
obligations.
The number of trade claims against the member countries among themselves, by
the Junta and by private companies was not recorded by the Junta from 1984 (see table
VI.4) until 1990 (see table VII. 10). By June 1984, the number of total claims had
reached 141. Between September 1990 and June 1992 the number of total claims was
between 2 and 13. The last figure corresponds to the last report available (June 1992).

15For example, by Decision 258 (February 1990) the member countries from May 1990 on had to
accelerate their tariff reductions. By September 1990 the number of items violated had risen to more than
3,800 from its record low of 251 in March 1990. These violations remained high, reached their peak of
6,700 in March 1991 and remained high until October 1991. In between. Decision 281 (March 1991) and
Decision 301 (July 1991) were approved accelerating again the tariff reduction process.
4<sThe CMET was reduced in February 1990 (Decision 260), and in March the number of items violated
went down to only 251 (the lowest recorded in this phase) from 655 in February. In September 1991 the
CMET was reduced again (Decision 309) and the violations went down to 702 items in October and to 575
in November from 2,325 in June.
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TA BLE V II. 10
CLA IM S M A D E TO:

BOLIVIA BY

COLOMBIA BY

ECUADOR BY 1/

DATE
C

E

P

V

J

T

B

E

P

V

J

T

B

C

092190

1

011691

1

031591

2

2

1

1

P

V

J

T

1

2
1

1

1

2

050391

2

1

3

061891

2

I

3

100491

1

1

112291

1

1

1

4

2

061092

1

1

1

2

1

1
4

1

Continues below ...
TABLE VII. 10
CLAIMS MADE TO:
PERU EtY 2/ 3/

... (CONTINUED)

VENEZUELA BY

DATE
B

C

E

V

J

T

B

C

E

P

J

Total

Sources

T

092190

1

1

3

I

011691

1

I

2

2

2

7

3

4

4

5

5

3

6

3

7

7

0

13

8

031591

2

050391

1

1

061891

1

100491

1

2

112291

1

2

061092

1

1

1

4

2

1

1

2

J = The Junta
1/ Includes a claim made by an Ecuadorean company to the Junta against its government on 06/10/92
2/ Includes one claim made by Peru to the Junta on 03/15/91 due to restrictions imposed by the other
members countries as a response to the cholera outbreak in Peru.
3/ Includes a claim by a Peruvian company to the Junta against its government on 10/04/91, 11/22/91, and
06/10/92.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) JUNAC, 199ld; (3) JUNAC, I991e; (4) JUNAC, 199lf; Abusada,
1991; (5) JUNAC, 1991g; (6) JUNAC, 1991h; (7) JUNAC, 1991i; (8) JUNAC, 1992.
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The number of items affected by non-tariff barriers diminished, especially after
the entry into force of the Quito Protocol, May 1988, and after the Andean presidents
agreed, in May 1989 to "lift immediately and effectively all measures which prevent the
full functioning of the [Andean] Liberalization Program, and to abstain from applying
new unilateral restrictions" (JUNAC, 1989f: 1; 1991b: 17). In May 1987, by the time
the Quito Protocol was adopted, there were more than 5,200 items under non-tariff
barriers; by March 1989 the number was less than 700 (JUNAC, 1988b: 5; 1989b: 13).
Non-tariff restrictions to intra-Andean trade were completely eliminated by 1992 as a
result of the presidential accords.

4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASES OF STAGNATION AND PROGRESS

This section presents an explanation of the last nine years of the Andean economic
integration process. This period is a composite of two phases: stagnation (1987-1989) and
progress (1990-1995). The first three parts will deal with the factors which play a role
in explaining both phases. The fourth part deals with an analysis of the output of the
Commission in the form of decisions adopted between 1987 and 1994. The last two parts
analyze the long-term aims and the economic policies of the governments, focusing on
the extent to which they were congruent with the aims and main mechanisms of the new
Cartagena Agreement, and of the presidential accords during the last two phases of the
Andean process.
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4.1.- The first attempts to change economic policies in the Andean countries (19871989)
The signing of the Quito Protocol was a consequence of the beginning of the
tendency of national interests to converge again. At the same time the protocol was the
minimum common denominator the member countries agreed upon to keep the Andean
process alive. The denominator was to improve trade levels and to minimize obligations.
Both the Junta and the Commission worked to comply with the Quito Protocol.
The "Transition Program" (Decision 225) approved by the Commission in May 1987,
and the Plan of Action (June 1987) to put it into practice contained guidelines for
gradually clearing the most egregious violations (Comision, 1987b: 3-4; JUNAC, 1987d).
By October 1987, according to the Junta, "governments were not fulfilling some
obligations [stated in the program] because of the economic difficulties the countries were
going through ..." (Gutierrez, 1987: 19).
Stagnation was the outcome because the Quito protocol was signed before national
objectives were clearly defined and during a time when economic recession was still the
main concern.47 In these circumstances, the governments did not find much use for the
Andean Pact,48 and violations remained. The lack of compliance proves again, as
proposed by the hypothesis of this dissertation, that governments will pursue their

47"The lack of an explicit and clear political project setting precisely the supreme objectives of the
subregion ... constitutes a weak flank" (Rodriguez, 1992; 12).
"... today [March 1987] there are divergent conceptions with regard to the basic guidelines for
the strategy of development. In consequence, it is not possible to propose a new strategy of economic
development which is applicable to the subregion, nor to pretend that integration can be based on the
permanent similarities of die development models of the five Member Countries" (JUNAC, 1987: 14-15).
the Quito Protocol... [has not] been able to make the [Andean] group move without stumbling,
even though its objectives have been diluted" (Salgado, 1992: 38).
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interests above and beyond any Andean commitment; and that the Andean institutions can
do little to modify this behavior.

4.2.- The revival of the Andean Pact; The convergence of economic policies (19901992)
The same economic objectives and the very similar economic policies pursued by
the Andean governments from 1989 on provided the basis for the revival of the Andean
Group. The presidential meetings were the means for the acceleration of the Andean
process. The deadlines for creating a customs union were hastened, policy harmonization
was quickened, and some steps easing the movements of capital and labor were taken in
order to create a common market. The leading role was taken over by the presidents.
The Commission and the Junta were left with the task of incorporating the presidential
accords into the Andean integration process.49
The attempt to speed up Andean integration was meant to facilitate the integration
of the Andean countries with the international system in the short-term through trade, and
in the medium-term through increased efficiency. Andean integration was also a tool to
give these countries more weight in the international system. In other words, subregional
integration was a by-product of the Andean governments’ unilateral decisions for

49"... the [Andean] institutions have been weakened. Today [1993] the Junta is a mere Secretariat,
because its proposal capacity has been lost. In addition, there is more progress in informal meetings than
in the meetings of the Commission. This has originated awkward situations like the Peruvian withdrawal,
the continuous changes of decisions, and the adoption of openly illegal norms ... The origin, of course,
has to be looked in the meetings of the presidents" (ANDI, 1993: 26).
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international integration and neo-liberal policies (Abusada, 1991: 8; Martinez, 1992:
52).50
There were other uses, old and new, that the governments found for the
Cartagena Agreement. First, the Andean Group continued to be a tool for aiding
development processes. Second, it was considered to be a protection from external crisis
(CRESET, 1989: 31). Third, integration was seen "as a network of commitments which
provided economic liberalization with stability and continuity" (SELA, 1991: 104).
The main problem was that progress in integration demands greater and greater
similarities in domestic economic policies; and more and more common positions with
regard to international economic and non-economic issues; as well as a greater
participation of society (SELA, 1991: 104).

4.3.- The slow down of the Andean process (1993-1995)
The need for greater harmonization of economic policies was not met by the
governments, resulting in a slow down of the Andean integration process. It began when
the tariff reduction program was put only partially into practice; the CET was not
approved on time; and the harmonization of policies did not progress. These crucial
failures combined to end the summit meetings.51 All of this made the Andean process

“ In an entrepreneurial meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela, in May 1989 (after the first presidential
meeting, in the same city in February), the participants declared "that the strengthening of the Andean
integration is the most adequate road to insure the insertion of our economies into the new realities and the
demands of the world economy, and guaranties our permanent presence ... in the international economic
scene" (Cumbre Empresarial Andina, 1990: 111).
51The self-coup of April 1992 in Peru and the failed coups in Venezuela in February and November
of the same year were the coup de grace to the summits. They were postponed first and later forgotten until
September 1995. New governments in Ecuador in 1992, and in Bolivia in 1993 contributed to this state of
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slowdown its progress.
August 1992 can be singled out as the date when the slowing down of the Andean
process began. On that date, the Commission approved Decision 321 by which Peru
became an observer in the most important aspects of the Andean process: the Andean
free trade zone, the CET, policy harmonization, and trade negotiations with third
countries.
One precedent for Peru’s withdrawal was its statement at the Commission’s
meeting in December 1991 when the CET was not approved. The Peruvian delegation
deplored the lack of agreement on the CET which "increases distortions to competition
... thus, Peru reserves its right to apply the necessary measures to counter their effects
..." (Comision, 1991: 5).
Another precedent was Peru’s Supreme Decree No 014-92-ICTI/DM (April 1992)
temporarily suspending the tariff reduction program, adducing the existence of trade
distortions due to the lack of equitable competition as a result of the failure to adopt the
CET, and to eliminate export subsidies (Cardenas, 1992: 54). In other words, Peru was
demanding the simultaneous creation of the free trade zone, and of the customs union;
and at the same time pressing for some economic policy harmonization (JUNAC, 1992b:
45), so unfair competition could be avoided. The temporary suspension of the tariff
reduction program by Peru’s decree showed that accords can be unilaterally dissolved if
they do not fit the interests of the violating country. This fact exemplifies a main finding
of this research project, namely, that the governments are the main actors in the process

affairs.
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and are able to create and undo obligations.
A final precedent was Peru’s veto, in June 1992, of the CET, because from the
"technical point of view, it was not a CET and was not observing the guidelines set by
the presidents in December 1991" (Comision, 1992: 4).52
The most obvious cause of Peru’s temporary withdrawal was its increasing trade
deficit with the other Andean countries (see table VII. 15) officially attributed to the
existing distortions in the Andean competition. "Presently, Peru considers that intraAndean trade is distorted because direct subsidies to exports are maintained by the
majority of the countries of the subregion and they are creating a fictitious
competitiveness. ... This distortion mainly affects Peru, because it does not subsidize its
exports" (VMTINCI, 1993: Paragraph 15).53
The most likely reasons for the deficit, however, were domestic currency
overvaluation,54 and economic instability in the form of high inflation, high taxes and

S2From a political point of view, the reason given by Peru’s minister of Finance, and not recorded in
the Final Act of the Commission’s meeting was: "Peru could not and would not vote into being the freetrade area and the customs unions, as long as Venezuela did not resume diplomatic relations [severed after
President Fujimori’s self coup on April 1992]" (LAWR, WR-92-25, July 2, 1992: 7).
S3A different version follows. "Full integration has been held up by developments within Peru. After
president Fujimori assumed dictatorial powers with his autogolpe on April 5, Venezuela suspended
diplomatic relations. Trade talks were also complicated by Peru’s desire to retain its higher tariff schedule
(with rates of 15% and 25%) and fear that free trade within the Andean Pact would further erode its trade
position given its overvalued exchange rate. Thus, in August 1992 Peru suspended its membership until
the end of 1993" (EIU, 1993e: 46-47).
^The Central Bank adopted in 1990 a policy of quasi-non-intervention in the exchange rate market
which led to currency overvaluation. The reasons were: first, there was an inflow of foreign currency
owing to the high interest rates because of the Central Bank’s tight money policy, as inflation remained
a priority. Second, an unregistered influx of dollars was generated by the cocaine trade. Private studies put
income from this source at anywhere from $600 million to $1.4 billion a year. Third, the government was
willing to support the domestic currency when it showed signs of weakening. Fourth, the substantial inflow
of short-term capital and the large inflow of dollars from the privatization of state enterprises, and from
foreign investment (EIU, 1992d: 6; 1995d: 10).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

335

interest rates (Kisic, 1992a: 60, 63-64). In simpler terms, during the negotiation of
Decision 321, "Peruvian officials argued the need to temporarily withdraw from the
Andean Group because of the deepening of its economic crisis" (INTAL, 1992a: 93).
The slow down brought about by the temporary withdrawal of Peru also reflected
the differences among the governments as to the pace and depth of the implementation
of the new strategy of economic development,55 and more importantly the results they
were obtaining.56 "The most important factor[s] which could affect integration plans
[were] the persistence of an unsatisfactory performance of the economies, ... their
macroeconomic disequilibria" (ECLA, 1991: 18); and the differences in foreign trade
policies, and in the speed to open their economies (SELA, 1991: 96).
Between 1989 and 1992 Peru had the lowest rate of growth of the subregion (see
table VII. 11), the highest rate of inflation (Portocarrero, 1992: 69), and its currency was

“ For example, although by 1992 in Colombia "there [was] a loose consensus that economic
liberalisation [was] necessary, there remain[ed] a strong lobby for protection, "managed" change and
administrative controls" which slowed the implementation of the program (EIU, 1992f: 4).
In the case of Ecuador, "[n]otwithstading the free market approach in some areas [e.g., foreign
trade]. President Borja’s government [1988-1992] is well behind other Latin American countries [e.g.,
Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela] in other key aspects o f economic reform, such
as trimming back the state sector through privatisation and attracting more foreign investment. Ecuador’s
implementation of trade liberalisation is also slower than that agreed upon by its partners in the Andean
Pact, ... (EIU, 1991c: 8).
"...Peru’s economic and trade liberalization process ... is much more accelerated than the other
Andean countries" (Canale, 1992 3). "Peru also believed it has gone far further in trade liberalisation than
any of its Pact partners other than Bolivia" (EIU, 1995d: 42). "... Peru recognizes ... that it has progressed
quicker than its other Andean partners in the same correct direction, however ... the different degree of
application of the economic policies among the member countries is detrimental to Peru" (VMTINCI, 1993:
paragraph 16).
“ "The concurrence in time and results and/or difficulties in the adjustment processes help to create an
identification among the countries. Paradoxically, then, the same motivation which unites some countries
separates others" (Hirst, 1992; 27).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336

the most overvalued in relation to the dollar,57 and in relation to the other Andean
currencies (de la Cuba, 1992: Paragraph 12; Anonymous, cl992: 14). As a result, its
intra-Andean trade deficit went from $114 million in 1988 to $295 million in 1994 (see
table VH.15). The lack of agreement to approve the CET in December 1991 could thus
be seen as a pretext for Peru to partially and temporarily withdraw from the process. The
evolution of its economy shows that macroeconomic variables are now much more stable,
but its currency is still the most overvalued in Latin America (La Republica, 1995a:
10) .58

57

REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE II (1980 = 100)
PHASE->

|

STAGNATION
1987

1988

[
1989

PROGRESS
1990

1991

1992

1993 p/

Bolivia

126.0

132.5

138.2

163.8

157.8

161.9

166.1

Colombia

165.0

171.0

177.5

200.9

194.3

178.1

169.7

Ecuador

180.9

240.6

208.2

226.1

215.5

214.1

193.0

97.9

99.7

64.7

49.5

40.4

39.4

42.9

186.0

166.6

195.9

217.9

203.9

195.9

189.0

Peru
Venezuela

Source: 1987-1993: IDB, 1994: 45, 63, 81, 145, 169.
1/ Real effective exchange rate takes into account the domestic and foreign inflation rates (consumer or
wholesale price index), export subsidies and import tariffs and non-tariff restrictions, and selected
bilateral exchange rates of the main partners weighted according to the relative significance of
exports to those countries and imports from them (see for example, ECLA, 1994: 100).
p/ Preliminary.
58The government wants to continue its minimum intervention in fixing the exchange rate and at the
same time fears that any abrupt increase of the rate of exchange would fuel inflation, a fact which is today
politically unacceptable since the government has fighting inflation as its main preoccupation.
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TABLE VH. 11
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1987-1994: RATES OF GROWTH
PHASE

STi\GNATION

PROGRESS

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Bolivia

2.1

2.8

2.4

4.4

5.0

1.8

4.0

4.2

3.5

Colomb

6.0

3.7

3.2

4.3

2.0

3.8

5.2

5.7

5.5

Ecuado

-5.5

12.8

0.5

3.0

5.0

3.6

2.0

4.0

2.5

Peru

7.8

-8.8

-11.2

-5.4

2.8

-2.5

6.5

12.3

7.5

Venezu

3.0

5.7

-8.1

6.5

9.7

6.1

-0.4

-3.3

2.0

GRAN

3.8

3.1

-3.8

3.9

5.9

4.1

2.4

2.1

n.a.

SOURCES:

1987-1989:
1990-1994:
1995:

JUNAC, 1990c: 95-106
JUNAC, 1995c: 29
ECLAC, 1996:3. Preliminary estimates. Figures have been
rounded to the nearest zero or five

Beyond economic policy considerations, foreign policy reasons could convince
the Peruvian government in the future to rejoin the Andean Group. If this is so, then, it
can be argued that the Cartagena Agreement is still a useful tool for this country. In this
case, the increased negotiation capacity within the Andean bloc could become the most
important reason to stay.59 Specific foreign policy considerations could be relevant
arguments for Peru to stay in the Andean process. The considerations are: (1) the
possibility of improving relations with Ecuador;60 (2) participation in presentand future

59This rationality is not different from the ones stated at the end of chapter VI explainingwhy in the
phase of regression, when aims and mechanisms were not supported by the member countries, the
governments did not end the Andean process.
“ Although border conflicts, such as the latest one between Ecuador and Peru in February-March 1995,
have temporarily paralyzed the Andean Pact (and this case was no exception), the closer relations derived
from the Andean Pact do improve bilateral and personal relations which in "normal" times allow for real
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accords signed by the Andean Pact as a bloc with other countries or groups of countries;
(3) international negotiating power in fora such as the World Trade Organization (which
in December 1994 replaced GATT), and UNCTAD; and (4) support and goodwill from
the other member countries towards Peruvian problems.
Peru, however, was not the only factor causing the slow down of the Andean
process. Another factor was the perception of Venezuela and Colombia that immediate
integration of their markets, the largest and most dynamic of the Group, would provide
them greater benefits.61 The adoption of a bilateral CET on March 1992, constituted an
important step towards increasing their interdependence.62
Related to the above were the negotiations of integration agreements by Colombia
and Venezuela with Mexico, Chile, Argentina, the CARICOM, and the Central American
nations. This did not only reduce the margin of preference for the Andean partners,63
but did also reduce the negotiating capacity of the Group and of the countries individually

attempts to address more positively the border problem. This was the case of the three visits, in 1992, of
President Fujimori to Quito, the first ever by a Peruvian President. The first visit of an Ecuadorean
president to Peru is still being awaited.
6l"... trade [between Colombia and Venezuela] of US$2.3 bn is projected for [1995], from US$700
m four years ago” (AGR, RA-95-05, June 26, 1995: 8). During the first semester of 1995, Colombia’s
exports to Venezuela were 48 percent of its Andean exports, while Venezuela’s exports to Colombia were
82 percent of its Andean exports; these two countries exported $1,725 million during this period, and
constituted 79 percent of the total intrasubregional exports (Gestion, 1995a: 21).
"The relation between Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia have [sic] been strengthened through
times and with the Andean Pact. ... [I]t looks like the increased trade between Colombia and Venezuela
is affecting negatively the Peruvian manufacturing sector" (Lizardo, 1995: 17, 18).
“ "At the end of the 1980s it was clear that the pair of Colombia-Venezuela should be the second pole
of integration in Latin America [the first being Brazil-Argentina-Uruguay] ... [W]e believe that integration
with Venezuela is the central piece in the strategy of Colombia to participate in the international market
in the 1990s. ... The Andean Pact cannot exclude integration with other Latin American countries ... but
it should be a bridge towards ALADI ..." (Moreno, 1989: 35-36).
“ " ...th e subregional market is being eroded by trade accords. As a matter of fact, a trade liberalization
accord among Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia would, in practice, eliminate Ecuador’s possibilities to
export to latter two..." (ANDI, 1993: 26).
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(INTAL, 1991: 42; JUNAC, 1991j: 1-3). Bolivia and Peru have shown interest in having
closer links with MERCOSUR.64 The disintegration of the Andean Group has been
made more likely with the approval of Decision 322 in August 1992 (Peru abstained),
which allowed the member countries to pursue bilateral negotiations with the sole
obligation to keep the Commission informed. A possible future scenario could be the
dismembering of the Andean Pact and the creation of an integration process among
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
The temporary withdrawal of Peru shows, as anticipated by this study, that the
governments of the member countries, when they are in agreement, can go beyond what
the Cartagena Agreement states.65 "Community interests are generated from the sum of
the different national interests. ... community needs ... [are] subordinated to ... national
interests, and to the options chosen by each state with regard to the ‘method’ and the
‘results’ obtained from their processes of economic reform" (Hirst, 1992: 27).

“ In early 1990s, Bolivia was "considering whether it might be better to become a member of the
fledgling Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Mercosur)" (EIU, 1991f: 10). In July 1992, according to the
Financial Times (Kendall, 1992: 5) "[t]he government of President Jaime Paz Zamora said that Bolivia,
which has lower tariff than the other Andean countries, "may well" seek full membership of Mercosur ...
Such a move, ... would require [Bolivia] to withdraw from the Andean Pact."
"The Peruvian minister of Economics and Finance, Carlos Bolona Behr, declared ... that his
country is studying the possibility of having closer links with Mercosur ... It seems to us a more advanced
integration system which has a bright future... (El Comercio, 1992a: Al).
“ Although the treatment accorded to Peru by Decision 321 was not considered in the text of the
Cartagena Agreement, neither it allow the Commission to sanction the arrangement they adopted by
Decision 321.
A more important aspect of Decision 321 was in its Article 3. This article allowed Peru to make
trade agreements with the other members "within the existing legal framework.” The agreements signed,
however, included norms to solve controversies outside the purview of the Junta and the Andean Tribunal
(Cardenas, 1994: 10), the organs legally in charge of dealing with these issues.
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4.4.- The Commission’s output during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989 and the
phase of progress (1990-1994)
The output of the Commission, as expected in this dissertation, was higher during
the phase of progress than in the phase of stagnation. After approving 20 decisions in
1987 (due to the optimism created by the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987),
the Commission adopted only 11 decisions in each 1988 and 1989 (see table VII. 12).
Between 1987 and 1989, the average number of decisions adopted per session went from
4.0 in the first year, to 2.75 in the second, to a mere 1.83 in the last year of that phase.
Of the 20 decisions approved in 1987, 15 were important new or modifying
decisions. Nineteen of the 22 decisions adopted in 1988 and 1989 were not important.66
The three important decisions were: Decision 243 setting the rules by which Ecuador
would begin its tariff reduction process; Decision 244 which modified Decision 169 on
Andean multinational enterprises; and Decision 257 modifying the norms about
international road transportation. In other words, only one decision dealt with a new
issue.
In the following phase, that of progress, the Commission’s output rose to around
20 decisions in each year except for 1991 when it rose to 34 (the highest ever), and for
1995 when it went down to 15. The average number of decisions adopted per session was
3 or more during this phase, reaching an average of 5.5 decisions in 1993.

“ Among these decisions were Decision 236 codifying the Cartagena Agreement; Decision 239
recognizing the Andean Confederation of Lawyers as a subsidiary organ of the agreement; Decisions 240
and 241 extending a member’s Junta term; Decisions 245, and 246 approving the budgets of the Junta and
the Andean tribunal; Decisions 250-256 on cooperation in agriculture; and Decisions 247 naming members
of the Junta.
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TABLE VII. 12
DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1988-1994

74-78

~ 1 69-73

79-86

1988

^1987

PHASE -- >

1989 [87-89

1990

1991

1992

STAGNATION

1 DECISIONS

81

55

85

20

11

11

2 NEW ISSUES

58

36

63

11

9

2.1 Important J /
2.2 Unimportant

32

8
28

8
55

7
4

1

26

3 MODIFYING DECISIONS

23

19

22

1

7

1993 ] 1994 1 1995 | 90-95

PROGRESS

1

21

34

18

22

19

16

130

9

42
29

16

21

16

16

10

6

85

11

5

2

4

2

34

6

10

11

14

6

4

51

9

8
2

8
21

10

9
2

13

5

13

2

6

9

10

45

16

8

1

1

10

3

11

2

3

3

2

24

3

4

4

1

1

6

1

6

2

1

1

11

1

4

12

4

5

3

2

1

13

3.2 Unimportant

22

12

6

3

6

8

21

4 SESSIONS

25

19

4.1 WITH DECISIONS

22

- Ordinary

3.1 Important \J
- Strengthening
- Weakening

i _

4

2

l_i

1

1

3

2

2

47

5

4

6

15

7

9

4

4

5

7

36

16

35

4

4

4

12

7

8

4

4

5

6

34

13

11

16

3

1

2

6

3

4

3

3

2

2

17

- Extraordinary

9

5

19

1

3

2

6

4

4

1

1

3

4

17

4.2 WITHOUT DECISIONS

3

3

12

1

2

3

1

2

2

1

1

1

- Ordinary
- Extraordinary
5. 1/4
6. 1/4.1

[

3

3

10

3.24

2.89

1.81

4.00

3.68

3.44

2.43

5.00

1

1
2

2

1

2.75

1.83

2.80

3.00

3.77

4.50

5.50

3.80

2.28

3.61

2.75

2.75

3.50

3.00

4.25

4.50

5.50

3.80 32.66

3.82

1

1/ Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress of the principal mechanisms of the Andean process.
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-33; Actas de la Comisidn.
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Between 1990 and 1995, of the 129 decisions adopted by the Commission, 57
were important, and 72 were not. Examples of the important decisions were: Decision
258 implementing the Strategic Design approved in Galapagos, Ecuador; Decision 281
implementing the deepening of the Strategic Design approved in La Paz, Bolivia,
November of 1990; Decisions 260 and 273 modifying the CMET; Decision 263
withdrawing products from the list of products reserved for industrial programming;
Decision 271 approving the Andean road system; Decisions 282 to 285, and 330
harmonizing some trade policies; and Decision 293 on norms of origin; Decisions 335
and 370 adopting the CET; Decisions 350, 357 and 365 modifying the CET; and
Decisions 340 and 341 reducing the debts of the member countries owed to the Junta and
the Tribunal.67
The slow down of the process from 1993 on is shown by the fact that of the 56
decisions approved between this year and in 1995, only 15 were important. This situation
is also illustrated by the fact that for the first time in Andean history, eight decisions
were adopted with the abstention of Peru and/or Ecuador;68 that for the first time ever

“ Examples of unimportant decisions adopted by the Commission were (besides naming members of
the Junta, and approving budgets): Decisions 276 and 328 related to agricultural cooperation; Decision 290
approving the Andean insurance policy for international road transportation; Decision 337 on rules for
importing used clothes; Decision 342 recognizing the Andean Association of Enterprises and Institutions
of Water and Sewage; and Decision 351 on common rules for copyrights.
“ Decisions in which Peru abstained from voting, in accordance with Decision 321 (temporary and
partial withdrawal of Peru), were: Decision 322: Rules to negotiate trade agreements with Latin American
and Caribbean countries; Decision 324: Guidelines for the CET, the tariff reduction program, and
incentives for intrasubregional trade; Decision 330: Elimination of subsidies and harmonization of
incentives to intrasubregional trade; Decision 335: The CET; Decision 357: Modification of the CET;
Decision 370 adopting the last version of the CET; and Decision 371 approving the flexible tariff system
for agricultural products. Ecuador abstained from voting on Decision 281 related to the deepening the tariff
reduction program after the presidential meeting in La Paz, Bolivia.
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two proposals of the Junta were vetoed by Peru and on one of them Ecuador
abstained;69 and that one proposal was approved with Peru’s negative vote.70
From the foregoing analysis, as expected by the hypothesis of this study, it can
be concluded that during the last phase of progress, the activity of the Commission was
greater than during a phase of stagnation.

4.S.- The long-term economic aims of the member countries and the Andean Group
As in the previous chapters, in this section the member countries’ relevant long
term economic goals, as defined and changed by their governments, will be compared
with the new aims of the Cartagena Agreement. These new aims as stated at the
beginning of this chapter are: primacy of the market, export-oriented industrialization,
and the increased role of foreign investment. The similarity between the Andean aims
and the goals of the governments during the phase of progress, and the dissimilarity
during the phase of stagnation will constitute, as anticipated by this research project, a
owerful explanation for the stagnation and the progress in the process.71

a) Colombia
Between 1987 and 1990, that is for the phase of stagnation, 1987-1989,

^ e r u vetoed Proposal 245/Mod. 2 on the CET on June 1992. Ecuador abstained and Peru also vetoed
Proposal 251.Mod. 2 on deepening the Andean integration process in June 1992.
70Decision 320 on air transportation.
71Following the practice of the preceding chapters Colombia has been analyzed alone, while Peru has
been paired with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador. The rationale for this is the similarities in their
levels of development, and their economic policies.
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Colombia72 continued with its development model of "efficient industrialization." This
meant periodic adjustments of the dollar to compensate for the rise in domestic costs,
credit and tax incentives for exports, and gradual liberalization of imports, coupled with
a cautious handling of fiscal and monetary policies (ECLA, 1989b: 207), and the
increasing role of the market. In the development plan for 1987-90 (Plan de Economia
Social), the role of the state was diminished, the privatization of public enterprises was
proposed, and the tariff reduction program was accelerated (JUNAC, 1991a: 74).
In February 1990, the outgoing government of Colombia unveiled the
"Modernization Program for the Colombian Economy," (Programa de modernization de
la economia colombiana). Its basic objective was to integrate Colombia into the
international economy by gradually increasing its competitiveness through trade
liberalization (Zapata, 1991: 40; IDB, 1990: 83; IDB, 1991: 61, 63). "It was based on
the consensus that, in order to recover from the growth rates of the 1980s, a different
development strategy was needed" (Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 15).
This program was continued by President Gaviria (1990-1994) which took office
in August of 1990 (IDB, 1991: 61). His development plan for 1991-1994, entitled
Peaceful Revolution (La Revolution Pacifica) in addition, emphasized investment in
export infrastructure (EIU, 1992b: 9), and the reduction of state intervention in the
economy (Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 15; ECLA, 1994: 85). He "opted for greater and
more rapid liberalisation ... The overall strategy [was] letting markets determine prices,
opening up to external competition and allowing more foreign participation in the

^For accounts of Colombia’s economic reform see Urrutia, (comp.) 1993; Urrutia, 1994; Lora, (ed.)
1991; Lora and Crane (eds.) 1991; Thorp, 1991.
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economy..." (EIU, 1992f: 4). The 1994-1998 Plan under the new administration of the
also Liberal Ernesto Samper Pizano, continues along the lines of his predecessor.
In short, Colombian administrations have been moving toward a neo-liberal
model. This process was accelerated between 1990 and 1994. Colombia, thus, was
supportive of the primacy of markets, of export-oriented industrialization, and of a
greater role for foreign investment in these last two phases of the Andean process.

b) Peru and Venezuela
Peru, between 1987 and July 1990, the last

three years of the Garcia

Administration,73 saw the end of the "heterodox" economic model based on the
expansion of consumption (1987-1988) and the application of orthodox programs without
external support (1988-1990). These years were "a lacklustre [sic] period of policy
making leading to considerable demoralization" (Thorp, 1991: 137). During this period,
attempts were made to reactivate industry through increasing protection.74 At the same
time, foreign direct investment continued to be under the rules of Decision 24 even
though they were already relaxed in May 1987 (JUNAC, 1991a: 76-77).
"The new government [headed by Alberto Fujimori, 1990-1995] had two main
economic objectives: to stabilize the economy and to achieve the reintegration of Peru
into the international financial community" (IDB, 1991: 147). It launched a drastic

^For the political and economic conditions of Peru since the 1980s see: Apoyo, 1992; Crabtree, 1992;
Escobal, 1992; Graham, 1992; Paredes and Sachs, 1991; Pastor and Wise, 1992; Rudolph, 1992; Thorp,
1991.
74"In 1986, ... [a] wide range of imports was also banned [in Peru] to encourage further import
substitution and promote local manufactures" (EIU, 1990d: 8).
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stabilization program based on closing the fiscal deficit through a substantial real increase
of the price of gasoline and of public utility rates; the elimination of all subsidies and
price controls; the replacement of the multiple exchange rate system by a marketdetermined floating exchange; the elimination of import licensing procedures, tariff
exemptions, and non-tariff barriers; the reduction of customs tariffs; the simplification
of the tariff structure; and the elimination of all restrictions to foreign investment (IDB,
1991: 7-8, 147-148; 1992: 164; EIU, 1992d: 9).75
In longer terms, the government adopted "a new pattern of economic development
based on efficiency, modernization, and international competitiveness, gradually
eliminating foreign trade difficulties ... The state [furthermore] must provide guidance,
not implement productive activities" (Fujimori, 1993 [1995]: 442-443). The new
constitution approved in 1993, ”enshrine[d] the principles of the free market economy,
[and] reduced the role of the state ... (EIU, 1995d: 6). During the 1990s, industrial
development was to be based on technological modernization, efficiency, competitiveness
and quality. The aim was to develop production lines in the areas in which Peru has
comparative advantages (Portocarrero, 1991: 6-8).
To summarize, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Peru was clearly not
supportive of any of the new aims of the Andean Pact. Between 1990 and the present,
Pem supported the three main objectives.

7sThese actions led to a 397 percent inflation rate for the month of August 1990 (when the first, and
most drastic, set of economic measures was instituted); and to an annual inflation of 12,378 percent for
1990. Both figures were records (EIU, I992d: 9).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

347

Venezuela, between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation),76 was guided by
its seventh Development Plan (1986-1989). Some of its objectives were to stimulate
private domestic and foreign investment, to continue government participation in
production, and to further a more efficient import substitution industrialization.
Soon after he took office for the second time in February 1989, President Carlos
Andres Perez launched a comprehensive and drastic program of structural change. He
decided to shift from inward- to outward-oriented economic development, giving
substantial room to non-traditional exports, private enterprise and market forces (de
Janvry et at., 1994: 123). The program
included ... elimination of all import restrictions, and reduction of tariffs to a
narrow band; elimination of all exchange controls and adoption of a free floating
rate... compatible with the development of non traditional exports; price
liberalization; the restructuring of the public sector ... and privatization of
parastatal [sic] enterprises; a comprehensive tax reform; ... and the elimination
of restrictions on foreign investment; ... (Rodriguez, 1994: 378).
In harmony with the new strategy of development, the eighth five-year plan,
1989-1994, mapped a switch to an outward, market oriented strategy for the 1990s (EIU,
1993e: 9). With regard to industrial development, the plan emphasized exports, a
diminished role of the state and of public investment, and the privatization of non
strategic public enterprises (JUNAC, 1991a: 77).
Political instability from early 1992 on, prevented implementation of these

7sFor analyses of the political economy of Venezuela see de Janvry, 1994; Naim, 1993; and Perry and
Bailey, 1994.
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measures.77 In 1994 and 1995, the new Venezuelan government found itself imposing
exchange controls and other anti-free market measures reversing the liberalization
process, and unsuccessfully applied nine economic programs (EIU, 1995e: 10; LAWR,
WR-94-35, September 15, 1994: 418; Moffett, 1995: A10).
Between 1987 and 1989 Venezuela was supportive of a greater role of foreign
investment, but was not supportive of export-oriented industrialization or the primacy of
the market. During the phase of progress (1989-1995), the administration supported the
three aims of the Andean Pact. This support lasted until 1994, when dictated by the
circumstances, controls were placed on market mechanisms, while support of the other
two objectives continued.
In conclusion, Peru and Venezuela were not supportive of market mechanisms and
export-oriented industrialization during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989). In this
phase, Peru was also not supportive of a greater role for foreign investment, while
Venezuela supported it. In the next phase, both countries supported all three aims, except
for Venezuela which did not support market mechanisms.

c) Bolivia and Ecuador
From 1987 to 1990 the stabilization programs, tax reform and economic

^In February and November 1992 there were two attempts to overthrow the president. In May 1993
Congress voted to strip President Carlos Andres Perez of his judicial immunity after the Supreme Court
found grounds to charge him with corruption in connection with government secret funds used to pay
security guards of the President of Nicaragua, Violeta Chamorro. He was replaced by the President of the
Senate, Octavio Lepage, until June 1993 when Congress elected the independent senator Ramon Jose
Velasquez, as interim president. In September 1993 Congress suspended Carlos Andres Perez from the
presidency indefinitely (EIU, 1995e: 4). In February 1994, independent Rafael Caldera, a former Christian
Democrat president, took power.
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revitalization efforts in Bolivia,78 introduced in August 1985, provided for an economic
system in which prices were determined by market forces and private-sector participation
in the economy was encouraged (IDB, 1990: 62).
At the beginning of 1990, the new Bolivian government issued four decrees
ratifying its determination to continue the process of liberalizing the economy to promote
private investment, to privatize public enterprises, and to decentralize the state
administrative system. Between 1990 and 1992, Bolivia continued to apply measures
aimed at its economic stability and reform of institutional framework in order to promote
private sector development (IDB, 1991: 43; 1993: 45).
The present government (1993-1997) headed by president Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada (Minister of Planning in charge of the liberalization of the Bolivian economy
during the Paz Estenssoro administration), continued the same neo-liberal strategy of
development. Special emphasis has been given to the capitalization of public enterprises
through investment of private capital, or their transfer to the private sector under a
conventional privatization arrangement (IDB, 1994: 46; Hendrix, 1995: A15).
In short, since 1985, when Bolivia adopted a neo-liberal development strategy,
this country has supported the three new aims of the Andean Group.
The Ecuadorean development plan of 1985-1988 proposed the reduction of state
participation in the economy, and to limit its role to provide clear and stable rules; it also
aimed at increasing the participation of the private economic actors in the development

^For an analysis of the reforms see Morales, 1992.
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process (JUNAC, 1991a: 75).79
The collapse of the price of oil in 1986 from $25 to $12 a barrel, the March 1987
earthquake, which cut Ecuador’s oil production and exports for six months, and political
instability brought, "[b]y early 1988, large budget deficits, and growing inflation [which]
forced the reimplantation [sic] of import restrictions and a multi-tiered exchange rate..."
(de Janvry et at., 1994: 73).®°
Within days of taking office in August 1988, the administration of Rodrigo Boija
announced stem measures to stabilize the economy. By the end of 1989 the government
began to shift from stabilization to a growth-oriented program based on the
encouragement of non-oil exports, private sector initiative and investment, and a market
oriented approach. Some of the goals were trade liberalization, and increased
competitiveness (EIU, 1993c: 9; de Janvry et at., 1994: 79; IDB, 1991: 81).
The new [Ecuadorean] administration, headed by the pro-market Sixto
Duran- Ballen [1992-1996], moved as quickly as its predecessor in instituting
reform when it came to power in August 1992. Sweeping fiscal reforms were
announced including a major privatisation programme, the country’s long-delayed
entry into the Andean Pact free trade area was implemented and, in January 1993,
a new foreign investment code was announced (EIU, 1993c: 9).
The aims of the program were to improve economic efficiency through trade
liberalization, market competition and foreign investment; through a substantial
79For details of the political economy of Ecuador see de Janvry et al, 1994.
“ Political problems made President Febres Cordero weaker. In January 1987 he was abducted by air
force paratroopers who successfully demanded the release of the leader of the March 1986 Air Force
revolt. Later Congress voted to demand his resignation, and forced the resignation of several of his
ministers. Another factor which eroded public support for Febres Cordero’s program o f free competition
was the increasing political opposition from the political parties, from the opposition controlled Congress,
and from private entrepreneurial groups. "The positive results of the liberalisation programme were
ultimately undermined not only by external conditions but also by the president’s attempts to bolster
political support and salvage his image through large public works investment" (de Janvry et at., 1994:
73).
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restructuring of the public sector, and the dismantling of the interventionist state (IDB,
1993: 85; LAWR, WR-93-32, August 19, 1993: 375).
In summary, Ecuador during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), was not
supportive of market mechanisms or export-oriented industrialization. A greater role for
foreign investment, however, was supported by the Ecuadorean government. In the phase
of progress, 1989-1995 Ecuador supported the three aims of the Cartagena Agreement.
Bolivia and Ecuador supported a greater role of foreign investment during the
phase of stagnation (1987-1989). Bolivia supported the other two objectives but Ecuador
did not. In the other phase both countries supported all the aims.
In brief, the five countries were almost equally divided in supporting and not
supporting the new aims of the Cartagena Agreement during the phase of stagnation. The
primacy of the market and export-oriented industrialization were not supported by three
of the five countries; while the greater role of foreign investment was supported by four
of them. In the next phase, governments supported the three Andean objectives, except
for Venezuela which did not support the primacy of the market (see table VII.13).

4.6.- The economic policies of the Andean countries
After the changes brought by the Quito Protocol and the presidential accords, the
most important mechanisms became: tariff reduction program, common external tariff,
and policy harmonization. The similarities or dissimilarities between these mechanisms
and the economic policies of the member countries, as in the other chapters, will provide
evidence to substantiate the claim of this study that these similarities or the lack of them
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TABLE VII.13
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 1987-1995

ANDEAN AIMS

CO

PE

VE

BO

EC

TOTALS

STAGNATION (1987-1989)
Primacy of market mechanisms
Export-oriented industrialization
Greater role of foreign investment

s
s
s

N

N

S

N

2S

3N

N

N

N

2S

3N

N

s

s
s

s

4S

IN

8S

7N

4S

IN

PROGRESS (1990-1995)
Primacy of market mechanisms
Export-oriented industrialization
Greater role of foreign investment

s
s
s

s
s
s

N
S

s

s
s
s

S

s
s

5S
5S
14S

S = Supportive

IN

N = Not supportive

explain progress or stagnation, respectively, of the Andean process.

a) The case of policy harmonization
Trade policies (especially tariff reductions) as well as trade figures constitute the
main elements to contrast the governments’ policies with the Andean mechanisms of the
tariff reduction program and CET. In the case of policy harmonization, many policies
are involved, such as monetary, fiscal, financial, and exchange policies, as well as
policies directly affecting trade, i.e. subsidies to exports, drawbacks, special regimes for
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exports and imports, dumping, etc. As is clear from the discussion of policy
harmonization at the Andean level (section 2.6 of this chapter), little progress was made
regarding policies directly related to trade, and practically no progress was made in
harmonizing other policies. This reflects the difficulty of handling the implementation of
this mechanism, the lack of enthusiasm by the member countries to support it, and their
unwillingness to limit their sovereignty and their national interests.
It is possible, however, to distinguish different attitudes of the governments during
the last two phases the Andean process. During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), the
member countries were quite comfortable with the relaxed provisions on policy
harmonization introduced by the Quito Protocol.81 Governments were still grappling
with stabilization measures and finding ways to reestablish growth. In this situation, they
were interested in having the greatest control over the economic tools. Suffice is to say
that even intra-Andean trade restrictions were maintained in these years. In this phase all
the governments were indifferent to policy harmonization.
In the first years of the phase of progress (1989-1992), the Andean presidents
supported the pursuit of some policy harmonization. This limited support was based on
the need to eliminate distortions in the intra-Andean trade.82 It was at this time that

81"... until 1988, economic policy harmonization had a limited development" (JUNAC, 1992d: 1).
c The need to have some policy harmonization is the direct result of the aim of the governments to
pursue an efficient international integration, in which subregional integration is the stepping stone. In order
for the Andean Group, then, to be an experimental area, the member countries have to create free trade
conditions within the subregion (as if trade was conducted within each country). To accomplish it, they
need to eliminate intra-trade barriers, to have a common external tariff, and to eliminate distortions in trade
due to the pursuit of different economic policies. In other words, ideally, to have free trade, an economic
union has to be created. This would include the harmonization of economic policies. This is far beyond
what any government is willing to accept as shown by the European Union. It is not a surprise that policy
harmonization is so difficult to pursue, even at its initial stage, when the immediate aim is to neutralize the
most glaring distorting effects its absence produces in the intra-Andean trade.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

354

policy harmonization made some progress, reflecting the rapid economic liberalization
of Colombia, Peru and Venezuela.
From the last quarter of 1992 to 1995, however, no important decisions were
approved to harmonize policies. Most member countries became again indifferent to it
since they were not ready to reduce further their control of these instruments. The
exception was Peru, which not only supported but demanded a radical harmonization of
foreign trade instruments along the lines of its national policies. Because Peru did not
succeed, it refused to support the other two mechanisms during this later part of phase
of progress. This situation is shown in table VII. 19. The phase of progress is therefore
divided in Progress (1990-1992) and Slow Progress (1993-1995).
Given the above discussion, the analysis of policy harmonization will not be
treated separately below. Suffice it to say that all the governments, except for Peru, kept
an array of incentives to promote their exports to both the other Andean members, and
to third countries.83 All Andean countries also applied other economic policies quite

“The 1991 Colombian new foreign trade law created the Council of Foreign Trade in charge of
designing the policies, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of the implementation. The Exports
Promotion Institution (PROEXPO) was replaced by the Colombian International Trade Bank (BANCOLDEX)
in charge of financing and promoting exports, and offering other financial services (EIU, 1992b: 39;
Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 17; Lora, 1992: 174-175).
In August 1990, Venezuelan incentive payments in the form of fiscal credits for non-traditional
exports were lowered from 30 percent to 5 percent of fob value for manufactures and to 6 percent to
agricultural products. In 1991 the export subsidy was replaced by an import drawback system (EIU, I995e:
47; IDB, 1991: 172).
"In March 1991 a new [Bolivian] export code, Regimen Nacional de Exportaciones, came into
effect. It introduced ... a "drawback" mechanism (to devolve import dues on goods to be re-exported)
effectively reducing further the remaining modest export incentives" (EIU, 1993a: 32). In April 1992, "a
single window" to facilitate and centralize export procedures in a single office was established. On July
1992 the Ministry of Exports and External Competitiveness was created (IDB, 1993: 45).
In September 1990, the CERTEX and FENT (the most important exports subsidies in Peru) were
eliminated (Paredes, 1994: 232; Escobal, 1992 : 252).
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differently.84 The bottom line was that Andean governments, except Pern’s, had chosen
not to pursue policy harmonization earnestly because it would limit their sovereignty in
economic policies.85

b) Colombia
b .l) The tariff reduction program .- Colombian exports to the other Andean countries,
after increasing by 44 percent in 1987, decreased for the next two years by 12 and 14
percent (see table VII. 14). Except for 1994, exports increased in each of the years of the
phase of progress, 1991 being the year in which it increased by an outstanding 109
percent, followed by an impressive 30 percent increase in 1992.

MFor example, member countries had quite different and changing exchange policies and exchange
systems. The exchange system in Colombia became less and less regulated by the Central Bank from 1990
on. By the end of 1990 a new law on foreign exchange replaced the one existing since 1967. The aims
were to liberalize exchange operations, and increase market influence. It allowed holdings abroad by
nationals, and abolished the Central Bank monopoly on currency transactions (EIU, 1991f: 10; Lora, 1992:
168). The Central Bank, however fixed the exchange rate in daily basis until January 1994, when it was
replaced by a free market system (EIU, 1995b: 8).
From 1978 to 1985 a system of minidevaluations was applied in Peru. From 1985 to 1990 a
multiple tier exchange rate (which had up to ten different rates in a given period) was applied. In August
1990, the new government returned to a free market determined exchange rate.
The adjustment package introduced in Venezuela by the Perez administration in early 1989
included a single, freely floating rate and the removal of all restrictions of access to foreign exchange (EIU,
1990e: 9). By May 1994, this system was replaced by rationed auctions of foreign exchange to stem the
massive loss of reserves but it created many exchange rates. From June on a comprehensive exchange
control was imposed with a single fixed rate, and parallel market transactions were forbidden (LAWR,
WR-94-18, May 19, 1994: 205; WR-94-25, July 7, 1994:289; WR-94-26, July 14, 1994: 301; WR-94-27,
July 21, 1994: 314; WR-95-24, 1995: 287, EIU, 1995e: 9).
In Bolivia, since August 1985 the official rate has been allowed to float more or less freely (EIU,
1993a: 8).
From 1971 to 1992, Ecuador has had a multiple exchange rate system. It has gone from a two tier
to a four-tier system, and since 1988 it is a three-tier system. Minidevaluations and periodical
maxidevaluations have been the method to adjust the exchange rate. Since November 1992, the government
allowed exporters and importers to trade their currencies in the free market, which in practice led to the
floating of the sucre (EIU, 1993c: 7).
“This, of course, leads to the vicious circle of not pursuing policy harmonization because the Andean
market is too small, and that the Andean market is too small because policy harmonization is not pursued.
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TA BLE VII. 14
COLOM BIA: AN D EA N TR A D E 1987-1994

Phase->

STAGNATION
1987

1988

PROGRESS
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Mil lions of dollars)
GRAN

405.0

358.1

309.3

372.8

778.4

1.014.4

1,139.0

1,109.8

World

5,024.4

5,026.2

5,739.4

6,765.0

7,244.3

7,071.7

7,123.5

8,407.9

IMPORTS (FOB) (Mil ions of dollars)
GRAN

227.9

328.2

383.4

473.6

475.8

647.7

1,297.6

1,541.8

World

4,228.0

5,005.3

5,010.5

5,588.5

4,967.0

6,513.0

9,841.0

11,855.7

302.6

366.7

(159.0)

(432.0)

2,277.3

558.7

(2,717.6)

(3,447.7)

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN

177.1

29.9

(74.1)

World

796.5

21.0

729.0

(100.8)
1,176.5

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

8.06

7.12

5.39

5.51

10.75

14.34

15.98

13.20

Imports

5.39

6.56

7.65

8.47

9.58

9.95

13.19

13.01

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN

43.95

-11.59

-13.60

20.50

108.82

30.31

12.51

-2.53

World

-1.63

0.04

14.19

17.87

7.08

-2.38

0.73

18.03

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN

.-8.39

44.03

16.83

23.51

0.47

36.13

100.33

18.82

World

9.76

18.38

0.10

11.54

-11.12

31.12

51.10

20.47

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28,
30, 40 and author’s calculations.

The share of Andean exports out of the total Colombian exports, surpassed the
10 percent barrier in 1991, and since then has continue to increase. The share of imports,
also increased, but below that of exports. For Colombia the Andean market was growing
in importance. Therefore the government supported the tariff reduction program during
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this period (1987-1995). This support was more intense during the phase of progress
(1989-1995), since it coincided with the liberalization of Colombia’s international trade.
Support for this mechanism also stemmed from the Colombian long-term policy of
promoting its exports.

b.2) Common external tariff.- Between 1987 and 1989, the Colombian government
increased its trade restrictions to third countries. The percentage of dutiable items under
import control increased from 55 percent in 1987 to 60 percent in 1989 (Urrutia, 1994:
291). These restrictions increased Colombia’s indifference to the approval of a CET,
since it would have resulted in a drastic and rapid reduction in the protection of domestic
production via elimination of import controls.
From February 1990 to 1992, the government implemented a program of tariff
reduction. By May 1993 there were concentrated in four tariff levels: 5, 10, 15 and 20
percent. Agricultural products were protected by a system of variable tariffs. During
1991, the government eliminated non-tariffs barriers to imports, and the import surcharge
was brought down to 8 percent. The average tariff went down to 11.8 percent, in May
1992 from 44.5 percent in December of 1989 (see table VII.5). The 75 percent tariff
applied to automobiles was reduced to 35 percent after accords with Ecuador and
Venezuela in November 1993. Since 1992, tariffs have remained without major variations
(EIU, 1990b: 36; 1992b: 38; JUNAC, 1991: 8; IDB, 1991: 63-64; Fleischer and Lora,
1994: 16; Urrutia, 1994: 291, 296).
The acceleration of the opening of the Colombian market to foreign competition,
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and the acceleration of the Andean trade liberalization process from 1990 on, established
an increasing willingness by Colombia to adopt a CET. This support was conditional on
the adoption of a CET quite similar to the Colombian tariff structure. This was the case,
since the CET discussed in 1991 and 1992, had "tariffs slightly lower than those adopted
by Colombia in August 1991" (Ocampo, 1994: 146). The CET finally adopted in
November 1994, included criteria which reflected Colombia’s interests. In brief,
Colombia was supportive of the adoption of the CET during the phase of progress.
Summarizing, Colombia, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989) was
supportive only of the tariff reduction program, and indifferent to the CET and to policy
harmonization. During the subsequent phase, Colombia supported the tree principles, but
it became indifferent to policy harmonization from 1993 on.

c) Peru and Venezuela
c.l) The tariff reduction program .- Although Peruvian exports to the Andean countries
grew during most of the years from 1987 to 1994, imports grew faster. This resulted in
a growing trade deficit with its Andean partners (see table VII. 15). The government of
Peru, therefore, did not support the tariff reduction program during the phase of
stagnation (1987-1989), and from 1992 to 1995.
Between 1989 and 1992, Peru, however, was supportive of the tariff reduction
program. Support in 1989 was due to the fact that President Garcia’s party had an
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TA B LE VII. 15
PERU: A N D EA N T R A D E 1987-1994

Phase-> |
|

STAGNATION
1987 |

1988

PROGRESS
1989

1990

|

1991

1992

1993

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran
World

157.0

188.6

196.2

214.0

269.4

269.6

2,476.9

2,645.9

3,437.8

3,312.7

3,329.0

3,484.4

3,341.0

4,361.4

269.1

310.1

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of clollars)
Gran
World

242.2

302.4

240.9

340.6

546.3

567.8

522.2

645.8

3,247.3

2,736.9

2,121.4

2,634.0

3,291.3

3,647.8

4,191.1

5,628.5

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran

(85.1)

(113.8)

World

(770.4)

(91-0)

(44.7)
1,316.4

(126.6)

(276.8)

(298.2)

(253.1)

(335.6)

678.8

37.7

(163.4)

(846.7)

(1,267.2)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

6.34

7.13

5.71

6.46

8.09

7.74

8.05

7.11

Imports

7.46

11.05

11.35

12.93

16.60

15.57

12.46

11.47

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran

7.71

20.11

4.02

9.09

25.89

0.06

-0.19

15.26

World

4.99

6.82

29.93

-3.64

0.49

4.67

-4.02

30.41

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran

45.45

24.87

-20.35

41.40

60.39

3.94

-8.03

23.67

World

33.58

-15.72

-22.49

24.16

24.96

10.83

14.89

34.30

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 30,
40 and author’s calculations.

ideology which backed Latin American political and economic union,86 and that the

“ Garcia’s party (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) was founded by Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre in Mexico, in May 1924 as a Latin American movement. The "APRA movement ... stressed
the political union of Latin America and the solidarity with all the peoples and oppressed classes of the
world (Chang-Rodriguez, 1988: 4), as well as concerted actions against Yankee imperialism, land and
industry nationalization, and the internationalization of the Panama Canal (Haddox, 1989: 61-62).
"In our platform of Latin American economic and political unity, we have synthesized Bolivar’s
immortal phase: ‘Union, union adored America, or else Anarchy will devour you’" (Haya de la Torre,
1931 [1995]: 241).
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implementation of the acceleration of tariff reductions would occur only after he had left
office. In 1990, the drastic program of opening the Peruvian market to international
competition went beyond the Andean trade liberalization accords of 1989 and 1990,
creating no objections for Peru in supporting them. By 1991, Peru showed its
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in policy harmonization by delaying the
finalization of its tariff reduction process until July 1992. In August of 1992, Peru
obtained its temporary withdrawal from the Andean Group, which signaled, among other
things, its lack of support of this mechanism.
Venezuelan trade with Andean countries increased during most years from 1987
to 1994 (see table VII. 16). Exceptions were the reduction of exports of only 3 percent
in 1991, and imports by 40 percent in 1989 and by 7 percent in 1993. Its Andean trade
balance showed surpluses in all years, except for 1988, when it was $55 million deficit.
With these trade results Venezuela was supportive of the tariff reduction program in these
phases. Moreover, tariff reductions and the opening of the domestic market in Venezuela
were accelerated from 1989 on, providing increased support to Andean trade
liberalization.87

c.2) Common external tariff.- From 1983 until mid-1990 Peruvian import duties
increased. By December 1989 tariffs averaged 45.2 percent. Surcharges raised to 72
percent. Exemptions and rebates, however, were widespread. Moreover, many items

^Between 1987 and 1993 Venezuelan oil exports to the Andean countries went from as low as $15
million in 1989, to as high as $106 million in 1991. These figures constituted 5 percent and 22 percent of
the Venezuelan exports to its Andean partners (JUNAC, 1994b: 1, 5).
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TA BLE V II. 16
VENEZUELA: A N D EA N TRA D E 1987-1994

Phase->

STAGNATION
[_ 1987

}

PROGRESS

1988

1989

1990

|

1991

|

1992

1993

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of do lars)
Gran
World

215.1

220.7

300.1

493.7

478.8

665.8

1,045.3

1,426.4

10,538.7

9,957.7

12,913.8

17,692.1

15,219.3

14,184.3

15,459.0

16,717.5

IMPORTS (FOB) (Mi lions of do lars)
Gran
World

199.9

275.6

166.9

234.6

428.2

617.6

573.1

495.3

9,765.3

12,864.8

7,732,5

7,268.6

11,046.1

13,154.4

11,639.9

8,400.8

TRADE BALANCE (1Millions of dollars)
Gran
World

15.2

(54.9)

133.2

259.1

50.6

48.2

472.2

931.1

773.4

(2,907.2)

5,181.2

10,423.5

4,173.2

1,029.9

3,819.0

8,316.7

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Expons

2.04

2.22

2.32

2.79

3.15

4.69

6.76

8.53

Impons

2.05

2.14

2.16

3.23

3.88

4.70

4.93

5.90

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran

33.63

2.62

35.98

64.50

-3.02

39.07

56.99

36.46

World

21.64

-5.51

29.69

37.00

-13.98

-6.80

8.99

8.14

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran

27.11

37.90

-39.44

40.54

82.54

44.25

-7.21

-13.56

World

13.62 L

31.74

-39.89

-6.00

51.97

19.09

-11.51

-27.83

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28,
30, 40 and author’s calculations.

were prohibited from importation. By 1990 there were 661 such items including most
locally produced consumer goods (EIU, 1990d: 36-37).88

“ "By the end of the Garcia Administration [July 1990] the most important feature of the tariff structure
was the multiplicity of rates and their wide dispersion. [There were] 56 different gross tariff rates ranging
from 10 to 110 percent. ... A second important feature was the multiplicity of exemptions about—fifty
types of special customs regimes existed ... In addition an overvalued currency disproportionately [sic]
increased the competitiveness of foreign goods, ..." (Paredes, 1994: 227-228).
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In September 1990 the recently elected government of Alberto Fujimori launched
a sweeping overhaul of the foreign trade system. The majority of the quantitative
restrictions were removed, the number of tariff rates was reduced from 56 to 3 (15, 25,
and 50 percent), and most tariff exemptions were eliminated. In March 1991 the number
of tariff rates was reduced to two: 15 and 25 percent, and it will eventually be only one,
of 15 percent (EIU, 1991d: 37; Paredes, 1994: 230, 250; Marquez: El). The average
tariff of Peru dropped to 16 percent in mid-1993, when all subsidies and non-tariff
barriers were eliminated (LAWR, WR-94-06, February 17, 1994: 64). In 1994 almost
98 percent of imports had a 15 percent rate. The only exception was the flexible
surcharge on certain basic foods to temporarily protect local farmers (EIU, 1995d: 39).
Between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation), Peru was indifferent to the
approval of the CET because Peru had a multiplicity of tariff rates, exemptions, and
import controls in its tariff schedule. From 1989 to 1992, the Peruvian government was
supportive of a CET with three levels (instead of the two levels of its domestic tariff),
and very few exceptions to the general rule; in exchange Peru wanted a quick and full
harmonization of some economic policies. From 1992 on, Peru did not support the CET
because the aforementioned demands were not met by its partners.
From 1987 to 1989, Venezuela continued with its existing import system
protecting domestic production with high tariffs and an array of non-tariff barriers. This
system was not conducive to the support of the CET.
An import liberalization program was announced in mid-1989 by the Venezuelan
government, under which protective tariffs were to be lowered progressively, and tariff
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exemptions eliminated over a four-year period. The final tariff structure included four
rates: 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent. The negotiations within the Andean Pact accelerated the
original timetable, finishing the process by early 1992. The average rate fell from 31
percent in 1988 to less than 12 percent in 1992 (see table VII.5). By the beginning of
1992 quantitative restrictions were practically eliminated (EIU, 1990e: 40; 1993e: 43;
ECLA, 1994: 446). The exception was the automobile sector which in September 1991
its tariff rate was cut from 40% to 25%. The tariff, was increased in November 1993 to
35 percent as part of the accord with Colombia and Ecuador (EIU, 1993e: 27; JUNAC,
1995: 3).
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Venezuela was indifferent to the
adoption of the CET but from 1989 on it supported its approval. The tariff structure
aimed at by the Venezuelan reform was quite similar to that of the CET proposed by the
Junta. These similarities were: four basic rates, and special treatment of automobiles.
Support by Venezuela of the CET, was, thus, established.
To recapitulate, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Peru and Venezuela
were indifferent to the approval of the CET and of policy harmonization. Peru was not
supportive of the tariff reduction program and Venezuela was. Between 1989 and 1992,
the two countries were supportive of the three mechanisms. Between 1992 and 1995
(slow progress), Peru supported only policy harmonization and Venezuela supported the
tariff reduction program and the CET, and was indifferent to policy harmonization.
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d) Bolivia and Ecuador
d .l) The tariff reduction program.- Bolivian trade increased during the years of 1987
to 1994 except for 1988 when exports decreased by 10 percent, and 1987 when imports
decreased by 12 percent (see table VII. 17). Its trade balance with the rest of the Andean
subregion was positive in all years. These results compare favorably with Bolivia’s
performance with the rest of the world. Rates of growth of both Andean exports and
imports were higher than the rates for total exports and imports in most years. Bolivia
benefitted from intra-Andean trade and because of this, the country was supportive of the
tariff reduction mechanism. Support of the tariff reduction program was reinforced by
the tariff reduction policy pursued by the government from 1985 on, which allowed
Bolivia to quickly eliminate trade barriers to Andean products.
Exports from Ecuador to the rest of the subregion increased in all the years
between 1987 and 1994, except for 1992; while imports decreased in 1988, 1992 and
1993 (see table VII. 18). Its trade balance was negative in 1987, 1991 and 1994. It is also
important to point out, that this country enjoyed incredible rates of increase in its Andean
exports in 1987 (190 percent) and in 1993 (65 percent). In the case of Andean imports,
there was a 240 percent increase in 1987, and a 171 percent in 1994. The Andean Group
as a market for Ecuador’s exports increased quickly from 1992 on, and by 1994 it
represented more than 10 percent of its exports; while imports from the Andean Group
were 14 percent of the total imports.
Ecuador was indifferent to the tariff reduction program between 1989 and 1992,
not only because of its trade results but also because the government was still hesitant
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TABLE VII. 17
BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994

Phase->

|
[

STAGNATION
1987

| 1988

PROGRESS
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran

30.7

27.5

50.0

60.0

82.3

99.6

120.0

196.0

World

569.8

597.4

819.2

922.9

850.8

765.5

751.3

1,040.6

IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran
World

15.4

17.7

21.7

29.9

33.3

40.0

77.5

102.9

766.3

590.5

619.9

702.7

992.4

1,115.0

1,177.0

1,196.4

42.5

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran
World

15.4
(196.5)

9.8

28.3

30.1

49.1

59.6

6.9

199.3

220.3

(141.7)

(349.5)

93.0

(425.6)

(155.8)

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Expons

5.39

4.60

6.10

6.50

9.68

13.00

15.97

18.83

Imports

2.00

3.00

3.50

4.25

3.35

3.59

6.58

8.60

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran

26.64

-10.46

81.81

19.90

37.32

20.93

20.51

63.35

World

-11.02

4.85

37.12

12.67

-7.82

-10.02

-1.85

38.50

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran

-11.70

15.32

22.39

37.79

11.44

20.21

93.67

32.88

World

13.69

-22.94

4.99

13.35

41.23

12.35

5.55

1.65

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28,
30, 40 and author’s calculations.

to quickly open its market to Andean competition. It became supportive of it from 1992
on. Ecuadorean indifference towards this Andean mechanism is corroborated by the
abstention of Ecuador in accelerating the tariff reduction program in both the La Paz
summit in November 1990, and in Cartagena in December 1991. Its support from 1992
on is, on the other hand, reconfirmed by its quick embrace of the tariff reduction
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TABLE VII. 18
ECU A D O R: ANDEAN TR A D E 1987-1994

Phase->

STAGNATION
1987

|

1988

PROGRESS
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

183.0

188.5

203.7

178.2

294.8

385.7

2,353.9

2,714.3

2,851.4

3,056.9

3,061.9

3,725.1

181.7

233.3

172.6

182.7

494.4

1,861.7

2,398.6

2,430.4

2,562.2

3,649.7

5.5

112.1

(108.7)

626.5

499.7

75.4

9.63

10.35

7.13

13.55

1994

EXPORTS (FOB) (Mil lions of do lars)
Gran

125.1

177.1

World

1,927.7

2,192.9

IMPORTS (FOB) (Mil ions of do lars)
Gran
World

309.7

78.1

2,158.1

1,713.5

92.9
1,854.8

TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran

(184.6)

99.0

90.1

6.9

World

(230.4)

479.4

499.1

852.6

(29.6)
452.8

INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports

6.49

8.08

7.77

6.95

7.14

Imports

14.35

4.56

5.01

9.76

9.73

5.83
7.10

RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran

191.32

41.64

3.30

3.02

8.06

-2.55

65.49

30.82

World

-11.81

13.76

7.34

15.31

5.05

7.21

0.16

21.66

RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran
World

239.86

-74.77

18.88

95.55

28.43

-26.01

-5.83

170.62

19.22

-20.60

8.24

0.38

28.84

1.33

5.42

42.44

SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28,
30, 40 and author’s calculations.

program which was part of Ecuador’s newly-adopted neo-liberal strategy of development.

d.2) Common external tariff.- In 1988 the Bolivian authorities continued to eliminate
obstacles to external trade aimed at establishing a regime of free trade (ECLA, 1989b;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

367

151; IDB, 1990: 63). Tariffs were reduced by Bolivia in 1989 and 1991. Capital goods
levies went from 10 to 5 percent, and for other products from 20 to 10 percent, and they
have remained so (JUNAC, 1991k: 8; Marquez, 1995: E l). Because of this policy, and
the fact that other Andean countries from the very beginning accepted that Bolivia would
maintain its own tariffs as part of the CET, this country supported this mechanism during
the last phase of the Andean process. During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989),
however, Bolivia was indifferent to the approval of the CET since it was clear that the
other countries were not ready for it, and that their higher tariffs than those of Bolivia’s
favored this country’s exports.
From 1987 to 1989, the phase of stagnation, Ecuador maintained its foreign trade
under tight control. Import restrictions were reinstalled in 1988, due to balance of
payments problems (de Janvry et al., 1994: 73). This situation made Ecuador indifferent
to the approval of the CET.
Between 1990 and 1992, the Ecuadorean government implemented a program to
liberalize foreign trade. By 1992, the maximum tariff was down to 20 percent, from 290
percent in 1990. Duties on capital goods and certain foods were reduced to 2%; tariffs
on intermediate goods fell to 7-12%; and tariffs on finished goods to 17%.89 The
number of items subject to import controls in 1991 fell from 2,300 to 903 in 1992 (IDB,
1992: 87; 1993: 85; EIU, 1993c: 38-39).
Tariff reductions and trade liberalization brought Ecuador’s tariff system closer
to the CET proposed by the Junta. Ecuador, therefore supported the CET from 1990 on.

“’Data in table VII.6 reflect tariff levels before these changes.
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This support became stronger when, in February 1992, Ecuador presented a list of
products for special tariff treatment which was accepted for negotiation.
The position of Bolivia and Ecuador with regard to the three mechanisms of the
Cartagena Agreement between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation) was as follows:
Both countries were indifferent to the CET and to policy harmonization. Bolivia
supported the tariff reduction program while Ecuador was indifferent. From 1990 to
1992, Bolivia supported all three mechanisms, but Ecuador supported only the CET and
policy harmonization, and continued to be indifferent to the tariff reduction program.
Finally, between 1992 and 1995 (slow progress), the tariff reduction program and the
CET were supported by the two countries while they were indifferent to policy
harmonization.

e) Conclusion
As anticipated by the hypothesis which guides this dissertation, during the phase
of stagnation (1987-1989), governments were mostly indifferent to the main mechanisms
of the Cartagena Agreement. Likewise, in the phase of progress (1989-1992), they were
supportive more between 1990 and 1992 (termed here as progress) than between 1992
and 1995 (slow progress) (see table VII. 19).
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), all the member countries were
indifferent to the approval of the CET and of policy harmonization. In the phase of
progress (1989-1992), the governments were highly supportive of all the mechanisms.
From 1992 on (slow progress) four member countries were supportive of the tariff
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TABLE Vn. 19
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN MECHANISMS AND
NATIONAL POLICIES 1987-1995
ANDEAN MECHANISMS

CO

PE

VE

BO

EC

TOTALS

STAGNATION (1987-1989)
The tariff reduction program

s

N

S

s

I

3S 11 IN

Common external tariff

I

I

I

I

I

51

Policy harmonization

I

I

I

I

I

51
3S 111 IN

PROGRESS (1989-1992)
The tariff reduction program
Common external tariff
Policy harmonization

s
s
s

S
S

s

s
s
s

s
s
s

I

4S

s
s

5S

11

5S
14S

11

4S

IN

4S

IN

SLOW PROGRESS (1993-1995)
N

Common external tariff

s
s

Policy harmonization

I

The tariff reduction program

N

s
s

s
s

s
s

S

I

I

I

IS 41
9S 41 2N

S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

N = Not supportive

reduction program and the approval of the CET, but they were indifferent to policy
harmonization while Peru did not support any mechanism, except policy harmonization.
The outcomes for the phase of progress (1989-1995) show a majority support for
the Andean mechanisms. There are, however, significant differences. As compared to
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the years 1990 to 1992, between 1992 and 1995, countries were more indifferent.
The slow down of the process (1992-1995) was the result of: (a) the unwillingness
of the countries, except for Peru, to pursue economic policy harmonization, (b) The
demand of Peru to have a CET with minimum exceptions to the general rules, and the
unwillingness of the others to follow suit, (c) Peru’s revocation of the tariff reduction
program, while Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela went ahead to create a
customs union among themselves. And (d) the pursuit of Colombia and Venezuela to
integrate with other countries and areas.
All these reasons point to the fact that the slow down of the Andean process was
not the result of the member countries disagreeing with the usefulness of the mechanisms
for furthering their interests (as was the case in the phase of stagnation), but was result
of disagreement about the pace and the depth of the implementation of these mechanisms.
Peru, having gone the farthest, pressed others, but they were reluctant to speed up and
deepen the process.90
This situation clearly corroborates the main aspect of the hypothesis of this
dissertation, namely, that governments consider the Andean Group a tool to further their
national interests. Each government tries to make the implementation of the mechanisms
reflect as much as possible its domestic policies and interests. The outcome depends on
the negotiating skills and the relative power of the country. Peru tried to make its
interests prevail. Being a medium-size country, Peru was not successful and was unable

90It is also possible to consider that Peru does not really want to remain in the Andean Group, and the
obstacles this country is posing to the process is just a preamble for a departure. In this case, this fact
would prove the contention of this research project that governments might decide to leave the process if
the pursue of its objectives are hampered by GRAN.
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to prevent other countries, from going in the direction they wanted. The progress of the
Andean process, however, slowed down.
Support for the mechanisms is shown, and progress of the Andean process is
recorded, even though Peru opposed them. The progress reflects, as expected by the
hypothesis, the interests of the countries, especially of the most powerful ones. This
makes the present progress of the Andean process doubtful in the future, since it is
highly probable that some decisions already approved (e.g., the CET) will have to be
renegotiated to include Peru’s interests, and policy harmonization should be resumed if
this country is going to rejoin the Andean Group.
The first political step towards rejoining was taken during the presidential meeting
in September 1995 (the first since December 1991) in Quito, Ecuador (six months after
the latest border skirmish between Ecuador and Peru).91 Peru agreed, by Decision 377,
to participate only in the Andean free trade zone by January 1996, but only if the
harmonization of the norms of origin, export subsidies, and duty free zones were pursued
(El Comercio, 1995a: E l). Nevertheless, President Fujimori reiterated the existence "of
profound differences among the member countries" related to "subsidies, tariffs, and
especially the different speed with which each country has been reducing its customs
duties" (Gestion, 1995: 3).
Since no substantial progress was made in policy harmonization, in December

9lThe presidents signed the Quito Act (Acta de Quito) creating the Andean Integration System (Sistema
Andino de Integration) in which all the Andean institutions, including the Andean Presidential Council and
the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, become part of it. The Junta is transformed into a
General Secretary. The Quito Act restates that "the Andean subregional integration is one of the principal
means to accelerate economic and social progress of the Latin American countries," and also that there is
a need "to gradually reduce distortions in competition" (JUNAC, 1995e: 1-6; El Comercio, 1995: E8).
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1995, by Decision 387, the Commission eliminated the deadline of January 1996; and
allowed Peru to maintain its tariff policy. Peru, however, agreed to expand its bilateral
trade agreements, especially with Ecuador, even though the other countries could keep
their export subsidies (El Comercio, 1995b: A l; 1995c: El; 1995d: E2; 1995e: E l;
1995f: E l; Rey-Sanchez, 1995: E l; La Republica, 1995 : 9: Lauer, 1995: 6). The
situation which led to the slow down of the process, thus, continues.
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CHAPTER V m
CONCLUSION:
THE LONG MARCH OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

1.- INTRODUCTION

In this final chapter the research findings are considered and discussed. The
various phases of the economic integration process will be compared among themselves,
and against the different aspects of the hypothesis guiding this endeavor.
The main contention, using the evolution of the Andean Group as a case study,
is that economic integration processes do not evolve smoothly into supranationalism.1
On the contrary, the Andean case proves that economic integration processes do evolve
through non-sequential phases of progress, stagnation and regression. These phases,
moreover, do not show a tendency toward the disappearance of the nation-state, but
reaffirm the supremacy of the individual governments.
The indicators used in this study to show whether a given phase is one of

‘"...th e experiences of the 1960s suggest that it may be unfounded to take a linear view of integration
commitments as leading to greater and greater levels of interdependence" (Rosenthal, 1993: 16).
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progress, stagnation or regression are: (1) the implementation of the Andean mechanisms
will be quick during progress, will be slow and delayed during stagnation, and will
reverse or be abandoned during regression; (2) intra-Andean trade will increase every
year during a phase of progress, will decrease in one or two years during stagnation, and
will decrease over several years in a phase of regression; (3) during progress, stagnation,
and regression violations to the commitments will, respectively, be few, will increase,
and will be widespread; (4) decisions adopted by the Commission, the political unit of
the Andean process, will deal mainly with new issues during a phase of progress; will
deal mainly with unimportant issues, and with modifying existing decisions in a phase
of stagnation; and will deal mainly with unimportant decisions during regression.
Indicators (1) and (2), implementation of the mechanisms and trade flows, have
been analyzed in sections 2 of chapters IV, V, VI, and VII for each one of the five
phases the Andean Group has undergone. Indicators (3) and (4), violations to accords and
decisions of the Commission, have been examined in section 3 and parts of section 4 of
the same chapters. The inquiry has shown, as expected, that from 1969 to 1973 the
Andean Group was in a phase of progress; from 1974 to 1978 in a phase of stagnation;
from 1979 to 1986 in a phase of regression; between 1987 and 1989 in a phase of
stagnation; and between 1990 and 1995 in a phase of progress.
Why has the Andean process gone through these phases? According to data
assembled in this research project the evolution of the Andean process is the product of
the relations among the governments of the member countries. The individual
governments attempt to achieve some of their national goals by using the Andean Pact
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as one of several tools available to them. This establishes that governments are the most
important actors in the process, and that they determine its evolution by negotiating
among themselves. The outcome of these negotiations depends on the power relations
existing among the member countries over time, or at a specific moment or moments of
the negotiations.
The Andean process progresses when all the countries find the Andean Group a
useful tool for their respective national interests. The integration process stagnates when
a minority of the member countries disagree with the aims and/or mechanisms of the
agreement. Finally, integration regresses when the majority of the governments do not
find the aims and/or the mechanisms useful and reverse prior decisions.2
This dissertation tests the above mentioned assertions in the last two parts of
section 4 of chapters IV, V, VI, and VII. The first compares the long-term objectives of
the governments of the member countries with the principles of the Cartagena
Agreement. The second compares the relevant economic policies pursued by the
government with the main mechanisms of the agreement. Other parts of section 4 analyze
external and domestic influences affecting governments’ behavior.

2.- PROGRESS. STAGNATION AND REGRESSION IN THE ANDEAN
PROCESS: A COMPARISON OF THE INDICATORS
This section will compare the indicators of progress, stagnation and regression.

:Logically, the integration process would be terminated if none of the countries, or a majority of the
members including all the most important units, finds the process not useful to them.
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Here we will look at the way these indicators show if a given period can be termed as
one of progress, stagnation, or regression.

2.1.- Implementation of the mechanisms
a) Optimism and progress (1969-1973), progress (1990-1995)
The favorable conditions of the international environment in the 1960s, that is,
the continuing growth of most of the economies, especially of the industrialized nations,
helped the Andean countries to accelerate their economic growth, and to decrease their
economic and political dependency on the international system. The Andean integration
process was one tool used to achieve these aims. The creation of the Andean Group, and
its progress between 1969 and 1973, was also possible thanks to the common import
substitution industrialization strategy pursued by the member countries.
The deadlines established by the Cartagena Agreement to implement the
mechanisms by the Commission were met during this phase. Approved were the different
lists contemplated by the trade liberalization mechanism, the common minimum external
tariff, the first Sectoral Program of Industrial Development (the Metalworking Program),
and the common treatment of foreign investment.
Mechanisms not subject to deadlines, however, advanced little or not all, i.e.;
planning coordination, and policy harmonization. It was not by chance that these
mechanisms were from the beginning, the most difficult to implement.
The second phase of progress began in 1989, when the governments of Colombia,
Peru, and Venezuela (the three most important members) rapidly converged on a new
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strategy of development: export-oriented industrialization. Once this happened, progress
was achieved (1990-1995) based on the new aims given to the Cartagena Agreement, and
on the reordering of the importance of the Andean mechanisms. The Andean Group
became a tool to reverse international economic marginalization, and to increase
production efficiency. Progress was also due to the direct support of the Andean
presidents as evidenced in their summit meetings held between 1989 and 1991.
At the international level the phase of progress of the Andean Group was
positively influenced by the end of the Cold War, the process of creating continental
trade blocs; a revival of integration processes in Europe, Latin America, and other
regions; and the creation of market economies in most of the world accompanied by the
opening of the economies of Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Trade liberalization was completed by the Andean nations by early 1993, and the
CET was implemented in February 1994. Economic policy, especially of those
instruments directly affecting trade (e.g., export subsidies, dumping, technical rules,
etc.), began to be harmonized mostly between 1990 and 1992.
From 1992 to the present (1995), however, the process slowed down due not to
discrepancies over the aims, but over the speed, and the depth to which the mechanisms
were to be implemented. The divergences led to the temporary and "partial" withdrawal
of Peru (a supporter, with Bolivia, of an ample and quick progress). Peru’s limbo
continues. The Andean customs union is not yet a reality. The common treatment of
foreign investment, in practice, disappeared. Finally, Industrial Programming was, for
all practical purposes, abolished in March 1993.
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The two phases of progress of the Andean Group have in common, as expected
by the hypothesis of this project, that they happened when governments of the member
countries had similar strategies of development and economic policies. In the first phase
of progress, they had just launched the Andean project and there was high hope that it
would be a useful tool to help the countries’ development. In the second phase of
progress, the governments changed the aims and reordered the importance of the
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, thereby giving GRAN new basis for
usefulness.

b) Doubts and stagnation (1974-1978) and stagnation (1987-1989)
Between 1974 and 1978, the Andean process went through a phase of stagnation.
In 1974 Venezuela became the sixth member and Chile exited in 1976. Negotiations with
these countries absorbed much of the time of the Commission and of the Junta.
Negotiations also allowed Colombia to voice the need for greater flexibility of the
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development and of the common treatment of foreign
investment. Deadlines were not met. The Protocols of Lima (1976) and of Arequipa
(1978) postponed deadlines, and introduced changes to the agreement.
At the international level, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and
the oil price increase of 1973 affected the economies of the Andean nations differently.
This created a divergence of interests among the member countries, and began to put into
doubt the usefulness of the import substitution strategy for the domestic and regional
levels.
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The implementation of the mechanisms was delayed. The common external tariff,
to be adopted by December 1975, was not acted on. The approval of all the Sectoral
Programs of Industrial Development, by December 1975, was not achieved. After a fiveyear extension of Industrial Programming by the Protocols of Lima and of Arequipa,
only 2 more programs were approved: the Petrochemical in 1975, and the Automobile
in 1977. Decision 24, on the common treatment of foreign investment, was modified
seven times. The process of tariff reduction for intra-Andean trade, however, continued,
albeit with increasing delays in their implementation (see table V m .3, column 4).
The second phase of stagnation of the process lasted between 1987 and 1989. The
Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987, made the Andean obligations less stringent. It did
provide the impetus to push the Andean process not from its phase of regression to a
phase of progress, but to a phase of stagnation. The governments were still dealing with
their debt problems, and restructuring their economies but without clear guidelines.
During these years, they became more and more convinced that the import substitution
strategy of development must be replaced by an export-oriented strategy.
The international system was going through important changes during these years.
The Soviet Union was collapsing, and its Eastern European sphere of influence was
disintegrating. The Western industrialized world, and the international economic
institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were
pressing the debtor countries to adopt economic policies in line with a free market
economy as a condition to deal with the debt problem.
Contrary to what was expected, after the signing of the Quito Protocol, May
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1987, the Andean countries, involved with their domestic troubles, did not make any
attempt to revitalize the Andean process. Violations did not substantially diminish (see
table Vm.3). Trade began to increase, but it was mostly due to the necessity of obtaining
essential goods not locally produced. Trade flows, moreover, continued to be restricted
by non-tariff barriers applied indiscriminately to Andean and non-Andean imports, and
by the existing Andean bilateral trade accords. The Sectoral Programs of Industrial
Development were forgotten, and the governments again modified their common
treatment of foreign investment.

c) Pessimism and regression (1979-1986)
The "lost decade" caused by the international debt crisis forced the Andean
countries to rethink their import substitution development strategy. The economic crisis
of the 1980s also brought the military back to the barracks in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador.
All the members had elected civilian governments for the first time in the history of the
Andean process. These factors, especially the first, strongly influenced the evolution of
the Andean process: it went into a phase of regression. This phase ended with the
adoption of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, which profoundly modified the Cartagena
Agreement. The protocol made the agreement more flexible, and more in tune with the
still evolving interests of the member countries.
The regression of the Andean process is clearly shown in the way the mechanisms
were applied. The tariff reduction program was reversed by restricting (in the form of
non-tariff barriers) the exchange of goods among the Andean countries. The Commission
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failed to adopt the CET by the deadline of December 1979, and after some efforts to do
it, in 1981 abandoned that hope. By December 1980, the 5 additional years to approve
all the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development ended, and from 1978 no industrial
program, as mandated by the Cartagena Agreement, was approved. In addition, the three
existing industrial programs were repeatedly modified, their deadlines postponed, and
their regulations made more lax. Finally, the common treatment of foreign investment
was again modified, making it more flexible, and less common.
One bright spot in the Andean evolution in this phase of regression was the
establishment of the Andean Court of Justice, of the Andean Parliament, and of the
Andean Council of Foreign Ministers. They were heralded as signs that the Andean
process was spreading into the political arena. A second bright spot, but short lived, was
the adoption of common foreign economic policies. It was considered a harbinger of the
establishment of political cooperation in the international arena. In both instances hopes
proved to be premature. They only were attempts of the governments to pursue
integration in new areas in order to show some progress of the process, since the main
mechanisms were in regression.

d) The output of the Commission as a reflection of the phases of the Andean
integration process.
Progress, stagnation and regression of the Andean Group is also correlated to the
dynamism of the Commission or its lack of it. As proposed by this research project,
decisions of the Commission were found to be greater in number during a phase of
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progress than in a phase of stagnation, or in a phase of regression. Decisions dealt more
with new issues during the phases of progress. During the phases of stagnation they dealt
with modifying existing decisions, and with unimportant issues. During the phase of
regression they dealt more with watering down existing decisions.
Table VIII. 1 shows data which confirm that, in the main, the Commission was
more dynamic, and its performance more effective in furthering integration during
progress than during stagnation or regression. The average number of decisions, more
than three per session, approved by the Commission, was the highest during the phases
of progress, 1969-1973 and 1990-1995 (see table VIII. 1, line 5.1). The lowest average
corresponds to the phase of regression with less than two decisions per session.
The result is similar if the data are calculated as decisions per year (see table

Vin. 1, line 5.2). The average number of decisions approved by the Commission per year
was the highest during the phases of progress, 16 in 1969-1973, and 23 in 1990-1994.
The phases of stagnation, 1974-1978 and 1987-1989, show on average 11 and 14
decisions per year being respectively approved by the Commission, while during the
phase of regression, 1979-1986, only an average of 10 decisions per year were taken.
The hypothesis is also validated by analyzing the percentages of important and
unimportant new issues approved by the Commission during the five phases of the
Andean integration process. Important new issues constituted 40 percent and 28 percent
of all the decisions made by the Commission in the two phases of progress, while they
were 15 and 19 percent in the two phases of stagnation, and only 9 percent in the phase
of regression. Similarly, unimportant decisions were 32 percent and 31 percent in each
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TA BLE VIII. 1
DECISIONS A PPROV ED DURING 1969-1994

(1)

74-78
Stag.
(3)

69-73
Prog.
(2)

79-86
Regr.
(4)

87-89
Stag.
(5)

90-94
Prog.
(6)

Totals
69-94
(8)

1 Decisions (2 + 3)

81

55

85

42

114

377

2. New Issues (2.1+2.21

58

36

63

29

79

265

2.1 Important 1/

32

8

8

8

32

88

2.2 Unimportant

26

28

55

21

47

177

3.- Modifying decisions
(3.1 + 3.2)

23

19

22

13

35

112

3.1 Important U (A+B)

I

7

16

10

22

56

3

4

6

10

23

1

4

12

4

12

34

3.2 Unimportant

22

12

6

3

13

56

4 Num ber of sessions

25

19

42

15

29

130

3.24

2.89

1.81

2.80

3.93

2.90

16.20

11.00

10.60

14.00

22.80

14.50

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

71.61

65.46

74.12

69.05

69.30

70.29

A. Important U

39.51

14.55

9.41

19.05

28.07

23.34

B. Unimportant

32.10

50.91

64.71

50.00

41.23

46.95

28.40

34.55

25.89

30.95

30.70

29.71

1.23

12.73

18.82

23.81

19.30

14.85

5.46

4.71

14.29

8.77

6.10

1.23

7.27

14.11

9.52

10.53

8.75

27.16

21.82

7.06

7.14

11.40

14.85

A. Strengthening
B. Weakening

S.- Averages
5.1 Decisions per session
5.2 Decisions per year
6.- Percentages
TOTAL (6.1 + 6.2)
6.1 New Issues (A+B)

6.2 Modifying decisions
(A + B)
A. Important (a + b)
a.- Strengthening
b.- Weakening
B. Unimportant

1/ Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress o f the principal mechanisms of
the Andean process.
SOURCES: See tables IV.6; V.9; VI.8: VII. 12; JUNAC, n.d.: 1-33; JUNAC, 1982c; Vinces and
Kuljevan, 1974; Actas de la Comision.
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of the phases of progress, while they constituted around 50 percent in the phases of
stagnation, and 65 percent in the phase of regression (see table VIII. 1, lines 6.1. A and
B).
The highest percentage of decisions that modified important decisions in ways that
weakened the Andean process occurred during the phase of regression (14 percent of all
the decisions approved in this phase), while the lowest corresponded to the first phase
of progress, 1969-1973, with one percent of the decisions (see table VIII.l, line 6.2).
The two phases of stagnation showed higher percentages of modifying decisions
weakening the integration process (between 7 and 10 percent) than in the first phase of
progress. The exception to this is the second phase of progress, 1990-1992, in which
almost 11 percent of all the decisions approved by the Commission weakened existing
decisions. This result reflected the rapid process of weakening existing decisions related
to import substitution (e.g., Industrial Programming and Common Treatment for Foreign
Investments). Finally, the decisions strengthening the process were 9 percent of the total
during the second phase of progress (see table V III.l, line 6.2.a),3 this figure is the
highest with the exception of the 14 percent recorded in the second phase of stagnation
highly influenced by the 11 decisions approved in May 1987 concurrently with the Quito
Protocol.

3During the first phase of progress, 1969-1973 no decision was approved strengthening an existing
decision.
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2.2.- Trade among the Andean countries
According to the methodology, it was anticipated that during a phase of progress,
trade would increase every year, that in a phase of stagnation trade would decrease in
at least one year, and in a phase of regression trade would lessen in two or more years.
The rates of growth of exports and imports among the member countries support
the aforementioned part of the working hypothesis. During the two phases of progress
(1969-1973 and 1990-1992) both the rate of growth of intra-Andean exports and of
imports increased in every year (see table Vm.2). It is also noteworthy that in this phase
intra-Andean trade grew almost always faster than total trade. In the two phases of
stagnation (1974-1978, 1987-1989) the rate of growth of exports and of imports
decreased at least in one year. In the first phase of stagnation both the rate of growth of
exports and of imports decreased in 1978. In the second phase of stagnation, the rate of
growth of imports diminished in 1989. During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, the
rates of exports and of imports decreased in four years. Exports lowered in 1982, 1983,
1984 and 1986, while imports reduced their value continuously between 1983 and 1986.

2.3.- Violations of the Cartagena Agreement and of the decisions of the Commission
Violations, according to this study should be minimal in a phase of progress,
should be more numerous during a phase of stagnation, and should be widespread in a
phase of regression. Data analyzed in previous chapters substantiate this assertion.
The clearest evidence comes from the number of decisions not incorporated by
the member countries into their national legislation. The lowest range (minimum and
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TABLE V III.2
AN D EAN TRADE G R O W TH : 1969-1994 1/

Rate of growth of exports
PHASE

ON

YEAR

GRAN

WORLD

GRAN

WORLD

1970

17.43

9.56

23.67

10.50

1971

31.02

-6.42

16.90

3.77

1972

7.00

5.74

9.40

7.83

1973

38.83

43.87

38.85

20.51

1974

102.64

107.73

90.80

62.80

1975

7.58

-16.67

47.98

30.48

1976

29.73

7.86

15.45

4.25

1977

34.45

10.38

31.72

38.41

1978

-17.34

3.15

-22.71

10.76

1979

56.41

46.17

17.90

-1.64

1980

11.50

26.95

22.95

23.01

-3.93

29.97

12.79

1981

NATION

Rate of growth of imports

1986

-17.81

-22.83

-16.32

3.85

1987

42.37

8.34

46.11

16.15

1988

4.19

-0.57

0.71

13.62

1989

6.86

23.72

-9.61

-24.32

1993

28.74

4.12

29.69

9.50

1994

19.53

15.17

23.64

-4.49

15.4

8.8

3,611

828

YEARLY AVERAGE 1969-1994 2/

15.4

INDEX (1969 = 100) 1994 2/

3,613

698

\J Includes Venezuela from 1974 on and excludes Chile from 1976
2/ Includes Venezuela but not Chile
SOURCES: See tables 4.3, 5.4, 6.3, and 7.7, JUNAC, 1995f: 26, 30, 46.
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maximum number) of decisions which governments did not make part of their legal
systems corresponds to the two phases o f progress. In the first phase of progress, 19691973, out of the 81 decisions adopted, a minimum of S and a maximum of 11 decisions
did not become law in the members countries. In the second phase of progress, 19901995, of the 114 decisions approved by the end of 1994, a maximum of 8 and a
minimum of zero decisions did not become law (see table VIII.3, column 3).
The "perfect" compliance by the governments during the second phase of progress
1990-1995, that is, all decisions were part of their national legislation, was due to two
facts. (1) By 1993 the Commission had abrogated all the decisions the governments were
not in compliance with, chief among them were the decisions dealing with the Sectoral
Programs of Industrial Development. (2) Between 1990 and 1992, the Andean presidents
committed themselves to further the Andean integration process beyond what the Quito
Protocol stipulated. This meant that governments were formally observing all the
obligations included in the existing Cartagena Agreement.
During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, both the minimum and maximum
number of decisions not incorporated into the legal systems of the countries were the
highest: 13 and 24 respectively. The Commission adopted in this phase 85 decisions. The
number of decisions not made part of the legislation of the member countries was greater
during the first two phases of stagnation than during the phases of progress. They ranged
between 8 to 14 during the first phase of stagnation (1974-1978), out of 55 decisions
approved; and between 6 and 9 during the second phase of stagnation (1987-1989), from
a total of 42 decisions adopted by the Commission.
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TA BLE VIII.3
VIOLATIONS TO THE AND EAN AGREEM ENT A N D ITS DECISIONS

Phase

Years

(I)

(2)

Number of
Decisions not
incorporated in
the domestic
legislation
(3)

Progress

69-73

5 - II

0 - 12

n.a.

n.a.

Stagnation

74-78

8 - 14

0-48

66 - 2,760

n.a.

Regression

79-86

13-24

n.a.

66 - 5,337

2 7 - 141

Stagnation

87-89

6 -9

n.a.

829 - 6,303

n.a.

Progress

90-94

0
1
00

MINIMUM - MAXIMUM

n.a.

251 -6 ,6 9 2 1 /

2-131/

Delays in
implementing
decisions
(months)
(4)

Number o f items
violating trade
liberalization or
common external
tariff
(5)

Number of
claims
made by
the
countries
(6)

1/ 1990-1992
SOURCES: See Tables IV.4; IV.5; V.6; V.7; V.8; VI.3; VI.4; VI.5; VII.8; VII.9; VII. 10

With regard to the implementation of the "automatic" mechanisms (trade
liberalization and the common minimum external tariff), the limited amount of
information (only for the first phases of progress and stagnation), also shows that
postponements increased during a phase of stagnation as compared to a phase of
progress. Delays rose from a maximum of 12 months in the first phase of progress,
1969-1973, to a maximum of 48 months (due to Venezuela’s reluctance to comply with
them) in the first phase of stagnation, 1974-1978 (see table VIII.3, column 4).
The range (minimum and maximum number) of dutiable items the governments
did not comply with in the tariff reduction program and/or the common tariff does not
fit the anticipations of this dissertation. The maximum number of violations was at its
highest during the second phase of progress (6,692 items), while during the phase of
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regression it was only the third highest of the four phases for which information is
available, 5,337 items, (see table V m .3, column 5). Similarly, the minimum number of
items violated were the lowest during the first phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, and
during the phase of regression, 1979-1986, with only 66 items for which countries did
not observe the agreed tariffs levels. During the second phase of progress, 1990-1995,
the minimum number of items violated was 251, which was the third highest of the four
phases for which there is data.
The high number of items violated during the second phase of progress
(supposedly a phase in which compliance should be the highest) can be attributed to the
fact that, between 1990 and 1992, the member countries were both swiftly reducing their
tariffs to third countries, and accelerating the Andean trade liberalization process. The
reduction of tariffs to non-member countries violated the common tariff, the Andean
trade liberalization was not implemented by the governments as quickly as was expected,
so the Junta’s reports showed a large number of items violating the tariff levels
agreed.
The low level of violations during the phase of regression (when they are expected
to be the highest) can be explained by the widespread existence of non-tariff barriers
applied to Andean trade. Since trade flows were regulated basically through non-tariff
barriers, violations of the trade reduction program, and to the common tariff were
meaningless, and thus, they were low.
Finally, for the only two phases for which there is information about claims made
by the Junta to and among the member countries themselves were, as expected, lower

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

390

in a phase of progress than in a phase of regression. During the second phase of
progress, 1990-1995, the minimum number of claims was two, and the maximum was
13; while during the phase of regression, 1979-1986, the minimum was 27 and the
maximum 141 (see table Vm.3, column 6).

2.4.- Conclusion
The indicators used in this study to find out if a given period of years in the
evolution of the Andean economic integration process corresponds to a phase of progress,
stagnation, or regression are basically adequate. The main mechanisms of the Cartagena
Agreement have been more thoroughly implemented during the phases of progress than
during the other two phases. This is also corroborated by the activities of the
Commission. It has been more dynamic and adopted more decisions furthering integration
during the phases of progress than in the phases of stagnation or regression.
Trade increased in all the years of the phases of progress, while it decreased in
one year during two of the three phases of stagnation, and diminished in half of the
number of years of the phase of regression. Finally, violations of the decisions of the
Commission were generally low during the phases of progress, increased in the phases
of stagnation, and were widespread during the phase of regression.

3.- EXPLAINING PROGRESS. STAGNATION AND REGRESSION
This section presents a comparison of the support given by the governments of
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the member countries to first, the aims of the Cartagena Agreement, and second, to its
main mechanisms. The objective of this section is to show that support for the aims and
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement by the governments is directly correlated with
progress in the Andean integration process; that indifference is related to the stagnation
of the economic integration of the Andean subregion, and that the lack of support is
linked to the regression of the Andean process. The expected results indicate that the
governments are the main actors behind the evolution of the Andean economic integration
process, and that their support for the Cartagena Agreement or lack of it explains the
phases of progress, stagnation, and regression.

3.1.- The long-term aims of the governments and the principles of the Cartagena
Agreement
As mentioned above, support by the governments for the principles of the
Cartagena Agreement will be greater during a phase of progress than during phases of
stagnation and regression. This greater support is the result of the perception of the
member countries that their national objectives are better reflected by the aims of the
Andean process during the phases of progress than during the other phases.
During the two phases of progress, governments’ support for the Andean aims
was the highest. Out of the 18 possible results in the first phase of progress (19691973),4 14 were supportive, while only 4 were indifference. In other words, 78 percent
of the results were in support of the aims of the Cartagena Agreement (see table Vm.4).

4Six countries times three principles equals 18 outcomes.
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In the second phase of progress, 1990-1995, of the 15 possible results,5 14 were in
support of the Andean aims (93 percent) and only one was not supportive.
During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, of the 15 possible outcomes, 8 were
not supportive of the aims, while 5 were supportive. This meant that 53 percent of the
results were not in support of the aims. In this phase, as anticipated by this research
project, the lack of support for the Andean aims was at its highest. Since the lack of
support was only a little over 50 percent of the possible outcomes, it is safe to say that
the survival of the Andean Group was not in peril during this phase.
In the two phases of stagnation, 1974-1978 and 1987-1989, out of the 18 and the
15 possible outcomes respectively, the aims were supported by a little over half of them,
56 and 53 percent respectively, while indifferent was the highest, with 28 and 47 percent
respectively.
As anticipated by the hypothesis of this dissertation, governments’ support for the
aims of the Cartagena Agreement was widespread in the phases of progress, 72 and 93
percent of the outcomes. During the phases of stagnation, support diminished but was
slightly above 50 percent of the results. In the phase of regression support was at is
lowest with only 33 percent of the possible outcomes.

3.2.- The economic policies and the mechanisms of the Agreement
As predicted by the hypothesis of this research project, support for the main
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement was at its highest during the two phases of

5Chile withdrew in 1976.
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TABLE VIII.4
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN AIMS: 1969-1995

PHASE — >

Progress

Stagnation

Regression

ANDEAN AIMS (1969-1986)

1969-1973

1974-1978

1979-1986

4S 11 IN

2S 21 IN

Primacy of government

6S

Import substitution industrialization

5S

11

4S 11 IN

2S

3N

Subordination of foreign investment

3S

31

2S 31 IN

IS

4N

14S 41

10S 51 3N

5S 21 8N

56 28 16

33 13 53

TOTALS
PERCENTAGES

PHASE— >

72

22

Stagnation ||

ANDEAN AIMS (1987-1995)

Progress

1987-1989

1990-1995

Primacy of market mechanisms

2S

3N

4S

Export-oriented industrialization

2S

3N

5S

Greater role of foreign investment

4S

IN

5S

TOTALS

8S

7N

14S

IN

PERCENTAGES

53

47

93

7

S = Supportive

I = Indifferent

IN

N = Not supportive

progress. In the first phase of progress, 1969-1973, all of the 24 possible outcomes were
supportive (see table Vm.5). Within the second phase of progress, between 1990 to
1992, support was 93 percent of the 15 possible outcomes.6 From 1993 to 1995 (slow
progress) support diminished to 60 percent of the outcomes.

6By the second phase of progress the total possible outcomes were reduced to 15 because the Andean
Pact had one country less, Chile, and there were only three rather than four main mechanisms.
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The lack of support for the main mechanisms was at its highest during the phase
of regression, 1979-1986. Out of the 20 possible outcomes, 14 (70 percent) were not
supportive of the mechanisms.
The two phases of stagnation show an intermediate degree of support. In the first
phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, indifference was the result in 46 percent of the
outcomes, followed by 38 percent of the outcomes being supportive. During the second
phase of stagnation, 1987-1989, indifference was the outcome in 73 percent of the cases,
and support happened in only 20 percent.
In short, support or lack of support for the main mechanisms of the Cartagena
Agreement by the governments of the member countries correlates well with progress,
stagnation and regression of the Andean integration process. There has always been
higher level of support for the mechanisms during the phases of progress than during the
phases of stagnation or regression.

4.- THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IS A LONG
MARCH AND NOT A GREAT LEAP FORWARD

Of all the economic integration processes attempted in the developing world, the
Andean Group has been the most ambitious because of its aims, and its progress.7

7”The Andean Group was bom as the most ambitious integration process in Latin America" (Aninat,
1992: 69).
"Until the beginning of the 1980s the Andean Group was considered to be the most comprehensive
... [and] as the most successful example of regional cooperation among developing countries" (Axline,
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TABLE VIII.5
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS: 1969-1995

PHASE - >

Progress

MECHANISMS

| Stagnation

Regression

1969-1973

1974-1978

1979- 1986

Trade Liberalization

6S

2S 31 IN

IS 21 2N

Common External Minimum Tariff

6S

IS 41 IN

5N

Industrial Programming

6S

4S 11 IN

IS 11 3N

Foreign Investment

6S

2S 31 IN

IS

TOTALS

24S

9S 111 4N

3S 31 14N

PERCENTAGES

100

38 46 16

15

4N

15 70

PH A SE-->

Stagnation

Progress

Slow
Progress

MECHANISMS

1987-1989

1990-1992

1992-1995

3S 11 IN

4S

4S

IN

Common external tariff

51

5S

4S

IN

Policy harmonization

51

5S

3S 111 IN

14S

11

9S 41 2N

20

93

7

60 27

Trade liberalization

TOTALS
PERCENTAGES
S = Supportive

73

I = Indifferent

7

11

41

IN

13

N = Not supportive

The evolution of the Andean process demonstrates that changing external and
domestic circumstances heavily influence individual governments, and their long- and

1994b: 193, 196).
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short-term interests.8 These influences have direct bearing on the changing usefulness
of the Andean integration process for the governments in order to achieve their own
goals. The changes in the perception of the member countries of the usefulness of
economic integration, as another tool to be employed in their quest for national
development, lead to phases of progress, stagnation, or regression of the Andean
process.9 Thus, the straightforward implementation of the Andean mechanisms and the
fulfillment of its aims, as expected by the existing functionalist and neo-fimctionalist
theories of economic integration proved practically impossible.10
The lack of recognition that economic integration is not only linked to the realm
of economics, but it is also a process in which social, cultural, and above all, political
factors play important roles has contributed to inadequate analysis of the process
(Aftalion, 1990: 14). It is the political factor which in the end has the last word in the
evolution of the integration process. As such, then, the governments are the most
important players in this process. Bargaining to achieve their national interests defines
what route the Andean process should take for the Cartagena Agreement to continue to

’"Regional cooperation is the result of multilateral decisions taken by member countries as part of their
individual national foreign policy processes ... which reflect their national interests, and which are
determined by myriad political influences, both domestic and international" (Axline, 1994b: 186).
9"In virtually every case [of economic integration] it is possible to trace a pattern of establishment,
some modest successes with respect to the original goals, but eventually failure to achieve the overall aims,
and finally stagnation or collapse, only to emerge in a new form in the 1990s" (Axline, 1994: 5).
10"No integration process is without obstacles ... nor is their progress lineal" (Marquez, 1989: 23).
"In both economic and political terms, the Andean Group has so far not succeeded in yielding its
long sought goal of closer regional integration. The reason for this outcome lies mainly in the fact that
adherence to the Cartagena Agreement came into direct conflict with national ambitions" (OECD, 1993:
60).
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be a relevant instrument of the governments in their quest for development.11
The speed and depth of the implementation of the mechanisms cannot be linear
not only because of the changing interests of the governments, but also because
governments do not always have a clear idea how to utilize these mechanisms. Another
practical reason, which makes implementation of the mechanisms quite difficult, is the
fact that negotiations are pursued in a piecemeal fashion, making it impossible for
governments to have a comprehensive view of give and take, and of the overall effects
of the process for the country (Tironi, 1976: 100-101; Cohen and Rosenthal, 1977: 34).
Nevertheless, the most important reason for the lack of smooth progress of the Andean
integration process was the dissimilarities in the strategies of development, and in the
economic policies of the governments.12 The smooth progress of the Andean process
requires the impossible goal of furthering more and more policy harmonization. This in
turn means that governments should pursue more and more similar, and eventually
identical policies with the corresponding decrease of their sovereignty.
Since the Andean process is primarily a tool for the member countries to achieve
their national goals, governments will be interested in furthering integration only if it

""Regional cooperation is better understood as part of a development strategy, ... [and] it is apparent
... that [it] can only be understood from the perspective of the national interests of the individual member
states, and that the politics of regional negotiations will involve accommodating these interests from all
partners" (Axline, 1994b: 183, 217).
12"... insofar there are substantial differences in the economic policies of the member countries of the
Andean process, the process will not be able to achieve the objectives for which it was created" (Tafur,
1982: 101).
"... the principal cause of the [Andean crises] was the existence of important discrepancies among
the economic policies of the governments of the member countries ..." (Aninat, 1992: 69).
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serves them.13 On the other hand, governments only reluctantly abdicate powers to the
community organs.14 The self-limitation of their sovereignty is accepted only when
governments clearly find that, by doing so, important objectives can be achieved. In
consequence, economic integration has little chance to become an important factor in the
Andean economies. This in turn makes the governments unwilling to deepen and expand
the integration process.
Therefore, the integration process has had, not by chance, a few years of
progress, some of regression, and many of stagnation. This at the same time explains its
survival. The few years during which the Andean Pact proved to be useful makes the
governments reluctant to abandon the process. "Integration will always be an imperfect
process whose objectives can only be achieved partially" (Peiia-Parra, 1979: 38). Most
of the time, there are incentives to keep the integration process, but most of the time
there are not enough incentives to keep it making progress.
Is the Andean integration process still relevant? Why is the Cartagena Agreement
seen as useful today by the governments of the member countries?

13"Andean decisions will be adopted only if they coincide with some predefined policies" (Abusada,
1991: 14).
"Ultimately the outcome of regional cooperation (the form it takes, its success of failure) will
depend on its ability to respond to the interests of its member states as determined by the individual
economic, social and political characteristic of each member state" (Axline, 1994a: 29). "And the greater
the congruence between regional policies and mechanisms and the national interests of member countries,
the greater will be the support for regional cooperation" (Axline, 1994b: 191-192).
14"The Andean states have not been willing to tolerate ... a greater penetration by regional authorities
into areas subject to national control" (Middlebrook, 1979: 80).
"It is evident that the Andean institutions and inter-governmental relations have been closely
controlled by the states" (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 113).
"The fundamental political problem posed by economic integration is the loss of sovereignty ...
At some point, each member state risks being forced to ignore national interests—political, economic,
social, or cultural—as a consequence of maintaining its international obligations. This tension between
national interest and international obligations ... poses a severe dilemma for states which tend to value
security and autonomy above all else" (Balaam and Veseth, 1996: 222).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

399

Now, more than before, due to the globalization of the economy there are few
problems that can be solved unilaterally. Economic integration, in a rapidly changing
world, is useful to solve common problems and to reduce the insecurity and uncertainty
of contemporary international relations. Economic integration now serves as a means to
facilitate an efficient integration of the Andean countries with the international economy;
and to pool resources to increase their diminished standing in the international system.15
At the domestic level, the new objectives assigned to the Andean Pact help
domestic production to increase their efficiency and productivity. The Andean market
offers to local producers an experimental and safer area where they can compete under
free trade rules.
From a different perspective, integration processes, such as the Andean Group,
are international treaties which contain a set of ideal objectives rather than achievable
targets. The theories of economic integration assumed that the aims were possible to
reach, and within the agreed upon timetable. The obvious way to analyze integration
processes, such as the Andean Group, was, then, to investigate how successfully they
met their objectives within the agreed upon timetable. The conclusions were similarly
disappointing. Even under their extended timetables, no integration process has been able
to reach its goals. The Andean Pact is no exception.
The expectation that the community institutions created by the integration accords

l5"Perhaps the main [conclusion] is that, just as economic integration played a functional role in the
import-substitution model of decades past, it can also do so in the contemporary model for enhanced
competitiveness in the international market" (Rosenthal, 1993: 18).
"The new generation of [regional trade] agreements [RTA] aims to reap the benefits of an
expanded domestic market in order to increase exports to the world outside. ... [they] are now portrayed
as an ‘export platform’ ... Tariff reductions within the RTAs are merely complementary to (and slightly
greater than) the general tariff reductions taking place under structural adjustment" (Green, 1995: 142).
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would be the harbingers of a supranational organization, as predicted by the functionalist
and neo-functionalist theories, was unwarranted. These community organs more resemble
international governmental organizations (IGOs) than supranational organizations16. This
is so because the decision-making process rests in the hands of the political body
composed of government representatives. The political body will always put the national
interests above the community interests and benefits. As any IGO, the Andean
community institutions will only accomplish as much as its member countries want; and
what these members want the communal organs to do is to be a tool of achieving their
national objectives. The powers and capabilities of the Andean community institutions
depend more on the wishes of the member governments than in whatever powers and
capabilities the organization’s charter might bestowed on them.17
We can see that the process of supranationalization through an integration process
is prevented, and the stated goals of the agreements remain elusive. In practice, economic
integration assures the supremacy of the governments and their leading role in
determining the evolution of the process, since nations will not subordinate their national
interests to the "common good." The process will progress, stagnate, or regress because
of the changing interests of the governments, disregarding the common goals agreed upon

l6"We can conclude so far that IGOs will in the foreseeable future remain vehicles through which
nations-states conduct their affairs, but they are not likely to become decision-imposing entities on their
member states" (Feld et al., 1994: 77).
"In a world where international pressures penetrate deep into national economies, the effective
harmonization of policies toward international transactions can be highly intrusive. Assigning extensive
powers to an international organization would therefore create a structure that would be resisted by member
states and rob the arrangement of credibility" (Eichengreen, 1995: 1076).
17"There is apparently some resistance to delegating authority to intergovernmental or supra-national
agencies" (Rosenthal, 1993: 19).
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in the agreement.
Integration processes can also be seen as international regimes. The concept of
international regimes, defined as set of "principles, norms, rules, decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner,
1983: 1), goes well with integration accords. It can be said that while the rules, norms,
and regulations can be changed over time by the members, reflecting their changing
interests, the regime changes but it still is a regime. The conceptualization of integration
processes as international regimes supports the guiding idea of this study, namely the
supremacy of the governments in determining the evolution of the process, or in this
case, of the regime.
Governments are the most important actors and determine the evolution of the
Andean process, but they are also influenced by external factors (as shown in this
dissertation) and by domestic factors (not explicitly taken into account in this study). It
is also pertinent to point out the relevance of the role of the presidents. Progress between
1990 and 1992 happened in part due to the nine meetings through which the presidents
effectively redefined the path and pace of the Andean process. This progress, however,
was backed primarily by the similarities in the strategies of development and in the
economic policies of the governments. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
presidents met eight times between August 1978 and December 1983, during the end of
the stagnation and the first years of regression phases. Then, the presidential accords did
not reinvigorate the process, because external and domestic factors were not supportive
of the process.
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In both cases, nevertheless, presidential leadership shows that it could be useful
for the Andean process to be furthered, provided that the circumstances are right. More
importantly, the presidential meetings prove "that the Andean process is above all, a
political project" (JUNAC, 1995g: 1).
What then can be expected from economic integration processes in general, and
from the Andean Group in particular? The Andean Pact has shown over time it is a
useful tool to further some national aims for some of the governments of the member
countries for some time. As any other tool, the Andean Group will be employed when
needed and left in limbo when not. The dynamism of the process and its progress
principally depends on the convergence of objectives the governments want to reach
through the integration process. Stagnation and regression of the process is a reflection
of diminishing usefulness of the integration accord for the governments in achieving their
national aims. Changes of the aims of the Andean Group and of the relative importance
of the mechanisms (as well as the creation of new mechanisms), are the means by which
governments re-tool the process and make it again useful. The survival of the Andean
process is assured because either the governments find it useful, or the accord is
modified by the member countries to suit their new purposes. There is little else that can
be expected from integration besides being a tool, sometimes a very important tool, to
help its members to achieve some of their shared goals.18 A more peaceful international
regional or subregional system, if reached, would be only an unintended consequence,

18"There are still many difficulties—political as well as economic—in advancing Latin American
integration efforts; but such efforts do help (although still marginally) in Latin America’s economic
development and they do provide, albeit in small ways, a means to bring the Latin American Countries
together" (Wiarda, 1995: 203).
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a by-product, and it would be more an intended objective of its member countries.
The Andean economic integration process, being a tool of the governments rather
than an actor on its own, cannot evolve into a great leap forward towards
supranationalism as predicted by economic integration theorists. Integration processes are
most likely to evolve as a long march of non-sequential phases, as demonstrated by this
research project on the Andean Pact. This long march leads not necessarily to officially
stated objectives, and even less towards the disappearance of the nation-state, but in the
directions set by the convergent interests of the member countries.
In short, economic integration processes have economic goals, and use economic
mechanisms. They are, however, the result of political undertakings using economic
means and goals. In these endeavors governments, and their behavior have a crucial role
in the evolution of the integration processes, a role which has often been ignored and
down played in the prevailing literature.
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